CIHM 
Microfiche 
Series 
(IMonographs) 


ICIMH 

Collection  de 
microfiches 
(monographles) 


Canadian  Institut*  for  Historical  Microraproductions  /  Inttitut  Canadian  da  microraproductions  hittoriquaa 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes  /  Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obMn  the  best  original 
copy  available  for  filming.  Features  of  this  copy  which 
may  be  bibliographically  unique,  which  may  alter  any  of 
the  images  in  the  reproduction,  or  which  may 
significantly  change  the  usual  method  of  filming  are 
checked  below. 


[^ 


Coloured  covers  / 
Couverture  de  couleur 


□  Covers  damaged  / 
Couverture  endommagte 

□  Covers  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
Couverture  restaurto  et/ou  pellicuMe 

Cover  title  missing  /  Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 

Coloured  maps  /  Cartes  g^raphlques  en  couleur 

0  Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)  / 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 

Cotoured  plates  and/or  illustrations  / 
Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 

Bound  with  other  material  / 
Relid  avec  d'autres  documents 

Only  edition  available  / 
Seule  Mitton  disponibie 

Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion  atong 
interior  margin  /  La  reliure  serr6e  peut  causer  de 
I'ombre  ou  de  la  distorsion  le  long  de  ia  marge 
intdrieure. 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restorattons  may  appear 
within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these  have  been 
omitted  from  filming  /  II  se  peut  que  certaines  pages 
blanches  ajoutdes  lors  d'une  restauration 
apparaissent  dans  le  texte,  mais,  lorsque  cela  6tait 
possible,  ces  pages  n'ont  pas  6t6  filmtes. 

Additional  comments  / 
Commentaires  suppldmentaires: 


D 
D 
D 


D 


D 


L'Institut  a  microfilm^  le  meilleur  exemplaire  qu'li  lui  a 
M  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details  de  cet  exem- 
plaire qui  sont  peut-«tre  unk]ues  du  point  de  vue  bibli- 
ographique.  qui  peuvent  nwdifier  une  image  reproduite, 
ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une  nKxIifteatton  dans  la  metho- 
ds nomfiale  de  filmage  sont  indk^uto  ci-dessous. 

I     I  CokHjred  pages/ Pages  de  couleur 

I I  Pages  damaged/ Pages  endommagdes 

□   Pages  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
Pages  restaurdes  et/ou  pellicul^es 

r~^  Pages  discokjured,  stained  or  foxod  / 
L^   Pages  dteoiortes,  tachetdes  ou  piques 

I     I  Pages  detached/ Pages  d^tachdes 

pj  Showthrough/ Transparence 

I     I  Quality  of  print  varies  / 


Qualitd  inhale  de  I'impresston 

Includes  supplementary  material  / 
Comprend  du  materiel  suppldmentaire 


D 

H/T  Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  enata  slips, 
' — '  tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  totalement  ou 
partiellement  obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une 
pelure,  etc.,  ont  6\6  film^es  k  nouveau  de  fafon  h 
obtenir  la  meilieure  image  possible. 

I  I  Opposing  pages  with  varying  colouration  or 
I — '  discoburations  are  filmed  twtee  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  s'opposant  ayant  des 
colorations  variables  ou  des  decolorations  sont 
filmtes  deux  fois  afin  d'obtenir  la  meilieure  image 
possible. 


rhis  iluii  Is  fflliiMd  flt  tiM  reduction  ratio  chOGkod  bolow  / 
lOx                             14x                             ItR 

22x 

26x 

30x 

J 

12x 


lex 


20x 


24x 


28x 


32x 


Th«  eopy  fUmad  hf  has  bMn  raproduMd  thank* 
tottM  ■•tMreaity  of : 

LbnryofthflNttioral 
AraMvM  of  Cafwda 


L'Msmplaira  fllmi  fut  rapreduit  srica  *  la 
gdndrositd  da: 

U  MWiotMqut  dM  ArehlvM 
mtiomlM  du  Cwwd* 


Tha  imagaa  appaaring  hara  ara  tha 
paaaibia  canaidaring  tha  candWan 
af  tha  ariginal  eapy  and  in  kaaptaig 
filming  eantraet  <pacmeatlana. 


quality 
laglbility 


Original  eaplaa  in  printad  papar  aavaia  ara  fNmad 
baginning  with  tha  frant  eovar  and  anding  on 
tha  laat  paga  with  a  printad  ar  Wuatratad  impraa- 
aion,  or  tha  bacli  eavar  whan  apprapriata.  All 
athar  ariginal  eaplaa  ara  fifmad  baginning  an  tha 
firat  paga  with  a  printad  ar  INuatratad  impraa* 
aien.  and  anding  an  tha  laat  paga  with  a  printad 
or  Hluatratad  impraaaion. 


Tha  laat  racerdad  frama  an  aach  microficha 
ahali  eantain  tha  ■ymbol  «^  (maaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), ar  tha  aymbai  y  (maaning  "END"), 
whidiavar  applias. 


Laa  imagaa  auivantas  ant  §tt  rapreduitat  avac  la 
plua  grand  sain,  cempta  tanu  da  la  eendition  at 
da  la  nattatd  da  I'anampiaira  fiim«.  at  an 
aonfermit*  avac  laa  eanditiona  du  eantrat  da 
fHmaga. 

Laa  axamplairaa  ariginaux  dont  la  eauvartura  an 
papiar  aat  imprimda  aont  fiimda  an  eammanf ant 
par  la  pramiar  plat  at  an  tarminant  salt  par  la 
damMra  paga  qui  camporta  una  amprainta 
d'impraaaian  eu  d'iiiuauatian,  aoit  par  la  tacond 
plat,  aalan  la  eaa.  Taua  laa  autraa  axamplairaa 
originaux  aont  fiimda  an  commandant  par  la 
pramMra  paga  qui  camporta  una  amprainta 
dimpraaaion  ou  d'iiluatration  at  an  tarminant  par 
la  damlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  talla 
amprainta. 

Un  daa  aymbolaa  auhranta  apparattra  sur  la 
damiira  imaga  da  chaqua  microficha,  salon  la 
caa:  la  symboia  ^  signifia  "A  8UIVRE".  la 
aymboia  ▼  aignifia  "FIN". 


Mapa.  plataa.  charta.  ate.,  may  ba  fllmad  at 
diffarant  reduction  ratioa.  Thoaa  too  large  to  ba 
entirely  included  in  one  expoeure  ere  filmed 
baginning  in  tha  upper  left  hand  comer,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bonom.  aa  many  framea  aa 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illuatrata  the 
method: 


Lea  cartaa.  planches,  tablaeux.  etc..  peuvant  *tra 
flimds  i  das  taux  da  rMuction  diffArants. 
Lorsqua  ie  document  eat  trap  grand  pour  ttra 
raproduit  en  un  soul  ciichd.  il  est  filmi  A  pqrtir 
do  I'angia  supArieur  gauche,  de  geuche  i  droits, 
et  de  iMut  on  bas.  an  prenant  la  nombre 
d'imeges  ndcosseire.  Les  diagrammes  suivantt 
Uluatrant  Ie  mdthode. 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

MKROCOrV  RBOUniON  TMT  CHART 

(A^»I  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


ii25  :„  ,4 


I 


1.6 


/APPLIED  IIVHGE    Inc 

I6S3  East  Main  StrMt 

Rocheittr,   N«»  York        14609       USA 

(716)   W  -  0300  -  Phon« 

(71f)  2M- 5989 -Fax 


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THE  SEQUEL  OF  APFOBUITOX 


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ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  EDITION 

•    • 

VOLUME  32 

THE  CHRONICLES 

OF  AMERICA  SERIES 

ALLEN  JOHNSON 

EDITOR 

GERHARD  R.  LOMER 

CHARLES  W.  JEFFERYS 

ASSISTANT  EDITORS 


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THE  SEQUEL 
OF  APPOMATTOX 

A  CHRONICLE  OF  THE 

REUNION  OP  THE  STATES 

BY  WALTER  LYNWOOD  FLEMING 


NEW  HAVEN:  YALE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

TORONTO:    GLASGOW.   BROOK  k  CO. 

LONDON:    HUMPHREY    MILFORD 

OXFORD    UNIVERSITY    PRESS 

1919 


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Copyright^  1919,  by  Yale  Univertity  Prut 


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CONTENTS 


I.    THE  AFTERMATH  OF  WAR 
II.    WHEN  FREEDOM  CRIED  OUT 

III.  THE  WORK  OF  THE  PRESIDENTS 

IV.  THE  WARDS  OF  THE  NATION 

V.    THE  VICTORY  OF  THE  RADICALS 
VI.    THE  RULE  OF  THE  MAJOR  GENERALS 
Vn.    THE  TRIAL  OF  PRESIDENT  JOHNSON 
VIII.     THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OF  AMERICA 
IX.    CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL 
X.    CARPETBAG  AND  NEGRO  RULE 
XI.    THE  KU  KLUX  MOVEMENT 
XII.    THE  CHANGING  SOUTH 
Xffl.    RESTORATION  OF  HOME  RULE 
BIBUOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 
INDEX 


Pag. 

1 

i« 

S4 

!• 

«4 

*• 

89 

«t 

118 

'• 

140 

•  « 

158 

*f 

174 

*• 

100 

<* 

ttl 

•« 

UH 

«l 

iW 

•« 

282 

•  • 

305 

<« 

309 

vu 


«■ 


I' 


MHii 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


CHARLES  SUMNER 

Photottnph  by  J.  W.  Black  and  Co.,  Boaton. 
In  the  coilectioiu  of  the  Boetonian  Society.  Old 
State  Houie.  Ikxiton.  Fnmlupue$ 


WADE  HAMPTON 

Photograph  by  H.  P.  Cook,  Ridtmond,  Vir- 
ginia. 

ANDREW  JOHNSON 

Engraving  after  a  photograph  by  Brady. 


Facing  pagt    SO 


THADDEUS  STEVENS 
Photograph  by  Brady. 

PRESIDENT  GRANT 

Photograph.    In  the  collection  of  L.  C.  Handy, 
Washington. 


70 


IM 


170 


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THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 


CHAPTER  I 


THE  AVTERMATH  OF  WAR 

When  the  armies  of  the  Union  and  of  the  Con- 
federacy were  disbanded  in  186A,  two  matters  had 
been  settled  beyond  further  dispute:  the  negro 
was  to  be  free,  and  the  Union  was  to  be  perpet- 
uated. But  though  slavery  and  state  sovereignty 
were  no  longer  r,t  issue,  there  were  still  many  prob- 
lems wu-oh  pressed  for  solution.  The  huge  task  of 
reconstruction  must  be  faced.  The  nature  of  the 
situation  required  that  the  measures  of  reconstruc- 
tion be  first  formulated  in  Washington  by  the  vic- 
tors and  tn«.  worked  out  in  the  conquered  South. 
Since  the  success  of  these  policies  would  depend 
in  a  large  measure  upon  their  acceptability  to 
both  sections  of  the  country,  it  was  expected  that 

the  North  would  be  influenced  to  some  extent 

1 


if 

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(  hi 


t  THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

by  the  attitude  of  the  Southern  people,  which  in 
turn  would  be  determined  largely  by  local  condi- 
tions in  the  South.  The  situation  in  the  South  at 
the  close  of  the  Civil  War  is  therefore  the  point  at 
which  this  narrative  of  the  reconstruction  naturally 
takes  its  beginning. 

The  surviving  Confederate  soldiers  came  strag- 
gling back  to  commimities  which  were  now  far 
from  being  satisfactory  dwelling  places  for  civilized 
people.  Everywhere  they  found  missing  many  of 
the  best  of  their  former  neighbors.  They  found 
property  destroyed,  the  labor  system  disorganized, 
and  the  inhabitants  in  many  places  suffering  from 
want.  They  found  the  white  people  demoralized 
and  sometimes  divided  among  themselves,  and  the 
negroes  free,  bewildered,  and  disorderly,  for  or- 
ganized government  had  lapsed  with  the  surrender 
of  the  Confederate  armies. 

Beneath  a  disorganized  society  lay  a  devastated 
land.  The  destruction  of  property  affected  all 
classes  of  the  population.  The  accumulated  capi- 
tal of  the  South  had  disappeared  in  worthless  Con- 
federate stocks,  bonds,  and  currency.  The  banks 
had  failed  early  in  the  war.  Two  billion  dollars 
invested  in  slaves  had  been  wiped  out.  Facto- 
ries which  had  been  running  before  the  war,  or 


iii'i 


^M 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  WAR  S 

were  developed  after  1861  in  order  to  supply  the 
blockaded  country,  had  been  destroyed  by  Federal 
raiders  or  seized  and  sold  or  dismantled  because  they 
had  fiunished  supplies  to  the  Confederacy.  Min- 
ing industries  were  paralyzed.  Public  buildings 
which  had  been  used  for  war  purposes  were  de- 
stroyed or  confiscated  for  the  uses  of  the  army  or 
for  the  new  freedmen's  schools.  It  was  months  be- 
fore courthouses,  state  capitols,  school  and  college 
buildings  were  again  made  available  for  normal 
uses.  The  military  school  buildings  had  been  de- 
stroyed by  the  Federal  forces.  Among  the  schools 
which  suffered  were  the  Virginia  MiUtary  Institute, 
the  University  of  Alabama,  the  Louisiana  State 
Seminary,  and  many  smaller  institutions.  Nearly 
all  these  had  been  used  in  some  way  for  war 
purposes  and  were  therefore  subject  to  destruction 
or  confiscation. 

The  farmers  and  planters  found  themselves 
"land  poor."  The  soil  remained,  but  there  was  a 
prevalent  lack  of  labor,  of  agricultural  equipment, 
of  farm  stock,  of  seeds,  and  of  money  with  which  to 
make  good  the  deficiency.  As  a  result,  a  man  with 
hundreds  of  acres  might  be  as  poor  as  a  negro 
refugee.  The  desolation  is  thus  described  by  a 
Virginia  farmer: 


)fr  .• 


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11'/ 


!  1      ■ 


4  THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

From  Harper's  Ferry  to  New  Market,  which  is  about 
eighty  miles  ...  the  country  was  almost  a  desert. 
...  We  had  no  cattle,  hogs,  sheep,  or  horse  or  any- 
thing else.  The  fences  were  all  gone.  Some  of  the 
orchards  were  very  much  injured,  but  the  fruit  trees 
had  not  been  destroyed.  The  bams  were  all  burned; 
chimneys  standing  without  houses,  and  houses  standing 
without  roof,  or  door,  or  window. 

Much  land  was  thrown  on  the  market  at  low 
prices — three  to  five  dollars  an  acre  for  land  worth 
fifty  dollars.  The  poorer  lands  could  not  be  sold 
at  all,  and  thousands  of  farms  were  deserted  by 
their  owners.  Everywhere  recovery  from  this  agri- 
cultural depression  was  slow.  Five  years  after  the 
war  Robert  Somers,  an  English  traveler,  said  of 
the  Tennessee  Valley: 

It  consists  for  the  most  part  of  plantations  in  a  state 
of  semi-ruin  and  plantations  of  which  the  ruin  is  for  the 
present  total  and  complete.  .  .  .  The  trail  of  war  is 
visible  throughout  the  valley  in  bumt-up  gin-houses, 
ruined  bridges,  mills,  and  factories  .  .  .  and  in  large 
tracts  of  once  cultivated  land  stripped  of  every  vestige 
of  fencing.  The  roads,  long  neglected,  are  in  disorder, 
and  having  in  many  places  become  impassable,  new 
tracks  have  been  made  through  the  woods  and  fields 
without  much  respect  to  boundaries. 

Similar  conditions  existed  wherever  the  armies 
had  passed,  and  not  in  the  country  districts  alone. 


if 


■Vh 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  WAR  5 

Many  of  the  cities,  such  as  Richmond,  Charleston, 
Columbia,  Jackson,  Atlanta,  and  Mobile  had 
suffered  from  fire  or  bombardment. 

There  were  few  stocks  of  merchandise  in  the 
South  wher  the  war  ended,  and  Northern  creditors 
had  lost  so  heavily  through  the  failure  of  Southern 
merchants  that  they  were  cautious  about  extending 
credit  again.  Long  before  1865  all  coin  had  been 
sent  out  in  contraband  trade  through  the  blockade. 
That  there  was  a  great  need  of  supplies  from  the 
outside  world  is  shown  by  the  following  statement 
of  General  Boynton: 

Window-glass  has  given  way  to  thin  boards,  in  rail- 
way coaches  and  in  the  cities.    Furniture  is  marred 
and  broken,  and  none  has  been  replaced  for  four  years. 
Dishes  "-t  cemented  in  various  styles,  and  half  the 
pitcher     ave  tin  handles.    A  complete  set  of  crockery 
is  never  seen,  and  m  very  few  families  is  there  enough 
to  set  a  table.  .  .  .    A  set  of  forks  with  whole  tines  is  a 
curiosity.    Clocks  and  watches  have  nearly  all  stopped. 
.  .  .     Hair  brushes  and  tooth  brushes  have  all  worn 
out;  combs  are  broken.  .  .  .     Pins,  needles,  and  thread, 
and  a  thousand  such  articles,  which  seem  indispensable 
to  housekeeping,  are  very  scarce.     Even  in  weaving  on 
the  looms,  corncobs  have  been  substituted  for  spindles. 
Few  have  pocket  knives.     In  fact,  everything  that  has 
heretofore  been  an  article  of  sale  at  the  South  is  want- 
mg  now.  At  the  tables  of  those  who  were  once  esteemed 
luxurious  providers  you  will  find  neither  tea,  coflFee, 


9  THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

sugar,  nor  spices  of  any  kind.  Even  candles,  in  some 
cases,  have  been  replaced  by  a  cup  of  grease  in  which  a 
piece  of  cloth  is  plunged  for  a  wick. 


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This  poverty  was  prolonged  and  rendered  more 
acute  by  the  lack  of  transportation.  Horses,  mules, 
wagons,  and  carriages  were  scarce,  the  country 
roads  were  nearly  impassable,  and  bridges  were 
in  bad  repair  or  had  been  burned  or  washed  away. 
Steamboats  had  almost  disappeared  from  the 
rivers.  Those  which  had  escaped  capture  as  block- 
ade runners  had  been  subsequently  destroyed  or 
were  worn  out.  Postal  facilities,  which  had  been 
poor  enough  during  the  last  year  of  the  Confed- 
eracy, were  entirely  lacking  for  several  months 
after  the  surrender. 

The  railways  were  in  a  state  of  physical  dilap- 
idation little  removed  from  destruction,  save  for 
those  that  had  been  captured  and  kept  in  partial 
repair  by  the  Federal  troops.  The  rolling  stock 
had  been  lost  by  capti"*  >  oy  aestruction  to  prevent 
capture,  in  wrecks,  .«uich  were  frequent,  or  had  been 
worn  out.  The  railroad  companies  possessed  large 
sums  in  Confederate  currency  and  in  securities 
which  were  now  valueless.  About  two-thirds  of  all 
the  lines  were  hopelessly  bankrupt.  Fortunately 
the  United  States  War  Department  took  over  the 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  WAR  7 

control  of  the  railway  lines  and  in  some  cases  e£Fected 

a  temporary  reorganization  which  could  not  have 

m    been  accomplished  by  the  bankrupt  companies. 

f    During  the  summer  and  fall  of  1865  "  loyal "  boards 

of  directors  were  appointed  for  most  of  the  roads, 

-d    and  the  army  withdrew  its  control.    But  repairs 

J    and  reconstruction  were  accomplished  with  diffi> 

culty  because  of  the  demoralization  of  labor  and 

the  lack  of  funds  or  credit.     Freight  was  scarce 

and,  had  it  not  been  for  government  shipments, 

some  of  the  roads  would  have  been  abandoned.  Not 

many  people  were  able  to  travel.    It  is  recorded 

that  on  one  trip  from  Montgomery  to  Mobile  and 

return,  a  distance  of  860  miles,  the  road  which  is 

now  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  collected  only 

thirt^x  n  dollars  in  fares. 

Had  there  been  unrestricted  commercial  freedom 
in  the  South  in  1865-66,  the  distress  of  the  people 
would  have  been  somewhat  lessened,  for  here  and 
there  were  to  be  found  public  and  private  stores 
of  cotton,  tobacco,  rice,  and  other  farm  products, 
all  of  which  were  bringing  high  prices  in  the 
market.  But  for  several  months  the  operation 
of  wartime  laws  and  regulations  hin-lered  the  dis- 
tribution of  even  these  scanty  stores.  Property 
upon  which  the  Confederate  Government  had  a 


i^:im 


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8  THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

claim  was  of  course  subject  to  confiscation,  and 
private  property  offered  for  sale,  even  that  of 
Unionists,  was  subject  to  a  S5  per  cent  tax  on 
sales,  a  shipping  tax,  and  a  revenue  tax.  The 
revenue  tax  on  cotton,  ranging  from  two  to  three 
cents  a  pound  during  the  three  years  after  the 
war,  brought  in  over  $68,000,000.  This  tax,  with 
other  Federal  revenues,  yielded  much  more  than 
the  entire  expenses  of  reconstruction  from  1865  to 
1868  and  of  all  relief  measures  for  the  South,  both 
public  and  private.  After  May,  1865,  the  25  per 
cent  tax  was  imposed  only  upon  the  produce  of 
slave  labor.  None  of  the  war  taxes,  except  that 
on  cotton,  was  levied  upon  the  crops  of  1866,  but 
while  these  taxes  lasted  they  seriously  impeded 
the  resumption  of  trade. 

Even  these  restrictions,  however,  might  have 
been  borne  if  only  they  had  been  honestly  applied. 
Unfortunately,  some  of  the  most  spectacular 
frauds  ever  perpetrated  were  carried  through  in 
connection  with  the  attempt  of  the  United  States 
Treasury  Department  to  collect  and  sell  the  con- 
fiscable property  in  the  South.  The  property  to 
be  sold  consisted  of  what  had  been  captured  and 
seized  by  the  army  and  the  navy,  of  "aban- 
doned" property,  as  such  was  called  whose  owner 


iK 


1 1 


;t 


THE  AFTERBfATH  OF  WAR  9 

waa  absent  in  the  Confederate  service,  and  of  prop- 
erty subject  to  seizure  under  the  confiscation  acts  of 
Congress.  No  captures  were  made  after  the  general 
surrender,  and  no  further  seizures  of  "abandoned" 
property  were  made  after  Johnson's  amnesty  proc- 
lamation of  May  29,  1865.  This  left  only  the 
"confiscable"  property  to  be  collected  and  sold. 

For  collection  purposes  the  States  of  the  South 
were  divided  into  districts,  each  imder  the  super- 
vision  of  an  agent  of  the  Treasury  Department, 
who  received  a  commission  of  about  25  per  cent. 
Cotton,  r^arded  as  the  root  of  the  slavery  evil, 
was  singled  out  as  the  principal  object  of  confisca- 
tion. It  was  known  that  the  Confederate  Govern- 
ment had  owned  in  1865  about  150,000  bales,  but 
the  records  were  defective  and  much  of  it,  with 
no  clear  indication  of  ownership,  still  remained 
with  the  producers.  Secretary  Chase,  foreseeing  the 
diUlculty  of  effecting  a  just  settlement,  counseled 
against  seizure,  but  his  judgment  was  overruled. 
Secretary  McCulloch  said  of  his  agents:  "I  am 
sure  I  sent  some  honest  cotton  agents  South;  but 
it  sometimes  seems  doubtful  whether  any  of  them 
remained  honest  very  long."  Some  of  the  natives, 
even,  became  cotton  thieves.  In  a  report  made  in 
1866,  McCulloch  describes  their  methods: 


<  ' 


10        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOBfATTOX 

Contracton,  snziotu  for  gain,  were  fometimet  guilty 
of  bad  faith  and  peculation,  and  frequently  took  poa- 
aession  of  cotton  and  delivered  it  under  contracts  aa 
captured  or  abandoned,  when  in  fact  it  waa  not  luch. 
and  they  had  no  right  to  touch  it.  .  .  .  Reaideu^n  «sid 
others  in  the  districts  where  these  peculations  were  go- 
ing on  took  advantage  of  the  unsettled  condition  of 
the  country,  and  representing  themselves  as  agents  of 
this  department,  went  about  robbing  under  such  pre- 
tended authority,  and  thus  added  to  the  difficulties  of 
the  situation  by  causing  unjust  opprobrium  and  sus- 
picion to  rest  upon  officers  engaged  in  the  faithful 
discharge  of  their  duties.  Agents,  .  .  .  frequently  re- 
ceived or  collected  property,  and  sent  it  forward  which 
the  law  did  not  authorize  them  to  take.  .  .  .  Lawless 
men,  singly  and  in  organized  bands,  engaged  in  general 
plunder;  every  species  of  intrigue  and  peculation  and 
theft  were  resorted  to. 

These  agents  turned  over  to  the  United  States 
about  $34,000,000.  About  40,000  claimants  were 
subsequently  indemnified  on  the  ground  that  the 
property  taken  from  them  did  not  belong  to  the 
Confederate  Government,  but  many  thousands  of 
other  claimants  have  been  unable  to  prove  that 
their  property  was  seized  by  government  agents 
and  hence  have  received  nothing.  It  is  probable 
that  the  actual  Confederate  property  was  nearly 
all  stolen  by  the  agents.  One  agent  in  Alabama 
sold  an  appointment  as  assistant  for  $25,000,  and  a 


^■i 


THE  AFTERBiATH  OF  WAR  11 

few  months  later  both  the  assistant  and  the  agent 
were  tried  by  a  military  court  for  stealing  and 
were  fined  $90,000  and  $250,000  respectively  in 
addition  to  being  imprisoned. 

Other  property,  including  horses,  mules,  wagons, 
to>>»oco,  rice,  and  sugar  which  the  natives  claimed 

.neir  jwn,  was  seized.  In  some  places  the  agents 
even  collected  delinquent  Confederate  taxes.  Much 
of  the  coniSscable  property  was  not  sold  but  was 
turned  over  to  the  Freedmen's  Bureau'  for  its  sup- 
port. The  total  amount  seized  cannot  be  satisfac- 
torily ascertained.  The  Ku  Klux  minority  report 
asserted  that  3,000,000  bales  of  cotton  were  taken, 
of  which  the  United  States  received  only  114,000. 
It  is  certain  that,  owing  to  the  deliberate  destruc- 
tion of  cotton  by  fire  in  1864-65,  this  ^timate  was 
too  high,  but  all  the  testimony  points  to  the  fact  that 
the  frauds  were  stupendous.  As  a  result  the  United 
States  Government  did  not  succeed  in  obtaining 
the  Confederate  property  to  which  it  had  a  claim, 
and  the  country  itself  was  stripped  of  necessities  to  a 
degree  that  left  it  not  only  destitute  but  outraged 
and  embittered.  "Such  practices,"  said  Trow- 
bridge, "had  a  pernicious  effect,  engendering  a 
contempt  for  the  Government  and  a  murderous 

'  See  pp.  89  et  teq. 


u 


u 


U         THE  8BQUEL  OF  APFOliATTOX 

Ol-will  which  too  o     jiovHy  vented  itself  upon 
•oldien  and  negroes." 

The  South  faced  the  work  of  reconitruction 
not  only  with  a  shortage  of  material  and  greatly 
hampered  in  the  employment  even  of  that  but 
■till  more  with  a  shortage  of  men.  The  losses 
among  the  whites  are  usually  estimated  at  about 
half  the  military  population,  but  since  accurate 
records  are  lacking  the  exact  numbers  cannot  be  as- 
certained. The  best  of  the  civil  leaders,  as  well  as 
the  prominent  military  leaders,  had  so  committed 
themselves  to  the  support  of  the  Confederacy  as 
to  be  excluded  from  participation  in  any  recon- 
struction that  might  be  attempted.  The  business 
of  reconstruction,  therefore,  fell  of  necessity  to  the 
Confederate  private  soldiers,  the  lower  oflScers, 
nonparticipants,  and  lukewarm  individuals  who 
had  not  greatly  compromised  themselves.  These 
politically  and  physically  uninjured  survivors  in- 
cluded also  all  the  "slackers"  of  the  Confederacy. 
Bv^  though  there  were  such  physical  and  moral 
losses  on  the  part  of  those  to  whom  fell  the  direc- 
tion of  affairs  there  was  also  a  moral  strengthen- 
ing  in  the  sound  element  of  the  people  who  had 
been  tried  by  the  discipline  of  war. 
The  greatest  weakness  of  both  races  was  theii 


THE  AFTERBfATH  OF  WAR  18 

eitreme  poverty.  The  cropf  of  1805  turned  out 
badly,  for  moet  of  the  aoldien  reached  home  too 
late  for  luccessful  planting  and  the  negro  labor 
wai  not  dependable.  The  sale  of  such  cotton  and 
farm  products  as  had  escaped  the  treasury  agents 
was  of  some  help,  but  curiously  enough  much  of 
the  good  money  thus  obtained  was  spent  extrava- 
gantly by  a  people  used  to  Confederate  rag  money 
and  for  four  years  deprived  of  the  luxuries  of  life. 
The  poorer  whites  who  had  lost  all  were  close 
to  starvation.  In  the  white  counties  which  had 
sent  so  large  a  proportion  of  men  to  the  army  the 
destitution  was  most  acute.  In  many  families  the 
breadwinner  had  been  killed  in  war.  After  186« 
relief  systems  had  been  organized  in  nearly  all 
the  Confederate  States  for  the  purpose  of  aiding 
the  poor  whites,  but  these  organizations  w?re  dis- 
banded in  1865.  A  Freedmen's  Bureau  official 
traveling  through  the  desolate  back  country  fur- 
nishes a  description  which  might  have  applied  to 
two  hundred  counties,  a  third  of  the  South:  "It 
is  a  common,  an  every-day  sight  in  Randolph 
County,  that  of  women  and  children,  most  of 
whom  were  formerly  in  good  circumstances,  beg- 
ging for  bread  from  door  to  door.  Meat  of  any 
kind  has  been  a  stranger  to  many  of  their  mouths 


3 


I- 


M        THE  8BQUBL  OF  APPOBIATTOX 

for  monthi.  The  drought  cut  off  what  little  cropt 
they  hoped  to  Mve,  and  they  must  have  immediate 
help  or  perish.  B  /  far  the  greater  suffering  exiata 
among  the  whites.  T^eir  scanty  supplies  have 
been  exhausted,  anH  ft  they  look  to  the  Govern- 
ment alone  for  i-  u'  .>urt.  Some  are  without  homes 
of  any  description." 

Where  the  armies  ha4  passed,  few  of  the  people, 
white  or  bla'>k,  remained;  most  of  them  had  been 
forced  as  "refugees"  within  the  Union  lines  or  into 
the  interior  of  the  Confederacy.  Now,  along  with 
the  disbanded  Confederate  soldiers,  they  came 
straggling  back  to  their  war-swept  homes.  It  was 
estimated,  in  December,  1805,  that  in  the  States  of 
Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  Georgia,  there  were  five 
hundred  thousand  white  people  who  were  without 
the  necessaries  of  life;  numbers  died  from  lack  of 
food.  Within  a  few  months  relief  agencies  were 
at  work.  In  the  North,  especially  in  the  border 
States  and  in  New  York,  charitable  organizaticma 
collected  and  forwarded  er«>at  quantities  of  sup- 
plies  to  the  negroes  and  to  the  whites  in  the  bill 
and  mountain  counties.  The  reorganized  state  and 
local  governments  sent  food  from  the  unravaged 
portions  of  the  Black  Belt  to  the  nearest  white 
counties,  and  the  army  conunanders  gave  some 


i"  it 


III 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  WAR  1« 

aid.  Am  toon  m  the  Fkvedmen'i  Butmu  wm  or^ 
gtnised,  it  fed  to  the  limit  of  it«  supplies  the  needy 
whites  M  well  u  the  blacks. 

The  extent  of  the  relief  afforded  by  the  charity 
of  the  North  and  by  the  agencies  of  the  United 
States  Government  is  n^t  now  generally  remem- 
bered, probably  on  account  of  the  later  objection- 
able activities  of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau,  but  it 
was  at  the  time  properly  ap.  <ciated.  A  Southern 
journalist,  writing  of  what  he  saw  in  Georgia, 
remarked  that  "it  must  be  a  matter  of  gratitude 
as  well  as  surprise  for  our  people  to  see  a  Govern- 
ment which  was  lately  fighting  us  with  fire  and 
sword  and  shell,  now  generously  feeding  our  poor 
and  distressed.  In  the  immense  crowds  which 
throng  the  distributing  house,  I  notice  the  mothers 
and  fathers,  widows  and  orphans  of  our  soldiers. 
.  .  .  Again,  the  Confederate  soldier,  with  one  leg 
or  one  arm,  the  crippled,  maimed,  and  broken,  and 
the  worn  and  destitute  men,  who  fought  bravely 
their  enemies  then,  their  benefactors  now,  have 
their  sacks  filled  and  are  fed." 

Acute  distress  continued  until  1867;  after  that 
year  there  was  no  further  danger  of  starvation. 
Some  of  the  poor  whites,  especially  in  the  remote  dis- 
tricts, never  again  reached  a  comfortable  standard 


); 
I 


|i 


t,'' 


t' 


1«         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

of  Living;  some  were  demoralized  by  too  much  as- 
sistance; others  were  discouraged  and  left  the  South 
for  the  West  or  the  North.  But  the  mass  of  the 
people  accepted  the  discipline  of  poverty  and  made 
the  best  of  their  situation. 

The  difficulties,  however,  that  beset  even  the 
courageous  and  the  competent  were  enormous. 
The  general  paralysis  of  industry,  the  breaking 
up  of  society,  and  poverty  on  all  sides  bore  espe- 
cially hard  on  those  who  had  not  previously  been 
manual  laborers.  Physicians  could  get  practice 
enough  but  no  fees;  lawyers  who  had  supported 
the  Confederacy  found  it  difficult  to  get  back  into 
the  reorganized  courts  because  of  the  test  oaths 
and  the  competition  of  "loyal"  attorneys;  and 
for  the  teachers  there  were  few  schools.  We  read 
of  officers  high  in  the  Confederate  service  selling  to 
Federal  soldiers  the  pies  and  cakes  cooked  by  their 
wives,  of  others  selling  fish  and  oysters  which  they 
themselves  had  caught,  and  of  men  and  women 
hitching  themselves  to  plows  when  they  had  no 
horse  or  mule. 

Such  incidents  must,  from  their  nature,  have 
been  infrequent,  but  they  show  to  what  straits 
some  at  least  were  reduced.  Six  years  after  the 
war,  James  S.  Pike,  then  in   South  Carolina, 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  WAR  17 

mentions  cases  which  might  be  duplicated  in  nearly 
every  old  Southern  community:  "In  the  vicinity," 
he  says,  "lived  a  gentleman  whose  income  when 
the  war  broke  out  was  rated  at  $150,000  a  year. 
Not  a  vestige  of  his  whole  vast  estate  remains 
today.  Not  far  distant  were  the  estates  of  a 
large  proprietor  and  a  well  known  family,  rich  and 
distinguished  for  generations.  The  s'a/w  T^ere 
gone.  The  family  is  gone.  A  singl  scion  of  the 
house  remains,  and  he  peddles  tea  ly  the  poun  1 
and  molasses  by  the  quart,  on  a  comer  of  tht  c!d 
homestead,  to  the  former  slaves  of  the  family  and 
thereby  earns  his  livelihood." 

General  Lee's  good  example  influenced  many. 
Commercial  enterprises  were  willing  to  pay  for  the 
use  of  his  name  and  reputation,  but  he  wished 
to  farm  and  could  get  no  opportunity.  "They 
are  o£Fering  my  father  everything,"  his  daughter 
said,  "except  the  only  thing  he  will  accept,  a  place 
to  earn  lonest  bread  while  engaged  in  some  useful 
work."  This  remark  led  to  an  oflFer  of  the  presi- 
dency of  Washington  College,  now  Washington 
and  Lee  University,  which  he  accepted.  "I  have 
a  self-imposed  task  which  I  must  accomplish,"  he 
said,  "I  have  led  the  young  men  of  the  South  in 
battle;  I  have  seen  many  of  them  fall  under  my 


M 


)  i 


I   . 


18         THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

standard.    I  shall  devote  my  life  now  to  training 
young  men  to  do  their  duty  in  life." 

The  condition  of  honest  folk  was  still  further  trou- 
bled by  a  general  spirit  of  lawlessness  in  many  re- 
gions. Virginia,  Tennessee,  Arkansas,  and  Louisi- 
ana recognized  the  "Union"  state  government,  but 
the  coming  of  peace  brought  legal  anarchy  to  the 
other  States  of  the  Confederacy.  The  Confederate 
state  and  local  governments  were  abolished  as  the 
armies  of  occupation  spread  over  the  South,  and  for 
a  period  of  four  or  six  months  there  was  no  govern- 
ment except  that  exercised  by  the  commanders  of 
the  military  garrisons  left  behind  when  the  armies 
marched  away.  Even  before  the  surrender  the  local 
governments  were  unable  to  make  their  authority 
respected,  and  soon  after  the  war  ended  parts  of  the 
country  became  infested  with  outlaws,  pretended 
treasury  agents,  horse  thieves,  cattle  thieves,  and 
deserters.  Away  from  the  military  posts  only  lynch 
law  could  cope  with  these  elements  of  disorder. 
With  the  aid  of  the  army  in  Lhe  more  settled  re- 
gions, and  by  extra-legal  means  elsewhere,  the  out- 
laws, thieves,  cotton  burners,  and  house  burners 
were  brought  somewhat  under  control  even  before 
the  state  governments  were  reorganized,  though  the 
embers  of  lawlessness  continued  to  smolder. 


r 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  WAR  19 

The  relations  between  the  Federal  soldiers  sta- 
tioned in  the  principal  towns  and  the  native  white 
population  were  not,  on  the  whole,  so  bad  as  might 
have  been  expected.  If  the  commanding  o£5cer  were 
well  disposed,  there  was  littl  5  danger  of  friction, 
though  sometimes  his  troops  got  out  of  hand.    The 
regulars  had  a  better  reputation  than  the  volun- 
teers. The  Confederate  soldiers  were  surfeited  with 
fighting,  but  the  "stay-at-home"  element  was  often 
a  cause  of  trouble.    The  problem  of  social  relations 
between  the  conquerors  and  the  conquered  was  trou- 
blesome. The  men  might  get  along  well  together, 
but  the  women  would  have  nothing  do  with  the 
"Yankees  "  and  ill  feeling  arose  because  of  their  an- 
tipathy.    Carl  Schurz  reported  that  "the  soldier  of 
the  Union  is  looked  upon  as  a  stranger,  an  intruder, 
as  the  'Yankee, '  the  'enemy/  ...     The  existence 
and  intensity  of  this  aversion  is  too  well  known  to 
those  who  have  served  or  are  serving  in  the  South 
to  require  proof." 

In  retaliation  the  soldiers  de'-        -d  ingenious 
ways  of  annoying  the  whites.  en,  forced 

for  any  reason  to  go  to  headquarters,  were  made 
to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  or  the  "ironclad" 
oath  before  their  req  ests  were  granted;  flags  were 
fastened  over  doors,  gates,  or  sidewalks  in  order  to 


'  It 


i  t. 


t 


M         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

irritate  the  recalcitrant  dames  and  their  daughters. 
Confederate  songs  and  color  combinations  were  for- 
bidden. In  Richmond,  General  Halleck  ordered  that 
no  marriages  be  performed  unless  the  bride,  the 
groom,  and  the  oflSciating  clergyman  took  the  oath 
of  allegiance.  He  explained  this  as  a  measure  taken 
to  prevent  "the  propagation  of  legitimate  rebels.** 
The  wearing  of  Confederate  uniforms  was  for- 
bidden by  military  order,  bu  by  May,  1865,  few 
soldiers  possessed  regulation  uniforms.  In  Ten- 
nessee the  State  also  imposed  fines  upon  wearers 
of  the  uniform.  In  the  vicinity  of  military  posts 
buttons  and  marks  of  rank  were  usuaUy  ordered 
removed  and  the  gray  clothes  dyed  with  some 
other  color.  General  Lee,  for  example,  had  the 
buttons  on  his  coat  covered  with  cloth.  But  fre- 
quently the  Federal  commander,  after  issuing  the 
orders,  paid  no  more  attention  to  the  matter  and 
such  conflicts  as  arose  on  account  of  the  uniform 
were  usually  caused  by  officious  enlisted  men  and 
the  negro  troops.  Whitelaw  Reid  relates  the 
following  v.icident: 


Nothing  was  more  touching,  in  all  that  I  saw  in  Sa- 
vannah, than  the  almost  painful  effort  of  the  rebels, 
from  generals  down  to  privates,  to  conduct  themselves 
so  as  to  evince  respect  for  our  soldiers,  and  to  bring  no 


•f 

I 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  WAR  si 

severer  punishment  upon  the  city  than  it  had  already 
received.    There  was  a  brutal  scene  at  the  hotel,  where 
a  drunken  sergeant,  with  a  pair  of  tailor's  shears,  in- 
fflsted  on  cutting  th.-  buttons  from  the  uniform  of  an 
elegant  gray-headed  old  brigadier,  who  had  just  come 
m  from  Johnston's  army;  but  he  bore  himself  modestly 
and  very  handsomely  through  it.    His  staff  was  com- 
posed of  fine-looking,  stalwart  fellows,  evidently  gentle- 
men, who  appeared  intensely  mortified  at  such  treat- 
ment.   They  had  no  clothes  except  their  rebel  uniforms, 
and  had,  as  yet,  had  no  time  to  procure  others,  but  they 
avoided  disturbances  and  submitted  to  what  they  might, 
with  some  propriety,  and  with  the  general  approval  of 
our  officers,  have  resented. 

The  negro  troops,  even  at  their  best,  were  every- 
where considered  offensive  by  the  native  whites. 
General  Grant,  indeed,  urged  that  only  white 
troops  be  used  to  garrison  the  interior.  But  the 
negro  soldier,  impudent  by  reason  of  his  new 
freedom,  his  new  uniform,  and  his  new  gun,  was 
more  than  Southern  temper  could  tranquilly  bear, 
and  race  conflicts  were  frequent.  A  New  Orleans 
newspaper  thus  states  the  Southern  point  of  view: 
"Our  citizens  who  had  been  accustomed  to  meet 
and  treat  the  negroes  only  as  respectful  servants, 
were  mortified,  pained,  and  shocked  to  encounter 
them  .  .  .  wearing  Federal  uniforms  and  bearing 
bright  muskets  and  gleaming  bayonets.  .  .  .    They 


li 


.r 


P' 


tt        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

are  jostled  from  the  sidewalks  by  dusky  guards, 
marching  four  abreast.  They  were  halted,  in  rude 
and  sullen  tones,  by  negro  sentinels." 

The  task  of  the  Federal  forces  was  not  easy. 
The  garrisons  were  not  large  enough  nor  numerous 
enough  to  keep  order  in  the  absence  of  civil  govern- 
ment. The  commanders  in  the  South  asked  in 
vain  for  cavalry  to  police  the  ruxaX  districts.  Much 
of  the  disorder,  violence,  and  incendiarism  attri- 
buted at  the  time  to  lawless  soldiers  appeared  later 
to  be  due  to  discharged  soldiers  and  others  pre- 
tending to  be  soldiers  in  order  to  carry  out  schemes 
of  robbery.  The  whites  complained  vigorously  of 
the  garrisons,  and  petitions  were  sent  to  Washing- 
ton from  mass  meetings  and  from  state  legislatures 
asking  for  their  removal.  The  higher  commanders, 
however,  bore  themselves  well,  and  in  a  few  fortu- 
nate cases  Southern  whites  were  on  most  amicable 
terms  with  the  garrison  commanders.  The  corre- 
spondence of  responsible  military  oflScers  in  the 
South  shows  how  earnestly  and  considerately  each, 
as  a  rule,  tried  to  work  out  his  task.  The  good 
sense  of  most  of  the  Federal  officers  appeared  when, 
after  the  murder  of  Lincoln,  even  General  Grant 
for  a  brief  space  lost  his  head  and  ordered  the  arrest 
of  paroled  Confederates. 


>ii 


THE  AFTERMATH  OP  WAR  88 

The  church  organizations  were  as  much  involved 
in  the  war  and  in  the  reconstruction  as  were  secular 
institutions.  Before  the  war  every  religious  or- 
ganization having  members  North  and  South,  ex- 
cept the  Catholic  Church  and  the  Jews,  had  sepa- 
rated into  independent  Northern  and  Southern 
bodies.  In  each  section  church  feeling  ran  high, 
and  when  the  war  came  the  churches  support- 
ed the  armies.  As  the  Federal  armies  occupied 
Southern  territory,  the  church  buildings  of  each 
denomination  were  turned  over  to  the  correspond- 
ing Northern  body,  and  Southern  ministers  were 
permitted  to  remain  only  upon  agreeing  to  con- 
duct "loyal  services,  pray  for  the  President  of  the 
United  States  and  for  Federal  victories"  and  to 
foster  "loyal  sentiment."  The  Protestant  Epis- 
copal churches  in  Alabama  were  closed  from  Sep- 
tember to  December,  1865,  and  some  congrega- 
tions were  dispersed  by  the  soldiers  because  Bish- 
op Wilmer  had  directed  his  clergy  to  omit  the 
prayer  for  President  Davis  but  had  substituted  no 
other.  The  ministers  of  non-liturgical  churches 
were  not  so  easily  controlled.  A  Georgia  Method- 
ist preacher  directed  by  a  Federal  oflBcer  to  pray 
for  the  President  said  afterwards:  "I  prayed  for 
the  President  that  the  Lord  would  take  out  of  him 


itt 


:t 


y  V 

If 

'f 


M         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

and  his  allies  the  hearts  of  beasts  and  put  into  them 
the  hearts  of  men  or  remove  the  cusses  from  office.' 
Sometimes  members  of  a  congregation  showed  their 
resentment  at  the  "loyal"  prayers  by  leaving  the 
chiuch.  But  in  spite  of  many  irritations  both  sides 
frequently  managed  to  get  some  amusement  out  of 
the  "loyal"  services.  The  church  situation  was, 
however,  a  serious  matter  during  and  after  the  re- 
construction, and  some  of  its  later  phases  will  have 
to  be  discussed  elsewhere. 

The  Unionist,  or  "Tory,"  of  the  lower  and  east- 
em  South  found  himself,  in  1865,  a  man  without 
a  country.  Few  in  number  in  any  community, 
they  foimd  themselves  upon  their  return  from  a 
harsh  exile  the  victims  of  ostracism  or  open  hostil- 
ity. One  of  them,  William  H.  Smith,  later  Gover- 
nor of  Alabama,  testified  that  the  Southern  people 
"manifest  the  most  perfect  contempt  for  a  man 
who  is  known  to  be  an  unequivocal  Union  man; 
they  call  him  a  'galvanized  Yankee'  and  apply 
other  terms  and  epithets  to  him."  General  George 
H.  Thomas,  speaking  of  a  region  more  divided  in 
sentiment  than  Alabama,  remarked  that  "Middle 
Tennessee  is  disturbed  by  animosities  and  hatreds, 
much  more  than  it  is  by  the  disloyalty  of  persons 
towards  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 


f 


: 


THE  AFTERMATH  OP  WAR  is 

Those  personal  animosities  would  break  out  and 
overawe  the  civil  authorities,  but  for  the  presence 
there  of  the  troops  of  the  United  States.  .  .  . 
They  are  more  unfriendly  to  Union  men,  natives 
of  the  State  of  Tennessee,  or  of  the  South,  who 
have  been  in  the  Union  army,  than  they  are  to 
men  of  Nort'  em  birth." 

In  the  border  States  society  was  sharply  divid- 
ed and  feeling  was  bitter.    In  eastern  Tennessee, 
eastern  Kentucky,  West  Virgiaia,  and  p  rts  of  Ar- 
kansas and  Missouri  returning  Conf?d'   ates  met 
harsher  treatment  than  did  the  Unioiii:>ts  in  the 
lower  South.     Trowbridge  says  of  east  Tennes- 
see: "Returning  rebels  were  robbed;  and  if  one 
had  stolen  unawares       '  's  home,  it  was  not  safe 
for  him  to  remain  there.    I  saw  in  Virginia  one 
of  these  exiles,  who  told  me  how  homesickly  he 
pined  for  the  hills  and  meadows  of  east  Tennessee, 
which  he  thought  the  most  delightful  region  in 
the  world.    But  there  was  a  rope  hanging  from  a 
tree  for  him  there,  and  he  dared  not  go  back. 
'The  bottom  rails  are  on  top, '  said  he,  'that  is  the 
trouble.'    The  Union  element,  and  the  worst  part 
of  the  Union  element,  was  uppermost."    Con- 
federates and  Confederate  sympathizers  in  Mary- 
land, West  Virginia,  Tennessee,  and  Kent-.jky 


I 


I'll 


I!- 


I 

if 


II 


i 


i 


'S 


M        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOBiATTOX 

were  disfranchised.  In  West  Virginia,  Tennessee, 
and  Missouri  "war  trespass"  suits  were  bt  ..ught 
against  returning  Confederates  for  military  acts 
done  in  war  time.  In  Missouri  and  West  Vir- 
ginia strict  test  oaths  excluded  Confederates  from 
office,  from  the  polls,  and  from  the  professions  of 
teaching,  preaching,  and  law.  On  the  other  hand 
in  central  and  western  Kentucky  the  predominant 
Unionist  population,  themselves  suffering  through 
the  abolition  of  slavery,  and  by  the  objectionable 
operations  of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau  and  the  un- 
wise military  administration,  showed  more  sym- 
pathy for  the  Confederates,  welcomed  them  home, 
and  soon  relieved  them  of  all  restrictions. 

Still  another  element  of  discord  was  added  by 
the  Northerners  who  came  to  exploit  the  South. 
Many  mustered-out  soldiers  proposed  to  stay. 
Speculators  of  all  kinds  followed  the  withdrawing 
Confederate  liu<  and  with  the  conclusion  of 
peace  spread  through  the  country;  but  they  were 
not  cordially  received.  With  the  better  class,  the 
Southerners,  especially  the  soldiers,  associated 
freely  if  seldom  intimately.  But  the  conduct  of  a 
few  of  their  number  who  considered  that  the  wai 
had  opened  all  doors  to  them,  who  very  freely  ex- 
pressed their  views,  gave  advice,  condemned  old 


THE  AFTERBiATH  OF  WAR  tT 

customs,  and  were  generally  offensive,  did  mt  -h  to 
bring  all  Northerners  into  disrepute.  Tactlessly 
critical  letters  published  in  Northern  papers  did 
not  add  to  their  popularity.  The  few  Northern 
women  felt  the  ostracism  more  keenly  than  did  the 
men.  Benjamin  C.  Truman,  ar  agent  of  President 
Johnson,  thus  summed  up  the  situation:  "There 
is  a  prevalent  disposition  not  to  associate  too  freely 
with  Northern  men  or  to  receive  them  into  the 
circle*  of  society ;  but  it  is  far  from  unsurmountable. 
Over  Southern  society,  as  over  every  other,  woman 
reigns  supreme,  and  they  are  more  embittered 
against  those  whom  they  deem  the  authors  of  all 
their  calamities  than  are  their  brothers,  sons,  and 
husbands."  But  of  the  thousands  of  Northern 
men  who  overcame  the  reluctance  of  the  South- 
erners to  social  intercourse  little  was  heard.  Many 
a  Southern  planter  secured  a  Northern  partner,  or 
sold  him  half  his  plantation  to  get  money  to  run 
the  other  half.  For  the  irritations  of  1865  each 
party  must  take  its  share  of  responsibility. 

Had  the  South  assisted  in  a  skillful  and  adequate 
publicity,  much  dij'astrous  misunderstanding  might 
have  been  avoided.  The  North  knew  as  little 
of  the  South  as  the  South  did  of  the  North,  but 
the  North  was  eager  for  news.     Able  newspaper 


1.1' 


>!      I 


IS  THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOBIATTOX 
oorretpondentt  like  Sidney  Andrews  of  the  Boston 
Advertiser  and  the  Chicago  TrUmne,  who  opposed 
President  Johnson's  policies,  Thomas  W.  Knox  of 
the  New  York  Herald,  who  had  given  General 
Sherman  so  much  trouble  in  Tennessee.  Whitelaw 
Reid,  who  wrote  for  several  papers  and  tried  cotton 
planting  in  Louisiana,  and  John  T.  Trowbridge. 
New  EngUnd  author  and  journalist,  were  dis- 
patched southwards.  Chief  of  the  President's 
investigators  were  General  Carl  Schurc.  German 
revolutionist.  Federal  soldier,  and  soon  to  be 
radical  Republican,  who  held  harsh  views  of  the 
Southern  people;  and  there  were  besides  Harvey 
M.  Watterson,  Kentucky  Democrat  and  Unwnist, 
the  father  of  "Marse"  Henry;  Benjamin  C.  Tru- 
man, New  England  journalist  and  soldier,  whose 
long  report  was  perhaps  the  best  of  all;  Chief 
Justice  Chase,  who  was  thinking  mainly  of  "How 
soon  can  the  negro  vote?";  and  General  Grant, 
who  made  a  report  so  brief  that,  notwithstand- 
ing its  value,  it  attracted  little  attention.  In  ad- 
dition, a  constant  stream  of  information  and  mis- 
information was  going  northward  from  treasury 
agents,  officers  of  the  army,  the  Freedmen's  Bu- 
reau, teachers,  and  missionaries.  Among  foreigners 
who  described  the  conquered  land  were  Robert 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  WAR  M 

Somen,  Henry  Latham,  and  WHliam  Hepworth 
Dixon.    But  few  in  the  South  realised  the  impor- 
tance of  supplying  the  North  with  correct  infor- 
mation about  actual  conditions.    The  letters  and 
reports,  they  thought,  humiliated  them;  inquiry 
was  felt  to  be  pry .ng  and  gloating.    "  Correspond- 
ents have  added  a  new  pang  to  surrender,"  it  waa 
said.  The  South  was  proud  and  refused  to  be  cate- 
chized. From  the  Northern  point  of  view  the  South, 
a  new  and  strange  region,  with  strange  customs  and 
principles,  was  of  course  not  to  be  considered  as 
quite  normal  and  American.  %ut  there  was  on  the 
part  of  many  correspondents  a  determined  attempt 
to  describe  things  as  they  were.  And  yet  th.  North 
persisted  in   its  unsympathetic  queries  when  it 
seemed  to  have  a  sufficient  answer  in  the  reports  of 
Grant,  Schurz,  and  Truman. 

Grant's  opinion  was  short  and  direct:  "I  am 
satisfied  that  the  mass  of  thinking  men  of  the 
South  accept  the  present  situation  of  affairs  in 
good  faith.  ...  The  citizen:-  of  the  Southern 
States  are  anxious  to  return  to  self-government 
within  the  Union  as  .soon  as  possible."  Truman 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  "the  rank  and  file 
of  the  disbanded  Southern  army  ...  are  the 
backbone  and  smew  of  the  South.  ...     To  the 


t  ) 


ilf 


I 


■i 


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It 

1. 


11 


t 

'I 


'I 


30         THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

disbanded  regiments  of  the  rebel  army,  both  officers 
and  men,  I  look  with  great  confidence  as  the  best 
and  altogether  the  most  hopeful  element  of  the 
South,  the  real  basis  of  reconstruction  and  the 
material  of  worthy  citizenship."  General  John 
Tarbell,  before  the  Joint  Committee  on  Recon- 
struction, testified  that  "there  are,  no  doubt,  dis- 
loyal and  disorderly  persons  in  the  South,  but  it  is 
an  entire  mistake  to  apply  these  terms  to  a  whole 
people.  I  would  as  soon  travel  alone,  unarmed, 
through  the  South  as  through  the  North.  The 
South  I  left  is  not  at  all  the  South  I  hear  and  read 
about  in  the  North.  From  the  sentiment  I  hear 
in  the  North,  I  would  scarcely  recognize  the  people 
I  saw,  and,  except  their  politics,  I  liked  so  well.  I 
have  entire  faith  that  the  better  classes  are  friendly 
to  the  negroes." 

Carl  Schurz  on  the  other  hand  was  not  so  favor- 
ably impressed.  "The  loyalty  of  the  masses  and 
most  of  the  leaders  of  the  southern  people, "  he  said, 
"  consists  in  submission  to  necessity.  There  is,  ex- 
cept in  individual  instances,  an  entire  absence  of 
that  national  spirit  which  forms  the  basis  of  true 
loyalty  and  patriotism."  Another  government 
official  in  Florida  was  quite  doubtful  of  the  South- 
ern whites.     "  I  would  pin  them  down  at  the  point 


ij 


icers 

best 

the 

the 

John 

con- 

dis- 

it  IS 

hole 
ned, 
The 
read 
hear 
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1.  I 
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vor- 
and 
said, 
,  ex- 
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true 
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a, 


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30  rHK  .-^KQIKJ-  Ol     \i'!'<»MAl'roX 

disiiar.ili'f!  !-i'ginv-nts<){  ihcrihi'i  .'»rni.  t.>tht)fticeri 
aru!  nii'ii,  I  look  willi  ^rt-jit  confiiit-jK*-  ,*ii>  tlic  bcsi 
and  :illog(tln'r  iht."  \iu>-^\  iiopcful  ■■lt*meut  of  lh> 
Soiilli.  the  i«'nl  hut;-  if  nronslriRlion  juiii  liii 
uialeri.tl  of  worlhy  cinzt nsbiii  (ienera!  Johr 
Taibeil,  iK'fort-  the  '"irt  <  '.n'lnitfr-  on  Hectu 
striH-tiini.  t^'slified  tl  -  •  iM.  di^ 

lo\ft!  Jind  ui>orderly  t :!r>-  .  '"•  SomUk  h!it  it  ■ 

an  t'nt.irt'  mi'^fakf  1u  <{)l'iy  ;    vltoi' 

peopl«'.      1   viiuiii  ,;      '.<,  i  dlonf.  unarnuMl 

tliront'li    'hf  Soi-th   a.s  th-«ugb  thf   North.     Thi 
SoutJ!  I  h«n  H  noVWV'MLi-M  •■\<v»;«iji  i  f:tar  aid  road 

abiHI!     ..iJiiivii/   iiioiSfui*!!}!   .iiS«'.>i.M    li  vil  i«i^tyiil«d«li     1     hi-:i 

Hi  thf  Norlii,  I  V. oiiM  s.-arciy  rrvo..  <■  ix-opi. 

1  saw,  and,  »'X<'rf»Mh'-ir  jM>I}'  * 

h.a%*' viii  in' faith '■  .  ;;i<'adl.> 

ably  jinprv 

I'iOst   f  !l  i  III     ':■  '  -,  .,,  :  ■,• 

'  ;'0*!^!:^tS  '>•>  .■,,.■-,.. 

■■  i  ,>\  III  l\)'\>  ....        ... 


■■>  lavor 
.iti'^sfs  ai;. 

ThiTf  is,  t,.\ 


"iotisTH."      \n< 


f-.i!  "f  t!ie  SouU: 
!    f  iu'  poll, 


II 


m  i 


I 


'i  1 


(F 


1 


,\ 


.1 


THE  AFTERMATH  OP  WAR  81 

of  the  bayonet,"  he  declared,  "so  close  that  they 
would  not  have  room  to  wiggle,  and  allow  intelli- 
gent colored  people  to  go  up  and  vote  in  preference 
to  them.  The  only  Union  element  in  the  South 
proper  ...  is  among  the  colored  people.  The 
whites  will  treat  you  very  kindly  to  your  face,  but 
they  are  deceitful.  I  have  often  thought,  and  so 
expressed  myself,  that  there  is  so  much  deception 
among  the  people  of  the  South  since  the  rebellion, 
that  if  an  earthquake  should  open  and  swallow 
them  up,  I  was  fearful  that  the  devil  would  be 
dethroned  and  some  of  them  take  his  place." 

The  point  of  view  of  the  Confederate  military 
leaders  was  exhibited  by  General  Wade  Hampton 
in  a  letter  to  President  Johnson  and  by  General 
Lee  in  his  advice  to  Governor  Letcher  of  Virginia. 
General  Hampton  wrote:  "The  South  unequivo- 
cally 'accepts  the  situation'  in  which  she  is  placed. 
Everything  that  she  has  done  has  been  done  in 
perfect  faith,  and  in  the  true  and  highest  sense  of 
the  word,  she  is  loyal.  By  this  I  mean  that  she 
intends  to  abide  by  the  laws  of  the  land  honestly, 
to  fulfill  all  her  obligations  faithfully  and  to  keep 
her  word  sacredly,  and  I  assert  that  the  North  has 
no  right  to  id  more  of  her.    You  have  no 

right  to  ask,  or  ex^icct  that  she  will  at  once  profess 


1    ' 

ti 

•1 

1* 

h 

||.'    ' 

•  • 

1; 


!"': 


t 


82         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

unbounded  love  to  that  Union  from  which  for  four 
years  she  tried  to  escape  at  the  cost  of  her  best 
blood  and  all  her  treasures."  General  Lee  in 
order  to  set  an  example  applied  through  General 
Grant  for  a  pardon  under  the  amnesty  proclama- 
tion and  soon  afterwards  he  wrote  to  Governor 
Letcher:  "All  should  unite  in  honest  efforts  to 
obliterate  the  effects  of  war,  and  to  restore  the 
blessings  of  peace.  They  should  remain,  if  possible, 
in  the  country;  promote  harmony  and  good-feeling; 
qualify  themselves  to  vote;  and  elect  to  the  State 
and  general  legislatures  wise  and  patriotic  men, 
who  will  devote  their  abilities  to  the  interests  of 
the  country  and  th;  healing  of  all  dissensions;  I 
have  invariably  recommended  this  course  since  the 
cessation  of  hostilities,  and  have  endeavored  to 
practice  it  myself." 

Southerners  of  the  Confederacy  everywhere, 
then,  accepted  the  destruction  of  slavery  and  the 
renunciation  of  state  sovereignty;  they  welcomed 
an  early  restoration  of  the  Union,  without  any 
punbhment  of  leaders  of  the  defeated  cause.  But 
they  were  proud  of  their  Confederate  records 
though  now  legally  "loyal"  to  the  United  States; 
they  considered  the  negro  as  free  but  inferior,  and 
expected  to  be  permitted  to  fix  his  status  in  the 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  WAR  9$ 

sodal  organization  and  to  solve  the  problem  of  free 
labor  in  their  own  way.  To  embarrass  the  easy 
and  permanent  realization  of  these  views  there  was 
a  society  disrupted,  economically  prostrate,  de- 
prived of  its  natural  leaders,  subjected  to  a  control 
not  always  wisely  conceived  nor  effectively  exer- 
cised, and,  finally,  containing  within  its  own  pop- 
ulation unassimilated  elements  which  presented 
problems  fraught  with  difficulty  and  danger. 


I 


if  -■ 


CHAPTER  II 


\\ 


lijj     ^ 

I  t- 


(I 


I 


'r 

if 


■■.'<  \ 


tKS> 


W     ■ 


WHEN  FBBEOOM  CRIED  OUT 

The  negro  is  the  central  figure  in  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  the  South.  Without  the  negro  there  would 
have  been  no  Civil  War.  Granting  a  war  fought 
for  any  other  cause,  the  task  of  reconstruction 
would,  without  him,  have  been  comparatively 
simple.  With  him,  however,  reconstruction  meant 
more  than  the  restoring  of  shattered  resources;  it 
meant  the  more  or  less  successful  attempt  to  obtain 
and  secure  for  the  freedman  civil  and  political 
rights,  and  to  improve  his  economic  and  social 
status.  In  1861  the  American  negro  was  every- 
where an  inferior,  and  most  of  his  race  were  slaves; 
in  1865  he  was  no  longer  a  slave,  but  whether  he 
was  to  be  serf,  ward,  or  citizen  was  an  unsettled 
problem;  in  1868  he  was  in  the  South  the  legal  and 
political  equal,  frequently  the  superior,  of  the 
white;  and  before  the  end  of  the  reconstruction 
period  he  was  made  by  the  legislation  of  some 

34 


WHEN  FREEDOM  CRIED  OUT  55 

States  and  by  Gingress  the  legal  equal  of  the 
white  even  in  certain  social  matters. 

The  race  problem  which  confronted  the  American 
people  had  no  parallel  in  the  past.  British  and  Span- 
ish-American  emancipation  of  slaves  had  affected 
only  small  numbers  or  small  r^ons,  in  which  one 
race  greatly  outnumbered  the  other.  The  results  of 
these  earlier  emancipations  of  the  negroes  and  the 
difficulties  of  European  states  in  dealing  with  subject 
white  populations  were  not  such  as  tc  afford  helpful 
example  to  American  statesmen.  But  since  it  was 
the  actual  situation  in  the  Southern  States  rather 
than  the  experience  of  other  countries  which  shaped 
the  policies  adopted  during  reconstruction,  it  is  im- 
portant to  examine  with  some  care  the  conditions 
in  which  the  negroes  in  the  South  found  themselves 
at  the  close  of  the  war. 

The  negroes  were  not  all  helpless  and  without 
experience  "when  freedom  cried  out."'  In  the 
Border  States  and  in  the  North  there  were,  in  1861, 
half  a  million  free  negroes  accustomed  to  looking 
out  for  themselves.  Nearly  200,000  negro  men 
were  enlisted  in  the  United  States  army  between 
1862  and  1865,  and  many  thousands  of  slaves  had 
followed  raiding  Federal  forces  to  freedom  or  had 

'  A  negro  phrase  much  used  in  referring  to  emancipation. 


I>: 


^ 


■ -i. 


I' 


I/,  -'i 

■■.  t  ■ 

I'  ■ 
1 1., 


Mi 

1 


86         THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

escaped  through  the  Confederate  lines.  State  eman- 
cipation in  Missouri,  Maryland,  West  Virginia, 
and  Tennessee,  and  the  practical  application  of 
the  Emancipation  Proclamation  where  the  Union 
armies  were  in  control  ended  slavery  for  many 
thousands  more.  Wherever  the  armies  marched, 
slavery  ended.  This  was  true  even  in  Kentucky, 
where  the  institution  was  not  legally  abolished 
until  the  adoption  of  the  Thirteenth  Amendment 
Altogether  more  than  a  million  negroes  were  free 
and  to  some  extent  habituated  to  freedom  before 
May,  1865. 

Most  of  these  war-emancipated  negroes  were 
scattered  along  the  borders  of  the  Confederacy,  in 
camps,  in  colonies,  in  the  towns,  on  refugee  farms, 
at  work  with  the  armies,  or  serving  as  soldiers 
in  the  ranks.  There  were  large  working  colonies 
along  the  Atlantic  coast  from  Maryland  to  Florida. 
The  chief  centers  were  near  Norfolk,  where  General 
Butler  was  the  first  to  establish  a  "contraband" 
camp,  in  North  Carolina,  and  on  the  Sea  Islands  of 
South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Florida,  which  had 
been  seized  by  the  Federal  fleet  early  in  the  war. 
To  the  Sea  Islands  also  were  sent,  in  1865,  the 
hordes  of  negroes  who  had  followed  General  Sher- 
man out  of  Georgia  and  South  Carolina.   Through 


I 


n 


WHEN  FREEDOM  CRIED  OUT  87 

the  Border  Sutet  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Misiia- 
sippi  and  along  both  aides  of  the  Miuiuippi  from 
Cairo,  Illinois,  to  New  Orleans,  t!iere  were  other 
refugee  camps,  farms,  and  colonies.    For  periods 
varying  from  one  to  four  years  these  free  negroes 
had  been  .at  work,  often  amid  conditions  highly  un- 
favorable to  health,  under  the  supervision  of  offi- 
cers of  the  Treaaury  Department  or  of  the  army. 
Emancipation  was  therefore  a  gradual  process, 
and  most  of  the  negroes,  through  their  widening  ex- 
perience on  the  planUtions,  with  the  armies,  and 
in  the  colonies,  were  better  fitted  for  freedom  in 
1865  than  they  had  beenml861.    Even  their  years 
of  bondage  had  done  something  for  them,  for  they 
knew  how  to  work  and  they  had  adopted  in  part 
the  language,  habits,  religion,  and  morals  of  the 
whites.     But  slavery  had  not  made  them  thrifty, 
self-reliant,  or  educated.    Frederick  Douglass  said 
of  the  negro  at  the  end  of  his  servitude:  "He  had 
none  of  the  conditions  of  self-preservation  or  self- 
protection.     He  was  free  from  the  individual  mas- 
ter, but  he  had  nothing  but  the  dusty  road  under 
;  s  feet.  He  was  free  from  the  old  quarter  that  once 
^ve  him  shelter,  but  a  slave  to  the  rains  of  summer 
and  to  the  frosts  of  winter.    He  was  turned  loose, 
naked,  hungry,  and  destitute  to  the  open  sky." 


■41         '\t 


; 
[I   ' 


1  I 


1 
\ 


m        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

To  prove  that  he  was  free  the  negro  thou|^t  he 
muat  leave  his  old  master,  change  his  name,  quit 
work  for  a  time,  perhaps  ^'^  a  new  wife,  and  hang 
around  the  Federal  soldiers  in  camp  or  garrison, 
or  go  to  the  towns  when-  the  Freedmen's  Bureau 
was  in  process  of  organi/Htion.  To  the  negroes 
who  remained  at  home  —  aii'l  curiously  enough, 
for  a  time  at  least  many  J  id  su  -  the  news  of  f  ree> 
dom  was  made  known  ~<  .'jowim,  ceremonially  by 
the  master  or  his  repi  "  ei^at  ve.  The  n^roes 
were  summoned  to  the  *' '  -ig  ^'ousf^,*'  tolJ  that  they 
were  free,  and  advised  to  1 1  ij  u  fn*  ,'  .  r  •  of  the 
crop.  The  description  I  Mrs  *'lr  .un,  the  wife 
of  a  Southern  general,  wi  »erv  ic.  many:  "My 
husband  said,  'I  think  it  ^  M  fc>i  iiic  to  inform  our 
negroes  of  their  freedom.'  So  he  ordered  all  the 
grown  slaves  to  come  to  him,  and  told  them  they 
no  longer  belonged  to  him  as  property,  but  were 
all  free.  '  You  are  not  bound  to  remain  with  me 
any  longer,  and  I  have  a  proposition  to  make  to 
you.  If  any  of  you  desire  to  leave,  I  propose  to 
furnish  you  with  a  conveyance  to  move  you,  and 
with  provisions  for  the  balance  of  the  year.'  The 
universal  answer  was,  'Master,  we  want  to  stay 
right  here  with  you.'  In  many  instances  the 
slaves  were  so  infatuated  with  the  idea  of  being. 


i 


^; 


^     11 


WHEN  FREEDOM  CRIED  OUT  90 

M  they  Mid.  'free  as  birds '  that  they  left  their 
homes  and  consequently  suffered;  but  our  slaves 
were  not  so  foolish."' 

The  negroes,   however,  had   learned  of  their 
freedom  before  their  old  masters  returned  from  the 
war;  they  were  aware  that  the  issues  of  the  war 
involved  in  some  way  the  question  of  their  freedom 
or  servitude,  and  through  the  "grape  vine  tele- 
graph, "  the  news  brought  by  the  invading  soldiers, 
and  the  talk  among  the  whites,  they  had  long  been 
kept  fairly  well  informed.    What  the  idea  of  free- 
dom meant  to  the  negroes  it  is  difficult  to  say. 
Some  thought  that  there  would  be  no  more  work 
and  that  all  would  be  cared  for  by  the  Government; 
othws  believed  that  education  and  opportunity 
were  about  to  make  them  the  equal  of  their  mas- 
ters.   The  majority  of  them  were  too  bewildered 
to  appreciate  anything  except  the  fact  that  they 
were  free  from  enforced  labor. 

Conditions  were  most  disturbed  in  the  so-called 
"Black  Belt,"  consisting  of  about  two  hundred 
counties  in  the  most  fertile  parts  of  the  South, 
where  the  plantation  system  was  best  developed 
and  where  by  far  the  majority  of  the  negroes  were 
segregated.     The   negroes   in   the   four   hundred 


(I 
I 


.11 


I '  1 


?'  I 


'  Black  and  White  undjr  the  Old  Bigime,  p.  15«. 


'[. 


p 


(i  h''' 


L     i 


40         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

more  remote  and  less  fertile  "white"  counties, 
which  had  been  less  disturbed  by  armies,  were  not 
so  upset  by  freedom  as  those  of  the  Black  Belt, 
for  the  garrisons  and  the  larger  towns,  both  centers 
of  demoralization,  were  in  or  near  the  Black  Belt. 
But  there  was  a  moving  to  and  fro  on  the  part  of 
those  who  had  escaped  from  the  South  or  had 
been  captured  during  the  war  or  carried  into  the 
interior  of  the  South  to  prevent  capture.  To 
those  who  left  slavery  and  home  to  find  freedom 
were  added  those  who  had  found  freedom  and 
were  now  trying  to  get  back  home  or  to  get  away 
from  the  negro  camps  and  colonies  which  were 
breaking  up.  A  stream  of  immigration  which 
began  to  flow  to  the  southwest  afiPected  n^^roes  as 
far  as  the  Atlantic  coast.  In  the  confusion  of 
moving,  families  were  broken  up,  and  children, 
wife,  or  husband  were  often  lost  to  one  another. 
The  very  old  people  and  the  young  children  were 
often  left  behind  for  the  former  master  to  care  for. 
R^ments  of  negro  soldiers  were  mustered  out  in 
every  large  town  and  their  numbers  were  added  to 
the  disorderly  mass.  Some  of  the  Federal  garri- 
sons and  Bureau  stations  were  almost  overwhelmed 
by  the  numbers  of  blacks  who  settled  down  upon 
them  waiting  for  freedom  to  bestow  its  full  meas- 


ih 


WHEN  FREEDOM  CRIED  OUT  41 

ure  of  blessing,  and  many  of  the  negroes  continued 
to  remain  in  a  demoralized  condition  until  the 
new  year. 

The  first  year  of  freedom  was  indeed  a  year  of 
disease,  suffering,  and  death.   Several  partial  cen- 
suses indicate  that  in  1865-66  the  negro  popuhi- 
tion  lost  as  many  by  disease  as  the  whites  had  lost 
in  war.    Ill-fed,  crowded  in  cabins  near  thegarri- 
sons  or  entirely  without  shelter,  and  unaccustomed 
to  caring  for  their  own  health,  the  blacks  who  wer« 
searching  for  freedom  fell  an  easy  prey  to  ordinary 
diseases  and  to  epidemics.    Poor  health  conditions 
prevailed  for  several  years  longer.    In  1870  Robert 
Somers  remarked  that  "the  health  of  the  whites 
has  greatiy  improved  since  the  war,  while  the 
health  of  the  negroes  has  declined  till  the  mor- 
tality of  the  colored  population,  greater  than  the 
mortality  of  the  whites  was  before  the  war,  has 
now  become  so  markedly  greater,  that  nearly  two 
colored  die  for  every  white  person  out  of  equal 
numbers  of  each." 

Morals  and  manners  also  suffered  under  the  new 
dispensation.  In  the  crowded  and  disease-stricken 
towns  and  camps,  the  conditions  under  which  the 
roving  n^p'oes  lived  were  no  better  for  morals 
than  for  health,  for  here  there  were  none  of  the 


.4 


(i, 


If 

I' 


f 


ni 


(I       5- 

..1  'I 


,1 1  -.i 


Ii 


!»      ' 


l!M. 


42         THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

restraints  to  which  the  blacks  had  been  accus- 
tomed and  which  they  now  despised  as  being  a 
part  of  their  servitude.  But  in  spite  of  all  the 
relief  that  could  be  given  there  was  much  want. 
In  fact,  to  restore  former  conditions  the  relief 
agencies  frequently  cut  off  supplies  in  order  to 
force  the  negroes  back  to  work  and  to  prevent 
others  from  leaving  the  country  for  the  towns. 
But  the  htmgry  freedmen  turned  to  the  nearest 
food  supply,  and  "spilin  de  gypshuns"  (despoiling 
the  Egyptians,  as  the  negroes  called  stealing  from 
the  whites)  became  an  approved  means  of  support. 
Thefts  of  hogs,  cattle,  poultry,  field  crops,  and 
v^etables  drove  almost  to  desperation  those 
whites  who  lived  in  the  vicinity  of  the  negro  camps. 
When  the  ex-slave  felt  obliged  to  go  to  town,  he 
was  likely  to  take  with  him  a  team  and  wagon  and 
his  master's  clothes  if  he  could  get  them. 

The  former  good  manners  of  the  negro  were 
now  replaced  by  impudence  and  distrust.  There 
were  advisers  among  the  negro  troops  and  other 
agitators  who  assured  them  that  politeness  to  whites 
was  a  mark  of  servitude.  Pushing  and  crowding 
in  public  places,  on  street  cars  and  on  the  sidewalks, 
and  impudent  speeches  everywhere  marked  gener- 
ally the  limit  of  rudeness.    And  the  n^roes  were, 


t  I 


WHEN  FREEDOM  CRIED  OUT  4S 

in  this  respect,  perhaps  no  worse  than  those  Euro- 
pean immigrants  who  act  upon  the  prmciple  that 
bad  manners  are  a  proof  of  independence. 

The  year  foUowmg  emancipation  was  one  of  re- 
ligious excitement  for  large  numbers  of  the  blacks. 
Before  1865  the  negro  church  members  were  at- 
tached to  white  congregations  or  were  organized 
into  missions,  with  nearly  always  a  white  minister 
in  charge  and  a  black  assistant.     With  the  coming 
of  freedom  the  races  very  soon  separated  in  re- 
ligious matters.    For  this  there  were  two  prin- 
cipal reasons:  the  negro  preachers  could  exercise 
more  influence  in  independent  churches;  and  new 
church  organizations  from  the  North  were  seeking 
n^ro  membership.    Sometimes  n^ro  members 
were  urged  to  insist  on  the  right  "to  sit  together" 
with  the  whites.    In  a  Richmond  church  a  n^ro 
from  the  street  pushed  his  way  to  the  communion 
altar  and  knelt.     There  was  a  noticeable  pause; 
then  General  Robert  E.  Lee  went  forward  and 
knelt  beside  the  negro;   and   the  congregation 
followed  his  example.     But  this  was  a  solitary 
instance.    When  the  race  issue  was  raised  by 
either  color,  the  church  membership  usually  di- 
vided.    There  was  much  churchgoing  by  the  ne- 
groes, day  and  night,  and  church  festivities  and 


-k^A 


n 


n 


\t' 


i 


f 


I 


1 

fi    ■«■ 
IS' 


'      i 


r 


l\ 


:•:] 


I 


VA^ 


it 


s  1 


f 


i  ! 


(  r  1  • 
*<;  i 

Ml! 


1 1" 


if 

i  1 


44         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

baptisnu  were  common.  The  blacks  preferred 
immeraion  and  wanted  a  new  baptism  each  time 
they  changed  to  a  new  church.  Baptizings  in 
ponds,  creeks,  or  rivers  were  great  occasions  and 
were  largely  attended.  "Shoutmg"  the  candi- 
dates went  into  the  water  and  "shouting"  they 
came  out.  One  old  woman  came  up  screaming, 
"Freed  from  slavery!  freed  from  sin!  Bless  God 
and  General  Grant!" 

In  the  effort  to  realize  their  new-found  freedom, 
the  negroes  were  heavily  handicapped  by  their 
extreme  poverty  and  their  ignorance.  Thd  total 
value  of  free  negro  property  ran  up  into  the  mil- 
lions in  1860,  but  the  majority  of  the  negroes  had 
nothing.  There  were  a  few  educated  n«^oes  in 
the  South,  and  more  in  the  North  and  in  Canada, 
but  the  mass  of  the  race  was  too  densely  ignorant 
to  furnish  its  own  leadership.  The  case,  however, 
was  not  hopeless;  the  negro  was  able  to  work  and 
in  large  territories  had  little  competition;  wages 
were  high,  even  though  paid  in  shares  of  the  crop; 
the  cost  of  living  was  low;  and  land  was  cheap. 
Thousands  seemed  thirsty  for  an  education  and 
crowded  the  schools  which  were  available.  It  was 
too  much,  however,  to  expect  the  negro  to  take 
immediate  advantage  of  his  opportunities.    What 


WHEN  FREEDOM  CRIED  OUT  45 

he  wanted  was  a  long  holiday,  a  gun  and  a  dog, 
and  plenty  of  hunting  and  fishing.  He  must  have 
Saturday  at  least  for  a  trip  to  town  or  to  a  picnic 
or  a  cmnis ;  he  did  not  wish  to  be  a  servant.  When 
he  had  any  money,  swindlers  reaped  a  harvest. 
They  sold  him  worthless  finery,  cheap  guns,  prep- 
arations to  bleach  the  skin  or  straighten  the  hair, 
and  striped  pegs  which,  when  set  up  on  the  mas- 
ter's plantation,  would  entitle  the  purchaser  to 
"40  acres  and  a  mule." 

The  attitude  of  the  n^roes'  employers  not 
infrequently  complicated  the  situation  which  they 
sought  to  better.  The  old  masters  were,  as  a 
rule,  skeptical  of  the  value  of  free  negro  labor. 
Carl  Schurz  thought  this  attitude  boded  ill  for  the 
future:  "A  belief,  conviction,  or  prejudice,  or 
whatever  you  may  call  it,"  he  said,  "so  widely 
spread  and  apparently  deeply  rooted  as  this,  that 
the  negro  will  not  work  without  physical  compul- 
sion, is  certainly  calculated  to  have  a  very  serious 
influence  upon  the  conduct  of  the  people  enter- 
taining it.  It  naturally  produced  a  desire  to 
preserve  slavery  in  its  original  form  as  much  and 
as  long  as  possible  ...  or  to  introduce  mto  the 
new  system  that  element  of  physical  compulsion 
which  would  make  the  negro  work." 


II 


i 


i 

i 

\ 


F 


•I 


;; 


I 


t:    I- 
'*■    i  •  ■ 

I. 

::      If 


:!»\ 


4«         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

The  negro  wished  to  be  free  to  leave  his  job 
when  he  pleased,  but,  as  Benjamin  C.  Truman 
stated  in  his  report  to  President  Johnson,  a  "re- 
sult of  the  settled  belief  in  the  n^ro's  inferi- 
ority, and  in  the  necessity  that  he  should  not 
be  left  to  himself  without  a  guardian,  is  that 
in  some  sections  he  is  discouraged  from  leaving 
his  old  master.  I  have  known  of  planters  who 
considered  it  an  offence  against  neighborhood 
courtesy  for  another  to  hire  their  old  hands,  and  in 
two  instances  that  were  reported  the  disputants 
came  to  blows  over  the  breach  of  etiquette." 
The  new  Freedmen's  Bureau  insisted  upon  written 
contracts,  except  for  day  laborers,  and  this  un- 
doubtedly kept  many  negroes  from  working  regu- 
larly, for  they  were  suspicious  of  contracts.  Be- 
sides, the  agitators  and  the  n^ro  troops  led  them 
to  hope  for  an  eventual  distribution  of  property. 
An  Alabama  planter  thus  described  the  situation 
in  December,  1865: 

They  will  not  work  for  anything  but  wages,  and  few 
are  able  to  pay  wages.  They  are  penniless  but  resolute 
in  their  demands.  They  expect  to  see  all  the  land 
divided  out  equally  between  them  and  their  old  masters 
in  time  to  make  the  next  crop.  One  of  the  most  intelli- 
gent black  men  I  know  told  me  that  in  a  neighboring 
village,  where  several  hundred  blacks  were  congregated, 


i'Ct:  i 


I : 


3      i       I 


iVi 


WHEN  FREEDOM  CRIED  OUT  47 

he  doM  not  think  that  as  many  as  three  made  contracts, 
although  planters  are  urgent  in  their  soIiciiAtions  and 
offering  highest  prices  for  labor  they  can  possibly  af- 
ford to  pay.  The  same  man  informed  me  that  the 
unpression  widely  prevails  that  Congress  is  about  to 
divide  out  the  lands,  and  that  this  impression  is  given 
out  by  Federal  soldiers  at  the  nearest  military  station. 
It  cannot  be  disguised  that  in  spite  of  the  most  earnest 
efforts  of  their  old  master  to  conciliate  and  satisfy  them, 
the  estrangement  between  races  increases  in  its  extent 
and  bitterness.  Nearly  all  the  negro  men  are  armed 
with  repeaters,  and  many  of  them  carry  them  openly, 
day  and  night. 

The  relations  between  the  races  were  better, 
however,  than  conditions  seemed  to  indicate.  The 
whites  of  the  Black  Belt  were  better  disposed  to- 
ward the  negroes  than  were  those  of  the  white 
districts.  It  was  in  the  towns  and  villages  that 
most  of  the  race  conflicts  occurred.  All  whites 
agreed  that  the  negro  was  inferior,  but  there  were 
many  who  were  grateful  for  his  conduct  during 
the  war  and  who  wished  him  well.  But  others, 
the  policemen  of  the  towns,  the  "loyalists,"  those 
who  had  little  but  pride  of  race  and  the  vote  to 
distinguish  them  from  the  blacks,  felt  no  good  will 
toward  the  ex-slaves.  It  was  Truman's  opinion 
"not  only  that  the  planters  are  far  better  friends 
to  the  negroes  than  the  poor  whites,  but  also  better 


M 


i 


V: 

8 


I     i 


Ml 


I 


( 


n 


hi 

m 

ii 

I  Hi 
'  i  * 

I  k 


■11 

1        1 

il 

L 

48  THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOBIATTOX 
than  a  majority  of  the  Northern  men  who  go  South 
to  rent  pUuitations."  John  T.  Trowbridge,  the 
novelist,  who  recorded  hU  impressions  of  the 
South  after  a  visit  in  1865,  was  of  the  opinion  that 
the  Unionists  "do  not  like  niggers."  "For  there 
is,"  he  said,  "more  prejudice  against  color  among 
the  middle  and  poorer  classes  —  the  Union  men  of 
the  South  who  owned  few  or  no  slaves  —  than 
among  the  planters  who  owned  them  by  scores  and 
hundreds. "  The  reports  of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau 
are  to  the  same  effect.  A  Bureau  agent  in  Ten- 
nessee testified :  "  An  old  citizen,  a  Union  man,  said 
to  me,  said  he,  'I  tell  you  what,  if  you  takeaway 
the  military  from  Tennessee,  the  buzzards  can't  eat 
up  the  niggers  as  fast  as  we'll  kill  them.' " 

The  lawlessness  of  the  negroes  in  parts  of  the 
Black  Belt  and  the  disturbing  influences  of  the 
black  troops,  of  some  officials  of  the  Bureau,  and 
of  some  of  the  missionary  teachers  and  preachers, 
caused  the  whites  to  fear  i:  jurrections  and  to  take 
measures  for  protection.  Secret  semi-military  or- 
ganizations were  formed  which  later  developed  into 
the  Ku  Klux  orders.  When,  however.  New  Year's  • 
Day,  1866,  passed  without  the  hoped-for  distribu- 
tion of  property  the  negroes  began  to  settle  down. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  period  of  reconstruc- 


WHEN  FREEDOM  CRIED  OUT  40 

Uon  it  seemed  possible  that  the  negro  race  might 
speedily  fall  into  distinct  economic  groups,  for 
there  were  some  who  had  property  and  many 
others  who  had  the  ability  and  the  opportunity  to 
acquire  it;  but  the  later  drawing  of  race  lines  and 
the  political  disturbances  of  reconstruction  checked 
this  tendency.  It  was  expected  also  that  the  North- 
em  planters  who  came  South  in  large  numbers  in 
1865-66  might,  by  controlling  the  n^ro  labor  and 
by  the  use  of  more  efficient  methods,  aid  in  the 
economic  upbuilding  of  the  country.  But  they  were 
ignorant  of  agricultural  matters  and  incapable  of 
wisely  controlling  the  blacks;  and  they  failed  be- 
cause at  one  time  they  placed  too  much  trust  in  the 
negroes  and  at  another  treated  them  too  harshly 
and  expected  too  much  of  them. 

The  question  of  negro  suffrage  was  not  a  live 
issue  in  the  South  until  the  middle  of  1866.  There 
was  almost  no  talk  about  it  among  the  n^^roes; 
they  did  not  know  what  it  was.  President  Lincoln 
in  1864  and  President  Johnsou  in  1865  had  merely 
mentioned  the  subject,  though  Chief  Justice  Chase 
and  prominent  radical  members  of  Congress,  as 
well  as  numerous  abolitionists,  had  framed  a  ne- 
gro suffrage  platform.  But  the  Southern  whites, 
considering  the  matter  an  impossibility,  gave  it 


.^11 


J. 


V 


w 


5   ft. 


'3    ] 

>0 


H 


.!' 


i,.  * ' 

h  I 

t 

■ 


t 

11 

hi 


1L 


f  II 
1 


'■-  f 


M  THE  SEQUEL  OF  AFFOlfATTOX 
little  oonddention.  There  wm,  however,  both 
North  and  South,  a  tendency  to  see  a  connectiob 
between  the  freedom  of  the  negroes  and  their  polit- 
ical rights  and  thus  to  confuse  dvil  equality  with 
political  and  social  privileges.  But  the  great 
masses  of  the  whites  were  solidly  opposed  to  the 
recognition  of  negro  equality  in  any  form.  The 
poorer  whites,  especially  the  "Unionists"  who 
hoped  to  develop  an  opposition  party,  were  angered 
by  any  discussion  of  the  subject.  An  Alabama 
"Unionist,"  M.  J.  Saffold,  later  prominent  as  a 
radical  politician,  declared  to  the  Jomt  Committee 
on  Reconstruction:  "If  you  compel  us  to  carry 
through  universal  suffrage  of  colored  men  ...  it 
will  prove  quite  an  incubus  upon  us  in  the  organi- 
zation of  a  Utttional  union  party  of  white  men;  it 
will  furnish  our  opponents  with  a  very  effective 
weapon  of  offense  against  us." 

There  were,  however,  some  Southern  leaders  of 
ability  and  standing  who,  by  1866,  were  willing  to 
consider  negro  suffrage.  These  men,  among  them 
General  Wade  Hampton  of  South  Carolina  and 
Governor  Robert  Patton  of  Alabama,  were  of  the 
slaveholding  class,  and  they  fully  counted  on  be- 
ing able  to  control  the  negro's  vote  by  methods 
similar  to  those  actually  put  in  force  a  quarter  of  a 


iV 


WHEN  FREEDOM  CRIED  OUT  51 

rmitury  later.  The  negroes  were  not  as  yet 
p  '  '  aUy  organized,  were  not  even  interested  in 
politics,  and  the  master  class  might  neasocibly 
hope  to  r^ain  control  of  them.  Whitelaw  Rdd 
published  an  iitterview  with  one  of  the  Hampton* 
which  describes  the  situation  exactly: 


t, 


Ji 
%* 


A  brother  of  General  Wade  Hampton,  the  South 
Carolina  Hotspur,  was  on  board.  He  saw  no  great 
objection  to  negro  suffrage,  so  far  as  the  whites  were 
ooooemed;  and  for  himself,  South  Carolinian  and 
secessionist  though  hf.  was,  he  was  quite  willing  to 
accept  it.  He  oiAy  dreaded  its  effect  on  the  blacks 
themselves.  Hitherto  they  had  in  the  main,  been 
mo(kst  and  respectful,  and  mere  freedom  was  not 
likely  to  spoil  them.  But  the  deference  to  them  likdy 
to  be  shown  by  partisans  eager  tor  their  votes  would 
have  a  tendency  to  uplift  them  and  unbalance  them. 
Beyond  this,  no  harm  would  be  done  the  South  by  negro 
suffrage.  The  old  owners  would  cast  the  votes  of  their 
people  almost  as  absolutdy  and  securely  as  they  cast 
their  own.  If  Northern  men  expected  in  this  way  to 
build  up  a  northern  party  in  the  South,  they  were 
gravely  mistaken.  They  would  only  be  multiplying 
the  power  of  the  old  and  natural  leaders  of  Southern 
politics  by  giving  every  vote  to  a  former  slave.  Hereto- 
fore such  men  bad  served  their  masters  only  in  the 
fields;  now  they  would  do  no  less  faithful  service  at  the 
polls.  If  the  North  could  stand  it,  the  South  could. 
For  himself,  he  should  make  no  special  objection  to 
negro  suffrage  iia  one  of  the  terms  of  reorganization,  and 


^ 


s  i, 


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f;  .1 


fl 


1. 1 

I 


<: 


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ffll 


fli 

1  w 


i  i 


M 

if  it 


THE  SEQUEL  OF  APFOBfATTOX 

t.  he  (fid  not  thiolc  the  South  would  have  mtidi 
it. 


to 

To  lum  up  the  litUAtion  at  this  time:  the  negro 
population  at  the  doie  of  the  war  constituted  a 
tremendous  problem  for  those  in  authority.    The 
race  was  free,  but  without  status,  without  leaders, 
without  property,  and  without  education.    Pro- 
bably a  fourth  of  them  had  some  experience  in 
freedom  before  the  G>nf  ederate  armies  surrendered, 
and  the  sorvitude  of  the  other  three  millions  ended 
very  quickly  and  without  violence.    But  in  the 
Black  Belt,  whore  the  bulk  of  the  black  popula- 
tion was  to  be  found,  the  labor  system  was  broken 
up,  and  for  several  months  the  bewildered  freed- 
men  wandered  about  or  remained  at  home  under 
conditions  which  were  bad  for  health,  morals,  and 
thrift.    The  Northern  negroes  did  not  furnish  the 
expected  leadership  for  the  race,  and  the  mor« 
capable  men  in  the  South  showed  a  tendency  to  go 
North.    The  unsettled  state  of  the  negroes  and 
their  expectation  of  receiving  a  part  of  the  property 
of  the  whites  kept  the  latter  uneasy  and  furnished 
the  occasion  of  frequent  conflicts.    Not  the  least 
of  the  unsettling  influences  at  work  upon  the  n^ro 
population  were  the  colored  troops  and  the  agiti^ 
tors  furnished  by  the  Freedmen's  Bureau,  the  mis- 


U 


WHEN  FREEDOM  CRIED  OUT  5S 

dons,  and  the  Bureau  acbook.  But  st  the  begin- 
ning of  the  year  1866  the  aituation  appeared  to  be 
clearing,  and  the  aocial  and  economic  revolution 
leemed  on  the  way  to  a  quieter  ending  than  might 
have  been  eiq>ected. 


m 


'." 


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f        f 


if 


; 


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I 
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I 


CHAPTER  in 

THE  WORK  OF  THE  PRESIDENTS 

The  war  ended  slavery,  but  it  left  the  problem  of 
the  freed  slave;  it  preserved  the  Union  in  theory, 
but  it  left  unsolved  many  delicate  problems  of 
readjustment.  Were  the  seceded  States  in  or  out 
of  the  Union?  If  in  the  Union,  what  rights  had 
they?  If  they  were  not  in  the  Union,  what  was 
their  status?  What  was  the  status  of  the  South- 
em  Unionist,  of  the  ex-Confederate?  What  punish- 
ments should  be  inflicted  upon  the  Southern  people? 
What  authority,  executive  or  legislative,  should 
carry  out  the  work  of  reconstruction?  The  end  of 
the  war  brought  with  it,  in  spite  of  much  discus- 
sion, no  clear  answer  to  these  perplexing  questions. 
Unfortunately,  American  political  life,  with  its 
controversies  over  colonial  government,  its  con- 
flicting interpretations  of  written  constitutions, 
•^.nd  its  l^ally  trained  statesmen,  had  by  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  produced  a  habit 

«4 


THE  WORK  OP  THE  PRESmENTO  55 
of  political  thought  which  demanded  the  settle- 
ment  of  most  governmental  matters  upon  a  theo- 
retical basis.  And  now  in  1805  each  prominent 
leader  had  his  own  plan  of  reconstruction  f unda- 
mentaUy  irreconcilable  with  aU  the  others,  because 
rigidly  theoretical.  During  the  war  the  powers  of 
tiie  Executive  had  been  greatiy  expanded  and  a 
legisUtive  reaction  was  to  be  expected.  The  Con- 
stitution caUed  for  fresh  interpretation  in  the  light 
of  the  Civil  War  and  its  results. 

The  first  tiieory  of  reconsb^ction  may  be  found 
in  the  Crittenden-Johnson  resolutions  of  July, 
1861,  which  declared  that  the  war  was  being  waged 
to  maintain  tiie  Union  under  the  Constitution  and 
tiiat  it  should  cease  when  tiiese  objects  were  ob- 
tained.    This  would  have  been  subscribed  to  in 
1861  by  the  Union  Democrats  and  by  most  of  the 
Republicans,  and  in  1865  tiie  conquered  Soutiiern- 
ers  would  have  been  gkd  to  reenter  tiie  Union 
upon  tills  basis;  but  tiiough  in  1865  tiie  resolution 
stiU  expressed  tiie  views  of  many  Democrats,  tiie 
majority  of  Nortiiem  people  had  moved  away  from 
this  position. 

The  attitude  of  Lincoln,  which  in  1865  met  the 
views  of  a  majority  of  tiie  Nortiiem  people  tiiough 
not  of  the  political  leaders,  was  tiiat  "no  State  can 


«ij 


^  */ 


¥     ■ 


6%         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

upon  its  mere  motion  get  out  of  the  Union,"  that 
the  States  survived  though  there  might  be  some 
doubt  about  state  governments,  and  that  "loyal" 
state  organizations  might  be  established  by  a  popu- 
lation consisting  largely  of  ex-Confederates  who 
had  been  pardoned  by  the  President  and  made 
"loyal"  for  the  future  by  an  oath  of  allegiance. 
Reconstruction  was,  Lincoln  thought,  a  matter  for 
the  Executive  to  handle.  But  that  he  was  not  in- 
flexibly committed  to  any  one  plan  is  indicated 
by  his  proclamation  after  the  pocket  veto  of  the 
Wade-Davis  Bill  and  by  his  last  speech,  in  which 
he  declared  that  the  question  of  whether  the 
seceded  States  were  in  the  Union  or  out  of  it  was 
"merely  a  pernicious  abstraction."  In  addition, 
Lincoln  said : 

We  are  all  agreed  that  the  seceded  States,  so  called,  are 
out  of  their  proper  practical  relation  with  the  Union, 
and  that  the  sole  object  of  the  government,  civil  and 
military,  in  regard  to  those  States  is  to  again  get  them 
into  that  proper  practical  relation.  I  believe  that  it  is 
not  only  possible,  but  in  fact  easier,  to  do  this  without 
deciding  or  even  considering  whether  these  States  have 
ever  been  out  of  the  Union,  than  with  it.  Finding  them- 
selves safely  at  home,  it  would  be  utteriy  immaterial 
whether  they  had  ever  been  abroad.  Let  us  all  join  in 
doing  the  acts  necessary  to  restore  the  proper  practical 
relations  between  these  States  and  the  Union,  and  each 


THE  WORK  OP  THE  FRESmENTS       57 

forever  after  innocently  indulge  his  own  opinion  whether 
in  doing  the  acts  he  brought  the  bUtes  from  without 
into  the  Union,  or  only  gave  them  proper  assistance, 
\bey  never  having  been  out  of  it. 

President  Johnson's  position  was  essentially  that 
of  Lincob,  but  his  attitude  toward  the  workfag 
out  of  the  several  problems  was  different     He 
maintained  that  the  States  survived  and  that  it 
was  the  duty  of  the  Executive  to  restore  them  to 
their  proper  relations.     "The  true  theory,"  said 
he,  "is  that  all  pretended  acts  of  secession  were 
from  the  banning  null  and  void.    The  States  can- 
not commit  treason  nor  screen  individual  dtizens 
who  may  have  committed  treason  any  more  than 
they  can  make  valid  treaties  or  engage  in  lawful 
commerce  with  any  foreign  power.   The  States  at- 
tempting to  secede  placed  themselves  in  a  condition 
where  their  vitality  was  impaired,  but  not  extin- 
guished; their  functions  suspended,  but  not  de- 
stroyed."    Lincoln   would   have  had  no  severe 
punishments  inflicted  even  on  leaders,  but  Johnson 
wanted  to  destroy  the  "slavocracy,"  root  and 
branch.    Confiscation  of  estates  would,  he  thought, 
be  a  proper  measure.     He  said  on  one  occasion: 
"Traitors  should  take  a  back  seat  in  the  work  of 
restoration My  judgment  is  that  he  [a  rebelj 


f 


tx.}  - 


I  it' 

I* 
> 


f.  ;l 


;'ll 


1 1.  C.*- 


:' 


11 


V  .1 


^ 


0t         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

should  be  subjected  to  a  severe  ordeal  before  he  is 
restored  to  dtizenship.  Treason  should  be  made 
odious,  and  traitors  must  be  punuhed  and  impov- 
erished. Hieir  great  plantations  must  be  seized, 
and  divided  into  small  farms  and  sold  to  honest,  in- 
dustrious men. "  The  violence  of  Johnson's  views 
subsequently  underwent  considerable  modification 
but  to  the  last  he  held  to  the  plan  of  ocecutive  res- 
toration based  upon  state  perdurance.  Neither 
Lincoln  nor  Johnson  favored  a  change  of  South- 
ern institutions  other  than  the  abolition  of  slav- 
ery, though  each  recommended  a  qualified  negro 
suffrage. 

There  were,  however,  other  theories  in  the  field, 
notably  those  of  the  radical  Republican  leaders. 
According  to  the  state-suicide  theory  of  Charles 
Sumner,  "any  vote  of  secession  or  other  act  by 
which  any  State  may  undertake  to  put  an  end  to 
the  supremacy  of  the  C!onstitution  within  its  terri- 
tory is  inoperative  and  void  against  the  Constitu- 
tion, and  when  sustained  by  force  it  becomes  a 
practical  abdication  by  the  State  of  all  rights  unda 
the  Constitution,  while  the  treason  it  involves  still 
fiu*ther  works  an  instantforfeiture  of  all  those  func- 
tions and  powers  essential  to  the  continued  exist- 
ence of  the  State  as  a  body  politic,  so  that  from 


THE  WORK  OP  THE  PRESIDENTS       59 

that  time  forward  the  territory  falls  under  the 
exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Congress  as  other  tori- 
tory,  and  the  State,  being  according  to  the  language 
of  the  law  felo  de  *e,  ceases  to  exist."  G>ngress 
should  punish  the  "rebels"  by  abolishing  slavery, 
by  giving  civil  and  political  rights  to  negroes,  and 
by  educating  them  with  the  whites. 

Not  essentially  different,  but  harsher,  was  Thad- 
deus  Stevens's  plans  for  treating  the  South  as  a 
conquered  foreign  province.  Let  the  victors  treat 
the  seceded  States  "as  conquered  provinces  and 
settle  them  with  new  men  and  exterminate  or  drive 
out  the  present  rebels  as  exiles. "  Congress  in  deal- 
ing with  these  provinces  was  not  bound  even  by  the 
Constitution,  "a  bit  of  worthless  parchmeat,"  but 
might  legislate  as  it  pleased  in  regard  to  slavery, 
the  ballot,  and  confiscation.  With  regard  to  the 
white  population  he  said:  "I  have  never  desired 
bloody  punishments  to  any  great  extent.  But 
there  are  punishments  quite  as  appalling,  and 
longer  remembered,  than  death.  They  are  more 
advisable,  because  they  would  reach  a  greater 
number.  Strip  a  proud  nobility  of  their  bloated 
estates;  reduce  them  to  a  level  with  plain  republi- 
cans; send  them  forth  to  labor,  and  teach  their 
children  to  enta  the  workshops  or  handle  a  plow. 


H 


\\ 


ni 


_^ 


eo         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

and  you  will  thus  humble  the  proud  traitors." 
Stevens  and  Sumner  agreed  in  reducing  the  South- 
em  States  to  a  territorial  status.  Sumner  would 
then  take  the  principles  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  as  a  guide  for  Congress,  while  Ste- 
vens would  leave  Congress  absolute.  Neither  con- 
sidered the  Constitution  as  of  any  validity  in  this 
crisis. 

As  a  rule  the  former  abolitionists  were  in  1865 
advocates  of  votes  and  lands  for  the  negro,  in  whose 
capacity  for  self-rule  they  had  complete  confidence. 
The  view  of  Gerrit  Smith  may  be  regarded  as  typ- 
ical of  the  abolitionist  position : 

Let  the  first  condition  of  peace  with  them  be  that  no 
people  in  the  rebel  States  shall  ever  lose  or  gain  civil  or 
political  rights  by  reason  of  their  race  or  origin.  The 
next  condition  of  peace  be  that  our  black  allies  in  the 
South  —  those  saviours  of  our  nation  —  shall  share  with 
their  poor  white  neighbors  in  the  subdivisions  of  the 
large  landed  estates  of  the  South.  Let  the  only  other 
condition  be  that  the  rebel  masses  shall  not,  for  say,  a 
dozen  years,  be  allowed  access  to  the  ballot-box,  or  be 
eligible  to  office;  and  that  the  like  restrictions  be  for  life 
on  their  political  and  military  leaders.  .  .  .  The  mass 
of  the  Southern  blacks  fall,  in  point  of  intelligence,  but 
little,  if  any,  behind  the  mass  of  the  Southern  whites.  .  .  . 
In  reference  to  the  qualifications  of  the  voter,  men  make 
too  much  account  of  the  head  and  too  little  of  the  heart. 
The  ballot-box,  Uke  God,  says:  "Give  me  your  heart." 


}  t 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  PRESmENTS       01 

The  best-hearted  men  are  the  best  qualified  to  vote;  and, 
in  this  light,  the  blacks,  with  their  characteristic  gentle- 
ness, patience,  and  affectionateness,  are  peculiarly  en- 
titled to  vote.  We  cannot  wonder  at  Swedenborg's 
belief  that  the  celestial  people  will  be  found  in  the  in- 
terior of  Africa;  nor  hardly  can  we  wonder  at  the  legend 
that  the  gods  came  down  every  year  to  sup  with  their 
favorite  Africans. 

One  of  the  most  statesmanlike  proposals  was 
made  by  Governor  John  A.  Andrew  of  Massachu- 
setts. If,  forgetting  their  theories,  the  conserva- 
tives could  have  imited  in  support  of  a  restora- 
tion conceived  in  his  spirit,  the  goal  might  have 
been  speedily  achieved.  Andrew  demanded  a  re- 
organization, based  upon  acceptance  of  the  results 
of  the  war,  but  carried  through  with  the  aid  of 
"those  who  are  by  their  intelligence  and  character 
the  natural  leaders  of  their  people  and  who  surely 
wili  lead  them  by  and  by. "  These  men  cannot  be 
kept  out  forever,  said  he,  for 

the  capacity  of  leadership  is  a  gift,  not  a  device.  They 
whose  courage,  talents,  and  will  entitle  them  to  lead, 
will  lead.  ...  If  we  cannot  gain  their  support  of  the 
just  measures  needful  for  the  work  of  safe  reorganiza- 
tion, reorganization  will  be  delusive  and  full  of  danger. 
They  are  the  most  hopeful  subjects  to  deal  with.  They 
have  the  brain  and  the  experience  and  the  education  to 
enable  them  to  understand  .  .  .  the  present  situation. 


I 


1 


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A- 


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P 

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4 


M         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

They  have  the  oonnge  m  well  h  the  ikill  to  lead  the 
people  in  the  direction  their  judgments  pomt.  .  .  .  Ii 
it  coniiitent  with  reaaon  and  our  knowledge  of  human 
nature,  to  believe  the  nuuM*  of  Southern  men  able  to 
face  about,  to  turn  their  backs  on  those  they  have 
trusted  and  followed,  and  to  adopt  the  lead  of  those 
who  have  no  magnetic  hold  on  their  hearts  or  minds? 
It  would  be  idle  to  reorganize  by  the  colored  vote.  If 
the  popular  vole  of  the  white  race  is  not  to  be  had  in 
favor  of  the  guarantees  justly  required,  then  I  am  in 
favor  of  holding  on  —  just  where  we  are  now.  I  am 
not  in  favor  of  a  surrender  of  the  present  rights  of  the 
Union  to  a  struggle  between  a  white  minority  aided 
by  the  freedmen  on  one  hand,  against  the  majority  of 
the  white  race  on  the  other.  I  would  not  consent,  hav- 
ing rescued  those  states  by  arms  from  Secesaon  and 
rebellion,  to  turn  them  over  to  anarchy  and  chaos. 

The  Southerners,  Unionists  as  well  as  Confed- 
erates, had  their  views  as  well,  but  at  Washington 
these  carried  little  influence.  The  former  Con- 
federates would  naturally  favor  the  plan  which 
promised  best  for  the  white  South,  and  their  views 
were  most  nearly  met  by  those  of  President  Lincoln. 
Although  he  held  that  in  principle  a  new  Union  had 
arisen  out  of  the  war,  as  a  matter  of  immediate  po- 
litical expediency  he  was  prepared  to  build  on  the 
assumption  that  the  old  Union  still  existed.  The 
Southern  Unionists  cared  little  for  theories;  they 
wanted   the  Confederates   punisheds  themselves 


•      I] 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  FRBSn>ENTS       68 

promoted  to  high  offices,  and  the  negro  kept  from 
the  ballot  box. 

Even  at  the  beginning  of  18M,  it  was  not  too 
much  to  hope  that  the  majority  of  former  Republi- 
cans would  accept  conservative  methods,  provided 
the  so-called  "fruits  of  the  war"  were  assured  — 
that  is,  equality  of  civil  rights,  the  guarantee  of  the 
United  States  war  debt,  the  repudiation  of  the  Con- 
federate debt,  the  temporary  disfranchisement  of 
the  leading  Confederates,  and  some  arrangement 
which  would  keep  the  South  from  profiting  by  repre- 
sentation based  on  the  non-voting  negro  population. 
But  amid  many  conflicting  policies,  none  attained 
to  continuous  and  compelling  authority. 

The  plan  first  put  to  trial  was  that  of  President 
Lincoln.  It  was  a  definite  plan  designed  to  meet 
actual  conditions  and,  had  he  lived,  he  might  have 
been  able  to  carry  it  through  successfully.  Not 
a  theorist,  but  an  opportunist  of  the  highest  type, 
sobered  by  years  of  responsibUity  in  war  time,  and 
fully  understanding  the  precarious  situation  in 
1865,  Lincoln  was  most  anxious  to  secure  an  early 
restoration  of  solidarity  with  as  little  friction  as 
possible.  Better  than  most  Union  leaders  he  ap- 
preciated conditions  in  the  South,  the  problem  of 
the  races,  the  weakness  of  the  Southern  Unionists, 


•  n 


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64  THE  SEQUEL  OF  AFFOBCATTOX 
•ad  the  advantage  of  calling  in  the  old  Southern 
leaden.  He  was  generou*  and  connderate;  he 
wanted  no  executioni  or  imprisonmeata;  he  wished 
the  leaden  to  escape;  and  he  was  anxious  that  the 
mass  of  Southernen  be  welcomed  back  without 
loss  of  rights.  "There  is. "  he  declared,  "too  little 
respect  for  their  rights, "  an  unwillingness,  in  short, 
to  treat  them  as  fellow  citizens. 

This  executive  policy  had  been  applied  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war  as  opportunity  offered.    The 
President  used  the  army  to  hold  the  Border  States 
in  the  Union,  to  aid  in  "  reorganising "  Unionist 
Virginia  and  in  esUblishing  West  Virginia.    The 
army,  used  to  preserve  the  Union  might  be  used 
also  to  restore  disturbed  parts  of  it  to  normal  con- 
dition.   Assuming  that  the  "SUtes"  still  existed, 
"loyal"  state  governments  were  the  first  necessity. 
By  his  proclamation  of  December  8,  1868,  Lincob 
suggested  a  method  of  beginning  the  reconstruc- 
tion: he  would  pardon  any  Confederate,  except 
specified  classes  of  leaders,  who  took  an  oath  of 
loyalty  for  the  future;  if  as  many  as  ten  per  cent 
of  the  voting  population  of  1860,  thus  made  loyal, 
should  establish  a  state  government  the  Executive 
would  recognize  it.    The  matter  of  slavery  must, 
indeed,  be  Irft  to  the  laws  and  proclamations  as 


THE  WCttK  OF  THE  PRESIDENTS       M 

interpreted  by  the  oourtt,  but  other  institutioiif 
ibould  oontinue  m  in  1861. 

This  pku  WM  inaugurated  in  four  SUtet  which 
had  been  in  part  controlled  by  the  Federal 
army  from  nearly  the  beginning  of  the  war:  Ten- 
nenee  (186i),  Louiiiana  (1862),  Arkanaaa  (186f), 
and  Virginia  after  the  formation  of  Weat  Virginia 
(186S).  For  eacL  SUte.  Lincoln  appointed  a  mili- 
tary goverDor:  for  TenneMee,  Andrew  Johnson; 
for  Arkanaaa,  John  S.  Phelpi;  for  Louisiana,  Gen- 
eral Shepley.  In  Virginia  he  recognised  the  "re- 
organized" government,  which  had  been  trans- 
ferred to  Alexandria  when  the  new  State  of  West 
Virginia  was  formed.  The  military  governors 
undertook  the  slow  and  difficult  work  of  reorgani- 
sation, howevor,  with  but  slight  success  owing  to 
the  small  numbers  of  Unionists  and  of  Confeder- 
ates who  would  take  the  oath.  But  by  1864  "ten 
per  cent"  state  governments  were  established  in 
Arkansas  and  Louisiana,  and  progress  was  being 
made  in  Tennessee. 

Congress  was  impatient  of  Lincoln's  claim  to  ex- 
ecutive precedence  in  the  matter  of  reconstruction, 
and  in  1864  both  Houses  passed  the  Wade-Davis 
Bin,  a  pUn  which  asserted  the  right  of  Congress 
to  control   reconstruction   and   foreshadowed 


i  r 


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Mietoeorr  msowtion  tbt  chait 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


la  ■2.8 

150     '^^ 


Itt 


112 


116 


1*0 


APPLIED  IIVMGE 


1653  Eoit  Main  Strati 
Roch«l«r,   N*w  York        14609       US* 
(716)  482-OMO-Phon.  ^ 

(716)  288 -5989 -Fa. 


60         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOBiATTOX 

radical  settlement  of  the  question.  Lincoln  dis- 
posed of  the  bill  by  a  pocket  veto  and,  in  a  proc- 
ktmation  dated  July  8,  1864,  stated  that  he  was 
unprepared  "to  be  inflexibly  committed  to  any 
single  plan  of  restoration,"  or  tx>  discourage  loyal 
citizens  by  setting  aside  the  governments  already 
established  in  Louisiana  and  Arkansas,  or  to  re- 
cognize the  authority  of  Ck>ngress  to  abolish  slav- 
ery. He  was  ready,  however,  to  cooperate  with 
the  people  of  any  State  who  wished  to  accept  the 
plan  prepared  by  Congress  and  he  hoped  that 
a  constitutional  amendment  abolishing  slavery 
would  be  adopted. 

Lincoln  early  came  to  the  conclusion  that  slavery 
must  be  destroyed,  and  he  had  urgently  advocated 
deportation  of  the  freedmen,  for  he  believed  that 
the  two  races  could  not  live  in  harmony  after  eman- 
cipation. The  nearest  he  came  to  recommending 
the  vote  for  the  negro  was  in  a  communication  to 
Governor  Hahn  of  Louisiana  in  March,  1864:  "I 
barely  suggest,  for  your  private  consideration, 
whether  some  of  the  colored  people  may  not  be 
let  in,  as  for  instance,  the  very  intelligent,  and 
especially  those  who  have  fought  gallantly  in  our 
ranks.  They  would  probably  help,  in  some  try- 
ing time  to  come,  to  keep  the  jewel  of  liberty 


THE  WOBK  OP  THE  PRESIDENTS  67 
within  the  family  of  freedom.  But  this  is  only  a 
suggestion,  not  to  the  public,  but  to  you  alone." 

Throughout  the  war  President  Lincoln  assumed 
that  the  state  or;:^anizations  in  the  South  were 
illegal  because  disloyal  and  that  new  governments 
must  be  established.  But  just  at  the  close  of  the 
war,  probably  carried  away  by  feeling,  he  all  but 
recognized  the  Virginia  Confederate  Grovemment 
as  competent  to  bring  the  State  back  into  the 
Union.  While  in  Richmond  on  April  5,  186fi,  he 
gave  to  Judge  Campbell  a  statement  of  terms:  the 
national  authority  to  be  restored;  no  recession 
on  slavery  by  the  Executive;  hostile  forces  to  dis- 
band. The  next  day  he  notified  Genera*  Weitzel, 
in  command  at  Richmond,  that  he  might  permit 
the  Virginia  Legislature  to  meet  and  withdraw 
military  and  other  support  from  the  Confederacy. 
But  these  measures  met  strong  opposition  in  Wash- 
ington, especially  from  Secretary  Stanton  and  Sen- 
ator Wade  and  other  congressional  leaders,  and  on 
the  11th  of  April  Lincoln  withdrew  his  permission 
for  the  Legislature  to  meet.  "I  cannot  go  for- 
ward, "  he  said,  "  with  everybody  opposed  to  me.  '* 
It  was  on  the  same  day  that  he  made  his  last 
public  speech,  and  Sumner,  who  was  strongly  op- 
posed to  his  policy,  remarked  that "  lie  President's 


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68         THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

speech  and  other  things  augur  confusion  and  un- 
certainty in  the  future,  with  hot  contumacy. "  At 
a  cabinet  meeting  on  the  14th  of  April,  Lmcoln 
made  his  last  statement  on  the  subject.  It  was 
fortunate,  he  said,  that  Congress  had  adjourned, 
for  "we  shall  reanimate  the  States"  before  Con- 
gress meets;  there  should  be  no  killing,  no  persecu- 
tions; there  was  too  much  disposition  to  treat  the 
Southern  people  "not  as  fellow  citizens." 

The  possibility  of  a  conciliatory  restoration 
ended  when  Lincoln  was  assassinated.  Moderate, 
firm,  tactful,  of  great  personal  influence,  not  a 
doctrinaire,  and  not  a  Southerner  like  Johnson, 
Lincoln  might  have  "prosecuted  peace"  success- 
fully. His  policy  was  very  imlike  that  proposed 
by  the  radical  leaden.  They  would  base  the  new 
governments  upon  the  loyalty  of  the  past  plus  the 
aid  of  enfranchised  slaves;  he  would  establish  the 
new  r^ime  upon  the  loyalty  "*  the  future.  Like 
Governor  Andrew  he  thought  that  restoration  must 
be  effected  by  the  willing  efforts  of  the  South.  He 
would  aid  and  guide  but  not  force  the  people.  Tf 
the  latter  did  not  wish  restoration,  they  might 
remain  under  military  rule.  There  should  be  no 
forced  negro  suffrage,  no  sweeping  disfranchise- 
ment of  whites,  no  "carpetbaggism." 


THE  WORK  OP  THE  PRESmENTS       99 
The  work  of  President  Johnson  demands  for  its 
proper  understanding  some  consideration  of  the 
condition  of  the  polit.oal  parties  at  the  close  of 
the  war,  for  politics  had  much  to  do  with  recon- 
struction.    The  Democratic  party,  divided  and 
defeated  in  the  election  of  1860,  lost  its  Southern 
members  in  1861  by  the  secession  and  remained  a 
mmority  party  during  the  remainder  of  the    *rar. 
It  retained  its  organization,  however,  and  in  1864 
polled  a  large  vote.    Discredited  by  its  policy  of 
opposition  to  Lincoln's  Administration,  its  ablest 
leaders  joined  the  Republicans  in  support  of  the 
war.    Until  1869  the  party  was  poorly  represented 
in  Congress  although,  as  soon  as  hostilities  ended, 
the  War  Democrats  showed  a  tendency  to  return 
to  the  old  party.    As  to  reconstruction,  the  party 
stood  on  the  Crittenden-Johnson  resolutions  of 
1861,  though  most  Democrats  were  now  willing 
to  have  slavery  abolished. 

The  Republican  party  —  frankly  sectional  and 
going  into  power  on  the  single  issue  of  opposition 
to  the  extension  of  slavery  —  was  forced  by  the 
secession  movement  to  take  up  the  task  of  pre- 
serving the  Union  by  war.  Consequently,  the 
party  developed  new  principles,  welcomed  the  aid 
of  the  War  Democrats,  and  found  it  advisable  to 


4; 
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L I 


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M- 


n        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APFOIilATTOX 

drop  its  name  and  with  its  allies  to  form  the  Union 
or  National  Union  party.  It  was  this  National 
Union  p&rty  which  in  1864  nominated  Abraham 
Lincoln,  a  Republican,  and  Andrew  Johnson,  a 
Democrat,  on  the  same  ticket.  Lincoln's  second 
Cabinet  was  composed  of  both  Republicans  and 
War  Democrats.  When  the  war  ended,  the  con- 
servative leadns  were  anxious  to  hold  the  Union 
party  tc^ther  in  order  to  be  in  a  better  position 
to  settle  the  problems  of  reconstruction,  but  the 
movement  of  the  War  Democrats  back  to  their 
old  party  tended  to  leave  in  the  Union  party 
only  its  Republican  members,  with  the  radical 
leaders  dominating. 

In  the  South  the  pressure  of  war  so  united  the 
people  that  party  divisions  disappeared  for  a  time, 
but  the  causes  of  division  continued  to  exist  and 
two  parties,  at  least,  would  have  developed  had 
the  pressure  been  removed.  Though  all  factions 
supported  the  war  after  it  began,  the  former  Whigs 
and  Douglas  Democrats,  when  it  was  over,  liked 
to  remember  that  they  had  been  "Union"  men  in 
1860  and  expected  to  organize  in  opposition  to 
the  extreme  Democrats,  who  were  now  charged 
with  being  responsible  for  the  mistortunes  of  the 
South.  They  were  in  a  position  to  affiliate  with  the 


i-s 


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ANmsmr  jomaoN 

Eii«ravia«  after  •  photograph  by  Bnjy. 


'•^%-. 

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"'.''T**^^^'  ''^  "^ 


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f  •»fi 


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70 


THF  SEQIEL  OF   VIMH)M\noX 


,1  i 


tir«>p  i«H  tiamo  atui  with  its  «! 
<i"  National  l'nit»!i  pcttv 
I  nion  parly  whi<'h  ii!   \Hl^', 
Lincoin,   a   Kc'publiran,   ain 
Deniixfiil,  f'lj  th)     ,'ine  ti* ! 

CuhllK't     AH,«;   (.'OinpOJitKl       ' 

servatlv*'  lra<U>rfj  were  hii\' 
partj   tog«-thrr  in  or<)< » 
to  s«^tth'  tlir  prol>!cni-  <-■•  ; 


■II  ())t»  Union 

\o<ioii{U 

>  hrahan'. 

lobnson,  a 

■^'■f  onti 

puohcaits  and 

<i  tlur  con- 

•!■•    Til" 
t  iiustrurtion,  but   th«- 


movt'inrnt  t;f  the  War  Dt'iiiocrat-s  back  to  tlieir 
oW  party  i^^n^},^l  .^^^^j"  the  Union  p^vrty 
only  JJ>    !lt'j'.  .!',(  ".       ,   ifi'i  "vi!}!    l[i«'  radifiii 

Ifn  the  >«i!j(tf  th«'  prt'-ssiin  of  war  .>.>  uniteii  ih'- 
»itH>f»|i'  tha*  \,uriy  division^  «liSHpp«vjrf»l  fiir  a  lini«\ 
hut  the  CHMH«'*i  ,f  f}i%'isioii  itniliiiuftl  h>  t  xist  and 
twt>  ]>arti«  nf.    wouhl  hav«'  <h»v('i<ipcti  hail 

the  pressurt'  bt-en  reiri<n>^'.  ThouKh  ali  faction- 
Kupporttvi  the  wj.rjil?  .m.  i he  former  Whii|< 

and  I)(jughi>i  Denio»  •  '"■;!  it  was  o%'er,  Jike<] 

to  remember  that  thvy  iia<'  bi-en  "I-num"  men  ifj 
l.HOO  .-md   expectetl   to  ors^anize  i'  ti 

the      \lr*-niv   l)eiri<HTat.s.   w}a»  wes'  fhrffi 

in^'  fi*!<fMjn.>»iblc  for  the  nu-  -  of  t 

'' ■■:■. ii    TliiH  V,  •■■:•  ill  H  iH-f>:ition  Ui  aniiiute  with  th; 


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THE  WORK  OP  THE  PRESIDENTS  71 
National  Union  party  of  the  North  if  proper  ;a- 
ducementi  were  offered,  while  the  regular  Demo- 
crat* were  ready  to  rejoin  their  old  party.  But  the 
embittered  feelings  resulting  from  the  murder  of 
Lincob  and  the  rapid  development  of  the  struggle 
between  President  Johnson  and  Congress  caused 
the  radicals  "to  mmp  the  old  Union  Democrats 
and  Whigs  tx>gether  with  the  secessionists  -  and 
many  were  d;iven  where  they  did  not  want  to 
go,  into  temporary  affiliation  with  the  Democratic 
party."  Thousands  went  verj-  reluctantly;  the 
old  Whigs,  indeed,  were  not  firmly  committed  to 
the  Democrats  until  radical  reconstruction  had  ac- 
tuaUy  begun.  Still  other  "  loyalists  "  in  the  South 
were  prepared  to  join  the  Northern  radicals  in  advo- 
cating the  disfranchisement  of  Confederates  and  in 
opposing  the  granting  of  suffrage  to  the  negroes. 

The  man  upon  whom  fell  the  task  of  leading 
these  opposing  factions,  radical  and  conservative, 
along  a  definite  line  of  action  looking  to  reunion 
had  few  qualifications  for  the  task.  Johnson  was 
ill-educated,  narrow,  and  vindictive  and  was  posi- 
tive that  those  who  did  not  agree  with  him  were 
dishonest.  Himself  a  Southerner,  picked  up  by  the 
Nat  al  Union  Convention  of  1864,  as  Thaddeus 
Stevens  said,  from  "one  of  those  damned  rebel 


r. 


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IB- 5 


-^> 


sn.-' 


79  THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 
provinces."  he  loved  the  Union,  worahiped  the 
Conftitution,  and  held  to  the  strict  construction 
views  of  the  State  Rights  Democrats.  Hising  from 
humble  beginnings,  he  was  animated  by  the  most 
intense  dislike  of  the  "slavncracy."  as  he  called 
the  political  aristocracy  of  the  South,  like  many 
other  American  leaders  he  was  proud  of  his  humble 
origin,  but  unlike  many  others  he  never  sloughed 
off  his  backwoods  crudeness.  He  continually 
boasted  of  himself  and  vilified  the  aristocrats,  who 
m  return  treated  him  badly.  His  dislike  of  them 
was  so  marked  that  Isham  G.  Harris,  a  rival  poli- 
tician, remarked  that  "if  Johniion  were  a  snake,  he 
would  lie  in  the  grass  to  bite  the  heels  of  rich  men's 
children."  His  primitive  notions  of  punishment 
were  evident  in  1865  when  he  advocated  imprison- 
ment, execution,  and  confiscation;  but  like  other 
reckless  talkers  he  often  said  more  than  he  meant. 
When  Johnson  succeeded  to  the  presidency,  the 
feeling  was  nearly  universal  among  the  radicals, 
according  to  Julian,  that  he  would  prove  a  god- 
send to  the  country,  for  "a&Ide  from  Mr.  Lincoln's 
known  policy  of  tenderness  to  the  rebels,  which 
now  so  jarred  upon  the  feelings  of  the  hour,  his  well 
known  views  on  the  subject  of  reconstruction  were 
as  distasteful  as  possible  to  radical  Republicans." 


r  i    '* 


THE  WORK  OP  THE  PRESIDENTS       78 
Senator  Wade  declared  to  the  Pretident:  "John- 
ton,  we  have  faith  in  you.    By  the  gods,  there  will 
be  no  trouble  now  in  running  tlie  Government!" 
To  which  Johnson  replied:    "Treason  is  a  crime 
and  crime  must  be  puni.'^'ied.    Treason  must  be 
made  infamous  and  traitors  must  be  impoverished." 
These  words  are  an  index  to  the  speeches  of  John- 
son during  1863-65.    Even  his  radical  friends 
feared  that  he  would  be  too  vindictive.    For  a  few 
weeks  he  was  much  inclined  to  the  radical  plans, 
and  some  of  the  leaders  certainly  understood  that 
he  was  in  favor  of  negro  suffrage,  the  supreme  test 
of  radicalism.   But  when  the  excitement  caused  by 
the  assassii.  ^tion  of  Lincoln  and  the  break-up  of  the 
Confederacy  had  moderated  somewhat,  Johnson 
saw  before  him  a  task  so  great  that  his  desire  for 
violent  measures  was  chilled.    He  must  disband 
the  great  armies  and  bring  all  war  work  to  an  end; 
he  must  restore  intercourse  with  the  South,  which 
had  been  blockaded  for  years;  he  must  for  a  time 
police  the  country,  look  after  the  negroes,  anr*  set 
up  a  temporary  civil  government;  i      finally  he 
must  work  out  a  restoration  of  the  -nion.    So- 
bered by  responsibility  and  \y  the  influence  of 
moderate  advisers,    u.^  rathci    f^uickly   adopted 
Lincoln's  policy. 


t'U 


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J 


m 


74         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

Johnson  at  first  set  his  face  against  the  move- 
ments toward  reconstruction  by  the  state  govern- 
ments already  organized  and  by  those  people  who 
wished  to  organize  new  governments  on  Lincoln's 
ten  per  cent  plan.  As  soon  as  possible  the  War 
Department  notified  the  Union  commanders  to 
stop  all  attempts  at  reconstruction  and  to  pursue 
and  arrest  all  Confederate  governors  and  other 
prominent  civil  leaders.  The  President  was  even 
anxious  to  arrest  the  military  leaders  who  had  been 
paroled  but  was  checked  in  this  desire  by  General 
Grant's  firm  protest.  His  cabinet  advisers  sup- 
ported Johnson  in  refusing  to  recognize  the  South- 
ern state  governments ;  but  three  of  them  —  Seward, 
Welles,  and  M cCuUoch  —  were  influential  in  mod- 
erating his  zeal  for  inflicting  punishments.  Never- 
theless he  soon  had  in  prison  the  most  prominent 
of  the  Confederate  civilians  and  several  general  oflB- 
cers.  The  soldiers,  however,  were  sent  home,  trade 
with  the  South  was  permitted,  and  the  Freedmen's 
Bureau  was  rapidly  extended. 

Previous  this  Johnson  had  brought  himself 
to  recognize,  early  in  May,  the  Lincoln  "ten  per 
cent"  governments  of  Louisiana,  Tennessee,  and 
Arkansas,  and  the  reconstructed  Alexandria  gov- 
ernment of  Virginia.    Thus  only  seven  States  were 


THE  WORK  OP  THE  PRESmENTS       75 
left  without  legal  governments,  and  to  bring  those 
States  back  into  the  Union  Johnson  inaugurated 
on  May  «9,  1865.  a  plan  which  was  like  that  of 
Lincoln  but  not  quite  so  liberal.    In  his  Amnesty 
Proclamation,  Johnson  made  a  longer  list  of  ex- 
ceptions aimed  especially  at  the  once  wealthy 
slave  owners.   On  the  same  day  he  proclaimed  the 
restoration  of  North  Carolina.    A  provisional  gov- 
ernor, W.  W.  Holden,  was  appointed  and  directed 
to  reorganize  the  civil  government  and  to  call  a 
constitutional  convention  elected  by  those  who 
had  taken  the  amnesty  oath.     This  convention 
was  to  make  necessary  amendments  to  the  con- 
stitution and  to  "restore  said  State  to  its  con- 
stitutional relations  to  the  Federal  Government." 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  Johnson  fixed  the  qualifica- 
tions of  delegates  and  of  those  who  elected  them, 
but,  this  stage  once  passed,  the  convention  or  the 
legislature  would  "prescribe  the  qualifications  of 
electors  ...  a  power  the  people  of  the  several 
States  composing  the  Federal  Union  have  right- 
fully exercised  from  the  origin  of  the  government  to 
the  present  time."    The  President  also  directed 
the  various  cabinet  oflScers  to  extend  the  work 
of  their  departments  over  the  Confederate  States 
and  ordered  the  army  oflicers  to  assist  the  civil 


f  ( . 

I   : 


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■  ♦.' 


76         THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

authorities.  During  the  next  six  weeks  similar 
measures  were  undertaken  for  the  remaining  six 
States  of  the  Confederacy. 

To  set  up  the  new  order  army  officers  were  first 
sent  into  every  county  to  administer  the  amnesty 
oath  and  thus  to  secure  a  "loyal'*  electorate.  In 
each  State  the  provisional  governor  organized  out 
of  the  remains  of  the  Confederate  local  regime  a 
new  civil  government.  Confederate  local  officials 
who  could  and  would  take  the  amnesty  oath  were 
directed  to  resume  office  until  relieved;  the  laws 
of  1861,  except  those  relating  to  slavery,  were  de- 
clared to  be  in  force;  the  courts  were  directed  to 
use  special  efforts  to  crush  lawlessness;  and  the  old 
jury  lists  were  destroyed  and  new  ones  were  drawn 
up  containing  only  the  names  of  those  who  had 
taken  the  amnesty  oath.  Since  there  was  no 
money  in  any  state  treasury,  small  sums  were  now 
raised  by  license  taxes.  A  full  staff  of  department 
heads  was  appointed,  and  by  July,  1865,  the  pro- 
visM>nal  governments  were  in  fair  working  order. 

To  the  constitutional  conventions,  which  met 
in  the  fall,  it  was  made  clear,  through  the  gover- 
nors, that  the  President  would  insist  upon  three 
conditions:  the  formal  abolition  of  slavery,  the 
repudiation  of  the  ordinance  of  secession,  and 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  PRESmENTS       77 
the  repudiation  of  the  Confederate  war  debt.    Tc 
Governor  Holden  he  telegraphed:  "Every  dollar 
of  the  debt  created  to  aid  the  rebellion  against  the 
United  States  should  be  repudiated  finally  and  for- 
ever.   The  great  mass  of  the  people  should  not  be 
taxed  to  pay  a  debt  to  aid  in  carrying  on  a  rebelHon 
which  they  in  fact,  if  left  to  themselves,  were  op- 
posed  to.   Let  those  who  had  given  their  means  for 
the  obligations  of  the  state  look  to  that  power  they 
tried  to  establish  in  violation  of  law,  constitution, 
and  wiU  of  the  people.     They  must  meet  their 
fate. "   With  little  opposition  these  conditions  were 
fulfilled,  though  there  was  a  strong  feeling  against 
the  repudiation  of  the  debt,  much  discussion  as  to 
whether  the  ordinance  of  secession  should  be  "re- 
pealed" or  declared  "now  and  always  null  and 
void,"  and  some  quibbling  as  to  whether  slavery 
was  being  destroyed  by  state  action  or  had  ah«ady 
been  destroyed  by  war. 

In  the  old  state  constitutions,  very  slight  changes 
were  made.  Of  these  the  chief  were  concerned 
with  the  abolition  of  slavery  and  the  arrangement 
of  representation  and  direct  taxation  on  the  basis 
of  white  population.  Little  eflFort  was  made  to 
settle  any  of  the  negro  problems,  and  in  all  States 
the  conventions  left  it  to  the  legislatures  to  make 


I 


m 


h. 


I 


78         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

bws  for  the  freedmen.  Them  ';'snodi8Ciusionof 
negro  suffrage  in  the  conventi^js,  but  President 
Johnson  sent  what  was  for  him  a  remarkable  com- 
munication to  Governor  Sharkey  of  Mississippi: 

If  you  could  extend  the  elective  franchise  to  all  persons 
of  color  who  can  read  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  in  English  and  write  their  names,  and  to  all  per- 
sons of  color  who  own  real  estate  valued  at  not  less  than 
two  hundred  and  fifty  dollars  aud  pay  taxes  thereon, 
you  would  completely  disarm  the  adversary  and  set  an 
example  the  other  States  will  follow.  This  you  can  do 
with  perfect  safety,  and  you  would  thus  place  South- 
em  States  in  reference  to  free  persons  of  color  upon 
the  same  basis  with  the  free  States.  .  .  .  And  as  a 
consequence  the  radicals,  who  are  wild  upon  negro 
franchise,  will  be  completely  foiled  in  their  attempts 
to  keep  the  Southern  States  u-om  renewing  their  rela- 
tions to  the  Union  by  not  accepting  their  senators 
and  representatives. 

In  deciding  upon  a  basis  of  representation  it  was 
clear  that  the  majority  of  delegates  desired  to 
lessen  the  influence  of  the  Black  Belt  and  place  the 
control  of  the  government  with  the  "up  country." 
In  the  Alabama  convention  Robert  M.  Patton, 
then  a  delegate  and  later  governor,  frankly  avowed 
this  object,  and  in  South  Carolina  Governor  Perry 
urged  the  convention  to  give  no  consideration  to 
negro  suffrage,  "because  this  is  a  white  man's 


M' 


THE  WORK  OP  THE  PRESIDENTS       79 

goverament,"  and  if  the  n^roes  should  vote  they 
would  be  controlled  by  a  few  whites.  A  kindly  dispo- 
sition toward  the  negroes  was  general  except  on  the 
part  of  extreme  Unionists,  who  opposed  any  favors 
to  the  race.  "This  is  a  white  man's  country  "  was  a 
doctrine  to  which  all  the  conventions  subscribed. 

The  conventions  held  brief  sessions,  completed 
their  work,  and  adjourned,  after  directing  that 
elections  be  held  for  state  and  local  officers  and 
for  members  of  Congress.    Before  December  the 
appointed  local  officials  had  been  succeeded  by 
elected  officers;  members  of  Congress  were  on  their 
way  to  Washington;  the  state  legislatures  were 
assembling  or  already  in  session;  and  the  elected 
governors  were  ready  to  take  office.    It  was  under- 
stood that  as  soon  as  enough  state  legislatures  rati- 
fied the  Thirteenth  Amendment  to  make  it  a  part 
of  the  Constitution,  the  President  would  permit 
the  transfer  of  authority  to  the  new  governors. 
The  Legislature  of  Mississippi  alone  was  recalci- 
trant about  the  amendment,  and  before  January, 
1866,  the  elected  officials  were  everywhere  in- 
stalled except  in  Texas,  where  the  work  was  not 
completed  until  March.    When  Congress  met  in 
December,  1865,  the  President  reported  that  all 
former   Confederate  States   except   Texas   were 


/iJ'Jl 


I 
I    • 


3 


»  THE  SEQUEL  OP  APP0B4ATT0X 
T9^y  to  be  readmitted.  Congreas,  however,  re- 
ftued  to  admit  their  senaton  and  representotives. 
and  thua  began  the  struggle  which  ended  over  a 
year  later  with  the  victory  of  the  radicals  and  the 
undoing  of  the  work  of  the  two  Presidents. 

The  plan  of  the  Presidents  was  at  best  only  im- 
perfecUy  realized.     It  was  found  impossible  to  re- 
oijganize  the  Federal  Administration  in  the  South 
with  men  who  could  subscribe  to  the  "ironclad 
oath,"  for  nearly  all  who  were  competent  to  hold 
office  had  favored  or  aided  the  Confederacy.  It 
was  two  years  before  more  than  a  third  oi  the 
post  offices  could  be  opened.    The  other  Federal 
departments  were  in  sinular  difficulties,  and  at 
last  women  and  "carpetbaggers"  were  appointed. 
The  Freedmen's  Bureau,  which  had  been  estab- 
lished coinddently  with  the  provisional  govern- 
ments, assumed  jurisdiction  over  the  negroes,  while 
the  army  authorities  very  early  took  the  posi- 
tion tiiat  any  man  who  claimed  to  be  a  Unionist 
should  not  be  tried  in  the  local  courts  but  must  be 
given  a  better  chance  in  a  provost  court.    Thus  a 
tiiird  or  more  of  the  population  was  witiidrawn 
from  the  control  of  tiie  state  government.     In  sev- 
eral States  tile  head  of  the  Bureau  made  arrange- 
ments  for  local  magistrates  and  officials  to  act  as 


i  i 


THE  WORK  OP  THE  PRESmENTS  81 
Bureau  officials,  and  in  such  cases  the  two  authori- 
ties acted  in  cooperation.  The  army  of  occupation, 
too,  exerted  an  authority  which  not  infrequently 
interfered  with  the  workings  of  the  new  sUte 
government.  Nearly  everywhere  there  was  a  lade 
of  certainty  and  efficiency  due  to  the  concurrent 
and  sometimes  conflicting  jurisdictions  of  state 
government,  army  commanders,  Bureau  authori- 
ties, and  even  the  President  acting  upon  or  through 
any  of  the  others. 

The  standing  of  the  Southern  state  organiza- 
tions was  in  doubt  after  the  refusal  of  Congress  to 
recognize  them.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  this  un- 
certainty they  continued  to  function  as  States 
during  the  year  of  controversy  which  followed;  the 
courts  were  opened  and  steadily  grew  in  influence; 
here  and  there  militia  and  patrols  were  reorganized; 
officials  who  refused  to  "accept  the  situation  "  were 
dismissed;  elections  were  held;  the  legislatures  re- 
vised the  laws  to  fit  new  conditions  and  enacted 
new  laws  for  the  emancipated  blacks.  To  all  this 
progress  in  reorganization  the  action  of  Congress 
was  a  severe  blow,  since  it  gave  notice  that  none 
of  the  problems  of  reconstruction  were  yet  solved. 
An  increasing  spirit  of  irritation  and  independence 
was  observed  throughout  the  States  in  question. 


'I 


11 


I  \^ 


M        THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 
aod  at  the  elections  the  former  Confederates  gained 
moie  and  more  offices.    The  year  was  marked  in 
the  South  by  the  tendency  toward  the  formation  of 
parties,  by  the  development  of  the  "Southern  out- 
rages" issue,  by  an  attempt  to  frustrate  radical 
action,  and  finally  by  a  line-up  of  the  great  mass 
of  the  whites  in  opposition  to  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  and  other  radical  plans  of  Congress. 
The  Joint  Committee  on  Reconstruction,  ap- 
pointed when  Congress  refused  to  accept  the  work 
of  President  Johnson,  proceeded  during  several 
months  to  take  testimony  and  to  consider  measures. 
The  testimony,  which  was  taken  chiefly  to  support 
opinions  already  formed,  appeared  to  prove  that 
the  negroes  and  the  Unionists  were  so  badly  treated 
that  the  Freedmen's  Bureau  and  the  army  must 
be  kept  in  the  South  to  protect  them;  that  free 
negro  labor  %  as  a  success  but  that  the  whites  were 
hostile  to  it;  that  the  whites  were  disloyal  and 
would,  if  given  control  of  the  Southern  govern- 
ments and  admitted  to  Congress,  constitute  a 
danger  to  the  nation  and  especially  to  the  party 
in  power. 

To  convince  the  voters  of  the  North  of  the  neces- 
sity  of  dealing  drastically  with  the  South  a  cam- 
paign   of   misrepresentation    was    begun   in    the 


THE  WORK  OP  THE  PRESmENTS       8S 
summer  of  1865,  which  became  more  and  more 
systematic  and  unscrupulous  as  the  political  strug- 
gle  at  Washington  grew  fiercer.    Newspapers  regu- 
larly ran  columns  headed  "Southern  Outrages" 
and   every  conceivable   mistreatment  of  blacks 
by  whites  was  represented  as  taking  place  on  a 
large  scale.     As   General   Richard   Taylor  said, 
it  would  seem  that  about  1866  every  white  man,' 
woman,  and  child  in  the  South  began  killing  and 
maltreating  negroes.    In  truth,  there  was  less  and 
less  ground  for  objection  to  the  treatment  of  the 
blacks  as  time  went  on  and  as  the  several  agencies 
of  government  secured  firmer  control  over  the 
lawless  elements.    But  fortunately  for  the  radicals 
their  contention  seemed  to  be  established  by  riots 
on  a  large  scale  in  Memphis  and  New  Orleans 
where  negroes  were  killed  and  injured  in  much 
greater  number  than  whites. 

The  rapid  development  of  the  radical  plans  of 
Congress  checked  the  tendency  toward  political 
division  in  the  South.  Only  a  small  party  of  rabid 
Unionists  would  now  aflBliate  with  the  radicals, 
while  all  the  others  reluctantly  held  together,  en- 
dorsed Johnson's  policy,  and  attempted  to  aflSli- 
ate  with  the  disintegrating  National  Union  party. 
But  the  defeat  of  the  President's  policies  in  the 


(H 


tl 


M 


•4         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 
elcctbna  of  1866.  the  increasing  radicalinn  of  Con- 


aa  shown  by  the  Civil  RighU  Act,  the  ex- 
pansion of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau,  the  report  of 
the  Joint  Committee  on  Reconstruction,  and  the 
proposal  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  led  far- 
sighted  Southerners  to  see  that  the  President  was 
likely  to  lose  in  his  fight  with  Congress. 

Now  began,  in  the  latter  half  of  1866,  with  some 
cooperation  in  the  North  and  probably  with  the 
approval  of  the  President,  a  movement  in  the 
South  to  forestall  the  radicals  by  means  of  a  settle- 
ment which,  although  less  severe  than  the  proposed 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  might  yet  be  acceptable 
to  Congress.    One  feature  of  the  settlement  was  to 
be  some  form  of  n^ro  suffrage,  either  by  local 
action  or  by  constitutional  amendment.     Those 
behind  this  scheme  were  mainly  of  the  former  gov- 
erning class.     Negro  suffrage,  they  thought,  would 
take  the  v/ind  out  of  the  radical  sails,  the  South- 
ern whites  would  soon  be  able  to  control  the 
blacks,  representation  in  Congress  would  be  in- 
creased, and  the  Black  Belt  would  perhaps  regain 
its  former  political  hegemony.     It  is  hardly  nec- 
essary to  say  that  the  majority  of  the  whites 
were  solidly  opposed  to  such  a  measure.    But  it 
was  hoped  to  carry  it  under  pressure  through  the 


i\\ 


mi 


THE  WORK  OP  THE  PRESmSNTS  8A 
LegitUture  or  to  bring  it  about  indirectly  through 
rulings  of  the  Preedmen't  Bureau. 

Coincident  with  this  scheme  of  partial  negro  suf- 
frage an  attempt  was  made  by  the  conservative 
leaders  in  Washington,  working  with  the  Southern- 
ers, to  propose  a  revised  Fourteenth  Amendment 
which  would  give  the  vote  to  competent  negroes 
•nd  not  disfranchise  the  whites.  A  conference  of 
Southern  govemi      met  in  Washington  earlv  in 

1867  and  drafted  such  an  amendment.   But  it  was 
too  late. 

Meanwhile  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  sub- 
mitted by  Congress  had  been  brought  before  the 
Southern  legislatures  and  during  the  winter  of 
1866-67  it  was  rejected  by  all  of  them.  There  was 
strong  opposition  to  it  because  it  disfranchised  the 
leading  whites,  but  perhaps  the  principal  reason 
for  its  rejection  was  that  the  Southern  people  were 
not  sure  that  stJll  more  severe  conditions  might 
not  be  imposed  later. 

While  the  President  was  "restoring"  the  States 
which  had  seceded  and  struggling  with  Congress, 
the  Border  States  of  the  South,  including  Tenaes- 
see  (which  was  admitted  in  1866  by  reason  of  its 
radical  state  government),  were  also  in  the  throes  of 
reconstruction.    Though  there  was  less  military 


"I 


tl  THE  SBQUEL  OP  APFOBfATTOX 
intcrfercnoe  in  these  than  in  the  other  States,  many 
of  the  problem!  were  similar.  All  had  the  Freed- 
men's  Bureau,  the  negro  race,  the  Unionists,  and 
the  Confederates;  in  every  State,  except  Kentucky, 
Confederates  were  persecuted,  the  minority  wm  in 
control,  and  "ring"  rule  was  the  order  of  Ihe  day; 
but  in  each  State  there  were  signs  of  the  political 
revolution  which  a  few  years  later  was  to  put  the 
radicals  out  of  power. 

The  executive  plan  for  the  restoration  of  the 
Union,  begun  by  Lincoln  and  adopted  by  Johnson, 
was,  as  we  have  seen,  at  first  applied  in  all  the  States 
which  had  seceded.  A  mih'tary  governor  was  ap- 
pointed in  each  State  by  the  President  by  virtue  of 
his  authority  as  commander  in  chief.  This  official, 
aided  by  a  civilian  staff  of  his  own  choice  and  sup- 
ported by  the  United  States  army  and  other  Fed- 
eral agencies,  reorganized  the  state  administration 
and  after  a  few  months  turned  the  state  and  local 
governments  over  to  regularly  elected  officials. 
Restoration  should  now  have  been  completed,  but 
Congress  refused  to  admit  the  senators  and  r^nre- 
sentatives  of  these  States,  and  entered  upon  a  fltt^'cn 
months'  struggle  w.^h  the  President  over  details 
of  the  methods  of  the  reconstruction.  Meanwhile 
the  Southern  States,  though    unrepresented   in 


If  i 


TOE  WORK  OF  THE  PRESIDENT  87 
CoiKreM.con  fnued  their  •ctivitlci.  with  tome  in- 
terference  from  Federal  «uthorltle«.  u-.tU  CongreM 
iu  1867  declared  their  government.  non^xi.t«it. 

The  work  begun  by  Lincoln  and  Johnion  de- 
•erved  better  succe...    The  original  pl^  rertored 
to  political  rights  only  a  imall  number  of  Unioniit. 
the  lukewarm  Confederate.,  and  the  unimportant! 
But  m  .pite  of  the  threatening  .peeche,  of  Johnson 
he  uMd  hi.  power  of  pardon  until  none  except  the 
mort  prominent  leaders  were  excluded.    The  per- 
•onneJ  of  the  Johnson  government,  was  fair.    The 
officials  were,  in  the  main,  former  Douglas  Demo- 
crats  and  Whigs,  respectable  and  conservative,  but 
not  admired  or  loved  by  the  people.    The  conven- 
twn.  and  the  legislature,  were  orderly  and  dignified 
and  manifested  a  desire  to  accept  the  situation. 

There  were  no  political  parties  at  first,  but 
material  for  several  existed.  If  things  had  been 
allowed  to  take  their  course  there  would  have 
arisen  a  normal  cleavage  between  former  Whigs 
and  Democrats,  between  the  up-country  and  the 
low  country,  between  the  slaveholders  and  the  non- 
slaveholders.  The  average  white  m-i  in  these 
governments  was  willing  tc  be  fair  to  the  negro 
but  was  not  greatly  concerned  about  his  future. 
In  the  view  of  most  white  people  it  was  the  white 


'  .'SI 


i 


if 


y  .1 


88         THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

man  who  was  emancipated.  The  white  districts 
had  no  desire  to  let  the  power  return  to  the  Black 
Belt  by  giving  the  negro  the  ballot,  for  the  vote  of 
the  negroes,  they  believed,  would  be  controlled  by 
their  former  masters.   ' 

Johnson's  adoption  of  Lincoln's  plan  gave  notice 
to  all  that  the  radicals  had  failed  to  control  him. 
He  and  they  had  little  in  common;  they  wished  to 
uproot  a  civilization,  while  he  wished  to  punish 
individuals;  they  were  not  troubled  by  constitu- 
tional scruples,  while  he  was  the  strictest  of  State 
Rights  Democrats;  they  thought  principally  of 
the  n^ro  and  his  potentialities,  while  Johnson  was 
thinking  of  the  emancipated  white  man.  It  is  pos- 
sible that  Lincoln  might  have  succeeded,  but  for 
Johnson  the  task  proved  too  great. 


) ' 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE   WARDS  OF  THE  NATION 

The  negroes  at  the  close  of  the  war  were  not  slaves 
or  serfs,  nor  were  they  citizens.    What  was  to  be 
done  with  them  and  for  them?     The  Southern 
answer  to  this  question  may  be  found  in  the  so- 
called  "Black  Laws."  which  were  enacted  by  the 
state  governments  set  up  by  President  Johnson. 
The  views  of  the  dominant  North  may  be  dis- 
cemed  in  part  in  the  organization  and  administra- 
tion of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau.    The  two  sections 
saw  the  same  problem  from  different  angles  and 
their  proposed  solutions  were  of  necessity  opposed 
in  principle  and  in  practice. 

The  South  desired  to  fit  the  emancipated  negro 
race  into  the  new  social  order  by  frankly  recogniz- 
ing  bis  inferiority  to  the  whites.  In  some  things 
racial  separation  was  unavoidable.  New  legisla- 
tion consequently  must  be  enacted,  because  the 
sUve  codes  were  obsolete;  because  the  old  laws 

89 


1 


m 


I 


90         THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOi>IATTOX 
made  for  the  small  free  negro  class  did  not  meet 
present  conditions;  and  because  the  emancipated 
blacks  could  not  be  brought  conveniently  and  at 
once  under  laws  originally  devised  for  a  white  popu- 
lation.   The  new  laws  must  meet  many  "»eeds; 
family  life,  morals,  and  conduct  must  be  regulated; 
the  former  slave  must  be  given  a  status  in  court 
in  order  that  he  might  be  protected  in  person  and 
property;  the  old,  the  infirm,  and  the  orphans  must 
be  cared  for;  the  white  race  must  be  protected 
from  lawless  blacks  and  the  blacks  from  unscrupu- 
lous and  violent  whites;  the  negro  must  have  an 
opportunity  for  education;  and  the  roving  blacks 
must  be  forced  to  get  homes,  settle  down,  and  go 
to  work. 

Pending  such  legislation  the  affairs  of  *  «  negro 
remained  in  control  of  the  unpopular  Pieedmen's 
Bureau  —  a  "system  of  espionage,"  as  Judge  Clay- 
ton of  Alabama  called  it,  and,  according  to  Gover- 
nor Humphreys  of  Mississippi,  "a  hideous  cuise" 
under  which  white  men  were  persecuted  and  pil- 
laged. Judge  Memminger  of  South  Carolina,  in 
a  letter  to  President  Johnson,  emphasized  the  fact 
that  the  whites  of  England  and  the  United  States 
gained  civil  and  political  rights  through  centuries 
of  slow  advancement  and  that  they  were  far  ahead 


\l 


THE  WARDS  OP  THE  NATION  91 

of  the  people  of  European  states.  Consequently, 
It  would  be  a  mistake  to  give  the  freedmen  a  status 
equal  to  that  of  the  most  advanced  whites.  Rather 
let  the  United  States  profit  by  the  experience  of 
the  British  in  their  emancipation  policies  and 
arrange  a  system  of  apprenticeship  for  a  period  of 
transition.  When  the  r.agro  should  be  fit.  let  him  be 
advanced  to  citizenship. 

Most  Southern  leaders  agreed  that  the  removal 
of  the  master's  protection  was  a  real  loss  to  the 
negro  which  must  be  made  good  to  some  extent  by 
giving  the  negro  a  status  in  court  and  by  accept- 
ing negro  testimony  in  aU  cases  in  which  blacks 
were  concerned.     The  North  Carolina  committee 
on  laws  for  freedmen  agreed  with  objectors  that 
"there  are  comparatively  few  of  the  slaves  lately 
freed  who  are  honest "  and  truthful,  but  maintained 
that  the  negroes  were  capable  of  improvement. 
The  chief  executives  of  Mississippi  and  Florida 
declared  that  there  was  no  danger  to  the  whites  in 
admitting  the  more  or  less  unreliable  negro  testi- 
mony, for  the  courts  and  juries  would  in  every 
case  arrive  at  a  proper  valuation  of  it.    Governors 
Marvin  of  Florida  and  Humphreys  of  Mississippi 
advocated  practical  civil  equality,  while  in  North 
Carolina  and  several  other  States  ther-  was  a 


I 


J 


I* 


U' 


•t         THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

disposition  to  admit  negro  testimony  only  in  cases 

in  which  negroes  were  concerned.     The  North 

Carolina  committee  recommended  the  abolition  of 

whipping  as  a  punishment  unfit  for  free  people, 

and  most  States  accepted  this  principle.    Even  in 

18W  the  general  disposition  was  to  make  uniform 

hiws  for  both  races,  except  in  regard  to  violation  of 

contracts,  immoral  conduct,  vagrancy,  marriage, 

schools,  and  forms  of  punishment.     In  some  of 

these  matters  the  whites  were  to  be  more  strictly 

regulated;  in  others,  the  negroes. 

There  was  further  general  agreement  that  in 
economic  relations  both  races  must  be  protected, 
each  from  the  other;  but  it  is  plain  that  the  leaders 
believed  that  the  negro  h'ld  less  at  stake  than  the 
white.    The  negro  was  disposed  to  be  in  Slent;  he 
knew  little  of  the  obligations  of  contracts;  he 
was  not  honest;  and  he  would  leave  his  job  at 
will.  Consequently  Memmmger  recommended  ap- 
prr  tic-ship  for  all  negroes;  Governor  Marvin  sug- 
gested it  for  children  alone;  and  others  wished 
it  provided  for  orphans  only.     Further,  the  laws 
enacted  must  force  the  negroes  to  settle  down, 
to  work,  and  to  hold  to  contracts.     Memmmger 
showed  that,  without  legislation  to  enforce  con- 
tracts and  to  secure  eviction  of  those  who  refused 


THE  WARDS  OP  THE  NATION  9S 

to  work,  the  white  planter  in  the  South  was  wholly 
at  the  mercy  of  the  negro.    The  plantations  were 
scattered,  the  laborers'  houses  were  already  occu- 
pied, and  there  was  no  labor  market  to  which  a 
planter  could  go  if  the  laborers  deserted  his  fields. 
What  would  the  negro  become  if  these  leaders 
of  reconstruction  were  to  have  their  way?    Some- 
thing better  than  a  serf,  something  less  than  a 
citizen -a  second  degree  citizen,  perhaps,  with 
legal  rights  about  equal  to  those  of  white  women 
and  children.    Governor  Marvin  hoped  to  make 
of  the  race  a  good  agricultural  peasantry;  his  suc- 
cessor was  anxious  that  the  blacks  should  be  pre- 
ferred to  European  immigrants;  others  agreed  with 
Memminger  that  after  training  and  education  he 
might  be  advanced  to  full  citizenship. 

These  opinions  are  representative  of  those  held 
by  the  men  who,  Memminger  excepted,  were 
placed  in  charge  of  affairs  by  President  Johnson 
and  who  were  not  specially  in  sympathy  with  the 
negroes  or  with  the  planters  but  rather  with  the 
average  white.  All  believed  that  emancipation  was 
a  mistake,  but  all  agreed  that  "it  is  not  the  negro's 
fault"  ahd  gave  no  evidence  of  a  disposition  to 
peri.3tuate  slavery  under  another  name. 
The  legislation  finally  framed  showed  in  its 


U 


r 


'{] 


w 


1 11 


!      S 


i    t    ■ 


M         THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

discriminatory  features  the  combined  influence  of 
the  old  laws  for  free  negroes,  the  vagrancy  laws  of 
North  and  South  for  whites,  the  customs  of  slav- 
ery times,  the  British  West  Indies  legislation  for 
ex-slaves,  and  the  regulations  of  the  United  States 
War  and  Treasury  Departments  and  of  the  Preed- 
men's  Bureau -all  modified  and  elaborated  by 
the  Southern  whites.    In  only  two  States,  Mis- 
sissippi and  South  Carolina,  did  the  legislation 
bulk  large  in  quantity;  in  other  States  discrimin- 
atmg  laws  were  few;  in  still  other  States  none  were 
passed  except  those  defimng  race  and  prohibiting 
intermarriage. 

In  all  of  the  state  laws  there  were  certain  com- 
mon  characteristics,  among  which  were  the  follow- 
ing: the  descendant  of  a  negro  was  to  be  classed 
as  a  negro  through  the  third  generation.'  even 
though  one  parent  in  each  generation  was  white; 
mtermarriage  of  the  races  was  prohibited;  exist- 
ing slave  marriages  were  declared  valid  and  for  the 
future  marriage  was  generally  made  easier  for  the 
blacks  than  for  the  whites.    In  all  States  the  negro 
was  given  his  day  in  court,  and  in  cases  relating  to 
negroes  his  testimony  was  accepted;  in  six  States 
he  might  testify  in  any  case.    When  provision  was 

'  Fourth  in  Tenoessee. 


'M 


THE  WARDS  OP  THE  NATION  95 

made  for  schooling,  the  rule  of  race  separation  was 
enforced.    In  Mississippi  the  "Jim  Crow  car, "  or 
separate  car  for  negroes,  was  invented.    In  several 
States  the  negro  had  to  have  a  license  to  carry 
weapons,  to  preach,  or  to  engage  in  trade.     In 
Mississippi,  a  negro  could  own  land  only  in  town- 
in  other  States  he  could  purchase  land  only  in  the' 
country.    Why  t'  e  difference,  no  one  knows  and 
probably  few  kne^  at  the  time.    Some  of  the  legis- 
lation was  undoubtedly  hasty  and  ill-considered. 
But  the  laws  relating  to  apprenticeship,  va- 
grancy, and  enforced  punitive  employment  turned 
outtobeof  greater  practical  importance.   On  these 
subjects  the  legislation  of  Mississippi  and  South 
Carolina  was  the  most  extreme.     In  Mississippi  ne- 
gro orphans  were  to  be  bound  out,  preferably  to 
a  former  master,  if  "he  or  she  shall  be  a  suitable 
person. "    The  master  was  given  the  usual  control 
over  apprentices  and  was  bound  by  the  usual 
duties,  including  that  of  teaching  the  apprentice 
But  the  penalties  for  "enticing  away"  apprentices 
were  severe.    The  South  Carolina  statute  was  not 
essentially  different.    The  vagrancy  laws  of  these 
two  States  were  in  the  main  the  same  for  both 
races,  but  in   Mississippi  the  definition  of  va- 
grancy was  enlarged  to  include  negroes  not  at  work. 


i 


ft 


lh\ 


W         THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOBfATTOX 

those  "found  unlawfully  auembling  themselves 
together,**  and  "  all  white  persons  assembling  them- 
selves with  freedmen."  It  is  to  be  noted  that 
nearly  all  punishment  for  petty  offenses  took  the 
form  of  hiring  out,  preferably  to  the  former  master 
or  employer.  The  principal  petty  oP^-es  were, 
it  would  seem,  vagrancy  and  "  ag  a.«ray" 

laborers  or  apprentices.  The  South  vj'-rclina  stat- 
ute contains  some  other  interesting  provisions.  A 
negro,  man  or  woman,  who  had  enjoyed  the  com- 
panionship of  two  or  more  spouses,  must  by  April 
1,  1866,  select  one  of  them  as  a  permanent  part- 
ner; a  farm  laborer  must  "rise  at  dawn,"  feed  the 
animals,  care  for  the  property,  be  quiet  and  orderly, 
and  "retire  at  reasonable  hours";  on  Sunday  the 
servants  must  take  turns  in  doing  the  necessary 
work,  and  they  must  be  respectful  and  civil  to  the 
"master  and  his  family,  guests,  and  agents";  to 
engage  in  skilled  labor  the  negro  must  obtain 
a  license.  Whipping  and  the  pillory  were  per- 
mitted in  Florida  for  certain  offenses,  and  in 
South  Carolina  the  master  might  "moderately 
correct"  servants  under  eighteen  years  of  age. 
Other  punishments  were  generally  the  same  for 
both  races,  except  the  hiring  out  for  petty  offenses. 
From  the  Southern  point  of  view  none  of  this 


r. 


THE  WARDS  OP  THE  NATION  97 

legislation  was  regarded  as  a  restriction  of  negro 
rights  but  as  a  wide  extension  to  the  negro  of  rights 
never  before  possessed,  an  adaptation  of  the  white 
man's  laws  to  his  peculiar  case.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  in  some  of  the  States  the  authorities  be- 
lieved that  there  were  any  discriminatory  laws; 
they  probably  overlooked  some  of  the  free  negro 
legislation  already  on  the  statute  books.  In  Ala- 
bama, for  example,  General  Wager  Swayne,  the 
head  of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau,  reported  that  all 
such  laws  had  either  been  dropped  by  the  legisla- 
ture or  had  been  vetoed  by  the  governor.  Yet 
the  statute  books  do  show  some  discriminations. 
There  is  a  marked  di£Ference  between  earlier  and 
later  legislation.  The  more  stringent  laws  were 
enacted  before  the  end  of  1865.  After  New  Year's 
Day  had  passed  and  the  negroes  had  begun  to 
settle  down,  the  legislatures  either  passed  mild 
lews  or  abandoned  all  special  legislation  for  the 
negroes.  Later  in  1866,  several  States  repealed  the 
legislation  of  1865. 

In  so  far  as  the  "Black  Laws"  discriminated 
against  the  negro  they  were  never  enforced  but 
were  suspended  from  the  beginning  by  the  army 
and  the  Freedmen's  Bureau.  They  had,  how- 
ever, a  very  important  eflFect  upon  that  section  of 


»i 


.'f 


;lii 


96        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOBIATTOX 

NortLom  opinion  which  wai  already  luspicioiif  of 
the  good  faith  of  the  Southerner!.  They  were  part 
of  a  plan,  some  believed,  to  reiSnsIave  the  negro  or  at 
least  to  create  by  law  a  class  of  serfs.  This  belief 
did  much  to  bring  about  later  radical  legislation. 

If  the  "Black  Laws"  represented  the  reaction 
of  the  Southern  legislatures  to  racial  conditions, 
the  Freedmen's  Bureau  was  the  corresponding  re- 
suit  of  the  interest  taken  by  the  North  in  the 
welfare  of  the  negro.  It  was  established  just  as 
the  war  was  closing  and  arose  out  of  the  various 
attempts  to  meet  the  n^ro  problems  that  arose 
during  the  war.  The  Bureau  had  always  a  dual 
nature,  due  m  part  to  its  inheritance  of  regulations, 
precedents,  and  traditions  from  the  various  at- 
tempts made  during  war  time  to  handle  the  many 
thousands  of  n^roes  who  came  under  Federal  con- 
trol, and  in  part  to  the  humanitarian  impulses  of 
1865,  bom  of  a  belief  in  the  capacity  of  the  negro 
for  freedom  and  a  suspicion  that  the  Southern 
whites  intended  to  keep  as  much  of  sla\  ery  as  they 
could.  The  officials  of  the  Bureau  likewise  were 
of  two  classes:  those  in  control  were  for  the  most 
part  army  officers,  standing  as  arbiters  between 
white  and  black,  usually  just  and  seldom  the  vic- 
tims of  their  sympathies;  but  the  mass  of  less 


THE  WARDS  OP  THE  NATION  M 

responBible  officials  were  men  of  inferior  ability 
and  character,  either  blind  partisans  of  the  negro 
or  corrupt  and  subject  to  purchase  by  the  whites. 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Freedmen's  Bureau 
was  cousidered  a  new  institution  in  1865,  it  is 
rather  remarkable  how  closely  it  followed  in  or- 
ganization, purpose,  and  methods  the  precedents 
set  during  the  war  by  the  officers  of  the  army 
and  the  Treasury.  In  Virginia.  General  Butler,  in 
1801,  declared  escaped  slaves  to  be  "contraband" 
and  proceeded  to  organize  them  into  communities 
for  discipline,  work,  food,  and  care.  His  successors 
in  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  and  others  in 
the  Sea  Islands  of  Georgia  and  South  Carolina, 
extended  his  plan  and  arranged  a  labor  system 
with  fixed  wages,  hours,  and  methods  of  work,  and 
everywhere  made  use  of  the  captured  or  abandoned 
property  of  the  Confederates.  In  Tennessee  and 
Arkansas,  Chaplain  John  Eaton  of  Grant's  army 
employed  thousands  in  a  modified  free  labor  sys- 
tem; and  further  down  in  Mississippi  and  Louisiana 
Generals  Grant,  Butler,  and  Banks  also  put  large 
numbers  of  captured  slaves  to  work  for  them- 
selves and  for  the  Government.  Everywhere,  as 
the  numbers  of  negroes  increased,  the  army  com- 
manders divided  the  occupied  negro  regions  into 


m: 


'ii 


A 


13 
.  1 


100       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APFOBCATTOX 

districti  under  superiniendenif  and  other  officiab. 
framed  labor  lawi,  cooperated  with  benevolent  so- 
cieties which  gave  ichooling  and  medical  care  to 
Lhe  blacks,  and  developed  systems  of  government 
for  them. 

The  United  States  Treasury  Department,  at- 
tempting to  execute  the  confiscation  laws  for  the 
benefit  of  the  Treasury,  appears  now  and  then  as 
an  employer  of  negro  labor  on  abandoned  plan- 
tations. Either  alone  or  in  cooperation  with  the 
army  and  charitable  associations,  it  even  supervised 
negro  colonies,  and  sometimes  it  assumed  practi- 
cally complete  control  of  the  economic  welfare 
of  the  negro.  This  Department  introduced  in 
1864  an  elaborate  lessee  and  trade  system.  The 
negro  was  regarded  as  "the  ward  of  the  nation," 
but  he  was  told  impressively  that  "labor  in  a  public 
duty  and  idleness  and  vagrancy  a  crime."  All 
wanted  him  to  work:  the  Treasury  wanted  cotton 
and  other  crops  to  sell;  the  lessees  and  speculators 
wanted  to  make  fortunes  b^'  his  labor;  and  the 
army  wanted  to  be  free  from  the  burden  of  the 
idle  blacks.  In  spite  of  all  these  ministrations 
the  negroes  suffered  much  from  harsh  treatment, 
neglect,  and  unsanitary  conditions. 

During  1863  and  1864  several  influences  were 


THE  WARDS  OF  TOE  NATION         lOl 

urging  the  esUblkhment  of  a  national  bureau  or 
department  to  take  charge  of  matters  relating  to 
the  African  race.   Some  wished  to  establish  on  the 
borders  of  the  South  a  paid  labor  system,  which 
might  later  be  extended  over  the  entire  region,  to 
get  more  slaves   mt  of  the  Confederacy  into  this 
free  labor  territory,  and  to  prevent  immigration 
of  negroes  into  the  North,  which,  after  the  Eman- 
cipation Proclamation,  was  apprehensive  of  this 
danger.    Others  wished  to  relieve  the  army  and 
the  treasury  officials  of  the  burden  of  caring  for 
the  blacks  and  to  protect  the  latter  from  the  "  north- 
em  harpies  and  bloodhounds"  who  had  fastened 
upon  them  the  lessee  system. 

The  discussion  lasted  for  two  years.  The  Freed- 
men's  Inquiry  Commission,  after  a  survey  of  the 
field  in  1868,  recommended  a  consolidation  of  all 
efforts  under  an  organization  which  should  per- 
petuate the  best  features  of  the  old  system.  But 
there  was  much  opposition  to  this  plan  in  Congress. 
The  negroes  would  be  exploited,  objected  some; 
the  ache-jae  gave  too  much  power  to  the  proposed 
organization,  said  others;  another  objection  was 
urged  against  the  employment  of  a  horde  of  incom- 
petent and  unscrupulous  officeholders,  for  "  the  men 
who  go  down  there  and  become  your  overseers  and 


3       « 


im 


Ifi*^|! 


10«       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

negro  drivers  will  be  your  brokendown  politicians 
and  your  dilapidated  preachers,  that  description  of 
men  who  are  too  lazy  to  work  and  just  a  little  too 
honest  to  steal." 

As  the  war  drew  to  a  close  the  advocates  of  a 
policy  of  consolidation  in  negro  affairs  prevailed, 
and  on  March  3,  1865,  an  act  was  approved  creat- 
ing in  the  War  Department  a  Bureau  of  Refugees, 
Freedmen,  and  Abandoned  Lands.  This  Bureau 
was  to  continue  for  one  year  after  the  close  of  the 
war  and  it  was  to  control  all  matters  relating  to 
freedmen  and  refugees,  that  is.  Unionists  who  had 
been  driven  out  of  the  South.  Food,  shelter,  and 
clothing  were  to  be  given  to  the  needy,  and  aban- 
doned or  confiscated  property  was  to  be  used  for  or 
leased  to  freedmen.  At  the  head  of  the  Bureau 
was  to  be  a  commissioner  with  an  assistant  com- 
missioner for  each  of  the  Southern  States.  These 
officials  and  other  employees  must  take  the  "iron- 
clad" oath. 

It  was  planned  that  the  Bureau  should  have  a 
brief  existence,  but  the  institution  and  its  wards 
became  such  important  factors  in  politics  that  on 
July  16,  1866,  after  a  struggle  with  the  President, 
Congress  passed  an  act  over  his  veto  amplifying 
the  powers  of  the  Bureau  and  extending  it  for  two 


THE  WARDS  OF  THE  NATION  108 
years  longer.  This  continuation  of  the  Bureau 
was  due  to  many  things:  to  a  belief  that  former 
slaveholders  were  not  to  be  trusted  in  dealing  with 
the  negroes;  to  the  baneful  eflFect  of  the  "Black 
Laws"  upon  Northern  public  opinion;  to  the  strug- 
gle between  the  President  and  Congress  over  re- 
constructic  u  and  to  the  foresight  of  radical  poli- 
ticians who  saw  iu  t'le  institution  an  instrument 
for  tht  poiitical  instruction  of  the  blacks  in  the 
proper  uucliiu^i- 

The  new  law  was  supplementary  to  the  Act  of 
1865,  but  its  additional  provisions  merely  endorsed 
what  the  Bureau  was  already  doing.  It  authorized 
the  issue  of  medical  supplies,  confirmed  certain 
sales  of  land  to  negroes,  and  provided  that  the 
promises  which  Sherman  made  in  1865  to  the  Sea 
Island  negroes  should  be  carried  out  as  far  as 
possible  and  that  no  lands  occupied  by  blacks 
should  be  restored  to  the  owners  until  the  crops 
of  1866  were  gathered;  it  directed  the  Bureau  to 
cooperate  with  private  charitable  and  benevolent 
associations,  and  it  authorized  the  use  or  sale  for 
school  purposes  of  all  confiscated  property;  and 
finally  it  ordered  that  the  civil  equality  of  the 
n^ro  be  upheld  by  the  Bureau  and  its  courts  when 
state  courts  refused  to  accept  the  principle.    By 


I'l 


■M 


104       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

later  laws  the  existence  of  the  Bureau  was  extended 
to  January  1,  1869,  in  the  unreconstructed  States, 
but  its  educational  and  financial  activities  were 
continued  until  June  20,  1872. 

The  chief  objections  to  the  Bureau  from  the 
conservative  Northern  point  of  view  were  summed 
up  in  the  President's  veto  messages.  The  laws 
creating  it  were  based,  he  asserted,  on  the  theory 
that  a  state  of  war  still  existed;  there  was  too  great 
a  concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of  a  few 
individuals  who  could  not  be  held  responsible; 
with  such  a  large  number  of  agents  ignorant  of  the 
country  and  often  working  for  their  own  advantage 
injustice  would  inevitably  result;  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  negro  everywhere  had  a  status  in 
court,  arbitrary  tribunals  were  established,  with- 
out jury,  without  regular  procedure  or  rules  of 
evidence,  and  without  appeal;  the  provisions  in 
r^ard  to  abandoned  lands  amounted  to  confisca- 
tion without  a  hearing;  the  negro,  who  must  in  the 
end  work  out  his  own  salvation,  and  who  was 
protected  by  the  demand  for  his  labor,  would  be 
deluded  into  thinking  his  future  secure  without 
further  effort  on  his  part;  although  nominally 
under  the  War  Department,  the  Bureau  was  not 
subject  to  military  control;  it  was  practically  a 


THE  WARDS  OP  THE  NATION 


105 


great  political  machine;  and,  finally,  the  States 
most  concerned  were  not  represented  in  Congress. 
The  Bureau  was  soon  organized  in  all  the  former 
slaveholding  States  except  Delaware,  with  general 
headquarters  in  Washington  and  state  head- 
quarters at  the  various  capitals.  General  O.  O. 
Howard,  who  was  appointed  commissioner,  was 
a  good  officer,  soft-hearted,  honest,  pious,  and 
frequently  referred  to  as  "the  Christian  soldier." 
He  was  fair-minded  and  not  disposed  to  irritate 
the  Southern  whites  unnecessarily,  but  he  was 
rather  suspicious  of  their  intentions  toward  the 
negroes,  and  he  was  a  believer  in  the  righteousness 
of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau.  He  was  not  a  good 
business  man;  and  he  was  not  beyond  the  reach  of 
politicians.  At  one  time  he  was  seriously  disturbed 
in  his  duties  by  the  buzzing  of  the  presidential  bee 
in  his  bonnet.  The  members  of  his  staff  were  not 
of  his  moral  stature,  and  several  of  them  were  con- 
nected with  commercial  and  political  enterprises 
wh'  '   'eft  their  motives  open  to  criticism. 

sistant  commissioners  were,  as  a  rule,  gen- 
eral otticers  of  the  army,  though  a  few  were  colo- 
nels and  chaplains.'     Nearly  half  of  them  had 

'  They  numbered  eleven  at  first  and  fourteen  after  July,  1866,  and 
were  changed  so  often  that  fifty,  in  all,  served  in  this  rank  before 
January  1, 1869,  when  the  Bureau  was  practically  discontinued. 


n 


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,11 


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i»^i 


{:  i 


100       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

during  the  war  been  associated  with  the  various  at- 
tempts to  handle  the  negro  proolem,  and  it  was  these 
men  who  shaped  the  organization  of  the  Bureau. 
While  few  of  them  were  immediately  acceptable  to 
the  Southern  whites,  only  ten  of  them  proved 
seriously  objectionable  on  account  of  personality, 
character,  or  politics.  Among  the  most  able  should 
be  mentioned  Generals  Schofield,  Swayne,  Fuller- 
ton,  Steedman,  and  Fessenden,  and  Colonel  John 
Eaton.  The  President  had  little  or  no  control 
over  the  appointment  or  discipline  of  the  officials 
and  agents  of  the  Bureau,  except  possibly  by 
calling  some  of  the  higher  army  officers  back  to 
military  service. 

As  a  result  of  General  Giant's  severe  criticism 
of  the  arrangement  which  removed  the  Bureau 
from  control  by  the  military  establishment,  the 
military  commander  was  in  a  few  instances  also 
appointed  assistant  commissioner.  Each  assistant 
commissioner  was  aided  by  a  headquarters  staff 
and  had  under  his  jurisdiction  in  each  State  various 
district,  county,  and  local  agents,  with  a  special 
corps  of  school  officials,  who  were  usually  teachers 
and  missionaries  belonging  to  religious  and  chari- 
table societies.  The  local  agents  were  recruited 
from  the  members  of  the  Veteran  Reserve  Corps, 


THE  WARDS  OF  THE  NATION         107 

the  subordinate  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers  of  the  army,  mustered-out  soldiers,  officers 
of  negro  troops,  preachers,  teachers,  and  Northern 
civilians  who  had  come  South.  As  a  class  these 
agents  were  not  competent  persons  to  guide  the 
blacks  in  the  ways  of  liberty  or  to  arbitrate  differ- 
ences between  the  races.  There  were  many  ex- 
ceptions, but  the  Southern  view  as  expressed  oy 
General  Wade  Hampton  had  only  too  much  foun- 
dation :  "  There  may  be, "  he  said,  "  an  honest  man 
connected  with  the  Biureau."  John  Minor  Botts. 
a  Virginian  who  had  remained  loyal  to  the  Union, 
asserted  that  many  of  the  agents  were  good  men 
who  did  good  work  but  that  trouble  resulted  from 
the  ignorance  and  fanaticism  of  others.  The  minor- 
ity members  of  the  Ku  Klux  Committee  con- 
demned the  agents  as  being  "generally  of  a  class 
of  fanatics  without  character  or  responsibility." 

The  chief  activities  of  the  Bureau  included  the 
following  five  branches:  relief  work  for  both  aces; 
the  regulation  of  negro  labor;  the  administration 
of  justice  in  cases  concerning  negroes;  the  manage- 
ment of  abandoned  and  confiscated  property;  and 
the  support  of  schools  for  the  negroes. 

The  relief  work  which  was  carried  on  for  more 
than  four  years  consisted  of  caring  for  sick  negroes 


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106       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

who  were  within  reach  of  the  hospitals,  furnishing 
food  and  sometimes  clothing  and  shelter  to  des- 
titute blacks  and  whites,  and  transporting  refu- 
gees of  both  races  back  to  their  homes.  Nearly 
a  hundred  hospitals  and  clinics  werr  established, 
and  half  a  million  patients  were  treated.  This 
work  was  greatly  needed,  especially  for  the  old  and 
the  infirm,  and  it  was  well  done.  The  transporta- 
tion of  refugees  did  not  reach  large  proportions, 
and  after  1866  it  was  entangled  in  politics.  But 
the  issue  of  supplies  in  huge  quantities  brought 
much  needed  reliet  though  at  the  same  time  a 
certain  amount  of  demoralization.  The  Bureau 
claimed  little  credit,  and  is  usually  given  none,  for 
keeping  alive  during  the  fall  and  winter  of  1865- 
1866  thousands  of  destitute  whites.  Yet  more  than 
a  third  of  the  food  issued  was  to  whites,  and  with- 
out it  many  would  have  starved.  Numerous  Con- 
federate soldiers  on  the  way  home  after  the  sur- 
render were  fed  by  the  Bureau,  and  in  the  destitute 
white  districts  a  great  deal  of  suffering  was  relieved 
and  prevented  by  its  operations.  The  negroes, 
dwelling  for  the  most  part  in  regions  where  labor 
was  in  demand,  needed  relief  for  a  shorter  time, 
but  they  were  attracted  in  numbers  to  the  towns 
by  free  food,  and  it  was  difficult  to  get  them  back 


THE  WARDS  OF  THE  NATION  109 

to  work.  The  political  value  of  the  free  food  issues 
waa  ^ot  generally  recognized  until  later  in  1866 
and  in  1867. 

During  the  first  year  of  the  Bureau  an  important 
duty  of  the  agents  was  the  supervision  of  negro 
labor  and  the  fixing  of  wages.    Both  officials  and 
planters  generally  demanded  that  contracts  be 
written,  approved,  and  filed  in  the  office  of  the 
Bureau.     They  thought  that  the  negroes  would 
work  better  if  they  were  thus  bound  by  contracts. 
The  agents  usually  required  that  the  agreements 
between  employer  and  laborer  cover  such  points 
as  the  nature  of  the  work,  the  hours,  food  and 
clothes,  medical  attendance,  shelter,  and  wages. 
To  make  wages  secure,  the  laborer  was  given  a  lien 
on  the  crop;  to  secure  the  planter  from  loss,  un- 
paid wages  might  be  forfeited  if  the  laborer  failed 
to  keep  his  part  of  the  contract.    When  it  dawned 
upon  the  Bureau  authorities  that  other  systems 
of  labor  had  been  or  might  be  developed  in  the 
South,  they  permitted  arrangements  for  the  vari- 
ous forms  of  cash  and  share  renting.    But  it  was 
everywhere  forbidden  to  place  the  negroes  under 
"overseers"   or  to  subject  them   to   "unwilling 
apprenticeship"  and    "compulsory  working  out 
of  debts." 


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I 


110       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

The  written  contract  system  for  laborers  did  not 
work  out  successfully.  The  negroes  at  first  were 
expecting  quite  other  fruits  of  freedom.  One  Mis- 
sissippi n^^  voiced  what  was  doubtless  the  opin- 
ion of  many  when  he  declared  that  he  "considered 
no  man  free  who  had  to  work  for  a  living." 
Few  negroes  would  contract  for  more  than  three 
months  and  none  for  a  period  beyond  January 
1,  1866,  when  they  expected  a  division  of  lands 
among  the  ex-slaves.  In  spite  of  the  regulations, 
most  worked  on  oral  agreements.  In  1866  nearly 
all  employers  threw  overboard  the  written  con- 
tract system  for  labor  and  permitted  oral  agree- 
ments. Some  States  had  passed  stringent  laws 
for  the  enforcing  of  contracts,  but  in  Alabama, 
Governor  Patton  vetoed  such  legislation  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  not  needed.  General  Swayne, 
the  Bureau  chief  for  the  State,  endorsed  the  Gov- 
ernor's action  and  stated  that  the  negro  was  pro- 
tected by  his  freedom  to  leave  when  mistreated, 
and  the  planter,  by  the  need  on  the  part  of  the 
negro  for  food  and  shelter.  Negroes,  he  said,  were 
afraid  of  contracts  and,  besides,  contracts  led 
to  litigation. 

In  order  to  safeguard  the  civil  rights  of  the  ne- 
groes the  Bureau  was  given  authority  to  establish 


Nfi 


THE  WARDS  OF  THE  NATION         111 

courts  of  its  own  and  to  supervise  the  action  of 
state  courts  in  cases  to  which  freedmen  were 
parties.  The  majority  of  the  assistant  commis- 
sioners made  no  attempt  to  let  the  state  courts 
handle  negro  cases  but  were  accustomed  to  bring 
all  such  cases  before  the  Bureau  or  the  provost 
courts  of  the  army.  In  Alabama,  quite  early,  and 
later  in  North  Carolina,  Mississippi,  and  Georgia, 
the  wiser  assistant  commissioners  arranged  ior  the 
state  courts  to  handle  freedmen's  cases  with  the 
underst  nding  that  discriminating  laws  were  to  be 
suspenc  J.  General  Swayne  in  so  doing  declared 
that  he  was  "unwilling  to  establish  throughout 
Alabama  courts  conducted  b^'  persons  foreign  to 
her  citizenship  and  strangers  to  her  laws."  The 
Bureau  courts  were  informal  affairs,  consisting  us- 
ually of  one  or  two  administrative  officers.  There 
were  no  jury,  no  appeal  beyond  the  assistant 
commissioner,  no  rules  of  procedure,  and  no  ac- 
cepted body  of  law.  In  state  courts  accepted  by 
the  Bureau  the  proceedings  in  negro  cases  were 
conducted  in  the  same  manner  as  for  the  whites. 

The  educational  work  of  the  Bureau  was  at  first 
confined  to  cooperation  with  such  Northern  re- 
ligious and  benevolent  societies  as  were  organiz- 
ing schools  and  churches  for  the  n^roes.    After 


lI,  ■ 


t 

111 


i 
t 


118  TIIE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 
the  first  year  the  Bureau  extended  financial  aid 
and  undertook  a  sytem  of  supervision  over  n^ro 
schools.  The  teachers  employed  were  North- 
em  whites  and  negroes  in  about  equal  numbers. 
Confiscated  Confederate  property  was  devoted  to 
negro  education,  and  in  several  States  the  assist- 
ant commissioners  collected  fees  and  percent- 
ages of  the  negroes*  wages  for  the  benefit  of  the 
schools.  In  addition  the  Bureau  expended  about 
six  million  dollars. 

The  intense  dislike  which  the  Southern  whites 
manifested  for  the  Freedmen's  Bureau  was  due  in 
general  to  their  resentment  of  outside  control  of 
domestic  affairs  and  in  particular  to  unavoidable 
diflSculties  inherent  in  the  situation.  Among  the 
concrete  causes  of  Southern  hostility  was  the  atti- 
tude of  some  of  the  higher  officials  and  many  of  the 
lower  ones  toward  the  white  people.  They  as- 
sumed that  the  whites  were  unwilling  to  accord 
fair  treatment  to  the  blacks  in  the  matter  of  wages, 
schools,  and  justice.  An  officinl  in  Louisiana  de- 
clared that  the  whites  would  exterminate  the 
negroes  if  the  Bureau  were  removed.  A  few 
months  later  General  FuUerton  in  the  same  State 
reported  that  trouble  was  caused  by  those  agents 
who  noisily  demanded  special  privileges  for  the 


I 


THE  WARDS  OF  THE  NATION         119 

negro  but  a  ho  objected  to  any  penalties  for  Iiis 
lawleuneas  uad  made  of  the  negroes  a  pampered 
dasi.  General  Tills  '  in  Georgia  predicted  the 
extinction  of  the  "old  time  Southerner  with  his 
hate,  cruelty,  and  malice."  General  Fisk  de- 
clared that  "there  are  some  of  the  meanest,  un- 
tubjugated  and  unreconstructed  rascally  revolu- 
tionists in  Kentucky  that  curse  the  soil  of  the 
country  ...  a  more  select  number  of  vindictive, 
pro-slavery,  rebellious  legislators  cannot  be  found 
than  a  majority  of  the  Kentucky  legislature." 
There  was  a  disposition  to  lecture  the  whites  about 
their  sins  in  regard  to  slavery  and  to  point  out 
to  them  how  far  in  their  general  ignorance  and 
backwardness  they  fell  short  of  enlightened  people. 
The  Bureau  courts  were  frequently  conducted 
in  an  "illegal  and  oppressive  manner,"  with  "de- 
cided partiality  for  the  colored  people,  without  re- 
gard to  justice."  For  this  reason  they  were  sus- 
pended for  a  time  in  Louisiana  and  G<  gia 
by  General  Steedman  and  General  FuUerton,  and 
cases  were  then  sent  before  military  courts.  Men 
of  the  highest  character  were  dragged  before  the 
Bureau  tribunals  upon  frivolous  complaints,  were 
lectured,  abused,  ridiculed,  and  arbitrarily  fined 
or  otherwise  punished.  The  jurisdiction  of  the 
8 


I 


Wl 


M 


m 


.•'I 


114       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APFOBiATTOX 

Bureau  courts  weakened  the  civil  courts  and  their 
frequent  interference  in  trivial  matters  was  not 
conducive  to  a  return  to  normal  conditions. 

The  inferior  agents,  not  sufficiently  under  the 
control  of  their  superiors,  were  responsible  for  a 
great  deal  of  this  bad  feeling.  Many  of  them  held 
radical  opinions  as  to  the  relations  of  the  races,  and 
mculcated  these  views  in  their  courts,  in  the  schools, 
and  in  the  new  negro  churches.  Some  were  charged 
with  even  causing  strikes  and  other  difficulties  in 
order  to  be  bought  off  by  the  whites.  The  tend- 
ency of  their  work  was  to  create  in  the  negroes  a 
pervasive  distrust  of  the  whites. 

The  prevalent  delusion  in  regard  to  an  impend- 
ing division  of  the  lands  among  the  blacks  had  its 
origin  in  the  operation  of  the  war-time  confiscation 
laws,  in  some  of  the  Bureau  legislation,  and  in  Gen- 
eral Sherman's  Sea  Island  order,  but  it  was  further 
fostered  by  the  agents  until  most  blacks  firmly 
believed  that  each  head  of  a  family  was  to  get  "40 
acres  and  a  mule. "  This  belief  seriously  interfered 
with  industry  and  resulted  also  in  widespread 
swindling  by  rascals  who  for  years  made  a  prac- 
tice of  selKng  fraudulent  deeds  to  land  with  red, 
white,  and  blue  sticks  to  mark  off  the  bounds  of  a 
chosen  spot  on  the  former  master's  plantation.  The 


'4^ 


THE  WARDS  OP  THE  NATION 


115 


asufUnt  coiiiiniMionen  labored  hard  to  diaabiue 
the  minds  of  the  negroes,  but  their  efforts  were 
often  neutralized  by  the  unscrupulous  attitude 
of  the  agents. 

As  the  contest  over  reconstruction  developed  in 
Washington,  the  officials  of  the  Bureau  soon  recog- 
nized the  political  possibilities  of  their  institu- 
tion.  After  mid-year  of  186C  the  Bureau  became  a 
political  machine  for  the  purpose  of  organizing  the 
blacks  into  the  Union  League,  where  the  rank  and 
file  were  taught  that  retinslavement  would  follow 
Democratic  victories.  Nearly  all  of  the  Bureau 
agents  aided  in  the  administration  of  the  recon- 
struction acts  in  1867  and  in  the  organization  of 
the  new  state  and  local  governments  and  became 
officials  under  the  new  regime.  They  were  the 
chief  agents  in  capturing  the  solid  negro  vote  for 
the  Republican  party. 


.f 


J. 


ibU^ 


Neither  of  the  two  plans  for  guiding  the  freed- 
men  into  a  place  in  the  social  order  —  the  **  Black 
Laws"  and  the  Freedmen's  Buresv:  —  was  success- 
ful. The  former  contained  a  program  which  was 
better  suited  to  actual  conditions  and  which  might 
have  succeeded  if  it  had  been  given  a  fair  trial. 
These  laws  were  a  measure  of  the  extent  to  which 


If 


116       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

the  average  white  would  then  go  in  "accepting  the 
situation"  so  far  as  the  blacks  were  concerned. 
And  on  the  whole  the  recognition  of  n^^  rights 
made  in  these  laws,  and  made  at  a  time  when  the 
whites  believed  that  they  were  free  to  handle 
the  situation,  was  remarkably  fair.  The  negroes 
lately  released  from  slavery  were  admitted  to  the 
enjoyment  of  the  same  rights  as  the  whites  as  to 
l^al  protection  of  life,  liberty,  and  property,  as  to 
education  and  as  to  the  family  relation,  limited 
only  by  the  clear  recognition  of  the  principles  of 
political  inferiority  and  social  separation.  Un- 
happily this  legislation  was  not  put  to  the  test  of 
practical  «cperience  because  of  the  Freedmen's 
Bureau;  it  was  nevertheless  skillfully  used  to 
arouse  the  dominant  Northern  party  to  a  course 
of  action  which  made  impossible  any  further  effort 
to  treat  the  race  problem  with  due  consideration  to 
actual  local  conditions. 

Much  of  the  work  of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau  was 
of  only  temporary  benefit  to  both  races.  The  re- 
sults of  its  more  permanent  work  were  not  gener- 
ally good.  The  institution  was  based  upon  the 
assumption  that  the  negro  race  must  be  protected 
from  the  white  race.  In  its  organization  and  ad- 
ministration it  was  an  impossible  combination  of 


THE  WARDS  OF  THE  NATION         117 

the  practical  and  the  theoretical,  of  opportunism 
and  humanitarianism,  of  common  sense  and  ideal- 
ism. It  failed  to  exert  a  permanently  wholesome 
influence  because  its  lesser  agents  were  not  held 
to  strict  accountability  by  their  superiors.  Under 
these  agents  the  alienation  of  the  two  races  began, 
and  the  ill  feelings  then  aroused  were  destined  to 
persist  into  a  long  and  troubled  future. 


n 


CHAPTER  V 


^    ! 


THE  VICTORY  OP  THE  RADICALS 

The  soldiers  who  fought  through  the  war  to  vic- 
tory or  to  defeat  had  been  at  home  nearly  two 
years  before  the  radicals  developed  sufficient 
strength  to  carry  through  their  plans  for  a  revolu- 
tionary reconstruction  of  the  Southern  States.  At 
the  end  of  the  war  a  majority  of  the  Northern 
people  would  have  supported  a.  settlement  in 
accordance  with  Lincoln',^  policy.  Eight  months 
later  a  majority,  but  a  s  u  Uer  one,  would  have 
supported  Johnson's  worj  ..  d  it  been  possible  to 
secure  a  popular  decision  How  then  did  the 

radicals  gain  the  victory  over  the  conservatives? 
The  answer  to  this  question  is  given  by  James 
Ford  Rhodes  in  terms  of  personalities:  "Three 
men  are  responsible  for  the  Congressional  policy 
of  Reconstruction:  Andrew  Johnson,  by  his  ob- 
stinacy and  bad  behavior;  Thaddeus  Stevens, 
by  his  vindictiveness  and  parliamentary  tyranny; 

118 


It » 
1  - 


THE  VICTORY  OP  THE  RADICALS      119 

Charles  Sumner,  by  his  pertinacity  in  a  misguided 
humanitarianism."  The  President  stood  alone  in 
his  responsibility,  but  his  chief  opponents  were  the 
ablest  leaders  of  a  resolute  band  of  radicals. 

Radicalism  did  not  begin  in  the  Administration 
of  Andrew  Johnson.  Lincoln  had  felt  its  covert 
opposition  throughout  the  war,  but  he  possessed 
the  faculty  of  weakening  his  opponents,  while 
Johnson's  conduct  usually  multiplied  the  number 
and  the  strength  of  his  enemies.  At  first  the  radi- 
cals criticized  Lincoln's  policy  in  regard  to  slavery, 
and  after  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  they 
shifted  their  attack  to  his  "ten  per  cent"  plan  for 
organizing  the  state  governments  as  outlined  in  the 
Proclamation  of  December,  1863.  Lincoln's  course 
was  distasteful  to  them  because  he  did  not  admit 
the  right  of  Congress  to  dicta'  ;  terms,  because  of 
his  liberal  attitude  towards  former  Confederates, 
and  because  he  was  conservative  on  the  negro 
question.  A  schism  among  the  Republican  sup- 
porters of  the  war  was  with  difficulty  averted  in 
1864,when  Fremont  threatened  to  lead  the  radicals 
in  opposition  to  the  "Union  "  party  of  the  President 
and  his  conservative  policy. 

The  breach  was  widened  by  the  refusal  of  Con- 
gress to  admit  representatives  from  Arkansas  and 


M 


1«0       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

Louisiana  in  1864  and  to  count  the  electoral  vote 
of  Louisiana  and  Tennessee  in  1865.    The  passage 
of  the  Wade-Davis  reconstruction  bill  in  July, 
1864,  and  the  protests  of  its  authors  after  Lincoh's 
pocket  veto  called  attention  to  the  growing  opposi- 
tion.  Severe  criticism  caused  Lincoln  to  withdraw 
the  propositions  which  he  had  made  in  April,  1865, 
with  regard  to  the  restoration  of  Virginia.    In  his 
last  public  speech  he  referred  with  regret  to  the 
growing  spirit  of  vindictr  eness  toward  the  South. 
Much  of  the  opposition  to  Lincok's  Southern 
policy  was  based  not  on  radicalism,  that  is,  not 
on  any  desire  for  a  revolutionary  change  in  the 
South,  but  upon  a  belief  that  Congress  and  not 
the  Executive  should  be  entrusted  with  the  work 
of  reorganizing  the  Union.    Many  congressional 
leaders  were  willing  to  have  Congress  itself  carry 
through  the  very  policies  which  Lincoln  had  ad- 
vocated; and  a  majority  of  the  Northern  people 
would  have  endorsed  them  without  much  caring 
who  was  to  execute  them. 

The  murder  of  Lincoln,  the  failure  of  the  radicals 
to  shape  Johnson's  policy  as  they  had  hoped,  and 
the  continuing  reaction  against  the  excessive  ex- 
pansion of  the  executive  power  added  s*  to 
the  opposition.   But  it  was  a  long  fight  before  the 


THE  VICTORY  OF  THE  RADICALS      l«l 

radical  leaders  won.  Their  victory  was  due  to 
adroit  tactics  on  their  own  part  and  to  mistakes, 
bad  judgment,  and  bad  manners  ca  the  part  of  the 
President.  When  all  hope  of  controlling  Johnson 
had  been  given  '  p,  Thadcjus  Stevens  and  other 
leaders  of  similar  views  b^an  to  contrive  means  to 
circumvent  him.  On  December  1,  1865,  before 
Congress  met,  a  caucus  of  radicals  held  in  Wash- 
ington agreed  that  a  joint  committee  of  the  two 
Houses  should  be  selected  to  which  should  be  re- 
ferred matters  relating  to  reconstruction.  This 
plan  would  thwart  the  more  conservative  Senate 
and  gain  a  desirable  delay  in  which  the  radicals 
might  develop  their  campaign.  The  next  day  at  a 
caucus  of  the  Union  party  the  plan  went  through 
without  arousing  the  suspicion  of  the  supporters 
of  the  Administration.  Next,  through  the  in- 
fluence of  Stevens,  Edward  McPherson,  the  clerk 
of  the  House,  omitted  from  the  roll  call  of  the 
House  the  names  of  the  members  from  the  South. 
The  radical  program  was  then  adopted  and  a  week 
later  the  Senate  concurred  in  the  action  of  the 
House  as  to  the  appointment  of  a  Joint  Committee 
on  Reconstruction. 

On  the   issues  before   Congress   both   Houses 
were  split  into  rather  clearly  defined  factions: 


W' 


W«       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 
the  extreme  radicak  with  such  leaden  as  Stevens, 
Sumner,  Wade,  and  Boutwell;  the  moderate  Re- 
publicans, chief  among  whom  were  Fessenden  and 
Trumbull;  the  administration  Republicans  led  by 
Raymond,  Doolittle,  Cowan,  and  Dixon;  and  the 
Democrats,  of  whom  the  ablest  were  Reverdy  John- 
son, Guthrie,  and  Hendricks.    All  except  the  ex- 
treme radicals  were  willing  to  support  the  President 
or  to  come  to  some  fairly  reasonable  compromise. 
But  at  no  time  were  they  given  an  opportunity 
to  get  together.    Johnson  and  the  administration 
leaders  did  little  in  this  direction  and  the  radicals 
made  the  mast  skillful  use  of  the  divisions  among 
the  conservatives. 

Whatever  final  judgment  may  be  passed  upon 
the  radical  reconstruction  policy  and  its  results, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  political  dexterity  of 
those  who  carried  it  through.  Chief  among  them 
was  Thaddeus  Stevens,  vindictive  and  unscrupu- 
lous, filled  with  hatred  of  the  Southern  leaders, 
bitter  in  speech  and  possessing  to  an  extreme 
degree  the  faculty  of  making  ridiculous  those  who 
opposed  him.  He  advocated  confiscation,  the  pro- 
scription or  exile  of  leading  whites,  the  granting 
of  the  franchise  and  of  lands  to  the  negroes,  and 
in  Southern  States  the  establishment  of  territorial 


l«i        'niE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 
theexlrtiiu'  rudii-ftls  with  siuh  l.^Hdtrs  as  Stevens. 
SuniDPr.  Wade,  and  Roiitwdi.  \hv  nuxlerate  Re> 
puhlicans,  dijef  among  u-hom  w«»re  Fessenden  and 
Truuihull;  the  ndiTiinisfratMin  llipuhluans  led  hy 
Rayi.ioiHi.  Dwlitti'N  (  owan,  an.i  Dixon;  and  the 
Dt  intK-ral^.nf  whom  theahlof  were  Reverdy  John- 
son. (Mithrit,  jin.l  Il.-rulritU       Al!  .  xr<  pf  the  ex- 
treme ra«iirid.s  wer,    •.  illing  to  supfK>rt  the  i'rt'sident 
or  to  coMH  to  mmir.  fairly  rea«i<inai)!.-  i-oinpniniise. 
But  Hi  no  iiine  were  Ihey  ghvn  an  opportunity 
ioKi-i  toj.'=tb.,       John  ofi  and  the  ••.dminisfrntion 
leaders  did  littk- !i'rVri^T''-<:)M^V>^An.i  the  radio.!. 
made  tlie  nio^t  »k-<»fSl¥  a'^<*''W^hy<''rlivisions  among 
the  e(inservati¥i»?5 

ANhaf.x         }i4|  ,ad«ment  may  be  pa^^si'd  upon 
the  rjuiua?  rtytmstrui  I  ion  poliry  an<i  its  results, 
there  rttu  \„    ■.,  douht  of  (he  |)olitical  dext<rity  of 
thoM'  who  larruvl  it  ihro.i|;h.    Chief  among  then! 
was  Thadd.  ii-  Steven ,.  \  sndirtive  and  unsi(;rui)ii 
lou.s.  filled  wHh  haired  .rf  the  Southern  leaders, 
bit!<T   in    vjM-wh    and    {KK'^sfssijig   to   an   t  xtreme 
degrvH-  the  fui-uH'.  .(  niukuiff  ridiculous  those  wh. 
uppo.sed  bifTt.      lii-  adv  o<;ated  eon  fi  seat  ion.  the  pro 
seriDtiou  or  .  xile  of  h-ading  whites,  fh.    grant  im. 
of  thi  f-Aiivinsc  and  of  lands  t..  the  negro<-s,  an,- 
•  n  Sontt.orr,  Si;,?,'.  <hv  .-»  sMishment  of  t-TTltoriH 


'rf-r     -'i-i-i-^i   i^-   fi    r 


THE  VICTORY  OF  THE  RADICALS      188 

govemmenti  under  the  control  (tfCongreM.  Thew 
States  ihould,  he  said,  "never  be  recognised  as 
capr.ble  of  acting  in  the  Union  .  .  .  until  the  Con- 
stitution shall  have  been  so  amended  as  to  make 
it  what  the  makers  intended,  and  so  as  to  secure 
perpetual  ascendency  to  the  party  of  the  Union." 
Charles  Sumner,  the  leader  of  the  radicals  in  the 
Senate,  was  moved  less  than  Stevens  by  personal 
hostility  toward  the  whites  of  the  South,  but  his 
sympathy  was  reserved  entirely  for  the  blacks. 
He  was  unpractical,  theoretical,  and  not  troubled 
by  constitutional  scruples.  To  him  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence  was  the  supreme  law  and  it 
was  the  duty  of  Congress  to  express  its  principles 
in  appropriate  legislation.  Unlike  Stevens,  who 
had  a  genuine  liking  for  the  negro,  Sumner's  sym- 
pathy for  the  race  was  purely  intellectual;  for  the 
individual  negro  he  felt  r^ulsion.  His  views  were 
in  effect  not  different  from  those  of  Stevens.  And 
he  was  practical  enough  not  to  overlook  the  value 
of  the  negro  vote,  "  To  my  mind, "  he  said, "  noth- 
ing is  clearer  than  the  absolute  necessity  of  suf- 
frage for  all  colored  persons  in  the  disorganized 
States.  It  will  net  be  enough  if  you  give  it  to  those 
who  read  and  write;  you  will  not,  in  this  way, 
acquire  the  voting  force  which  you  need  there  for 


f 

i. 
t4 


1^ 


i 


•11 » ' 


lU  THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 
the  protection  of  unionists,  whether  white  or  blade. 
You  will  not  secure  the  new  allies  who  are  essential 
to  the  national  cause."  A  leader  of  the  second 
rank  was  his  colleague  Henry  Wilson,  who  was 
jilw  actuated  by  a  desire  for  the  negro's  welfare 
and  for  the  perpetuation  of  the  Republican  party, 
w}i<«h  he  said  contained  in  its  ranks  "more  of 
nioi  r  1  and  intellectual  worth  than  was  ever  eni> 
hoi'irii  in  any  political  organization  in  any  land 
created  by  no  man  or  set  of  men  but  brought 
uAv  »yeing  by  Almighty  God  himself  .  .  and  en- 
lo.  '  .J  b"  ..  -eator  with  all  political  power  and 
cvor  >fiv.  under  Heaven."  Shellabarger  of  Ohio 
was  auc.her  important  figure  among  the  radicals. 
The  r<»i.uv,'ing  extract  from  one  of  his  speeches 
gives  an  indication  of  his  character  and  tempera- 
ment: "They  [the  Confederates]  framed  iniquity 
and  universal  murder  into  law.  .  .  .  Their  pirates 
burned  your  unarmed  commerce  upon  every  sea. 
They  carved  the  bones  of  the  dead  heroes  into  or- 
naments, and  drank  from  goblets  made  out  of  their 
skulls.  They  poisoned  your  fountains,  put  mines 
under  your  soldiers'  prisons;  organized  bands 
whose  leaders  were  concealed  in  your  homes;  and 
commissions  ordered  the  torch  and  yellow  fever  to 
be  carried  to  your  cities  and  to  your  women  and 


^f 


THE  VICiX)RY  OF  THE  RADICALS      IM 

children.  They  planned  one  univeruU  bonfire  of 
the  North  from  Lake  Ontario  to  the  Miuouri." 

Among  the  lesser  lights  may  be  mentioned  Mor- 
ton and  Wade,  both  bluff,  coarse,  and  ungener- 
ous, and  thorou^ly  convinceu  that  the  Republican 
party  had  a  monopoly  of  loyalty,  wisdom,  and 
virtues,  and  that  by  any  means  it  must  gain  and 
keep  control;  Boutwell,  fanatical  and  mediocre; 
and  Benjamin  Butler,  a  charlatan  and  demagogue. 
As  a  class  the  Western  radicals  were  less  troubled 
by  humanitarian  ideals  than  were  those  of  the 
East  and  sought  more  practical  political  results. 

The  Joint  Committee  on  Remnstruction  which 
finally  decided  the  fate  of  the  northern  States  was 
composed  of  eight  radicals,  four  moderate  Republi- 
cans, and  three  Democrats.  As  James  Gillespie 
Blaine  wrote  later,  "  it  was  foreseen  that  in  an  es- 
pecial degree  the  fortunes  of  the  Republican  party 
would  be  in  the  keeping  of  the  fifteen  men  who 
might  be  chosen."  This  committee  was  divided 
into  four  subcommittees  to  take  testimony.  The 
witnesses,  all  of  whom  were  examined  at  Washing- 
ton, included  army  officers  and  Bureau  agents  who 
had  served  in  the  South,  Southern  Unionists,  a 
few  politicians,  and  several  former  Confed<>rates, 
among  them  General  Robert  £.  Lee  and  Alexander 


M 


: 


'\  :\l 


n 


^ 


186        THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 
H.  Stephens.    Most  of  the  testimony  was  of  the 
kind  needed  to  support  the  contentions  of  the  radi- 
cals that  negroes  were  badly  treated  in  the  South; 
that  the  whites  were  disloyal;  that,  should  they  be 
left  in  control,  the  negro,  free  labor,  the  nation,  and 
the  Republican  party  would  be  in  danger;  that  the 
army  and  the  Freedmen's  Bureau  must  be  kept  in 
the  South;  and  that  a  radical  reconstruction  was 
necessary.    No  serious  effort,  however,  was  made 
to  ascertain  the  actual  conditions  in  the  South. 
Slow  to  formulate  a  definite  plan,  the  Joint  Com- 
mittee guided  public  sentiment  toward  radicalism, 
converted  gradually  the  Republican  Congressmen, 
and  little  by  little  undermined  the  power  and 
influence  of  the  President. 

Not  until  after  the  new  year  was  it  plain  that 
there  was  to  be  a  fight  to  the  finish  between  Con- 
gres«»  and  the  President.  Congress  had  refused 
in  December,  1866,  to  accept  the  President's  pro- 
gram, but  there  was  still  hope  for  a  compromise. 
Many  conservatives  had  voted  for  the  delay 
merely  to  assert  the  rights  of  Congress;  but  the 
radicals  wanted  time  to  frame  a  program.  The 
Northern  Democrats  were  embarrassingly  cordial 
in  their  support  of  Johnson  and  so  also  were  most 
Southerners.    The  moderates  were  not  far  away 


THE  VICTORY  OF  THE  RADICALS      127 

from  the  position  of  the  President  and  the  adminis- 
tration Republicans.  But  the  radicals  skillfully 
postponed  a  test  of  strength  until  Stevens  and 
Sumner  were  ready.  The  latter  declared  that  a 
generation  must  elapse  "before  the  rebel  com- 
munities have  so  far  been  changed  as  to  become 
safe  associates  in  a  common  government.  Time, 
therefore,  we  must  have.  Through  time  all  other 
guarantees  may  be  obtained;  but  time  itself  is 
a  guarantee." 

To  the  Joint  Committee  were  referred  without 
debate  all  measures  relating  to  reconstruction,  but 
the  Committee  was  purposely  making  littie  prog- 
gress  —  contented  merely  to  take  testimony  and  to 
act  as  a  clearing  house  for  the  radical  "facts" 
about  "Southern  outrages"  while  waiting  for  the 
tide  to  turn.  The  "Black  Laws"  and  the  election 
of  popular  Confederate  leaders  to  office  in  the 
South  were  eifectively  used  to  alarm  the  friends 
of  the  negroes,  and  the  reports  from  the  Bureau 
agents  gave  support  to  those  who  condemned  the 
Southern  state  governments  as  totally  inadequate 
and  disloyal. 

So  apparent  was  the  growth  of  radicalism  that 
the  President,  alarmed  by  the  attitude  of  Sumner 
and  Stevens  and  their  followers,  began  to  fear  for 


f 


t ' 


IM       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

the  Constitution  and  forced  the  fight.  The  passage 
of  a  bill  on  February  6.  1866,  extending  the  life  of 
the  Freedmen's  Bureau  furnished  the  occasion  for 
the  beginning  of  the  open  struggle.  On  the  19th  of 
February  Johnson  vetoed  the  bill,  and  the  next 
day  an  effort  was  made  to  pass  it  over  the  veto. 
Not  succeeding  in  this  attempt,  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives adopted  a  concurrent  resolution  that 
Senators  and  Representatives  from  the  Southern 
States  should  be  excluded  until  Congress  declared 
them  entitled  to  representation.  Ten  days  later 
the  Senate  also  adopted  the  resolution. 

Though  it  was  not  yet  too  late  for  Johnson 
to  meet  the  conservatives  of  Congress  on  middle 
ground,  he  threw  away  his  opportunity  by  an  in- 
temperate and  undignified  speech  on  the  22d  of 
February  to  a  crowd  at  the  White  House.  As  usual 
when  excited,  he  forgot  the  proprieties  and  de- 
nounced the  radicals  as  enemies  of  the  Union  and 
even  went  so  far  as  to  charge  Stevens,  Sumner,  and 
Wendell  Phillips  with  endeavoring  to  destroy  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  government.  Such 
conduct  weakened  his  supporters  and  rejoiced  his 
enemies.  It  was  expected  that  Johnson  would  ap- 
prove the  bill  to  confer  civil  rights  upon  the  negroes, 
but,  goaded  perhaps  by  the  speeches  of  Stevens, 


■»..^i 


.  THE  VICTORY  OF  THE  RADICALS      129 

he  vetoed  it  on  the  27th  of  March.  Its  patience 
now  exhausted.  Congress  passed  the  bill  over  the 
President's  veto.  To  secure  the  requisite  majority 
in  the  Senate,  Stockton,  Democratic  Senator  from 
New  Jersey,  was  unseated  on  technical  grounds, 
and  Senator  Morgan,  who  was  "paired  "  with  a  sick 
colleague,  broke  his  word  to  vote  aye  —  for  which 
Wade  offensively  thanked  God.  The  moderates 
had  now  fallen  away  from  the  President  and  at 
least  for  this  session  of  Congress  his  policies  were 
wrecked.  On  the  16th  of  July  the  supplementary 
Freedmen's  Bureau  Act  was  passed  over  the  veto, 
and  on  the  24th  of  July  Tennessee  was  readmitted 
to  representation  by  a  law  the  preamble  of  which 
asserted  unmistakably  that  Congress  had  assumed 
control  of  reconstruction. 

Meanwhile  the  Joint  Committee  on  Reconstruc- 
tion had  made  a  report  asserting  that  the  South- 
erners had  forfeited  all  constitutional  rights,  that 
their  state  governments  were  not  in  constitution- 
al form,  and  that  restoration  could  be  accom- 
plished only  when  Congress  and  the  President 
acted  together  in  fixing  the  terms  of  readmission. 
The  uncompromising  hostility  of  the  South,  the 
Committee  asserted,  made  necessary  adequate  safe- 
guards which  should  include  the  disfranchisement 


^ 

* 


I' 


180       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

of  the  white  leaders,  either  n^pt>  su£frage  or  a  reduc- 
tion of  white  representation,  and  repudiation  of  the 
Confederate  war  debt  with  recognition  of  the  va- 
lidity of  the  United  States  debt.  These  terms  were 
embodied  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  which 
was  adopted  by  Congress  and  sent  to  the  States 
on  June  13,  1866. 

In  the  congressional  campaign  of  1866  recon- 
struction was  almost  the  sole  issue.    For  success 
the  Administration  must  gain  at  least  one-third 
of  one  house,  while  the  radicals  were  fighting  for 
two-thirds  of  each  House.   If  the  Administration 
should  fail  to  make  the  necessary  gain,  the  work 
accomplished  by  the  Presidents  would  be  de- 
stroyed.   The  campaign  was  bitter  and  extended 
through  the  summer  and  fall.    Four  national  con- 
ventions were  held:  the  National  Union  party  at 
Philadelphia  made  a  respectable  showing  in  sup- 
port of  the  President;  the  Southern  Unionists, 
guided  by  the  Northern  radicals  met  at  the  same 
place;  a  soldiers'  and  sailors'  convention  at  Cleve- 
land supported  the  Administration;  and  another 
convention  of  soldiers  and  sailors  at  Pittsburgh 
endorsed  the  radical  policies.     A  convention  of 
Confederate  soldiers  and  sailors  at  Memphis  en- 
dorsed the  President,  but  the  Southern  support 


i;. 


THE  VICTORY  OF  THE  RADICALS      181 

and  that  of  the  Northern  Democrats  did  not 
encourage  moderate  Republicans  to  vote  for  the 
Administration.  Three  members  of  Johnson's 
Cabinet  —  Harlan,  Speed,  and  Dennison  —  re- 
signed because  they  were  unwilling  to  follow  their 
chief  further  in  opposing  Congress. 

The  radicals  had  plenty  of  campaign  material  in 
the  testimony  collected  by  the  Joint  Committee, 
in  the  reports  of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau,  and  in 
the  bloody  race  riots  which  had  occurred  in  Mem- 
phis and  New  Orleans.  The  greatest  blunder  of 
the  Administration  was  Johnson's  speechmaking 
tour  to  the  West  which  he  called  "  Swinging  Around 
the  Circle. "  Every  time  he  made  a  speech  he  was 
heckled  by  persons  in  the  crowd,  lost  his  temper, 
denounced  Congress  and  the  radical  leaders,  and 
conducted  himself  in  an  undignified  manner.  The 
election  returns  showed  more  than  a  two-thirds  ma- 
jority in  each  House  against  the  President.  The  For- 
tieth Congress  would  therefore  be  safely  radical,  and 
in  consequence  the  Thirty-ninth  was  encouraged 
to  be  more  radical  during  its  last  session. 

Public  interest  now  for  a  time  turned  to  the 
South,  where  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  be- 
fore the  state  legislatures.  The  radicals,  taunted 
with  having  no  plan  of  reconstruction  beyond  a 


1;; 


18«       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

desire  to  keep  the  Southern  States  out  of  the  Union* 
professed  to  see  in  the  ratification  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  a  good  opportunity  to  readmit 
the  States  on  a  safe  basis.  The  elections  of  1866 
had  pointed  to  the  ratification  of  the  proposed 
amendment  as  an  essential  preliminary  to  re- 
admission.  But  would  additional  demands  be 
made  upon  the  South  ?  Sumner,  Stevens,  and  Fes- 
senden  were  sure  that  negro  suffrage  also  must  come, 
but  Wade,  Chase,  Garfield,  and  others  believed 
that  nothing  beyond  the  terms  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  would  be  asked. 

In  the  Southern  legislatures  there  was  little  dis- 
position to  ratify  the  amendment.  The  rapid  de- 
velopment of  the  radical  policies  during  1866  had 
convinced  most  Southerners  that  nothing  short  of 
a  general  humiliation  and  complete  revolution  in 
the  South  would  satisfy  the  dominant  party,  and 
there  were  few  who  wished  to  be  "parties  to  our 
own  dishonor. "  The  President  advised  the  States 
not  to  accept  the  amendment,  but  several  South- 
ern leaders  favored  it,  fearing  that  worse  would 
come  if  they  should  reject  it.  Only  in  the  legisla- 
tures of  Alabama  and  Florida  was  there  any  serious 
disposition  to  accept  the  amendment;  and  in  the 
end  all  the  unreconstructed  States  voted  adversely 


V! 


liiE  VICTORY  OF  THE  RADICALS  1S8 
during  the  fall  and  winter  of  1866-67.  This  una- 
nimity of  action  was  due  in  part  to  the  belief  that, 
even  if  the  amendment  were  ratified,  the  Southern 
States  would  still  be  excluded,  and  in  part  to  the 
general  dislike  of  the  proscriptive  section  which 
would  disfranchise  all  Confederates  of  prominence 
and  result  in  the  breaking  up  of  the  state  gov- 
ernments. The  example  of  unhappy  Tennessee, 
which  had  ratified  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  and 
had  been  readmitted,  was  not  one  to  encourage 
conservative  people  in  the  other  Southern  States. 

The  rejection  of  the  amendment  put  the  ques- 
tion of  reconstruction  squarely  before  Congress. 
There  was  no  longer  a  possibilfty  of  accomplishing 
the  reconstruction  of  the  Southern  States  by  means 
of  constitutional  amendments.  Some  of  the  Border 
and  Northern  States  were  already  showing  signs 
of  uneasiness  at  the  continued  exclusion  of  the 
South.  But  if  the  Constitutional  Amendment  had 
failed,  other  means  of  reconstruction  were  at  hand, 
for  the  radicals  now  controlled  the  Thirty-ninth 
Congress,  from  which  the  Southern  representa- 
tives were  excluded,  and  would  also  control  the 
Fortieth  Congress. 

Under  the  lead  of  Stevens  and  Sumner  the  radi- 
cals now  perfected  their  plans.  On  January  8, 1867, 


ih 


.m 


,n 


1 1. 


!'> 


,  .1; 


I 


184       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

their  first  measure,  conferring  the  franchise  upon 
negroes  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  was  passed 
over  the  presidential  veto,  though  the  proposal  had 
been  voted  down  a  few  weeks  earlier  by  a  vote  of 
65i6  to  85  in  Washmgton  and  812  to  1  in  George- 
town. In  the  next  place,  by  an  act  of  January  31, 
1867,  the  franchise  was  extended  to  negroes  in  the 
territories,  and  on  March  2, 1867,  three  important 
measures  were  enacted:  the  Tenure  of  OflSce  Act 
and  a  rider  to  the  Army  Appropriation  Act — both 
designed  to  limit  the  power  of  the  President  —  and 
the  first  Reconstruction  Act.  By  the  Tenure  of 
OflSce  Act  the  President  was  prohibited  from  re- 
moving ofiSceholders  except  with  the  consent  of  the 
Senate;  and  by  the  Army  Act  he  was  forbidden  to 
issue  orders  except  through  General  Grant  or  to 
relieve  him  of  command  or  to  assign  him  to  com- 
mand away  from  Washington  unless  at  the  Gen- 
eral's own  request  or  with  the  previous  approval  of 
the  Senate.  The  first  measure  was  meant  to  check 
the  removal  of  radical  ofiSceholders  by  Johnson, 
and  the  other,  which  was  secretly  drawn  up  for 
Boutwell  by  Stanton,  was  designed  to  prevent 
the  President  from  exercising  his  constitutional 
command  of  the  army. 
The  first  Reconstruction  Act  declared  that  no 


if 


I'V 


THE  VICTORY  OF  THE  RADICALS      135 

legal  state  government  existed  in  the  ten  unrecon- 
structed States  and  that  there  was  no  adequate 
protection  for  life  and  property.  The  Johnson  and 
Lincoln  governments  in  those  States  were  declared 
to  have  no  legal  status  and  to  be  subject  wholly  to 
the  authority  of  the  United  States  to  modify  or 
abolish.  The  ten  States  were  divided  into  five 
military  districts,  over  each  of  which  a  general 
officer  was  to  be  placed  in  command.  Military 
tribunals  were  to  supersede  the  civil  courts  where 
necessary.  Stevens  was  willing  to  rest  here, 
though  some  of  his  less  radical  followers,  disliking 
military  rule  but  desiring  to  force  negro  suffrage, 
inserted  a  provision  in  the  law  that  a  State  might 
be  readmitted  to  representation  upon  the  following 
conditions:  a  constitutional  convention  must  be 
held,  the  members  of  which  were  elected  by  males 
of  voting  age  without  regard  to  color,  excluding 
whites  who  would  be  disfranchised  by  the  proposed 
Fourteenth  Amendment;  a  constitution  including 
the  same  rule  of  suffrage  must  be  framed,  ratified 
by  the  same  electorate,  and  approved  by  Con- 
gress; and  lastly,  the  legislatures  elected  under  this 
constitution  must  ratify  the  proposed  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  after  which,  if  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment should  have  become  a  part  of  the  Federal 


m 


i 


i 

ill 

i 


n 


I  «* 


If 


•A 


h 


«■ 


186       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

Constitution,  the  State  should  be  readmitted  to 
representation. 

In  order  that  the  adminiik  .on  of  this  radical 
legislation  might  be  supervised  by  its  friends,  the 
Thirty-ninth  Congress  had  passed  a  law  requiring 
the  Fortieth  Congress  to  meet  on  the  4th  of  March 
instead  of  in  December  as  was  customary.  Ac- 
cording to  the  Reconstruction  Act  of  the  2d  of 
March  it  was  left  to  the  state  government  or  to 
the  people  of  a  State  to  make  the  first  move  to- 
wards reconstruction.  If  they  preferred,  they  might 
remain  under  military  rule.  Either  by  design 
or  by  carelessness  no  machinery  of  administration 
was  provided  for  the  execution  of  the  act.  When 
it  became  evident  that  the  Southerners  preferred 
military  rule  the  new  Congress  passed  a  Supplemen- 
tary Reconstruction  Act  on  the  2Sd  of  March  de- 
signed to  force  the  earlier  a  .t  into  operation.  The 
five  commanding  generals  were  directed  to  register 
the  blacks  of  voting  age  and  the  whites  who  were 
not  disfranchised,  to  hold  elections  for  conventions, 
to  call  the  conventions,  to  hold  elections  to  ratify 
or  reject  the  constitutions,  and  to  forward  the 
constitutions,  if  ratified,  to  the  President  for 
transmission  to  Congress. 

In  these  reconstruction  acts  the  whole  doctrine 


i'>. 


THE  VICTORY  OP  THE  RADICALS      1S7 

of  radiadiiiii  was  put  on  the  way  to  accomplUh- 
nient.  Its  spread  had  been  rapid.  In  December, 
1800,  the  majority  of  Congress  would  have  ac- 
cepted with  little  modification  the  work  of  Lin- 
coln and  Johnson.  Three  months  later  the  Civil 
Rights  Act  measured  the  advance.  Very  soon  the 
new  Freedmen's  Bureau  Act  and  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  indicated  the  rising  tide  of  radicalism. 
The  campaign  of  1866  and  the  attitude  of  the 
Southern  States  swept  all  radicals  and  most  moder- 
ate Republicans  swiftly  into  a  merciless  course  of 
reconstruction.  Moderate  reconstruction  had  no- 
where strong  support.  Congress,  touched  in  its 
amour  propre  by  presidential  disregard,  was  eager 
for  extremes.  Johnson,  who  regarded  himself  as 
defending  the  Constitution  against  radical  assaults, 
was  stubborn,  irascible,  and  undignified,  and  with 
his  associates  was  no  match  in  political  strategy 
for  his  radical  opponents. 

The  average  Republican  or  Unionist  in  the 
North,  if  he  had  not  been  brought  by  skillful  mis- 
representation to  believe  a  new  rebellion  impend- 
ing in  the  South,  was  at  any  rate  painfully  alive 
to  the  fear  that  the  Democratic  party  might  re- 
gain power.  With  the  freeing  of  the  slaves  the 
representation  of  the  South  m  Congress  would  be 


t  ( 


n 


i 
-I 


THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOBIATTOX 

increased.  At  fint  it  seemed  that  the  South  might 
divide  in  politics  as  before  the  war.  but  the  longer 
the  delay  the  more  the  Southern  whites  tended  to 
unite  into  one  party  acting  with  the  Democrats. 
With  their  eighty-five  representatives  and  a  slight 
reaction  in  the  North,  they  might  gain  control  of 
the  lower  House  of  Congress.  The  Union-Repub- 
lican party  had  a  majority  of  less  than  one  hundred 
in  1866  and  this  was  lessened  slightly  in  the  For- 
tieth Congress.  The  President  was  for  all  |wacti- 
cal  purposes  a  Democrat  again.  The  prospect  was 
too  much  for  the  very  human  politicians  to  view 
without  distress.  Stevens,  speaking  in  support  ol 
the  Military  Reconstruction  Bill,  said: 

There  are  several  good  reasons  for  the  passage  of  this 
bill.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  just.  I  am  now  confining 
my  argument  to  negro  suffrage  in  the  rebel  SUtes. 
Have  not  loyal  blacks  quite  as  good  a  ri^t  to  choose 
rulers  and  make  laws  as  rebel  whites?  In  the  second 
place,  it  is  necessary  in  order  to  protect  the  loyal  white 
men  in  the  seceded  States.  With  them  the  blacks  would 
dct  in  a  body,  and  it  is  believed  that  in  each  of  these 
States,  except  one,  the  two  united  would  form  a  major- 
ity, control  the  States,  and  protect  themselves.  Now 
they  are  the  victims  of  daily  murder.  They  must  suffer 
constant  persecution  or  be  exiled.  Another  good  reason 
is  that  it  would  insure  the  ascendency  of  the  union 
party.  ...     I    believe  .  .  .  that  on   the   continued 


THE  VICTCWY  OF  THE  RADICALS      1S9 

•nendency  of  that  ptxly  depend*  the  Mfety  of  this 
great  nation.  If  impartuU  suffrage  i»  excluded  in  the 
rebel  States,  then  every  one  of  them  in  sure  to  send  a 
■olid  rebel  electoral  vote.  They,  with  their  kindred 
Copperheads  of  the  North,  would  always  elect  the 
President  and  control  Congfess. 

The  laws  paiMd  on  the  2d  and  the  «8d  of  March 
were  war  meaiures  and  presupposed  a  continuance 
of  war  conditionA.  The  Lincoln^ohnson  sUte 
govemmenta  were  overturned;  Congress  fixed  the 
qualifications  of  voters  for  that  time  and  for 
the  future;  and  the  President,  shorn  of  much  of 
his  constitutional  power,  could  exercise  but  little 
control  over  the  military  government.  Nothing 
that  a  State  might  do  would  secure  restoration 
until  it  should  ratify  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
to  the  Federal  Constitution.  The  war  had  been 
fought  upon  the  theory  ^bat  Lhe  old  Union  must 
be  preserved;  but  the  lia-sic  theory  of  the  recon- 
struction was  that  a  new  Union  wa^  to  be  created. 


r. 

hi 


i! 


.31 


r 


l\M 


H 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  RULE  OF  THE  MAJOR  GENERALS 

From  the  passage  of  the  reconstruction  acts  to 
the  close  of  Johnson's  Administration,  Congress, 
working  the  will  of  the  radical  majority,  was  in 
supreme  control.  The  army  carried  out  the  will  of 
Congress  and  to  that  body,  not  to  the  President,  the 
commanding  general  and  his  subordinates  looked 
for  direction. 

The  oflScial  opposition  of  the  President  to  the 
policy  of  Congress  ceased  when  that  policy  was 
enacted  into  law.  He  believed  this  legislation 
to  be  unconstitutional,  but  he  considered  it  his 
duty  to  execute  the  laws.  He  at  once  set  about 
the  appointment  of  generals  to  command  the 
military  districts  created  in  the  South, »  a  task 

•  The  first  five  genenb  appobted  were  Schofield.  Sickles.  Pope, 
Ord,  and  Sheridao.  None  of  these  remained  in  his  district  until  re- 
construction was  completed.  To  Schofield's  command  in  the  first 
district  succeeded  in  turn  Stoncman.  Webb,  and  Canby:  Sickles  gave 
way  to  Canby,  and  Pope  to  Meade.  Ord  in  the  fourth  district  was 

140 


THE  RULE  OF  THE  MAJOR  GENERALS  141 
calling  for  no  little  discretion,  since  much  de- 
pended upon  the  character  of  these  military 
govonors,  or  "satraps,"  as  they  were  frequently 
called  by  the  opposition.  The  commanding  general 
in  a  district  was  charged  with  many  duties,  mili- 
tary, political,  and  administrative.  It  was  his  duty 
to  carry  on  a  government  satisfactory  to  the 
radicals  and  not  too  irritating  to  the  Southern 
whites;  at  the  same  time  he  must  execute  the  re- 
construction acts  by  putting  old  leaders  out  of 
power  and  n^px>es  in.  Violent  opposition  to  this 
policy  on  the  part  of  the  South  was  not  looked 
for.  Notwithstanding  the  "  Southern  outrage  "  cam- 
paign, it  was  generally  recognized  in  government 
circles  that  conditions  in  the  seceded  States  had 
gradually  been  growing  better  since  the  close  of 
the  war.  There  was  in  many  regions,  to  be  sure, 
a  general  laxity  in  enforcing  laws,  but  that  had 
always  been  characteristic  of  the  newer  parts  of  the 
South.  The  Civil  Rights  Act  was  generally  in 
force,  the  "Black  Laws"  had  been  suspended,  and 

foUowed  by  GiUem,  McDowell,  and  Ames;  Sheridan,  in  the  fifth,  waa 
succeeded  by  Griffen,  Mower.  Hancock,  Buchanan,  Reynolds,  and  Can- 
by.  Some  of  the  geaenh  were  radical;  others,  moderate  and  tactful. 
The  most  extreme  were  Sheridan.  Pope,  and  Sickles.  Those  most 
acceptable  to  the  whites  were  Hancock,  Schofield,  and  Meade.  Gen- 
eral Grant  himself  became  more  radical  in  his  actions  as  he  became 
involved  in  the  fight  between  0>ngress  and  the  President. 


il 

¥  ■ 

I 


!y\ 


IH       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

the  Freedmen's  Bureau  was  everywhere  caring  tor 
the  negroes.  What  disorder  existed  was  of  recent 
origin  and  in  the  main  was  due  to  the  unsettling 
effects  of  the  debates  in  Congress  and  to  the 
organization  of  the  negroes  for  political  purposes. 

Military  rule  was  established  in  the  South  with 
slight  friction,  but  it  was  soon  found  that  the  re- 
construction laws  were  not  8u£Bciently  clear  on 
two  points:  first,  whether  there  was  any  limit  to 
the  authority  of  the  five  generals  over  the  local  and 
state  governments  and,  if  so,  whether  the  Umit- 
ing  authority  was  in  the  President;  and  second, 
whether  the  disfranchising  provisions  in  the  laws 
were  punitive  and  hence  to  be  construed  strictly. 
Attorney-General  Stanbery,  in  May  and  June, 
1867,  drew  up  opinions  in  which  he  maintained 
that  the  laws  were  to  be  conndered  punitive  and 
therefore  to  be  construed  strictly.  After  dis- 
cussions in  cabinet  meetings  these  opinions  re- 
ceived the  approval  of  all  except  Stanton,  Secre- 
tary of  War,  who  had  already  joined  the  radical 
camp.  The  Attorney-General's  opinion  was  sent 
out  to  the  district  commanders  for  their  informa- 
tion and  guidance.  But  Congress  did  not  intend 
to  permit  the  President  or  his  Cabinet  to  direct 
the  process  of  reconstruction,  and  in  the  Act  of 


% 


THE  RULE  OF  THE  BfAJOR  GENERALS  148 

July  19,  1867,  it  gave  a  radical  interpretation  to 
the  reconstruction  legislation,  declared  itself  in 
control,  gave  full  power  to  General  Grant  and  to 
the  district  commanders  subject  only  to  Grant, 
directed  the  removal  of  all  local  officials  who  op- 
posed the  reconstruction  policies,  and  warned  the 
civil  and  military  officers  of  the  United  States  that 
none  of  them  should  "be  bound  in  his  action  by 
any  opinion  of  any  civil  officer  of  the  United 
States. "  This  interpretive  legislation  gave  a  broad 
basis  for  the  military  government  and  resulted  in  a 
severe  application  of  the  disfranchising  provisions 
of  the  laws. 

Tlie  rule  of  the  five  generals  lasted  in  all  the 
States  until  June,  1868,  and  continued  in  Mis- 
sissippi, Texas,  Virginia,  and  Georgia  until  1870. 
There  had  been,  to  be  sure,  some  military  govern- 
ment in  1865,  subject,  however,  to  the  President, 
and  from  1865  to  1867  the  army,  along  with  the 
Freedmen's  Bureau,  had  exerted  a  strong  influence 
in  the  government  of  the  South,  but  in  the  r^ 
gime  now  inaugurated  the  military  was  supreme. 
The  generals  had  a  superior  at  Washington,  but 
whether  it  was  the  President,  General  Grant,  or 
Congress  was  not  clear  until  the  Act  of  July  19, 
1867  made  Congress  the  source  of  authority. 


.!   1 


:     ; 


I 


■-•    I 


hi 


144       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOBiATTOX 

The  power  of  the  generals  most  strikingly  ap- 
peared in  their  control  of  the  state  governments 
which  were  continued  as  provisional  organizations. 
Since  no  elections  were  permitted,  all  appointments 
and  removals  were  made  from  military  headquar- 
ters, which  soon  became  political  beehives,  centers 
of  wirepulling  and  agencies  for  the  distribution  of 
spoils.    At  the  outset  civil  oflScers  were  ordered  to 
retain  their  offices  during  good  behavior,  subject 
to  military  control.    But  no  local  official  was  per- 
mitted to  use  his  influence  ever  so  slightly  against 
reconstruction.    Since  most  of  them  did  not  favor 
the  policy  of  Congress,  thousands  were  removed 
as  "obstacles  to  reconstruction."    The  Governors 
of  Georgia,  Louisiana,  Virginia,  Mississippi,  and 
Texas  were  displaced  and  others  appointed  in  their 
stead.    All  kinds  of  subordinate  offices  rapidly  be- 
came vacant.   New  appointments  were  nearly  al- 
ways carpetbaggers  and  native  radicals  who  could 
take  the  "ironclad  "oath.   The  generals  complained 
that  there  were  not  enough   competent   native 
"loyalists"  to  fill  the  offices,  and  frequently  an  ar- 
my officer  was  installed  as  governor,  treasurer,  sec- 
retary of  state,  auditor,  or  mayor.    In  nearly  all 
towns  the  police  force  was  reorganized  and  former 
Federal  soldiers  were  added  to  the  force,  while  the 


I  4 


THE  RULE  OF  THE  MAJOR  GENERALS  145 

regular  troops  were  used  fpr  general  police  purposes 
and  for  rural  constabulary. 

Over  the  administration  of  justice  the  military 
authfmties  exercised  a  close  supervision.  Instruc- 
tions were  sent  out  to  court  officers  covering  the 
sdection  of  juries,  the  suspension  of  certain  laws, 
and  the  rules  of  evidence  and  procedure.  Courts 
were  often  closed,  court  decrees  set  aside  or  modi- 
fied, prisoners  released,  and  maay  cases  reserved 
for  trial  by  military  o«nmission.  Some  command- 
ers required  juries  to  admit  negro  members  and 
insisted  that  all  jurors  take  the  "in>nclad'*  test 
oath.  There  was  some  attempt  at  r^ulatifig  the 
Federal  coiuis  but  without  much  succem. 

Since  the  state  l^(id«ture8  were  forbidden  to 
meet,  m«ch  legislatiMi  was  eaaeted  through  Bsditary 
orders.  Stay  laws  were  enacted,  the  color  Ime  was 
abolished,  new  crimiadl  regulations  were  promvl' 
gated,  and  the  p)oUce  power  was  invc^ed  in  some 
instances  to  justify  sweeping  measures,  Midi  m  the 
prohibition  of  whisky  manufacture  in  Norlli  Cmk>- 
lina  and  South  Carolina.  The  miMtary  ^overaors 
levied,  increased,  or  decreased  taxes  and  made 
appropriations  which  the  state  treasurers  were 
forced  to  pay,  but  they  restrained  the  ra<&al  com- 
ventions,  all  of  idaich  wished  to  i^>end  mucb  moa^. 


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146       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

According  to  the  Act  of  March  23,  1867,  the  gen* 
ends  and  their  appointees  were  to  be  paid  by  the 
United  States,  but  in  practice  the  running  expenses 
of  reconstruction  were  paid  by  the  state  treasurers. 

Any  attempt  to  favor  the  Confederate  soldiers 
was  frowned  upon.  Laws  providing  wooden  I^gs  and 
free  education  for  crippled  Confederates  were  sus- 
pended. Militia  organizations  and  miUtary  schools 
were  forbidden.  No  uniform  might  be  worn,  no 
parades  were  permitted,  no  memorial  and  histor- 
ical societies  were  to  be  organized,  and  no  meet- 
ing of  any  kind  could  be  held  without  a  permit. 
The  attempt  to  control  the  press  resulted  in 
what  one  general  called  "a  horrible  uproar. "  Ed- 
itors were  forbidden  to  express  themselves  too 
strongly  against  reconstruction;  pOblic  advertis- 
ing and  printing  were  awarded  only  to  those  pa- 
pers actively  supporting  recons' ruction.  Several 
newspapers  were  suppressed,  a  notable  example 
being  the  Tuscaloosa  Independent  Monitor,  whose 
editor,  Ryland  Randolph,  was  a  picturesque  figure 
in  Alabama  journalism  and  a  leader  in  the  Ku 
KluxKlan. 

The  military  administration  was  thorough,  and 
as  a  whole  honest  and  efficient.  With  fewer  than 
ten   thousand   soldiers   the  generals   maintained 


1 


THE  RULE  OP  THE  MAJOR  GENERALS  147 

order  and  carried  on  the  reconstruction  of  the 
^uth.  The  whites  made  no  attempt  at  resistance, 
though  they  were  irritated  by  military  rule  and 
resented  the  loss  of  self-government.  But  most 
Southerners  preferred  the  rule  of  the  army  to  the 
alternative  reign  of  the  carpetbagger,  scalawag, 
and  negro.  The  extreme  radicals  at  the  North, 
on  the  other  hand,  were  disgusted  at  the  conserva- 
tive policy  of  the  generals.  The  apathy  of  the 
whites  at  the  beginning  of  the  military  reconstruc- 
tion excited  surprise  on  all  sides.  Not  only  was 
there  no  violent  opposition,  but  for  a  few  weeks 
there  was  no  opposition  at  all.  The  civil  offi- 
cials were  openly  unsympathetic,  and  the  news- 
papers voiced  dissent  not  untouched  with  dis- 
gust; others  simply  could  not  take  the  situation 
seriously  because  it  seemed  so  absurd;  many  lead- 
ers were  indifferent,  while  others  —  among  them. 
Generals  Lee,  Beauregard,  and  Longstreet,  and 
Governor  Patton  —  without  approving  the  pol- 
icy, advised  the  whites  to  cooperate  with  the  mili- 
tary authorities  and  save  all  they  could  out  of 
the  situation.  General  Beauregard,  for  instance, 
wrote  in  1867:  "If  the  suffrage  of  the  negro  is 
properiy  handled  and  directed  we  shall  defeat  our 
adversaries  with  their  own  weapons.   The  n^ro 


t: 


t    ' . 


*      !■ 


148       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

ia  Southern  bom.  With  education  and  property 
qualifications  he  can  be  made  to  take  an  interest 
in  the  affairs  of  the  South  and  in  its  prosperity. 
He  will  side  with  the  whites." 

Northern  observers  who  were  friendly  to  the 
South  or  who  disapproved  of  this  radical  recon- 
struction saw  the  danger  more  dearly  than  the 
Southerners  themselves,  who  seemed  not  to  appre- 
ciate the  full  implication  of  the  situation.  In  this 
connection  the  New  York  Herald  remarked: 

We  may  regard  the  entire  ten  unreconstructed  Southern 
States,  with  possibly  one  or  two  exceptions,  as  forced  by 
a  secret  and  overwhelming  revolutionary  influence  to  a 
common  and  inevitable  fate.  They  are  all  bound  to  be 
governed  by  blacks  spurred  on  by  worse  than  blacks  — 
white  wretches  who  dare  not  show  their  faces  in  re- 
spectable society  anywhere.  This  is  the  most  abomi- 
nable phase  barbarism  has  assumed  since  the  dawn  of 
civilisation.  It  was  all  right  and  proper  to  put  down 
the  rebellion.  It  was  all  right  perhaps  to  enumcipate 
the  slaves.  .  .  .  But  it  is  not  right  to  make  slaves  of 
white  men  even  though  they  may  have  been  former 
masters  of  blacks.  This  is  but  a  diange  in  a  system  of 
bondage  that  is  rendered  the  more  odious  and  intoler- 
able because  it  has  been  inaugurated  in  an  enlightened 
instead  of  a  dark  and  uncivilized  age. 

The  political  parties  rapidly  grouped  themselves 
for  the  coming  struggle.    The  radical  Republican 


i  1 


THE  RULE  OF  THE  MAJOR  GENERALS  149 

party  indeed  was  in  process  of  organisation  in  the 
South  even  before  the  passage  of  the  reconstruc- 
tion acts.  Its  membership  was  made  up  of  negroes, 
carpetbaggers,  or  Northern  men  who  had  come  in 
as  speculators,  officers  of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau 
and  of  the  army,  scalawags  or  Confederate  rene- 
gades, "  Peace  Society  "  men,  •  and  Unionists  of  Civil 
War  times,  with  a  few  old  Whigs  who  could  not 
yet  bring  themselves  to  affiliate  with  the  Demo- 
crats. At  first  it  seemed  that  a  respectable  num- 
ber of  whites  might  be  secured  for  the  radical 
party,  but  the  rapid  organization  of  the  negroes 
checked  the  accession  of  whites.  In  the  winter 
and  spring  of  1866-67  the  negroes  near  the  towns 
were  well  organized  by  the  Union  League  and  the 
Freedmen's  Bureau  and  then,  after  the  padbage  of 
the  reconstruction  acts,  the  organizing  activities 
of  the  radical  chieftains  shifted  to  the  rural  dis- 
tricts. The  Union  League  was  greatly  extended; 
Union  licague  conventions  were  held  to  which 
local  whites  were  not  admitted;  and  the  formation 
of  a  black  man's  party  was  well  on  the  way  be- 
fore the  registration  of  the  voters  was  completed. 
Visiting  statesmen  from  the  North,  among  them 

■  See  The  Day  of  the  Confederacy,  by  Nathaniel  W.  St«3>heiuoo  (io 
The  Chronicle*  of  America),  p.  121,  footnote. 


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150       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

Henry  Wilson  of  MMiachusetU  and  "Pig  Iron" 
Kelley  of  Pennsylvania,  toured  the  South  in  sup- 
port of  the  radical  program,  and  the  registrars  and 
all  Federal  officials  aided  in  the  work. 

The  whites,  slow  to  comprehend  the  real  extent 
of  radicalism,  wo-e  finally  aroused  to  the  necessity 
of  organising,  if  they  were  to  influence  the  negro 
and  have  a  voice  in  the  conventions.  The  old 
party  divisions  were  still  evident.  Witli  difficulty 
a  portion  of  the  Whigs  woe  brought  with  the 
Democrats  into  one  conservative  party  during  the 
summer  and  faii  of  1867,  though  many  still  held 
aloof.  The  lack  of  the  old  skilled  leadership  was 
severely  felt.  In  places  where  the  white  man's 
party  was  given  a  name  it  was  called  "Democratic 
and  Conservative, "  to  spare  the  feelings  of  former 
Whigs  who  were  loath  to  bear  the  party  name  of 
their  quondam  opponents. 

The  first  step  in  the  military  reconstruction  was 
the  registration  of  voters.  In  each  State  a  central 
board  of  registrars  was  appointed  by  the  district 
commander  and  a  local  board  for  every  county  and 
large  town.  Each  board  consisted  of  three  mem- 
bers —  all  radicals  —  who  were  required  to  sub- 
scribe to  the  "ironclad"  oath.  In  several  States 
one  negro  was  appointed  to  each  local  board.   The 


1) 


THE  RULE  OP  THE  MAJOR  GENERALS  lAl 

ngfatnn  luted  negro  votera  during  the  day,  and 
at  night  worked  at  the  organisation  of  a  radical 
Republican  party.  The  prospective  voters  were 
required  to  take  the  oath  prescribed  in  the  Recon- 
structk>n  Act,  but  the  registrars  were  empowered 
to  go  behind  the  oath  and  investigate  the  Con- 
federate record  of  each  applicant.  This  authority 
was  invoked  to  carry  the  disfranchisement  of 
the  whites  far  beyond  the  intention  of  the  law 
in  an  attempt  to  destroy  the  leadership  of  the 
whites  and  to  register  enough  negroes  to  outvote 
them  at  the  polls.  For  this  purpose  the  registra- 
tion was  continued  until  October  1,  1887,  and 
an  active  campaign  of  education  and  organization 
carried  on. 

At  the  close  of  the  registration  7^3,000  black 
voters  were  on  the  rolls  and  6«7,0(K.  whites.  In 
Alabama,  Louisiana,  South  Carolina,  Florida,  and 
Mississippi  there  were  black  majorities,  and  in  the 
other  States  the  blacks  and  the  radical  whites 
together  formed  majorities.  The  white  minorities 
included  several  thousand  who  had  been  rejected 
by  the  registrars  but  restored  by  the  military  com- 
manders. Though  large  numbers  of  blacks  were 
dropped  from  the  revised  rolls  as  fraudulently 
r^stered,  the  registration  statistics  nevertheless 


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152       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

bore  clear  witness  to  the  political  purpose  of  those 
who  compiled  them. 

Next  followed  a  vote  on  the  question  of  holding 
a  state  convention  and  the  election  of  delegates 
to  such  a  convention  if  held  —  a  double  election. 
The  whites,  who  had  been  harassed  in  the  regis- 
tration and  who  feared  race  conflicts  at  the  elec- 
tions, considered  whether  they  ought  not  to  abstain 
from  voting.    By  staying  away  from  the  polls, 
they  might  bring  the  vote  cast  in  each  State  below 
a  majority  and  thus  defeat  the  proposed  conven- 
tions for,  unless  a  majority  of  the  registered  voters 
actually  cast  ballots  either  for  or  agiJnst  a  conven- 
tion, no  convention  could  be  held.   Nowhere,  how- 
ever, was  this  plan  of  not  voting  fully  carried  out, 
for,  though  most  whites  abstained,  enough  of  them 
voted  (against  the  conventions,  of  course)  to  make 
the  necessary  majority  in  each  State.    The  effect 
of  the  abstention  policy  upon  the  personnel  of  the 
conventions  was  unfortunate.    In  every  conven- 
tion there  was  a  radical  majority  with  a  conserva- 
tive and  all  but  negligible  minority.     In  South 
Carolina  and  Louisiana  there  were  negro  majori- 
ties.  In  every  State  except  North  Carolina,  Texas, 
and  Virginia  the  negroes  and  the  carpetbaggers 
together  were  in  the  majority  over  native  whites. 


fi.' 


I 

1 


THE  RULE  OF  THE  MAJOR  GENERALS  158 

The  conservative  whites  were  of  fair  ability;  the 
carpetbaggers  and  scalawags  produced  in  each 
convention  a  few  able  leaders,  but  most  of  them 
were  conscienceless  political  soldiers  of  fortune; 
the  negro  members  were  inexperienced,  and  most 
of  them  were  quite  ignorant,  though  a  few  leaders 
of  ability  did  appear  among  them.  In  Alabama, 
for  example,  only  two  negro  members  could  write, 
though  half  had  been  taught  to  sign  their  names. 
They  were  barbers,  field  hands,  hack  drivers,  and 
servants.  A  negro  chaplain  was  elected  who  in- 
voked divine  blessings  on  "unioners  and  cusses  on 
rebels."  It  was  a  sign  of  the  new  era  when  the 
convention  specially  invited  the  "ladies  of  colored 
members*'  to  seats  in  the  gallery. 

The  work  of  the  conventions  was  for  the  most 
part  cut  and  dried,  the  abler  members  having 
reached  a  general  agreement  before  they  met.  The 
constitutions,  mosaics  of  those  of  other  States, 
were  noteworthy  only  for  the  provisions  made  to 
keep  the  whites  out  of  power  and  to  regulate 
the  relations  of  the  races  in  social  matters.  The 
Texas  constitution  alone  contained  no  proscriptive 
clauses  beyond  those  required  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The  most  thoroughgoing  proscrip- 
tion of  Confederates  was  found  in  the  o  nstitutions 


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154       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

of  Mississippi,  Alabama,  and  Virginia;  and  in 
these  States  the  voter  must  also  purge  himself  of 
guilt  by  agreeing  to  accept  the  "civil  and  political 
equality  of  all  men"  or  by  supporting  reconstruc- 
tion. Only  in  South  Carolina  and  Louisiana  were 
race  lines  abolished  by  law. 

The  legislative  work  of  the  conventions  was  more 
interesting  than  the  constitution  making.  By  ordi- 
nance the  legality  of  negro  marriages  was  dated 
from  November,  1867,  or  some  date  later  than 
had  been  fixed  by  the  white  conventions  of  1865. 
Mixed  schools  were  provided  in  some  States; 
militia  for  the  black  districts  but  not  for  the 
white  was  to  be  raised;  while  in  South  Carolina  it 
was  made  a  penal  offense  to  call  a  person  a  "Yan- 
kee"  or  a  "  nigger. "  Few  of  the  negro  delegates  de- 
manded proscription  of  whites  or  social  equality; 
they  wanted  schools  and  the  vote.  The  white 
radicals  were  more  anxious  to  '  eep  the  former 
Confederates  from  holding  oflSce  than  from  vot- 
ing. The  generals  in  command  everywhere  used 
their  influence  to  secure  moderate  action  by  the 
conventions,  and  for  this  they  were  showered 
with  abuse. 

As  provided  by  the  reconstruction  acts,  the 
new  constitutions  were  submitted  to  the  electorate 


1 


THE  RULE  OF  THE  MAJOR  GENERALS  165 

created  by  those  instruments.  Unless  a  majority 
of  the  registered  voters  in  a  State  should  take  part 
in  the  election  the  reconstruction  would  fail  and 
the  State  would  remain  under  military  rule.  The 
whites  now  inaugurated  a  more  systematic  policy 
of  abstention  and  in  Alabama,  on  February  4, 
1868,  succeeded  in  holding  the  total  vote  below  a 
majority.  Conrn^ss  then  rushed  to  the  rescue  of 
radicalism  with  the  act  of  the  11th  of  March,  which 
provided  that  a  mere  majority  of  those  voting  in 
the  State  was  sufficient  to  inaugurate  reconstruc- 
tion. Arkansas  had  followed  the  lead  of  Alabama, 
but  too  late;  in  Mississippi  the  constitution  was 
defeated  by  a  majority  vote;  in  Texas  the  conven- 
tion had  made  no  provision  for  a  vote;  and  in  Vir- 
ginia the  commanding  general,  disapproving  of  the 
work  of  the  convention,  refused  to  pay  the  expenses 
of  an  election.  In  the  other  six  States  the  consti- 
tutions were  adopted.' 

These  elections  gave  rise  to  more  violent  contests 
than  before.  They  also  were  double  elections,  as 
the  voters  cast  ballots  for  state  and  local  officials 
and  at  the  same  time  for  or  against  the  constitu- 
tion.   The  radical  nominations  were  made  by  the 


'  Except  in  Texas,  the  work  of  constitution  making  was  completed 
between  November  5. 1867.  and  May  18, 1868. 


I      A' 


% 

i 


IM       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

Union  League  and  the  Freedmen's  Bureau,  and 
nearly  all  radicals  who  had  been  members  of  con- 
ventions were  nominated  and  elected  to  o£Sce. 
The  negroes,  expecting  now  to  reap  some  benefits 
of  reconstruction,  frequently  brought  sacks  to  the 
polls  to  "  put  the  franchise  in. "  The  elections  were 
all  over  by  Jime,  1868,  and  the  newiy  elected  legisla- 
tures promptly  ratified  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 
It  now  remained  for  Congress  to  approve  the 
work  done  in  the  South  and  to  readmit  the  re- 
organized States.  The  case  of  Alabama  gave  some 
trouble.  £ven  Stevens,  for  a  time,  thought  that 
this  State  should  stay  out;  but  there  was  danger 
in  delay.  The  success  of  the  abstention  policy  in 
Alabama  and  Arkansas  and  the  reviving  interest 
of  the  whites  foreshadowed  white  majorities  in 
some  places;  the  scalawags  began  to  forsake  the 
radical  party  for  the  conservatives;  and  there  were 
Democratic  gains  in  the  North  in  1867.  Only  six 
States,  New  York  and  five  New  England  States, 
allowed  the  negro  to  vote,  while  four  States,  Minne- 
sota, Michigan,  Kansas,  and  Ohio,  voted  down 
negro  sud'rage  after  the  passage  of  the  reconstruc- 
tion acts.  The  ascendancy  of  the  radicals  in  Con- 
gress was  menaced.  The  radicals  needed  the  sup- 
port of  their  radical  brethren  in  Southern  States 


THE  RULE  OP  THE  MAJOR  GENERALS  157 
and  they  could  not  afford  to  wait  for  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  to  become  a  part  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  to  tolerate  other  delay.  On  the  ««d 
and  the  25th  of  June  acts  were  therefore  passed 
admitting  seven  States,  Alabama  included,  to  rep- 
resentation in  Congress  upon  the  "fundamental 
condition"  that  "the  constitutions  of  neither  of 
said  States  shall  ever  be  so  amended  or  changed 
as  to  deprive  any  citizens  or  class  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States  of  the  right  to  vote  in  said  State, 
who  are  entitled  to  vote  by  the  constitution  thereof 
herein  recognized. " 

The  generals  now  turned  over  the  government 
to  the  recently  elected  radical  officials  and  retired 
into  the  background.  Military  reconstruction  was 
thus  accomplished  in  all  the  Staies  except  Virginia, 
Mississippi,  and  Texas. 


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\ 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  TRIAL  OF  PRESIDENT  JOHNSON 

While  the  radical  program  was  being  executed  in 
the  South,  Congress  was  engaged  not  only  in  super- 
vising reconstruction  but  in  bubduing  the  Supreme 
Court  and  in  "  conquering  **  President  Johnson.  One 
must  admire  the  efficiency  of  the  radical  machine. 
When  the  Southerners  showed  that  they  preferred 
military  rule  as  permitted  by  the  Act  of  the  2d  of 
March,  Congress  passed  the  Act  of  the  23d  of  March 
which  forced  the  reconstruction.  When  the  Presi- 
dent ventured  to  assert  his  power  in  behalf  of  a 
considerate  administration  of  the  reconstruction 
acts.  Congress  took  the  power  out  of  his  hands  by 
the  law  of  the  19th  of  July.  The  Southern  plan  to 
defeat  the  new  state  constitutions  by  abstention 
was  no  sooner  made  clear  in  the  case  of  Alabama 
than  Congress  came  to  the  rescue  with  the  Act  of 
March  11,  1868. 
Had  it  seemed  necessary,  Congress  would  have 

158 


THE  TRIAL  OP  PRESIDENT  JOHNSON  IM 
handled  the  Supreme  Court  as  it  did  the  South- 
erners. The  opponents  of  radit  reconstruction 
were  anxious  to  get  the  reconstruction  laws  of 
March,  1867,  before  the  Court.  Chief  Justice 
Chase  was  known  to  be  opposed  to  military  re- 
construction, and  four  other  justices  were,  it  was 
believed,  doubtful  of  the  constitutionality  of  the 
laws.  A  series  of  conservative  decisions  gave 
hope  to  those  who  looked  to  the  Court  for  relief. 
The  first  decision,  in  the  case  of  ex  parte  Milligan, 
declared  unconstitutional  the  trials  of  civilians 
by  military  commissions  when  civil  courts  were 
open.  A  few  months  later,  in  the  cases  of  Cum- 
mings  vs.  Missouri  and  ex  parte  Garland,  the  Court 
declared  invalid,  because  ex  post  facto,  the  state 
laws  designed  to  punish  former  Confederates. 

But  the  first  attempts  to  get  the  reconstruc- 
tion acts  before  the  Supreme  Court  failed.  The 
State  of  Mississippi,  in  April,  1867,  brought  suit 
to  restrain  the  President  from  executing  the  re- 
construction acts.  The  Court  refused  to  inter- 
fere with  the  Executive.  A  similar  suit  was  then 
>  ought  against  Secretary  Stanton  by  Georgia 
•th  a  like  result.  But  in  1868,  in  the  case  of  ex 
parte  McCardle,  it  appeared  that  the  question  of 
the  constitutionality  of  the  reconstruction  acts 


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100       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

would  be  passed  upon.  McCardle,  a  Missiuippi 
editor  arrested  for  opposition  to  reconstruction 
and  conviiied  by  mflitary  commissicm,  appealed 
to  the  Supreme  Court,  which  asserted  its  jurisdic- 
tion. But  the  radicals  in  alarm  rushed  through 
Congress  an  act  (March  97,  1868)  which  took 
away  from  the  Court  its  jurisdiction  in  cases  aris- 
ing under  the  reconstruction  acts.  The  highest 
court  was  thus  silenced. 

The  attempt  to  remove  the  President  from 
office  was  the  only  part  of  the  radical  program 
that  failed,  and  this  by  the  narrowest  of  margins. 
During  the  spring  and  summer  of  1866  there  was 
some  talk  among  politicians  of  impeaching  Presi- 
dent Johnson,  and  in  December  a  resolution  was 
introduced  by  Representative  Ashley  of  Ohio 
looking  toward  impeachment.  Though  the  com- 
mittee charged  with  the  invei.tigation  of  "the  oi- 
ficial  conduct  of  Andrew  Johnson"  reported  that 
enough  testimony  had  been  taken  to  justify  fur- 
ther inquiry,  the  House  took  no  action.  There 
were  no  less  than  five  attempts  at  impeachment 
during  the  next  year.  Stevens,  Butler,  a^  I  others 
were  anxious  to  get  the  President  out  of  the  way, 
but  the  majority  were  as  yet  unwilling  to  impeach 
for  merely  political  reasons.    There  were  some 


1, 


!1: 


m 


THE  TRUL  OP  PRESIDENT  JOHNSON  lei 
who  thought  that  the  radicali  had  sufficient  ma- 
jorities to  ensure  all  needed  legislation  and  did 
not  relish  the  thought  of  Ben  Wade  in  the  presi- 
dency . '  Others  considered  that  no  just  grounds  f -»r 
action  had  been  found  in  the  several  investigations 
of  Johnson's  record.  Besides,  the  President's  au- 
thority and  influence  had  been  much  curtailed 
by  the  legislatioi  relating  to  the  Freedmen's  Bu- 
reau, tenure  of  ofiice,  reconstruction,  and  com- 
mand of  the  army,  and  Congress  had  also  refused 
to  recognize  his  amnesty  and  pardoning  powers. 

But  the  desire  to  impeach  the  President  was  in- 
creasing in  power,  and  very  little  was  needed  to 
provoke  a  trial  of  strength  between  the  radicals 
and  the  President.  The  drift  toward  impeach- 
ment was  due  in  part  to  the  legislative  reaction 
against  the  Executive,  and  in  part  to  Johnson's 
own  opposition  to  reconstruction  and  to  his  use 
of  the  patronage  against  the  radicals.  Specific 
grievance;  were  found  in  his  vetoes  of  the  various 
reconstruction  bills,  in  his  criticisms  of  Congress 
and  the  radical  leaders,  and  in  the  fact,  as  Stev- 
ens asserted,  that  he  was  a  "radical  renegade." 


'  Senator  Je  of  Ohio  wu  President  pro  tempore  of  the  Senate  and 
by  the  act  oc  1791  would  lucceed  President  Johnson  if  he  were  re- 
moved from  office. 


t 


^  H 


VI     1} 


IM       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

JohiuKm  was  a  Southern  man,  an  old-line  State 
Rights  Democrat,  somewhat  anti-negro  in  feeling. 
He  knew  no  book  except  the  Constitution,  and  that 
he  loved  with  all  his  soul.  Sure  of  the  correct- 
ness of  his  position,  he  was  too  stubborn  to  change 
or  to  compromise.  He  was  no  more  to  be  moved 
than  Stevens  or  Sumner.  To  overcome  Johnson's 
vetoes  required  two-thirds  of  each  House  of  Con- 
gress; to  impeach  and  remove  him  would  require 
only  a  majority  of  the  House  and  two-thirds  of 
the  Senate. 

The  desired  occasion  for  impeachment  was  fur- 
nished by  Johnsr  ^'s  attempt  to  get  Edwin  M. 
Stanton,  the  Secretary  of  War,  out  of  the  Cabinet. 
Stanton  held  radical  views  and  was  at  no  time 
sympathetic  with  or  loyal  to  Johnson,  but  he 
loved  oflSce  too  well  to  resign  along  with  those 
cabinet  members  who  could  not  follow  the  Presi- 
dent in  his  struggle  with  Congress.  He  was  sel- 
dom frank  and  sincere  in  his  dealings  with  the 
President,  and  kept  up  an  underhand  correspon- 
dence witt  the  radical  leaders,  even  assisting  in 
framing  some  of  the  reconstruction  legislation 
which  was  designed  to  render  Johnson  powerless. 
In  him  the  radicals  had  a  representative  within 
the  President's  Cabinet. 


i    ^i 


>'.U 


THE  TRIAL  OF  PRESmENT  JOHNSON  163 

Wearied  of  £tanton'i  disloyalty.  Johnson  asked 
him  to  resign  and,  upon  a  refusal,  suspended  him 
b  Auiput.  1807,  and  placed  General  Grant  in 
temporary  chai^  of  the  War  Department.  Gen- 
eral Grant,  Chief  Justice  ChB.<<e,  and  Secretary 
McCulloch,  though  they  all  disliked  Stanton,  ad- 
vised the  President  against  suspending  him.  But 
Johnson  was  determined.  About  the  same  time 
he  exercised  his  power  in  remoN  .ig  Sheridan  and 
Sickles  from  their  commands  in  the  South  and 
replaced  them  with  Hancock  and  Canby.  The 
radicals  were  furious,  but  Johnson  had  secured 
at  least  the  support  of  a  loyal  Cabinet. 

The  suspension  of  Stanton  was  reported  to  the 
Senate  in  December,  1867,  and  on  January  IS, 
1868,  the  Senate  voted  not  to  concur  in  the  Presi- 
dent's action.  Upon  receiving  Motice  of  the  vote 
m  the  Senate,  Grant  at  once  left  the  War  Depart- 
ment and  Stanton  again  took  possession.  Johnson 
now  charged  Grant  with  failing  to  keep  a  promise 
either  to  hold  on  himself  or  to  make  it  possible 
to  appoint  some  one  else  who  would  hold  «  until 
the  matter  might  be  brought  into  the  cour'  The 
President  by  this  accusation  ai^gered  Grant  and 
threw  him  with  his  great  ''nfluenct  '.n'.o  the  arms 
of  the  radicals. 


it»' 


164        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

Against  the  advice  of  his  leading  counselors 
Johnson  persbted  in  his  intention  to  keep  Stanton 
out  of  the  Cabinet.  Accordingly  on  the  Slst  of 
February  he  dismissed  Stanton  from  office  and  ap- 
pointed Lorenzo  Thomas,  the  Adjutant  General, 
as  acting  Secretary  of  War.  Stanton,  advised  by 
the  radicals  in  Congress  to  "stick,"  refused  to  yield 
possession  to  Thomas  and  had  him  arrested  for 
violation  of  the  Tenure  of  Office  Act.  The  mat- 
ter now  was  in  the  courts  where  Johnson  wanted 
it,  but  the  radical  leaders,  fearing  that  the  courts 
would  decide  against  Stanton  and  the  reconstruc- 
tion acts,  had  the  charges  against  Thomas  with- 
drawn. Thus  failed  the  last  attempt  to  get  the 
reconstruction  laws  before  the  courts.  On  the 
22d  of  February  the  President  sent  to  the  Senate 
the  name  of  Thomas  Ewing,  General  Sherman's 
father-in-law,  as  Secretary  of  War,  but  no  attention 
was  paid  to  the  nomination. 

On  February  24,  1868,  the  House  voted,  128 
to  47,  to  impeach  the  President  "of  high  crimes 
and  misdeme  jts  in  office."  The  Senate  was 
formally  notified  the  next  day  and  on  the  4th  of 
March  the  seven  managers  selected  by  the  House 
appeared  before  the  Senate  with  the  eleven  articles 
of  impeachment.    At  first  it  seemed  to  the  pubUc 


I  ^\ 


'.U 


THE  TRIAL  OF  PRESIDENT  JOHNSON  165 

that  the  impeachment  proceedings  were  merely 
the  culmination  of  a  struggle  for  the  control  of 
the  army.  There  were  rumors  that  Johnson  had 
plans  to  use  the  army  against  Congress  and  against 
reconstruction.  General  Grant,  directed  by  John- 
son to  accept  orders  from  Stanton  only  if  he  were 
satisfied  that  they  came  from  the  President,  re- 
fused to  follow  these  instructions.  Stanton,  pro- 
fessing to  fear  violence,  barricaded  himself  in 
the  War  Department  and  was  furnished  with  a 
guard  of  soldiers  by  General  Grant,  who  from 
this  time  used  his  influence  in  favor  of  impeach- 
ment. Excited  by  the  most  sensational  rumors, 
some  people  even  believed  a  new  rebellion  to 
be  imminent. 

The  impeachment  was  rushed  to  trial  by  the 
House  managers  and  was  not  ended  until  the 
decision  was  taken  by  the  votes  of  the  16th  and 
26th  of  May.  The  eleven  articles  of  impeachment 
consisted  of  summaries  of  all  that  had  been  charged 
agabst  Johnson,  except  the  charge  that  he  had 
been  an  accomplice  in  the  murder  of  Lincoln.  The 
only  one  which  had  any  real  basis  was  the  first, 
which  asserted  that  he  had  violated  the  Tenure  of 
Office  Act  in  trying  to  remove  Stanton.  The  other 
articles  were  merely  expansions  of  the  first  or 


u 


166       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

were  based  upon  Johnson's  opposition  to  recon- 
struction or  upon  his  speeches  in  criticism  of  Con- 
gress. Notning  could  be  said  about  his  control 
of  the  patronage,  tuough  this  was  one  of  the  un- 
written chai'ges.  J.  W.  Schuckers,  in  his  life  of 
Chase,  says  that  the  radical  leaders  "felt  the  vast 
importance  of  the  presidential  patronage;  many 
of  them  felt,  too,  that,  according  to  the  maxim 
that  to  the  victors  belong  the  spoils,  the  Republi- 
can party  was  rightfully  entitled  to  the  Federal 
patronage,  and  they  determined  to  get  possession 
of  it.  There  was  but  one  method  and  that  was 
by  impeachment  and  removal  of  the  President." 

The  leading  House  managers  were  Stevens, 
Butler,  Bingham,  and  Boutwell,  all  better  known 
as  politicians  than  as  lawyers.  The  President 
was  represented  by  an  abler  legal  array:  Curtis, 
Evarts,  Stanbery,  Nelson,  and  Groesbeck.  Jere- 
miah Black  was  at  first  one  of  the  counsel  for 
the  President  but  withdrew  under  conditions  not 
entirely  creditable  to  himself. 

The  trial  was  a  one-sided  affair.  The  Presi- 
dent's counsel  were  refused  more  than  six  days  for 
the  preparation  of  the  case.  Chief  Justice  Chase, 
who  presided  over  the  trial,  insisted  upon  regard- 
ing the  Senate  as  a  judicial  and  not  a  political 


I  1i 


THE  TRIAL  OF  PRESmENT  JOHNSON  167 

body,  and  he  accordingly  ruled  that  only  legal 
evidence  should  be  admitted ;  but  the  Senate  major- 
ity preferred  to  assume  that  they  were  settling  a 
political  question.  Much  evidence  favorable  to  the 
President  was  excluded,  but  everything  else  was  ad- 
mitted. As  the  trial  went  on  the  country  began  to 
understand  that  the  impeachment  was  a  mistake. 
Few  people  wanted  to  see  Senator  Wade  made 
President.  The  partisan  attitude  of  the  Senate 
majority  and  the  weakness  of  the  case  against 
Johnson  had  much  to  do  in  moderating  pub- 
lic opinion,  and  the  timely  nomination  of  Gen- 
eral Schofield  as  Secretary  of  War  after  Stan- 
ton's resignation  reassured  those  who  feared 
that  the  army  might  be  placed  under  sojie  ex 
treme  Democrat. 

As  the  time  drew  near  for  the  decision,  every 
possible  pressure  was  brought  by  the  radicals  to 
induce  senators  to  vote  for  conviction.  To  con- 
vict the  President,  thirty-six  votes  were  necessary. 
There  were  only  twelve  Democrats  in  the  Senate, 
but  all  were  known  to  be  in  favor  of  acquittal. 
When  the  test  came  on  the  16th  of  May,  seven 
Republicans  voted  with  the  Democrats  for  acquit- 
tal on  the  eleventh  article.  Another  vote  on  the 
26th  of  May,  on  the  first  and  second  articles, 


les        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

showed  that  conviction  was  nc  ,)OssibIe.  The 
radical  legislative  reaction  was  thus  checked  at 
its  highest  point  and  the  presidency  as  a  part  of 
the  American  governmental  system  was  no  longer 
in  danger.  The  seven  Republicans  had,  however, 
signed  their  own  political  death  warrants;  they 
were  never  forgiven  by  the  party  leaders. 

The  presidential  campaign  was  beginning  to 
take  shape  even  before  the  impeachment  trial 
began.  Both  the  Democrats  and  the  reorganized 
Republicans  were  turning  with  longing  toward 
General  Grant  as  a  candidate.'  Though  he  had 
always  been  a  Democrat,  nevertheless  when  John- 
son actually  called  him  a  liar  and  a  promise 
breaker  Grant  went  over  to  the  radicals  and  was 
nominated  for  President  on  May  20,  1868,  by 
the  National  Union  Republican  party.  Schuy- 
ler Colfax  was  the  candidate  for  Vice  President. 
The  Democrats,  who  could  have  won  with  Grant 
and  who  under  good  leadership  still  had  a  bare 
chance  to  win,  nominated  Horatio  Seymour  of 
New  York  and  Francis  P.  Blair  of  Missouri.  The 
former  had  served  as  war  governor  of  New  York, 
while  the  latter  was  considered  an  extreme  Dem- 
ocrat who  believed  that  the  radical  reconstruc- 
tion of  the  South  should  be  stopped,  the  troops 


THE  TRIAL  OP  PRESIDENT  JOHNSON  160 

withdrawn,  and  the  people  left  to  fonn  their  own 
governments.  The  Democratic  platform  pro- 
nounced itself  opposed  to  the  reconstruction  policy, 
but  Blair's  opposition  was  too  extreme  for  the 
North.  Seymour,  more  moderate  and  a  skillful 
campaigner,  made  headway  in  the  rehabilitation 
of  the  Democratic  party.  The  Republican  party 
declared  for  radical  reconstruction  and  negro 
suffrage  in  the  South  but  held  that  each  North- 
em  State  should  be  allowed  to  settle  the  suffrage 
for  itself.  It  was  not  a  courageous  platform,  but 
Grant  was  popular  and  carried  his  party  through 
to  success. 

The  returns  showed  that  in  the  election  Grant 
had  carried  twenty-six  States  with  214  electoral 
votes,  while  Seymour  had  carried  only  eight 
States  with  80  votes.  But  an  examination  of  the 
popular  vote,  which  was  3,000,000  for  Grant  and 
2,700,000  f:r  Seymour,  gave  the  radicals  cause 
for  alarm,  for  it  showed  that  the  Democrats  had 
more  white  voles  than  the  Republicans,  whose 
total  included  nearly  700,000  blacks.  To  insure 
the  continuance  of  the  radicals  in  power,  the 
Fifteenth  Amendment  was  framed  and  sent  out 
to  the  States  on  February  26,  1869.  This  amend- 
ment appeared  not  only  to  make  safe  the  negro 


t  * 


170       TBE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

majorities  in  the  South  but  also  gave  the  ballot 
to  the  negroes  in  a  score  of  Northern  States  and 
thus  assured,  for  a  time  at  least,  900,000  n^gro 
voters  for  the  Republican  party. 

When  Johnson's  term  ended  and  he  gave  place 
to  President  Grant*  four  States  were  still  unre- 
constructed—  Virginia,  Texas,  and  Mi.sissippi, 
in  which  the  reconstruction  had  failed,  and  Geor- 
gia, which,  after  accomplishing  reconstruction, 
had  again  been  placed  under  military  rule  by 
Congress.  In  Virginia,  which  was  too  near  th-; 
capital  for  such  rough  work  as  readmitted  Arkan- 
sas and  Alabama  into  the  Union,  the  new  constitu- 
tion was  so  severe  in  its  provisions  for  disfranchise- 
ment that  the  disgusted  district  commander  would 
not  authorize  the  expenditure  necessary  to  have 
it  voted  on.  In  Mississippi  a  similar  constitution 
had  failed  of  adoption,  and  in  Texas  the  strife  of 
party  factions,  radical  and  moderate  Republican, 
had  so  delayed  the  framing  of  the  constitution  that 
it  had  not  come  to  a  vote. 

The  Republican  politicians,  however,  wanted 
the  offices  in  these  States,  and  Congress  by  its  re- 
solution of  February  18,  1869  directed  the  district 
commanders  to  remove  all  civil  officerswho  could 
not  take  the  "ironclad"  oath  and  to  appoint 


*  ^    Vt"i    ' 


PRKSi 


Photograph.      I n  the  podectioh  of  L.  ( '.  Hamf(y^tW«MUl^^ 


i' 


i 

1 

t 

'1: 

Hwl'l^ 

£jB| 

^l 

niajoritit*  in  fhr  S<»uth  l.tiJ   »!s«    ^avi    Ihe  ballot 


n  Sfatos  and 

■     '  ivi'  pliirc 
'        >M  If  Ktjii   unre- 
!i;d    Mis,si>sip|)i 
I  fuijffi,  an«!  (ti'iH- 
ainp   r<-roTi>trii(ti</n, 


to  tilt'  n<»f(ro('s  in  a  s« . 
thu.s  asMirt'd.  for  a  lini' 
voters  For  t!ii'  Repiiblk'an  jum 

Wlii'f.  .lohiiNon's  t»rfii  fn«l»-(i  ; 
i<»  PriNi(l«*n}  ^iratp     '  ' 

"«»n>tni«f!(l       Vir^  ;   a.     I 
in  whi*  ii  ill'     .  -  ■       ' ;  :t''- 
gia.    vViiit'b.     ■  a  .  <  ,. 

had    nguhi    tir.   ,    T,!»f  fider    {irilitnry    rule   b^v 

('!Mt^T«>^       ii-    \h;  -If!     ^^;^>   too   Ju^ar   tltt- 

.•apital  tor  -'i-^i  '■■•■yy^;x,s  '\*y,W\>.H^\i4?i''tted  Arkan- 

tiOTi  T\as.-»'= 'iPVfr«-  in  i1^  !>ro\  i ••,••, >ri.s  for  (ii-n;!i)<  nis- 
nienl  thn?  f  hf  disinjstcfl  di>tript  rommandrr  vvouii" 
not  authon  '•^[K'lidiiiirc  nerrt'^sary  to  ha\ 

ill  Mi^ssissippi  a  ^iimilar  const  itulioi 
!><j)lion.  and  in  Texas  the  striXe  o) 
.^■U'rai.-  Rt'piihlkai- 
,  ui'  tlnM-oiistitulion  tha 

■  ■'■   voir 


it  %dtfd  on 
had  fail»<!  os 
party  f  nri<" 
had  .Ml,!' 
it  had  !.' 


!"! 


i     ;.■    'Ui  ii  at;    polit ifiUiis,    howevt^r,    wariif- 
!!ii'<-  in  ihc.'^f'  Stalt'S.  and  ('• 
(in  of  Fff.ruary  18,  IStiii  dir- -r  ,  :  ,-  r 

.  "dt'rs  to  rt'i:  •■'' civil  <>■''  ho<oU' 


>t  li 


Ill 


'1     n 


, 


111 


THE  TRIAL  OF  FRESIDENT  JOHNSON  171 

thow  who  could  subscribe  to  it.  An  excq>tion, 
however,  was  made  in  favor  of  the  scalawajp  who 
had  supported  recoustruction  and  whose  ditabilitici 
had  been  removed  by  Congress. 

President  Grant  was  anxious  to  complete  the  re- 
construction and  recommended  to  Congress  that 
the  constitutions  of  Virginia  and  Mississippi  be 
re-submitted  to  the  people  with  a  separate  vote 
on  the  disfranchising  sect''-n8.  Congress,  now  in 
harmony  wilh  the  Executive,  responded  by  placing 
the  reconstruction  of  the  three  States  in  the  hands 
of  the  President,  but  with  the  proviso  that  each 
State  must  ratify  the  Fifteenth  Amendment.  Grant 
thereupon  fixed  a  time  for  voting  in  each  State 
and  directed  that  in  Virginia  and  Mississippi  the 
di' Tranchising  clauses  be  submitted  separately. 
As  a  result,  the  constitutions  were  rati6ed  but  pro- 
scription was  voted  down.  The  radicals  secured 
control  of  Mississippi  and  Texas,  but  a  conserv- 
ative combination  carried  Virginia  and  thus  came 
near  keeping  the  State  out  of  the  Union.  Finally, 
during  the  early  months  of  1870  the  three  States 
were  readmitted. 

With  respect  to  Georgia  a  peculiar  condition 
of  affairs  existed.  In  June,  1868,  Georgia  had 
been  readmitted  with  the  first  of  the  reconstructed 


ITS       THE  SEQUEL  OF  AFFOBiATTOX 

States.  The  ftate  l^gbUiu  re  at  once  expelled  the 
twenty-seven  negro  members,  on  the  ground  that 
the  recent  legislation  and  the  state  constitution 
gave  the  negroes  the  right  to  vote  but  not  to 
hold  office.  Congress,  which  had  already  admit- 
ted the  Georgia  representatives,  refused  to  receive 
the  senators  and  turned  the  State  back  to  mil- 
itary control.  In  1860-70  Georgia  was  again  re- 
constructed after  a  drastic  purging  of  the  Legis- 
lature by  the  miUtary  commander,  the  reseating 
of  the  negro  members,  and  the  ratification  of  both 
the  Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth  Amendments.  The 
State  was  readmitted  to  representation  in  July, 
1870,  aftor  the  failure  of  a  strong  effort  to  extend  for 
two  years  the  carpetbag  government  of  the  State. 

Upon  the  last  States  to  pass  under  the  radical 
yoke  heavier  conditions  were  imposed  tuan  upon 
the  earlier  ones.  Not  only  were  they  required  '  > 
ratify  the  Fifteenth  Amendment,  but  the  'funda- 
mental conditions'*  embraced,  in  addition  to  the 
prohibition  against  future  change  of  the  suffrage, 
a  requirement  that  the  negroes  should  never  be 
deprived  of  school  and  officeholding  rights. 

The  congressional  plan  of  reconstruction  had 
thus  been  carried  through  by  able  leaders  in  the 
face  of  the  opposition  of  a  united  white  South, 


THE  TRIAL  C  PRESIDENT  JOHNSON  178 
netrly  half  the  Nor.b,  the  President,  the  Suprem-^ 
Court,  and  in  the  beginning  a  majority  of  Cr  jgreM. 
Thii  succeu  wm  due  to  the  poor  leadership  of  the 
conservatives  and  to  the  ability  and  solidarity  of 
the  radicak  led  by  Stevens  and  Sumner.    The 
radicals  had  a  definite  program;  the  moderates  had 
not.    The  object  of  the  radicals  was  to  secure  the 
supremacy  in  the  South  by  the  aid  of  the  negroes 
and  exclusion  of  whites.    Was  this  policy  politi- 
cally wise?  It  was  at  least  temporarily  successful. 
The  choice  offered  by  the  radicals  seemed  to  lie 
between  military  rule  for  an  indefinite  period  and 
negro  suffrage;  and  since  most  Americans  found 
military  rule  distasteful,  they  preferred  to  try 
negro  suffrage.    But.  after  all,  negro  suffrage  had 
to  be  supported  by  military  rule,  and  in  the  end 
both  failed  completely. 


W 


CHAPTER  Vni 


hi 


I 


THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OF  AMERICA 

The  elections  of  1867-68  showed  that  the  ne- 
groes were  well  organized  under  the  control  of  the 
radical  Republican  leaders  and  that  their  former 
masters  had  none  of  the  influence  over  the  blacks 
in  political  matters  which  had  been  feared  by  some 
Northern  friends  of  the  negro  and  had  been  hoped 
for  by  such  Southern  leaders  as  Governor  Patton 
and  General  Hampton.  Before  1865  the  '  iscipline 
of  slavery,  the  influence  of  the  master's  family,  and 
of  the  Southern  church,  had  sufficed  to  control  the 
blacks.  But  after  emancipation  they  looked  to  the 
Federal  soldiers  and  Union  officials  as  the  givers  of 
freedom  and  the  guardians  of  the  future. 

From  the  Union  soldiers,  especially  the  negro 
troops,  from  the  Northern  teachers,  the  mission- 
aries and  the  organizers  of  negro  churches,  from 
the  Northern  officials  and  traveUng  politicians,  the 
negroes  learned  that  their  interests  were  not  those 

174 


THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OF  AMERICA  175 
of  the  whites.  The  attitude  of  the  average  white 
in  the  South  often  confirmed  this  growing  es- 
trangement. It  was  difficult  even  for  the  white 
leaders  to  explain  the  riots  at  Memphis  and  New 
Orleans.  And  those  who  sincerely  wished  well  for 
the  negro  and  who  desired  to  control  him  for  the 
good  of  both  races  could  not  possibly  assure  him 
that  he  was  fit  for  the  suffrage.  For  even  Patton 
and  Hampton  must  tell  him  that  they  knew  better 
than  he  and  that  he  should  follow  their  advice. 

The  appeal  made  to  freedmen  by  the  Northern 
leaders  was  in  every  way  more  forceful,  because  it 
had  behind  it  the  prestige  of  victory  in  war  and 
for  the  future  it  could  promise  anything.  Until 
1867  the  principal  agency  in  bringing  about  the 
separation  of  the  races  had  been  the  Freedmen's 
Bureau  which,  with  its  authority,  its  courts,  its 
rations,  clothes,  and  its  "forty  acres  and  a  mule," 
did  eflfective  work  in  breaking  down  the  influence 
of  the  master.  But  to  understand  fully  the  almost 
absolute  control  exercised  over  the  blacks  in 
1867-68  by  alien  adventurers  one  must  examine 
the  workings  of  an  oath-bound  society  known  as 
the  Union  or  Loyal  League.  It  was  this  order, 
dominated  by  a  few  radical  whites,  which  or- 
ganized, disciplined,  and  controlled  the  ignorant 


176       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

negro  masses  and  paralyzed  the  influence  of  the 
conservative  whites. 

The  Union  League  of  America  had  its  origin  in 
Ohio  in  the  fall  of  1862,  when  the  outlook  for  the 
Union  cause  was  gloomy.  The  moderate  policies 
of  the  Lincoln  Administration  had  alienated  tho% 
in  favor  of  extreme  measures;  the  Confederates 
had  won  military  successes  in  the  field;  the  Demo- 
crats had  made  some  gains  in  the  elections;  the 
Copperheads'  were  actively  opposed  to  the  Wash- 
ington Government;  the  Knights  of  the  Golden 
Circle  were  organizing  to  resist  the  continuance 
of  the  war;  and  the  Emancipation  Proclamation 
had  chilleJ  the  loyalty  of  many  Union  men,  which 
was  everywhere  at  a  low  ebb,  especially  in  the 
Northern  cities.  It  was  to  counteract  these 
pressing  influences  that  the  Union  League  move- 
ment was  begun  among  those  who  were  associ- 
ated in  the  work  of  the  United  States  Sanitary 
Commission.  Observing  the  threatening  state  of 
public  opinion,  members  of  this  organization  pro- 
posed that  "loyalty  be  organized,  consolidated  and 
made  effective. " 

The  first  organization  was  made  by  eleven  men 

•  See  Abraham  Lincoln  and  the  Union,  by  Nathaniel  W.  Stephenson 
(in  The  ChronicUt  of  America),  pp.  16»-7, 834-5. 


THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OP  AMERICA  177 
in  Cleveland,  Ohio,  in  November,  1862.  The  Phil- 
adelphia Union  League  was  organized  a  month 
later,  and  in  January,  1863,  the  New  York  Union 
League  followed.  The  members  were  pledged  to 
uncompromising  and  unconditional  loyalty  to  the 
Union,  to  complete  subordination  of  political 
views  to  this  loyalty,  and  to  the  repudiation  of 
any  belief  in  state  rights.  The  other  large  cities  fol- 
lowed the  example  of  Philadelphia  and  New  York, 
and  soon  Leagues,  connected  in  a  loose  federation, 
were  formed  all  through  the  North.  They  were 
social  as  well  as  political  in  their  character  and 
assumed  as  their  task  the  stimulation  and  direc- 
tion of  loyal  Union  opinion. 

As  the  Union  armies  proceeded  to  occupy  the 
South,  the  Union  League  sent  its  agents  among  the 
disaffected  Southern  people.  Its  agents  cared  for 
n^ro  refugees  in  the  contraband  camps  and  in  the 
North.  In  such  work  the  League  cooperated  with 
the  various  Freedmen's  Aid  Societies,  the  Depart- 
ment of  Negro  Affairs,  and  later  with  the  Freed- 
men's Bureau.  Part  of  the  work  of  the  League 
was  to  distribute  campaign  literature,  and  nany  of 
the  radical  pamphlets  on  reconstruction  and  the 
negro  problem  bore  the  Union  League  imprint 
The  New  York  League  sent  out  about  seventj^ 


!i 


178       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

thousand  copies  of  various  publications,  while  the 
Philadelphia  Lea^e  far  surpassed  this  record,  cir- 
culating within  eight  years  four  million  five  hun- 
dred thousand  copies  of  144  different  pamphlets. 
The  literature  consisted  largely  of  accounts  of 
"Southern  outrages  "  taken  from  the  reports  of  Bu- 
reau agents  and  similar  sources. 

With  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  the  League  did 
not  cease  its  active  interest  in  things  political.  It 
was  one  of  the  first  organizations  to  declare  for 
negro  suffrage  and  the  disfranchisement  of  Con- 
federates; it  held  steadily  to  this  declaration 
during  the  four  years  following  the  war;  and  it 
continued  as  a  sort  of  bureau  in  the  radical  Re- 
publican party  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  the 
negro  vote  in  the  South.  Its  representatives  %  jre 
found  in  tlie  lobbies  of  Congress  demanding  ex- 
treme measures,  endorsing  the  reconstruction  pol- 
icies of  Congress,  and  condemning  the  course  of 
the  P'  iident.  After  the  first  year  or  two  of  re- 
c^ustiuction  the  Leagues  in  the  larger  Northern 
cities  began  to  grow  away  from  the  strictly  political 
Union  League  of  America  and  tended  to  become 
mere  social  clubs  for  members  of  the  same  poli- 
tical belief.  The  eminently  respectable  Philadelphia 
and  New  York  clubs  had  little  in  common  with 


r  w       i 

y 


„  •■) 


THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OP  AMERICA     170 
the  leagues  of  the  Southern  and  Border  States 
except  a  general  adherence  to  the  radical  program. 
Even  before  the  end  of  the  war  the  League  was 
extending  its  organization  into  the  parts  of  the 
Confederacy  held  by  the  Federal  forces,  admitting 
to  membership  the  army  officers  and  the  leading 
Unionists,  though  maintaining  for  the  sake  of  the 
latter  "a  discreet  secrecy. "    With  the  close  of  the 
war  and  the  establishment  of  army  posts  over  the 
South  the  League  grew  rapidly.    The  civilians  who 
followed  the  army,  the  Bureau  agents,  the  mis- 
sionaries, and  the  Northern  teachers  formed  one 
class  of  membership;  and  the  loyalists  of  the  hill 
and  mountain  country,  who  had  become  disa£Pected 
toward  the  Confederate  administration  and  had 
formed  such  orders  as  the  Heroes  of  America,  the 
Red  String  Band,  and  the  Peace  Society,  formed 
another  class.    Soon  there  were  added  to  these  the 
deserters,  a  few  old  line  Whigs  who  intensely  dis- 
liked the  Democrats,  and  others  who  decided  to 
cast  their  lot  with  the  victors.    The  disaflFected 
politicians  of  the  up-country,  who  wanted  to  be 
cared  for  in  the  reconstruction,  saw  in  the  organi- 
zation a  means  of  dislodging  from  power  the  po- 
litical leaders  of  the  low  country.    It  has  been 
estimated  that  thirty  per  cent  of  the  white  men  of 


1- 


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If 

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180       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

the  bill  and  mountain  counties  of  the  South  joined 
the  Union  League  in  1865-66.  They  cared  little 
about  the  original  objects  of  the  order  but  hoped 
to  make  it  the  nucleus  of  an  anti-Democratic 
political  organization. 

But  on  the  admission  of  negroes  into  the  lodges 
or  councils  controlled  by  Northern  men  the  native 
white  members  began  to  withdraw.  From  the  be- 
ginning the  Bureau  agents,  the  teachers,  and  the 
preachers  had  been  holding  meetings  of  negroes, 
to  whom  they  gave  advice  about  the  problems  of 
freedom.  Very  early  these  advisers  of  the  blacks 
grasped  the  possibilities  inherent  in  their  control  of 
the  schools,  the  rationing  system,  and  the  churches. 
By  the  spring  of  1866  the  n^roes  were  widely 
organized  under  this  leadership,  and  it  needed 
but  slight  change  to  convert  the  negro  meetings 
into  local  councils  of  the  Union  League.'  As  soon 
as  it  seemed  likely  that  Congress  would  win  in 
its  struggle  with  the  President  the  guardians  of 
the  n^ro  planned  their  campaign  for  the  control 


'  Of  these  teachers  of  the  local  blacks,  £.  L.  Godkin,  editor  of  the 
New  York  Nation,  who  had  supported  the  reconstruction  acts,  said: 
"Worse  instructors  for  men  emerging  from  slavery  and  coming  for  the 
first  time  face  to  face  with  the  problems  of  free  life  than  the  radical 
agitators  who  have  undertaken  the  pditical  guidance  of  the  blacks  it 
would  be  hard  to  meet  with. " 


THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OP  AMERICA  181 
of  the  race.  N^ro  leaders  were  organized  into 
councils  of  the  League  or  into  Union  Republi- 
can Clubs.  Over  the  South  went  the  organizers, 
until  by  1868  the  last  negroes  were  gathered  into 
the  fold. 

The  native  whites  did  not  all  desert  the  Union 
League  when  the  negroes  were  brought  in.  Where 
the  blacks  were  most  numerous  the  desertion  of 
whites  was  general,  but  in  the  regions  where  they 
were  few  some  of  the  whites  remained  for  several 
years.  The  elections  of  1868  showed  a  falling  oflf 
of  the  white  radical  vote  from  that  of  1867,  one 
measure  of  the  extent  of  loss  of  whites.  From  this 
time  forward  the  order  consisted  mainly  of  blacks 
with  enough  whites  for  leaders.  In  the  Black  Belt 
the  membership  of  native  whites  was  discouraged 
by  requiring  an  oath  to  the  effect  that  secession 
was  treason.  The  carpetbagger  had  found  that  he 
could  control  the  negro  without  the  help  of  the 
scalawag.  The  League  organization  was  soon  ex- 
tended and  centralized;  in  every  black  district 
there  was  a  Council;  for  the  State  there  was  a 
Grand  Council;  and  for  the  United  States  there 
was  a  National  Grand  Council  with  headquarters 
in  New  York  City. 

The  influence  of  the  League  over  the  negro  was 


i 


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I8f       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

due  in  large  degree  to  the  mysterious  secrecy  of  the 
meetings,  the  weird  initiation  ceremony  that  made 
him  feel  fearfully  good  from  hi^  head  to  his  heels, 
the  imposing  ritual,  and  the  sorgs.  The  ritual,  it  is 
said,  was  not  used  in  the  North;  it  was  probably 
adopted  for  the  particular  benefit  of  the  A '•''"an. 
The  would-be  Leaguer  was  informed  t^  .  em- 
blems of  the  order  were  the  altar,  the  i>id'c,  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  the  Constitution  of 
thA  United  States,  the  flag  of  the  Union,  censer, 
sword,  gavel,  ballot  box,  sickle,  shuttle,  anvil,  and 
other  emblems  of  industry.  He  was  told  to  the 
accompaniment  of  clanking  chains  and  groans 
that  the  objects  of  the  order  were  to  preserve  liber- 
ty, to  perpetuate  the  Union,  to  maintain  the  laws 
and  the  Constitution,  to  secure  the  ascendancy  of 
American  institutions,  to  protect,  defend,  and 
strengthen  all  loyal  men  and  members  of  the  Union 
League  in  all  rights  of  person  and  property,  to 
demand  the  elevation  of  labor,  to  aid  in  the  educa- 
tion of  laboring  men,  and  to  teach  the  duties  of 
American  citizenship.  This  enumeration  of  the 
objects  of  the  League  sounded  well  and  was  im- 
pressive. At  this  point  the  negro  was  always  will- 
ing to  take  an  oath  of  secrecy,  after  which  he  was 
asked  to  swear  with  a  solemn  oath  to  support  the 


M* 


19 


THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OP  AMERICA  18S 
principles  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  to 
pledge  himself  to  reaiat  all  attempts  to  overthrow 
the  United  States,  to  strive  for  the  maintenance 
of  liberty,  the  elevation  of  labor,  the  education  of 
all  people  in  the  duties  of  citizenship,  to  practice 
friendship  and  charity  to  all  of  the  order,  and  to 
support  for  election  or  appointment  to  office  only 
such  men  as  were  supporters  of  these  principles 
and  measures. 

The  council  then  sang  Hail,  Colutnlna/  and  The 
Star  Spangled  Banner,  after  which  an  official  lec- 
tured the  candidates,  saying  that  though  the  de- 
signs of  traitors  had  been  thwarted,  ihere  were  yet 
to  be  secured  legislative  triumphs  and  the  com- 
plete ascendancy  of  the  true  principles  of  popular 
government,  equal  liberty,  education  and  eleva- 
tion of  the  workmen,  and  the  overthrow  at  the 
ballot  box  of  the  old  oligarchy  of  political  leaders. 
After  prayer  by  the  chaplain,  the  room  was  dark- 
ened, alcohol  on  salt  flared  up  with  a  ghastly  light 
as  the  "fire  of  liberty,"  and  the  members  joined 
hands  in  a  circle  around  the  candidate,  who  was 
made  to  place  one  hand  on  the  flag  and,  with  the 
other  raised,  swear  again  to  support  the  govern- 
ment and  to  elect  true  Union  men  to  office.  Then 
placing  his  hand  on  a  Bible,  for  the  third  time  he 


'•I 


ill 


t 


IM       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

i«  w  to  keq>  bis  oath,  and  repeated  after  the 
president  " the  Freedmen's  Pledge " :  "To  defend 
and  perpetuate  freedom  and  the  Union,  I  pledge 
my  life,  my  fortune,  and  my  sacred  honor.  So 
help  me  God ! "  John  Brown* a  Body  was  then  sung, 
the  president  charged  the  members  in  a  long  speech 
concerning  the  principles  of  the  order,  and  the 
marshal  instructed  the  neophyte  in  the  signs.  To 
paiM  one's  self  as  a  Leaguer,  the  "Four  L's"  had 
to  be  given :  (1 )  with  right  hand  raised  to  heaven, 
thumb  and  third  finger  touching  ends  over  palm, 
pronounce  "Liberty";  (2)  bring  the  hand  down 
over  the  shoulder  and  say  "Lincoln";  (S)  drop  the 
hand  open  at  the  side  and  say  "Loyal";  (4)  catch 
the  thumb  in  the  vest  or  in  the  waistband  and 
pronounce  "League."  This  ceremony  of  initia- 
tion proved  a  most  effective  means  of  impressing 
and  controlling  the  negro  through  his  love  and  fear 
of  secret,  mysterious,  and  midnight  mummery. 
An  oath  taken  in  daylight  might  be  forgotten 
before  the  next  day;  not  so  an  oath  taken  in  the 
dead  of  night  under  such  impressive  circumstances. 
After  passing  through  the  ordeal,  the  negro  usually 
remained  faithful. 

In  each  populous  precinct  there  was  at  least  one 
council  of  the  League,  and  always  one  for  blacks. 


SI' 


THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OF  AMERICA     185 

In  each  town  m  city  there  were  two  councils,  one 
for  the  whites,  and  another,  with  white  officers,  for 
the  blacks.  The  council  met  once  a  week,  some- 
times oftener.  nearly  always  at  night,  and  in  a  ne- 
gro church  or  schoolhouse.  Guards,  armed  with 
rifles  and  shotguns,  were  stationed  about  the  place 
of  meeting  in  order  to  keep  away  intruders.  Mem- 
bers of  some  councils  made  it  a  pra^^tice  to  attend 
the  meetings  armed  as  if  for  battle,  in  these  meet- 
ings the  negroes  listened  to  inflammatory  speeches 
by  the  would-be  statesmen  of  the  new  regime;  here 
they  were  drilled  in  a  passionate  conviction  thnt 
their  interests  and  lho«e  of  the  Southern  whites 
were  eternally  at  war. 

White  men  who  joined  the  order  before  the 
negroes  were  admitted  and  who  left  when  the 
latter  became  members  asserted  that  the  negroes 
were  taught  in  these  meetings  that  the  only  way 
to  have  peace  and  plenty,  to  get  "the  forty  acres 
and  a  mule, "  ^as  to  kill  some  of  the  leadin/j  whites 
in  each  community  as  a  warning  to  others.  In 
North  Carolina  twenty-eight  barns  were  burned  in 
one  county  by  negroes  who  believed  that  Gover- 
nor Holden,  the  head  of  the  State  League,  had  or- 
dered it.  The  council  in  Tuscumbia,  Alabama, 
received  advice  from  Memphis  to  use  the  torch 


m] 


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t       f        i 

IV  I 


ISe       TBB  SEQUEL  OF  APFOICATIOZ 

becftute  the  bladu  were  at  war  with  the  whhe  race. 
The  advice  was  taken.  Three  men  went  in  front 
of  the  council  aa  an  advance  guard,  three  fdlowed 
wit'  oal  oil  and  fire,  and  others  guarded  the  rear. 
.  plan  was  to  bum  the  whole  town,  but  £rst 
one  negro  and  then  another  insisted  on  having 
some  white  man's  house  spared  because  "he  is  a 
good  man. "  In  the  end  no  residences  were  burned, 
and  a  happy  compromise  was  effected  by  burning 
the  Female  Academy.  Three  of  the  leaders  were 
afterwards  lynched. 

The  general  belief  of  the  whites  was  that  the 
ultimate  object  of  the  order  was  to  secure  political 
power  and  thus  bring  about  on  a  large  scale  the 
confiscation  of  the  property  of  Confederates,  and 
meanwhile  to  appropriate  and  destroy  the  prop- 
erty of  their  political  opponents  wherever  possible. 
Chicken  houses,  pigpens,  vegetable  gardens,  and 
orchards  were  visited  by  members  returning  from 
the  midnight  conclaves.  During  the  presidential 
campaign  of  1868  the  North  CRrol'*'.:!i  League  sent 
out  circular  instructions  to  the  blacks  advising  them 
to  drill  regularly  and  to  join  the  militia,  for  if 
Grant  were  not  elected  the  n^roes  would  go  back 
to  slavery;  if  he  were  elected,  the  negroes  were  to 
have  farms,  mules,  and  offices. 


f| 


THB  UNION  LEAGUE  OF  AMERICA     1S7 

Ai  Boon  M  poMible  after  the  war  the  negroes  had 
•upplied  thenuelves  with  guna  and  dogs  an  badge* 
of  freedom.  They  carried  their  guna  to  the  League 
meeting!,  often  marching  in  miJitary  formation, 
wepf.  through  the  drill  there,  marched  home  again 
along  the  roads,  shouting,  firing,  and  indulging  in 
boasts  and  threats  against  persons  whom  they 
disliki  Later,  military  parades  in  the  daytime 
were  much  favored.  Several  hundred  negroes 
would  march  up  and  down  the  streets,  abusing 
whites,  and  shoving  them  off  the  sidewalk  or  out 
of  the  road.  But  on  the  whole,  there  was  very  lit- 
tle actual  violrace,  though  the  whites  were  much 
akurmed  at  times.  That  outrages  were  compara- 
tively few  was  due.  not  to  any  sensible  teachings 
of  the  leaders,  but  to  the  fundamental  good  na- 
ture of  the  blacks,  who  were  generally  content  with 
mere  impudence. 

The  relations  between  the  races,  indeed,  con- 
tinued on  the  whole  to  be  friendly  until  1867-68. 
For  a  while,  in  some  localities  before  the  advent  of 
the  League,  and  in  others  where  the  Bureau  was 
conducted  by  native  magistrates,  the  negroes  looked 
♦o  their  old  masters  for  guidance  and  advice;  and 
the  latter,  for  the  good  of  both  races,  were  most 
eager  to  retain  a  moral  control  over  the  blacks. 


}  I 


I 


1»       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

They  arranged  barbecues  and  picnics  for  the 
negroes,  made  speeches,  gave  good  advice,  and 
believed  that  everything  promised  well.  Some- 
times the  negroes  themselves  arranged  the  festival 
and  invited  prominent  whites,  for  whom  a  separate 
table  attended  by  negro  waiters  was  reserved;  and 
after  dinner  there  followed  speeches  by  both  whites 
and  blacks. 

With  the  organization  of  the  League,  the  negroes 
grew  more  reserved,  and  finally  became  openly 
unfriendly  to  the  whites.  The  League  alone, 
however,  was  not  responsible  for  this  change.  The 
League  and  the  Bureau  had  to  some  extent  the 
same  personnel,  and  it  is  frequently  impossible  to 
distinguish  clearly  between  the  influence  of  the 
two.  In  many  ways  the  League  was  simply  the 
political  side  of  the  Bureau.  The  preaching  and 
teaching  missionaries  were  also  at  work.  And 
apart  from  the  organized  influences  at  work,  the 
poor  whites  never  laid  aside  their  hostility  towards 
the  blacks,  bond  or  free. 

When  the  campaigns  grew  exciting,  the  disci- 
pline of  the  order  was  used  to  prevent  the  negroes 
from  attending  Democratic  meetings  and  hear- 
ing Democratic  speakers.  The  leaders  even  went 
farther  and  forbade  the  attendance  of  the  blacks 


«■  s' 


THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OF  AMERICA     189 
at  political  meetings  where  the  speakers  were  not 
endorsed  by  the  League.    Almost  invariably  the 
scalawag  disliked  the  Leaguer,  black  or  white,  and 
as  a  political  teacher  often  found  himself  proscribed 
by  the  League.    At  a  Republican  mass  meeting  in 
Alabama  a  white  Republican  who  wanted  to  make 
a  speech  was  shoi't  >*;  down  by  the  negroes  because 
he  was  "oppos-  ;d  to  the  Loy.il  League. "    He  then 
went  to  anoth  r  place  to  speak  but  was  followed 
by  the  crowd,  wlucli  itfwsed  to  allow  him  to  say 
anything.    All  Republicans  in  good  standing  had 
to  join  the  League  and  swear  that  secession  was 
treason  — a  rather  stiflF  dose  for  the  scalawag. 
Judge  Hater  Governor)  David  P.  Lewis,  of  Ala- 
bama, was  a  member  for  a  short  while  but  he  soon 
became  disgusted  and  published  a  denunciation  of 
the  order.    Albion  W.  Tourg^e,  the  author,  a  radi- 
cal judge,  was  the  first  chief  of  the  League  in  North 
Carolina  and  was  succeeded  by  Governor  Holden. 
In  Alabama,  Generals  Swayne,  Spencer,  and  War- 
ner, all  candidates  for  the  United  States  Senate, 
hastened  to  join  the  order. 

As  soon  as  a  candidate  was  nominated  by  the 
League,  it  was  the  duty  of  every  member  to  sup- 
port him  actively.  Failure  to  do  so  resulted  in  a 
fine  or  other  more  severe  punishment,  and  members 


r^w 


' 


•ft:,.. 


I 


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I 


100       THE  SEQUFX  OF  APPOMATTOX 

who  had  been  expelled  were  still  considered  under 
the  control  of  the  officials.  The  League  was,  in 
fact,  the  machine  of  the  radical  party,  and  all  can- 
didates had  to  be  governed  by  its  edicts.  As  the 
Montgomery  Council  declared,  the  Union  League 
was  "the  right  arm  of  the  Union-Republican  party 
in  the  United  States." 

Every  negro  was  ex  colore  a  member  or  under 
the  control  of  the  League.  In  the  opinion  of  the 
League,  white  Democrats  were  bad  enough,  but 
black  Democrats  were  not  to  be  tolerated.  It 
was  almost  necessary,  as  a  measure  of  personal 
safety,  for  each  black  to  support  the  radical  pro- 
gram. It  was  possible  in  some  cases  for  a  negro 
to  refrain  from  taking  an  active  part  in  political 
affairs.  He  might  even  fail  to  vote.  But  it  was 
actually  dangerous  for  a  black  to  be  a  Democrat; 
that  is,  to  try  to  follow  his  old  master  in  politics. 
The  whites  in  many  cases  were  forced  to  advise 
their  few  faithful  black  friends  to  vote  the  radical 
ticket  in  order  to  escape  mistreatment.  Those  who 
showed  Democratic  leanmgs  were  proscribed  in 
negro  society  and  expelled  from  negro  churches; 
the  negro  women  would  not  "proshay"  (appre- 
ciate) a  black  Democrat.  Such  a  one  was  sure  to 
find  that  influence  was  being  brought  to  bear  upon 


W 


{■  ■  ■ 


t,    ! 


I 


THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OF  AMERICA     191 

his  dusky  sweetheart  or  his  wife  to  cause  him  to 
see  the  error  of  his  ways,  and  persistent  adherence 
to  the  white  party  would  result  in  his  losing  her. 
The  women  were  converted  to  radicalism  before 
the  men,  and  they  almost  invariably  used  their 
influence  strongly  in  behalf  of  the  League.  If 
moral  suasion  failed  to  cause  the  delinquent  to  see 
the  light,  other  methods  were  used.  Threats  were 
common  and  usually  sufficed.  Fines  were  levied  by 
the  League  on  recalcitrant  members.  In  case  of  the 
more  stubborn,  a  sound  beating  was  eflFective  to 
bring  about  a  change  of  heart.  The  offending  party 
was  "bucked  and  gagged,"  or  he  was  tied  by  the 
thumbs  and  thrashed.  Usually  the  sufferer  was 
too  afraid  to  complain  of  the  way  he  was  treated. 
Some  of  the  methods  of  the  Loyal  League  were 
similar  to  those  of  the  later  Ku  Klux  Klan.  Anony- 
mous warnings  were  sent  to  obnoxious  individuals, 
houses  were  burned,  notices  were  posted  at  night 
m  public  places  and  on  the  houses  of  persons  who 
had  incur.  *^  hostility  of  the  order.   In  order  to 

destroy  tL  jence  of  the  whites  where  kindly 

relations  still  existed,  an  "exodus  order"  issued 
through  the  League  directed  all  members  to  leave 
their  old  homes  and  obtain  work  elsewhere.  Some 
of  the  blacks  were  loath  to  comply  with  this  order, 


il 


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IM  THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 
but  to  remonstrances  from  the  white  s  the  usual  re- 
ply was:  "De  word  done  sent  to  ae  Leagur^.  We 
got  to  go. "  For  special  meetings  the  negroes  were 
in  some  regions  called  together  by  signal  guns.  In 
this  way  the  call  for  a  gathering  went  out  over  a 
county  in  a  few  minutes  and  a  few  hours  later 
nearly  all  the  members  in  the  county  assembled 
at  the  appointed  place. 

Negroes  as  organizing  agents  were  mclined  to  go 
to  extremes  and  for  that  reason  were  not  so  much 
used.    In  Bullock  County,  Alabama,  a  council  of 
the  League  was  organized  under  the  direction  of  a 
negro  emissary,   who  proceeded  to  assume  the 
government  of  the  comn^unity.    A  list  of  crimes 
and  punishments  was  adopted,  a  court,  with  vari- 
ous officials  was  established,  and  during  the  night 
the  negroes  who  opposed  the  new  r^me  were 
arrested.    But  the  black  sheriff  and  his  deputy 
were  in  turn  arrested  by  the  civil  authorities.    The 
negroes  then  organized  for  resistance,  flocked  into 
the  county  seat,  and  threatened  to  exterminate  the 
whites  and  take  possession  of  the  county.    Their 
agents  visited  the  plantations  and  forced  the  la- 
borers to  join  them  by  showing  orders  purport- 
ing to  be  from  General  Swayne,  the  commander  in 
the  State,  giving  them  the  authority  to  kill  all 


i 


THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OF  AMERICA     198 

who  resisted  them.    Swayne,  however,  sent  out 
detachments  of  troops  and  arrested  fifteen  of  the 
ringleaders,  and  the  League  government  collapsed. 
After  it  was  seen  that  existing  political  institu- 
tions were  to  be  overturned  in  the  process  of  re- 
construction, the  white  councils  of  the  League  and, 
to  a  certain  extent,  the  negro  councils  were  con- 
verted into  training  schools  for  the  leaders  of  the 
new  party  soon  to  be  formed  in  the  State  by  act 
of  Congress.    The  few  whites  who  were  in  control 
were  unwilling  to  admit  more  white  members  to 
share  in  the  division  of  the  spoils;  terms  of  ad- 
mission became  more  stringent,   and,  especially 
after  the  passage  of  the  reconstruction  acts  in 
March,  1867,  many  white  applicants  were  rejected. 
The  alien  element  from  the  North  was  in  control 
and  as  a  result,  where  the  blacks  were  numerous, 
the  largest  plums  fell  to  the  carpetba<»gers.    The 
negro   leaders  —  the   politicians,    preachers,    and 
teachers  —  trained  in  the  League  acted  as  sub- 
ordinates to  the  whites  and  were  sent  out  to  drum 
up  the  country  negroes  when  elections  drew  near. 
The  negroes    were  given   minor  positions   when 
oflBces  were  more  plentiful   than  carpetbaggers. 
Later,  after  some  complaint,  a  larger  share  of  the 
offices  fell  to  them. 


13 


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I 


111 


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rri 


i  --.t 


194       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

Tbc  League  counted  its  largest  white  member- 
ship in  1865-66,  and  after  that  date  it  steadily 
decreased.     The  largest  negro  membership  was 
recorded  in  1867  and  1868.    The  total  membership 
was  never  made  known.    In  North  Carolina  the 
order  clauned  from  seventy-five  thousand  to  one 
hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand  members;  in 
States  with  larger  negro  populations  the  member- 
ship was  probably  quite  as  large.    After  the  elec- 
tion of  1868  only  the  councils  in  the  towns  re- 
mained active,  many  of  them  transformed  into 
political  dubs,  loosely  organized  under  local  po- 
litical leaders.     The  plantation  negro  needed  less 
looking  after,  and  except  in  the  largest  towns  he 
became  a  kind  of  visiting  member  of  the  council  in 
the  town.    The  League  as  a  political  organization 
gradually  died  out  by  1870.' 

The  League  had  served  its  purpose.  It  had 
enabled  a  few  outsiders  to  control  the  negro  by 
separating  the  races  politically  and  it  had  com- 

'  The  Ku  Klux  Klan  had  much  to  do  with  the  decline  of  the  or- 
ganization. The  League  as  the  aUy  and  successor  of  the  Freedmen's 
Bureau  was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  Ku  Klux  movement,  because  it 
helped  to  creatfl  the  conditions  which  made  such  a  movement  in- 
evitable. As  early  as  1870  the  radical  leaders  missed  the  support 
formerly  given  by  the  League,  and  an  urgent  appeal  was  sent  out 
all  over  the  South  from  headquarters  in  New  York  advocating  its 
re)>stablishinent  to  assbt  in  carrying  the  elections  of  1870. 


^.    ^1 


THE  UNION  LEAGUE  OF  AMERICA     195 

pelled  the  n.groes  to  vote  as  radicals  for  several 
years,  when  mthout  its  influence  they  would  either 
not  have  voted  at  all  or  would  have  voted  as 
Democrats  along  with  their  former  masters.  The 
order  was  necessary  to  the  existence  of  the  radical 
party  in  the  Black  Belt.  No  ordinary  political 
organization  could  have  welded  the  blacks  into  a 
solid  party.  The  Freedmen's  Bureau,  which  had 
much  influence  over  the  negroes,  was  too  weak  in 
numbers  to  control  the  negroes  in  politics.  The 
League  finally  absorbed  the  personnel  of  the  Bu- 
reau and  turned  its  prestige  and  its  organization 
to  political  advantage. 


I 


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,   'l 


CHAPTER  IX 

CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL 

Reconstruction  in  the  State  was  closely  related 
to  reconstruction  in  the  churches  and  the  schools. 
Here  also  were  to  be  found  the  same  hostile  ele- 
ments: negro  and  white,  Unionist  and  Confederate, 
victor  and  vanquished.  The  church  was  at  that 
time  an  important  institution  in  the  South,  more 
so  than  in  the  North,  and  in  both  sections  more 
important  than  it  is  today.  It  was  inevitable, 
therefore,  that  ecclesiastical  reconstruction  should 
give  rise  to  bitter  feelings. 

Something  should  be  said  of  conditions  in  the 
churches  when  the  Federal  armies  occupied  the 
land.  The  Southern  organizations  had  lost  many 
ministers  and  many  of  their  members,  and  fre- 
queptly  their  buildings  were  used  as  hospitals  or 
had  been  destroyed.  Their  administration  was 
disorganized  and  their  treasuries  were  empty.  The 
Unionists,  scattered  here  and  there  but  numerous 

196 


CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL  197 

in  the  mountain  districts,  no  longer  wished  to 
attend  the  Southern  churches. 

The  military  censorship  in  church  matters,  which 
continued  for  a  year  in  some  districts,  was  irri- 
Uting,  especially  in  the  Border  States  and  in 
the  Union  districts  where  Northern  preachers  in- 
stalled by  the  army  were  endeavoring  to  remain 
against  the  will  of  the  people.  Mobs  sometimes 
drove  them  out;  others  were  left  to  preach  to 
empty  houses  01  o  a  few  Unionists  and  officers, 
while  the  congrt  ition  withdrew  to  build  a  new 
church.  The  problems  of  negro  membership  in 
the  white  churches  and  of  the  future  1 3lation8  of 
♦he  Northern  and  Southern  denominations  were 
..sing  for  settlement. 

All  Northern  organizations  acted  in  1865  upon 
the  assumption  that  a  reunion  of  the  churches 
must  take  place  and  that  the  divisions  existing 
before  the  war  should  not  be  continued,  since 
slavery,  the  cause  of  the  division,  had  been  de- 
stroyed. But  they  insisted  that  the  reunion  must 
take  place  upon  terms  named  by  the  "loyal" 
churches,  that  the  negroes  must  also  come  under 
"loyal"  religious  direction,  and  that  tests  must 
be  applied  to  the  Confederate  sinners  asking  for 
admission,  in  order  tnat  the  enormity  of  their 


ni 


i-i 


I 


f 
I 


Ui 


» 


f 


198       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APFOBIATTOX 

crimes  should  be  made  plain  to  them.  But  this 
policy  did  not  succeed.  The  Confederates  ob- 
jected to  being  treated  as  "rebels  and  traitors" 
and  to  "sitting  upon  stools  of  repentance"  before 
they  should  be  received  again  into  the  fold. 

Only  two  denominations  were  reunited  —  the 
Methodist  Protestant,  the  nbrthem  section  of 
which  came  over  to  the  southern,  and  the  Protes- 
tant Episcopal,  in  which  moderate  counsels  pre- 
vailed and  into  which  Southerners  were  welcomed 
back.  The  Southern  Baptists  maintained  their 
separate  existence  and  reorganized  the  Southern 
Baptist  Convention,  to  which  came  many  of  the 
Baptist  associations  in  the  Border  States;  the 
Catholics  did  not  divide  before  1861  and  therefore 
had  no  reconstruction  problems  to  solve;  and  the 
smaller  denominations  maintained  the  organiza- 
tions which  they  had  before  1861.  A  Unionist 
preacher  testified  before  the  Joint  Com.  littee  on  Re- 
construction that  even  the  Southern  Quakers  "are 
about  as  decided  in  regard  to  the  respectability  of 
secession  as  any  other  class  of  people. " 

Two  other  great  Southern  churches,  the  Pres- 
byterian and  the  Methodist  Episcopal,  grew 
stronger  after  the  Civil  War.  The  tendency  to- 
ward reunion  of  the  Presbyterians  was  checked 


CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL  loo 

when  one  Northern  b  inch  declared  «•  "a  condi- 
tion precedent  to  the  admissior  of  southern  appli- 
cants that  these  confess  as  sinf  u  4II  opinions  before 
held  in  regard  to  slavery,  nullification,  rebellion 
and  iUvery,  and  stigmatize  secession  as  a  crime 
and  the  withdrawal  of  the  southern  churches  as  a 
schism. "    Another  Northern  group  declared  that 
Southern  mmisters  must  be  placed  on  probation 
and  mufit  either  prove  their  loyalty  or  profess  re- 
penUnce  for  disloyalty  and  repudiate  their  former 
opinions.    As  a  result  several  Presbyterian  bodies 
in  the  South  joined  in  a  strong  union,  to  which 
also  adhered  the  synods  of  several  Border  States. 
The  Methodist  Episcopal  Church.  South,  was 
confronted  with  conditions  similar  to  those  which 
prevented  the  reunion  of  the  Presbyterians.    The 
Northern  church,  according  to  the  declaration  of 
its  authorities,  also  came  down  to  divide  the  spoils 
and  to   "disintegrate  and   absorb"   the   "schis- 
matic" Southern  churches.    Already  many  South- 
em  pulpits  were  filled   with  Northern   Metho- 
dist ministers  placed  there  under  military  protec- 
tion; and  when  they  finally  realized  that  reunion 
was  not  possible,  these  Methodist  worthies  re- 
solved to  occupy  the  late  Confederacy  as  a  mission 
field  and  to  organize  congregations  of  blacks  and 


'1 

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toe       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APF9MATT0X 

whitcf  who  were  "not  tainted  with  treason." 
Biahopt  and  clergymen  charged  with  this  work 
carried  it  on  vigorously  for  a  few  years  in  close 
connection  with  political  reconstruction. 

The  activities  of  the  Northern  Methodists  stimu- 
lated the  Southern  Methodists  to  a  quick  reorgan- 
ization. The  surviving  bishops  met  in  August, 
1865,  and  bound  together  their  shaken  church. 
In  reply  to  suggestions  of  reunion  they  asserted 
that  the  Northern  Methodists  had  become  "in- 
curably radical, "  were  too  much  involved  in  poli- 
tics, and,  further,  that  they  had,  without  right, 
seized  and  were  still  holding  Southern  church 
buildings.  They  objected  also  to  the  way  the 
Northern  church  referred  to  the  Southerners  as 
"schismatics"  and  to  the  Southern  church  as  one 
built  on  slavery  and  therefore,  now  that  slav- 
ery was  gone,  to  be  reconstructed.  The  bishops 
warned  their  people  against  the  missionary  efforts 
of  the  Northern  brethren  and  against  the  attempts 
to  "disintegrate  and  absorb"  Methodism  in  the 
South.  Within  five  years  after  the  war  the  Metho- 
dist Episcopal  Church,  South,  was  greatly  in- 
creased in  numbers  by  the  accession  of  conferences 
in  Maryland,  Kentucky,  Virginia,  Missouri,  and 
even  from  above  the  Ohio,  while  the  Northern 


CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL  §01 

Methodiit  Church  was  able  to  organiie  only  a  few 
white  congregations  ouUide  of  the  stronger  Union- 
ist districU,  but  continued  to  labor  in  the  South 
as  a  missionary  field.' 

But  if  the  large  Southern  churches  held  their 
white  membership  and  even  gained  in  numbers  and 
territory,  they  fought  a  losing  fight  to  retain  their 
black  members.  It  was  assumed  by  Northern 
ecclesiastics  that  whether  a  reunion  of  whites  took 
place  or  not,  the  negroes  would  receive  spiritual 
guidance  from  the  North.  This  was  necessary, 
,  a  they  said,  because  the  Southern  whites  were  igno- 
rant and  impoverished  and  because  "the  state  of 
mind  among  even  ihe  best  classes  of  Southern 

'  The  church  lituation  after  the  war  waa  well  deacribed  in  ISflS  by 
an  editorial  writer  in  the  S(Uion  who  pointed  out  that  the  Northern 
churchea  thought  the  South  determined  to  make  the  religioua  division 
permanent,  though  "slavery  no  longer  furnishes  a  pretext  for  separa- 
tion." "Too  much  pains  were  taken  to  bring  about  an  ecclesiastical 
reunion,  and  irriUting  offers  of  reconciliation  are  made  by  the  North- 
«n  churches,  all  baaed  on  the  assumption  that  the  South  has  not  only 
sinned,  but  sinned  knowingly,  in  slavery  and  in  war.  We  expect  them 
to  be  penittat  and  to  gladly  accept  our  offers  of  forgiveness.  But  the 
Southern  people  look  upon  a  *  loyal '  missionary  as  a  political  emissary, 
and  'loyal'  men  do  not  at  present  possess  the  necessary  qua'iScations 
for  evangelizing  the  Southerners  or  softening  their  hearti.  and  are 
sure  not  to  succeed  in  doing  so.  We  look  upon  their  defeat  m  retribu- 
tion and  expect  them  to  do  the  same.  It  will  do  no  good  if  we  tell  the 
Southerner  that  *we  will  forgive  them  if  they  will  confess  that  they 
are  criminals,  offer  to  pray  with  them,  preach  with  them,  and  labor 
with  them  over  their  hideous  sins.' " 


1 

1 

1 

i 

1 

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1 

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1^1  1 


808       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

whites  rendered  them  incapable  ...  of  doing 
justice  to  the  people  whom  they  had  so  long  per- 
sistently wronged."  Further,  it  was  also  neces- 
sary for  political  reasons  to  remove  the  negroes 
from  Southern  religious  control. 

For  obvious  reasons,  however,  the  Southern 
churches  wanted  to  hold  their  negro  members. 
They  declared  themselves  in  favor  of  n^ro  educa- 
tion and  of  better  organized  religious  work  among 
the  blacks,  and  made  every  sort  of  accommodation 
to  hold  them.  The  Baptists  organized  separate 
congregations,  with  white  or  black  pastors  as  de- 
sired, and  associations  of  black  churches.  In  1866 
the  Methodist  General  Conference  authorized  sepa- 
rate congregations,  quarterly  conferences,  annual 
conferences,  even  a  separate  jurisdiction,  with  ne- 
gro preachers,  presiding  elders,  and  bbhops  —  but 
all  to  no  avail.  Every  Northern  pohtical,  reli- 
gious, or  military  agency  in  the  South  worked  for 
separation,  and  negro  preachers  were  not  long  in 
seeing  the  greater  advantages  which  they  would 
have  in  independent  churches. 

Much  of  the  separate  organization  was  accom- 
plished in  mutual  good  will,  particularly  in  the 
Baptist  ranks.  The  Reverend  I.  T.  Tichenor,  a 
prominent  Baptist  minister,   has  described  the 


II 


ff 


CH^JRCH  AND  SCHOOL  sos 

process  as  it  took  place  in  the  First  Baptist  Church 
in  Montgomery.    The  church  had  nine  hundred 
members,  of  whom  six  hundred  were  black.    The 
negroes  received  a  regular  organization  of  their 
own  under  the  supervision  of  the  white  pastors. 
When  a  separation  of  the  two  bodies  was  later 
deemed  desirable,  it  was  inaugurated  by  a  con- 
ference of  the  negroes  which  passed  a  resolution 
couched  in  the  kj    Jiest  terms,  suggesting  the  wis- 
dom of  the  division,  and  asking  the  concurrence 
of  the  white  church  in  such  action.     The  white 
church  cordially  approved  the  movement,  and  the 
two  bodies  united  in  erecting  a  suiteble  house  of 
worship  for  the  negroes.     Until  the  new  church 
was  completed,  both  congregations  continued  to 
occupy  jointly  the  old  house  of  worship.    The  new 
house  was  paid  for  in  large  measure  by  the  white 
members  of  the  church  and  by  individuals  in  the 
community.     As  soon  as  it  was  completed  the 
colored  church  moved  into  it  with  its  pastor,  board 
of  deacons,  committees  of  all  sorts,  and  the  whole 
machinery  of  church  life  went  into  action  without 
a  jar.    Similar  accommodations  occurred  ip  all  the 
States  of  the  South. 

The  Methodists  lost  the  greater  part  of  their 
negro  membership  to  two  organizations   which 


1  I 


SM       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

came  down  from  the  North  in  1865  —  the  African 
Methodist  Episcopal  Church  and  the  African 
Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  ZIou.  Large  numbers 
also  went  over  to  the  Northern  Methodist  Church. 
After  losing  nearly  three  hundred  thousand  mem- 
bers, the  Southern  Methodists  came  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  remaining  seventy-eight  thousand 
negroes  would  be  more  comfortable  in  a  separate 
organization  and  therefore  began  in  1866  the 
Colored  Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  with  bishops, 
conferences,  and  all  the  accompaniments  of  the 
parent  Methodist  Church,  which  continued  to 
give  friendly  aid  but  exercised  no  control.  For 
many  years  the  Colored  Methodist  Church  was 
under  fire  from  the  other  negro  denominations, 
who  called  it  the  "rebel,"  the  '"democratic,"  the 
"old  slavery"  church. 

The  negro  members  of  the  Jii  iberland  Pres- 
byterians were  similarly  set  off  ii.  .  small  African 
organization.  The  Southern  Presbyterians  and  the 
Episcopalians  established  separate  congregations 
and  missions  under  white  supervision  but  sanc- 
tioned no  independent  negro  organization.  Con- 
sequently the  negroes  soon  deserted  these  churches 
and  went  with  their  own  kind. 

Resentment  at  the  methods  employed  by  the 


CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL  fl05 

Northern  religious  carpetbaggers  was  strong  among 
the  Southern  whites.  "Emissaries  of  Christ  and 
the  radical  party"  they  were  called  by  one  Ala- 
bama leader.  Governor  Lindsay  of  the  same  State 
asserted  that  the  Northern  missionaries  caused 
race  hatred  by  teaching  the  negroes  to  regard  the 
whites  as  their  natural  enemies,  who,  if  possible, 
would  put  them  back  in  slavery.  Others  were 
charged  with  teaching  that  to  be  on  the  safe  side, 
the  blacks  should  get  into  a  Northern  church,  and 
that  "Christ  died  for  negroes  and  Yankees,  not 
for  rebels. " 

The  scalawags,  also,  developed  a  dislike  of  the 
Northern  church  work  among  the  negroes  and  it 
was  impossible  to  organize  mixed  congregations. 
Of  the  Reverend  A.  S.  Lakin,  a  well-known  agent 
of  the  Northern  Methodist  Church  in  Alabama, 
Nicholas  Davis,  a  North  Alabama  Unionist  and 
scalawag,  said  to  the  Ku  Klux  Committee:  "The 
character  of  his  [Lakin 's]  speech  was  this:  to  teach 
the  negroes  that  every  man  that  was  born  and 
raised  in  the  Southern  country  was  their  enemy, 
that  there  was  no  use  trusting  them,  no  matter 
what  they  said  —  if  they  said  they  were  for  the 
Union  or  anything  else.  '  No  use  talking,  they  are 
your  enemies.'   And  he  made  a  pretty  good  speech. 


4 


fO^       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

too;  awful;  a  hell  of  a  one;  .  .  .  inflainmatory  and 
game,  too.  ...  It  was  enough  to  provoke  the 
devil.  Did  all  the  mischief  he  could  ...  I  tell 
you,  that  old  fellow  is  a  hell  of  an  old  rascal." 

For  a  time  the  white  churches  were  annoyed  by 
intrusions  of  strange  blacks  set  on  by  those  who 
were  bent  on  separating  the  races.  Frequently 
there  were  feuds  in  white  or  black  congregations 
over  the  question  of  joining  some  Northern  body. 
Disputes  over  church  property  also  arose  and  con- 
tinued for  years.  Lakin,  referred  to  above,  was 
charged  with  "stealing"  negro  congregations  and 
uniting  them  with  the  Cincinnati  C!onference  with- 
out their  knowledge.  The  n^p*oes  were  urged  to 
demand  title  to  all  buildings  formerly  used  for  ne- 
gro worship,  and  the  Constitutional  Convention 
of  Alabama  in  1867  directed  that  such  property 
must  be  turned  over  to  them  when  claimed. 

The  agents  of  the  Northern  churches  were  not 
greatly  different  from  other  carpetbaggers  and 
adventurers  taking  advantage  of  the  general  con- 
fusion to  seize  a  little  power.  Many  were  un- 
scrupulous; others,  sincere  and  honest  but  narrow, 
bigoted,  and  intolerant,  filled  with  distrust  ( * 
the  Southern  whites  and  with  correspond,  j 
confidence  in  the  blacks  and  in  themselves.    The 


4     \ 


I 


CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL  207 

missionary  and  church  publications  were  quite  as 
severe  on  the  Southern  people  as  any  radical  Con- 
gressman. The  publications  of  the  Freedmen'«»  Aid 
Society  furnish  illustrations  of  the  feelings  and 
views  of  those  engaged  in  the  Soutnern  work. 
They  in  turn  were  made  to  feel  the  effects  of  a 
merciless  social  proscription.  For  this  some  of 
them  cared  not  at  all,  while  others  or  their  families 
felt  it  keenly.  One  woman  missionary  wrote  that 
she  was  delighted  when  a  Southern  white  would 
speak  to  her.  A  preacher  in  Virginia  declared  that 
"the  females,  those  especially  whose  pride  has  been 
humbled,  are  more  intense  in  their  bitterness  and 
endeavor  to  keep  up  a  social  ostracism  against 
Union  and  Northern  people. "  The  Ku  Klux  raids 
were  directed  against  preachei^  and  congregations 
whose  conduct  was  disagreeable  to  the  whites. 
Lakin  asserted  that  while  he  was  conducting  a 
great  revival  meeting  among  the  hills  of  northern 
Alabama,  Governor  Smith  and  other  prominent 
and  sinful  scalawag  politicians  were  there  "under 
conviction"  and  about  to  become  converted.  But 
in  came  the  Klan  and  the  congregation  scattered. 
Smith  and  the  others  were  so  angry  and  frightened 
that  their  good  feelings  were  dissipated,  and  the 
devil  regnto-ed  them,  so  that  Lakin  said  he  was 


«06       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

never  able  to  "get  a  hold  on  them"  again.  For 
the  souls  lost  that  night  he  held  the  Klan  respon- 
sible. Lakin  told  several  marvelous  stories  of  his 
hairbreadth  escapes  from  death  by  assassination 
which,  if  true,  would  be  enough  to  ruin  the  reputa- 
tion of  northern  Alabama  men  for  marksmanship. 
The  reconstruction  ended  with  conditions  in  the 
churches  similar  to  those  in  politics:  the  races  were 
separated  and  unfriendly;  Northern  and  Southern 
church  organizations  were  divided;  and  between 
them,  especially  in  the  border  and  mountain  dis- 
tricts, there  existed  factional  quarrels  of  a  po- 
litical origin,  for  every  Northern  Methodist  was 
a  Republican  and  every  Southern  Methodist  was 
a  Democrat. 

The  schools  of  the  South,  like  the  churches  and 
political  institutions,  were  thrown  into  the  melting 
pot  of  reconstruction.  The  spirit  in  which  the 
work  was  begun  may  be  judged  from  the  tone  of 
the  addresses  made  at  a  meeting  of  the  National 
Teachers  Association  in  1865.  The  president, 
S.  S.  Greene,  declared  that  "the  old  slave  States 
are  to  be  the  new  missionary  ground  for  the 
national  school  teacher. "  Francis  Wayland,  the 
former  president  of  Brown  University,  remarked 


1. 


CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL  fl09 

that  "it  has  been  a  war  of  education  and  patriot- 
ism against  ignorance  and  barbarism. "  President 
Hill  of  Harvard  spoke  of  the  "new  work  of  spread- 
ing knowledge  and  intellectual  culture  over  the 
r^ions  that  sat  in  darkness."  Other  speakers 
asserted  that  the  leading  Southern  whites  were  as 
much  opposed  to  free  schools  as  to  free  govern- 
ments and  "we  must  treat  them  as  western  farm- 
ers do  the  stumps  in  their  clearings,  work  around 
them  and  let  them  rot  out";  that  the  majority  of 
the  whites  were  more  ignorant  than  the  slaves; 
and  that  the  negro  must  be  educated  and  strength- 
ened against  "the  wiles,  the  guile,  and  hate  of  his 
baffled  masters  and  their  minions. "  The  New  Eng- 
land Freedmen's  Aid  Society  considered  it  nec- 
essary to  educate  the  negro  "as  a  counteracting 
mfluence  against  the  evil  councils  and  designs  of 
the  white  freemen. " 

The  tasks  that  confronted  the  Southern  States 
in  1865-67  were  two:  first,  to  restore  the  shat- 
tered school  systems  of  the  whites;  and  second,  to 
arrange  for  the  education  of  the  negroes.  Educa- 
tion of  the  negro  slave  had  been  looked  upon  as 
dangerous  and  had  been  generally  forbidden.  A 
small  number  of  negroes  could  read  and  write, 
but  there  were  at  the  close  f  the  war  no  schools 
14 


m 


'1   s 

m  i' 
1 1 1 

tlO       THE  SEQUEL  OF  AFPOBIATTOX 

for  the  children.  Before  1861  each  State  had  do* 
veloped  at  least  the  outlines  of  a  school  system. 
Though  hindered  in  development  by  the  sparseness 
of  the  population  and  by  the  prevalence  in  some 
districts  of  the  Virginia  doctrine  that  free  schools 
were  only  for  the  poor,  public  schools  were  never- 
theless in  existence  in  1861.  Academies  and  col- 
leges, however,  were  thronged  with  students.  When 
the  war  ended,  the  public  schools  were  disorgan- 
ized, and  the  private  academies  and  the  collies 
were  closed.  Teachers  and  students  had  been  dis- 
persed; buildings  had  been  burned  or  used  for  hos- 
pitals and  laboratories;  and  public  libraries  had 
virtually  disappeared. 

The  collies  made  efforts  to  open  in  the  fall  of 
1865.  Only  one  student  presented  himself  at  the 
University  of  Alabama  for  matriculation ;  but  before 
June,  1866,  the  stronger  colleges  were  again  in  op- 
eration. The  public  or  semi-public  schools  for  the 
whites  also  opened  in  the  fall.  In  the  cities  where 
Federal  military  authorities  had  brought  about  the 
employment  of  Northern  teachers,  there  was  some 
friction.  In  New  Orleans,  for  example,  the  teach- 
ers required  the  children  to  sing  Northern  songs 
and  patriotic  airs.  When  the  Confederates  were 
restored  to  power  these  teachers  were  dismissed. 


n 


CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL  «ii 

The  movement  toward  negro  education  was 
general  throughout  the  South.    Among  the  blacks 
themselves  there  was  an  intense  desire  to  learn. 
They  wished  to  read  the  Bible,  to  be  preachers,  to 
be  as  the  old  master  and  not  have  to  work.    Day 
and  night  and  Sunday  they  crowded  the  schools. 
According  to  an  observer,'  "not  only  are  individ- 
uals seen  at  study,  and  under  the  most  untoward 
drcumstonces,  but  in  very  many  places  I  have 
found  what  I  will  call  'native  schools,*  often  rude 
and  very  imperfect,  but  there  they  are,  a  group, 
perhaps,  of  all  ages,  trying  to  learn.    Some  young 
man,  some  woman,  or  old  preacher,  in  cellar,  or 
shed,  or  comer  of  a  negro  meeting-house,  with  the 
alphabet  in  hand,  or  a  town  spelling-book,  is  their 
teacher.    AH  are  full  of  enthusiasm  with  the  new 
knowledge  the  book  is  unparting  to  them. " 

Not  only  did  the  negroes  want  schooling,  but 
both  the  North  and  the  South  proposed  to  give  it 
to  them.  Neither  side  was  actuated  entirely  by 
altruistic  motives.  A  Hampton  Institute  teacher 
in  later  days  remarked:  "When  the  combat  was 
over  and  the  Yankee  school-ma'ams  followed  in 
the  train  of  the  northern  armies,  the  business  of 

•J.  W.  Alvord.  Superintendent  of  SchooU  for  the  FVeednoi'i 
Bureau.  1806. 


I  , 


I 

I 

I 

[ 


ftli       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

educating  the  negroes  wm  a  continuation  of  hostili- 
ties against  the  vanquished  and  was  so  regarded  to 
a  considerable  extent  on  both  sides." 

The  Southern  churches,  through  their  bishops 
and  clergy,  the  newspapers,  and  prominent  individ- 
uals such  as  J.  L.  M.  Curry,  John  B.  Gordon,  vT.  L. 
Orr,  Governors  Brown,  Moore,  and  Patton,  came 
out  in  favor  of  negro  education.  Of  this  move- 
ment General  S*vayne  said:  "Quite  early  .  .  . 
the  several  religious  denom^'tiations  took  strong 
ground  in  favor  of  the  education  of  the  freedmen. 
The  principal  argument  was  an  appeal  to  sectional 
and  sectarian  prejudice,  lest,  the  work  being  inevi- 
table, the  influence  which  must  come  from  it  be 
realized  by  others;  but  it  is  believed  that  this  was 
but  the  shield  and  weapon  which  men  of  unselfish 
principle  found  necessary  at  first."  The  news- 
papers took  the  attitude  that  the  Southern  whites 
should  teach  the  negroes  because  it  was  their  duty, 
because  it  was  good  policy,  and  because  if  they  did 
not  do  so  some  one  else  would.  The  Advertiser  of 
Montgomery'  stated  that  educatior  was  a  danger 
in  slavery  times  but  that  under  fr  .cm  ignorance 
became  a  danger.  For  a  time  tl  re  were  numer- 
ous schools  taught  by  crippled  Confederates  and 
by  Southern  women. 


CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL  tis 

But  the  education  of  the  negro,  like  hi«  religious 
training,  was  taken  from  the  control  of  the  South- 
em  white  and  was  placed  under  the  direction  of  the 
Northern  teachers  and  missionaries  who  swarmed 
into  the  country  under  the  fostering  care  of  the 
Freedmen's  Bureau,  the  Northern  churches,  and 
the  various  Freedmen's  Aid  Societies.    In  three 
years  the  Bureau  spent  six  million  dollars  on  negro 
schools  and  everywhere  it  exercised  supervision 
over  them.    The  teachers  pursued  a  policy  akm  to 
that  of  the  religious  leaders.    One  Southerner  lik- 
ened them  to  the  "plagues  of  Egypt,"  another  de- 
scribed them  as  "saints,  foob,  incendiaries,  fakirs, 
and  plain  business  men  and  women. "    A  Southern 
woman  remarked  that  "their  spirit  was  often  high 
and  noble  so  far  as  the  black  man's  elevation  was 
concerned,  but  toward  the  white  it  was  bitter, 
judicial,  and  unrelenting."    The  Northern  teach- 
ers were  charged  with  ignorance  of  social  conditions, 
with  fratemizmg  with  the  blacks,  and  with  teach- 
ing them  that  the  Southerners  were  traitors,  "mur- 
derers of  Lincoln, "  who  had  been  cruel  taskmasters 
and  who  now  wanted  to  restore  servitude. 

The  reaction  against  negro  education,  which  be- 
gan to  show  itself  before  reconstruction  was  inaugu- 
rated, found  expression  in  the  view  of  most  whites 


If 


f  14       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

that  "Khooling  niini  a  negro."  A  more  intdli- 
fent  upinion  was  that  of  J  L.  M.  Curry,  a  lifelong 
adviH  <ite  of  negro  education: 

It  it  n  '^  juai  to  condemn  the  negro  for  the  education 
whicli  hr  received  in  the  early  yean  after  the  war.  That 
was  the  pt^riod  of  reconstruction,  the  saturnalia  of  mis- 
gov  T ! '  t,  the  greatest  poadble  hindrance  to  the  prog- 
resL  /tit  freedmen.  .  .  .  The  education  was  un- 
i(M;.'ig,  t't>rr.oraIizing.  [and  it]  pandered  to  a  wild  frenzy 
he  eti.n]'n,4  as  a  quick  method  of  reversing  social  and 
po  Mct:1  •  <ji  Jitions.  Nothing  could  have  been  better 
de  V  i  ^fv^  '<  -  .icludiit^  the  poor  negro  and  making  him  the 


tool 
nut' 


ne 


.;  \r 


."Oi  r 


,)t  taskmasters.    Education  is  a 


rul  ro!)  .^qu' .  «e  of  citizenship  and  enfranchisement 
.  .  of  '^N  '.  >m  and  humanity.  But  with  deliberate 
purpose  to  ,11 1  •  ^t  the  Southern  States  to  negro  domba- 
tk>u.  and  seciiP  the  States  permanently  for  partisan 
ends,  the  education  adopted  was  contrary  to  common- 
sense,  to  human  experience,  to  all  noble  purposes.  The 
curriculum  was  for  a  people  in  the  highest  degree  of  civi- 
lization; the  aptitude  and  capabilities  and  needs  of  the 
negro  were  wholly  disregarded.  Especial  stress  was  laid 
on  classics  and  liberal  culture  to  bring  the  race  per  sal- 
turn  to  the  same  plane  with  their  former  masters,  and 
realize  the  theory  of  social  and  political  equality.  A 
race  more  highly  civilized,  with  best  heredities  and 
environments,  could  not  have  been  coddled  with  more 
disregard  of  all  the  teachings  of  human  history  and  the 
necessities  of  the  race.  Colleges  and  universities,  es- 
tablished and  conducted  by  the  Freedmen's  Bureau  and 
Northern  churches  and  societies,  sprang  up  like  mush- 


CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL  tu 

rooou,  and  the  teachera.  ignorant.  fanaJcal.  without 
setf-poiw.  proceeded  to  make  all  pomble  miMhief.  It  ia 
irtstional,  cruel,  to  hold  the  negro,  under  auch  strange 
condHioM,  retponmble  for  all  the  ill  consequences  of  bad 
education,  unwise  teachers,  reconstruction  villiwies,  and 
partisan  schemes. ' 

Education  was  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  handmaid 
to  a  thorough  reconstruction,  and  its  general  char- 
acter and  aim  were  determined  by  the  Northern 
teachers.    Each  convention  framed  a  more  or  less 
complicated  school  system  and  undertook  to  pro- 
vide for  its  support.    The  negroes  in  the  conven- 
tions were  anxious  for  free  schools;  the  conser- 
vatives were  willing;  but  the  carpetbag^^  rs  and 
a  few  mulatto  leaders  insisted  in  several  States 
upon  mixed  schools.    Only  in  Loiusiana  and  South 
Carolina  did  the  constitutions  actually  fwbid  sep- 
arate schools;  in  Mississippi.  Florida,  Alabama, 
and  Arkansas  the  question  was  left  open,  to  the  em- 
barrassment of  the  whites.     Generally  the  blacks 
showed  no  desire  for  mixed  schools  unless  urged 
to  it  by  the  carpetbaggers.    In  the  South  Caro- 
lina convention  a  mulatto  thus  argued  in  favor 
of  mixed  schools:    "The  gentleman  from  New- 
berry said  he  was  afraid  we  were  taking  a  wrong 

■  Quoted  in  Proceeding*  of  the  Montgomery  Confeience  on  Bjtoe 
Problenu  (1000).  p.  188. 


.'  ti 


^ 


^1 


! 

f 


I 


I 


l^i    : 


216       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

course  to  remove  these  prejudices.  The  most 
natural  method  to  effect  this  object  would  be  to  al- 
low children  when  five  or  six  years  of  age  to  mingle 
in  schools  together  and  associate  generally.  Under 
such  training,  prejudice  must  eventually  die  ouf, 
but  if  we  postpone  it  until  they  become  men  and 
women,  prejudice  will  be  so  established  that  no  mor- 
tal can  obliterate  it.  This,  I  think,  is  a  sufficient 
reply  to  the  argument  of  the  gentleman." 

The  state  systems  were  top-heavy  with  adminis- 
trative machinery  and  were  officered  by  incompe- 
tent and  corrupt  officials.  Such  men  as  Cloud 
in  Alabama,  Cardozo  in  Mississippi,  Conway  in 
Louisiana,  and  Jillson  in  South  Carolina  are  fair 
samples  of  them.  Much  of  the  personnel  was 
taken  over  from  the  Bureau  teaching  force.  The 
school  officials  were  no  better  than  the  other 
officeholders. 

The  first  result  of  the  attempt  to  use  the  schools 
as  an  instrument  of  reconstruction  ended  in  the 
ruin  of  several  state  universities.  The  faculties  of 
the  Universities  of  North  Carolina,  Mississippi, 
and  Alabama  were  made  radical  and  the  institu- 
tions thereupon  declined  to  nothing.  The  negroes, 
unable  to  control  the  faculty  of  the  University  of 
South  Carolina,  forced  negro  students  in  and  thus 


liv 


CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL  «17 

got  possession.  In  Louisiana  the  radical  Legisla- 
ture cut  off  all  funds  because  the  university  would 
not  admit  negroes.  The  establishment  of  the  land 
grant  colleges  was  an  occasion  for  corruption  and 
embezzlement. 

The  common  schools  were  used  for  radical  ends. 
The  funds  set  aside  for  them  by  the  state  consti- 
tutions or  appropriated  by  the  legislatures  for  these 
schools  seldom  reached  their  destination  with- 
out being  lessened  by  embezzlement  or  by  plain 
stealing.  Frequently  the  auditor,  or  the  treas- 
urer, or  even  the  Legislature  diverted  tho  school 
funds  to  other  purposes.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  all  of 
the  reconstruction  systems  broke  down  financially 
after  a  brief  existence. 

The  mixed  school  provisions  in  Louisiana  and 
South  Carolina  and  the  uncertainty  of  the  educa- 
tional situation  in  other  States  caused  white  chil- 
dren to  stay  away  from  the  public  schools.  For 
several  years  the  negroes  were  better  provided 
than  the  whites,  having  for  themselves  both  all  the 
public  schools  and  also  those  supported  by  pri- 
vate benevolence.  In  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  and 
South  Carolina  the  whites  could  get  no  money  for 
schoolhouses,  while  large  sums  were  spent  on  ne- 
gro schools.    The  Peabody  Board,  then  recently 


'jt, 


f  18       THE  SEQUEL  OF  API  OMATTOX 

inaugurated,'  refused  to  cooperate  with  school 
officials  in  the  mixed  school  States  and,  when  criti- 
cized, replied:  "It  is  well  known  that  we  are  help- 
ing the  white  children  of  Louisiana  as  being  the 
more  destitute  from  the  fact  of  their  unwillingness 
to  attend  mixed  schools." 

As  was  to  be  expected  the  whites  criticised  the 
attitude  of  the  school  officials,  disapproved  of  the 
attempts  made  in  the  schools  to  teach  the  children 
radical  ideas,  and  objected  to  the  contents  of  the 
history  texts  and  the  "Freedmen's  Readers."  A 
white  school  board  in  Mississippi,  by  advertising 
for  a  Democratic  teacher  for  a  negro  school,  drew 
the  fire  of  a  radical  editor  who  inquired:  "What 
is  the  motive  by  which  this  call  for  a  'competent 
Democratic  teacher'  b  prompted?  The  most 
danming  that  has  ever  moved  the  heart  of  man. 
It  is  to  use  the  vote  and  action  of  a  human  being  as 
a  means  by  which  to  enslave  him.  The  treachery 
and  villainy  of  these  rebels  stands  without  parallel 
in  the  history  of  men. " 

A  negro  politician  has  left  this  account  of  a 
radical  recitation  in  a  Florida  negro  school: 


s  To  administer  the  fund  bequeathed  by  George  Peabody  of  Massa- 
chusetts to  promote  education  in  the  Southern  States.  See  The  Nm 
South,  by  Holland  Thompson  (in  The  Chronidu  of  Amtnea). 


CHURCH  AND  SCHOOL 


S19 


After  finishing  the  arithmetic  lesson  they  must  next  go 
through  the  catechism: 

"Who  is  the  'Publican  Government  of  the  State  of 
Florida?"    ^n«p«r:  "Governor  Stams." 

"Who  made  him  Governor?"  Answer:  "The  colored 
people." 

"Who  is  trying  to  get  him  out  of  his  seat?  "  Anmer: 
"The  Democrats,  Conover,  and  some  white  and  black 
Liberal  Republicans. " 

"What  should  the  colored  people  do  with  the  men 
who  is  trying  to  get  Governor  Starns  out  of  his  seat?" 
4n«wr;  "They  should  kill  them."  .    .    . 

This  was  done  that  the  patrons,  some  of  whom  could 
not  read,  would  be  impressed  by  the  expressions  of  their 
children,  and  would  be  ready  to  put  any  one  to  death 
who  would  come  out  into  the  country  and  say  anything 
against  Grovemor  Starns. 

The  native  white  teachers  soon  dropped  out  of 
negro  schools,  and  those  from  the  North  met  with 
the  same  social  persecution  as  the  white  church 
workers.  The  White  League  and  Ku  Klux  Klan 
drove  off  obnoxious  teachers,  whipped  some, 
buined  negro  .ichoolhouses,  and  in  various  other 
ways  manifested  the  reaction  which  was  rousing 
the  whites  against  negro  schools. 

The  several  agencies  working  for  negro  educa- 
tion gave  some  training  to  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  blacks,  but  the  whites  asserted  that,  like  the 
church  work,  it  was  based  on  a  wrong  spirit  and 
resulted  in  evil  as  well  as  in  good.    Free  schools 


hi 


no  THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 
failed  in  reconstruction  because  of  Ihe  dishonesty 
or  incompetence  of  the  authorities  and  because  of 
the  unsettled  race  question.  It  was  not  until  the 
turn  of  the  century  that  the  white  schools  were 
again  as  good  as  they  had  been  before  1861.  After 
the  reconstruction  native  whites  as  teachers  of  ne- 
gro schools  were  impossible  in  most  places.  The 
hostile  feeUngs  of  the  whites  resulted  and  still  re- 
sult in  a  Umitation  of  n^^  schools.  The  best 
thing  for  negro  schools  that  came  out  of  reconstruc- 
tion was  Armstrong's  Hampton  Institute  pro- 
gram, which,  however,  was  quite  opposed  to  the 
spirit  of  reconstruction  education. 


CHAPTER  X 


■ 


CARPETBAG  AND  NEGRO  RULE 

The  Southern  States  reconstructed  by  Congress 
were  subject  for  periods  of  varying  length  to  gov- 
ernments  designed   by  radical  Northerners  and 
imposed  by  elements  thrown  to  the  surface  in  the 
upheaval  of  Southern  society.    Georgia,  Virginia, 
and  North   Carolina   each   had  a   brief  experi- 
ence with  these  governments;  other  States  escaped 
after  four  or  five  years,  while  Louisiana,  South 
Carolina,  and  Florida  were  not  delivered  from  this 
domination  until  1876.    The  States  which  con- 
tained large  numbers  of  negroes  had,  on  the  whole, 
the  worst  experience.   Here  the  officials  were  ig- 
norant or  corrupt,  frauds  upon  the  public  were 
the  rule,  not  the  exception,  and  all  of  the  recon- 
struction governments  were  so  conducted   that 
they  could  secure  no  support  from  the  respectable 
elements  of  the  electorate. 
The  fundamental  cause  of  the  failure  of  these 


M? 


i 


nft       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

governments  was  the  character  of  the  new  ruling 
class.  Every  State,  except  perhaps  Virginia,  was 
under  the  control  of  a  few  able  leaders  from  the 
North  generally  called  carpetbaggers  and  of  a  few 
native  white  radicals  contemptuously  designated 
scalawags.  These  were  kept  in  power  by  negro 
voters,  to  some  seven  hundred  thousand  of  whom 
the  ballot  had  been  given  by  the  reconstruction 
acts.  The  adoption  of  the  Fifteenth  Amendment 
in  March,  1870,  brought  the  total  in  the  former 
slave  States  to  931,000,  with  about  seventy-five 
thousand  more  n^roes  in  the  North.  The  negro 
voters  were  most  numerous,  comparatively,  in 
Louisiana,  Mississippi,  South  Carolina,  Alabama, 
and  Georgia.  There  were  a  few  thousand  carpet- 
baggers in  each  State,  with,  at  first,  a  much  larger 
number  of  scalawags.  The  latter,  who  were  for- 
mer Unionists,  former  Whigs,  Confederate  desert- 
ers, and  a  few  unscrupulous  politicians,  were  most 
numerous  in  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  Texas,  Ar- 
kansas, and  Tennessee.  The  better  class,  however, 
rapidly  left  the  radical  party  as  the  character  of 
the  new  regime  became  evident,  taking  with  them 
whatever  claims  the  party  had  to  respectability, 
education,  political  experience,  and  property. 
The  conservatives,  hopelessly  reduced  by  the 


1  ■    ■■' 

f|. 

«1 

i   «    :] 

i                     1 

H 

lf.'i^ 

k 

CARPETBAG  AND  NEGRO  RULE   998 

operation  of  disfranchising  laws,  were  at  first  not 
well  organized,  nor  were  they  at  any  time  as  well 
led  as  in  antebellum  days.    In  1868  about  one 
hundred  thousand  of  them  were  forbidden  to  vote 
and  about  two  hundred  thousand  were  disquali- 
fied from  holding  office.    The  abstention  policy  of 
1867-68  resulted  in  an  almost  complete  withdrawal 
of  the  influence  of  the  conservatives  for  the  two 
years,  1868-70.    As  a  class  they  were  regarded  by 
the  dominant  party  in  State  and  nation  as  danger- 
ous and  untrustworthy  and  were  persecuted  in 
such  irritating  ways  that  many  became  indiffer- 
ent to  the  appeals  of  civil  duty.    They  formed  a 
solid  but  almost  despairing  opposition  in  the  black 
districts  of  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  Alabama,  and 
South  Carolina.    For  the  leaders  the  price  of  am- 
nesty was  conversion  to  radicalism,  but  this  price 
few  would  pay. 

The  new  state  governments  possessed  certain 
characteristics  in  common.  Since  only  a  small 
number  of  able  men  were  available  for  office,  full 
powers  of  administration,  including  appointment 
and  removal,  were  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  the 
governor.  He  exercised  a  wide  control  over  public 
funds  and  had  authority  to  organize  and  command 
militia  and  constabulary  and  to  call  for  Federal 


3 


,;J 


V 


ftU       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

troops.  The  numerous  administrative  boards 
worked  with  the  sole  object  of  keeping  their  party 
in  power.  OflScers  were  several  times  as  numerous 
as  under  the  old  regime,  and  all  of  them  received 
higher  salaries  and  larger  contingent  fees.  The  mor- 
al support  behind  the  government  was  that  of  Pres- 
ident Grant  and  the  United  States  army,  not  that 
of  a  free  and  devoted  people. 

Of  the  twenty  men  who  served  as  governors  eight 
were  scalawags  and  twelve  were  carpetbaggers  — 
men  who  were  abler  than  the  scalawag?  and  who 
had  much  more  than  an  equal  share  of  the  spoils. 
The  scalawags,  such  as  Brownlow  of  Tennessee, 
Smith  of  Alabama,  and  Holden  of  North  Carolina, 
were  usually  honest  but  narrow,  vindictive  men, 
filled  with  fear  and  hate  of  the  conservative  whites. 
Of  the  carpetbaggers  half  were  personally  honest, 
but  all  were  unscrupulous  in  politics.  Some  were 
flagrantly  dishonest.  Governor  Moses  of  South 
Carolina  was  several  times  bribed  and  at  one  time, 
according  to  his  own  statement,  received  $15,000 
for  his  vote  as  speaker  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives. Governor  Stearns  of  Florida  was  charged 
with  stealing  government  supplies  from  the  ne- 
groes; and  it  was  notorious  that  Warmoth  and 
Kellogg  of  Louisiana,  each  of  whom  served  only 


I 


CARPETBAG  AND  NEGRO  RULE  885 
one  term,  retired  with  large  fortunes.  Warmoth, 
indeed,  went  so  far  as  to  declare:  " Corruption  is 
the  fashion.  I  do  not  pretend  to  be  honest,  but 
only  as  honest  as  anybody  in  politics. " 

The  judiciary  was  no  better  than  the  executive. 
The  chief  justice  of  Louisiana  was  convicted  of 
fraud.  A  supreme  court  judge  of  South  Carolina 
offered  his  decisions  for  sale,  and  Whipper  and 
Moses,  both  notorious  thieves,  were  elected  judges 
by  the  South  Carolina  Legislature.  In  Alabama 
there  were  many  illiterate  magistrates,  among 
them  the  city  judge  of  Selma,  who  in  April,  1865, 
was  still  living  as  a  slave.  Governor  Chamberlain, 
a  radical,  asserted  that  there  were  two  hundred 
trial  judges  in  South  Carolina  who  could  not  read. 

Other  officers  were  of  the  same  stripe.  Les- 
lie, a  South  Carolina  carpetbagger,  declared  that 
"South  Carolina  has  no  right  to  be  a  State  unless 
she  can  support  her  statesmen,"  and  he  proceeded 
to  live  lip  to  this  principle.  The  manager  of  the 
state  railroad  of  Georgia,  when  asked  how  he  had 
been  able  to  accumulate  twenty  or  thirty  thousand 
dollars  on  a  two  or  three  thousand  dollar  salary, 
replied,  "By  the  exercise  of  the  most  rigid  econ- 
omy." A  North  Carolina  negro  legislator  was 
found  on  one  occasion  chuckling  as  he  counted 

IS 


.f  'i* 


fM       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

some  money.  "  What  are  you  laughing  '  Uncle?'* 
he  was  asked.  "Well,  boss,  I'se  been  ..  u  'leben 
times  in  my  life  and  dis  is  de  fust  time  I  eber  got  de 
money."  Godkin,  in  the  Naiion,  said  that  the 
Georgia  officials  were  "probably  as  bad  a  lot  of 
political  tricksters  and  adventurers  as  ever  got 
together  in  one  place."  This  description  will  fit 
equally  well  the  white  officials  of  all  the  recon- 
structed States.  Many  of  the  negroes  who  at- 
tained public  office  showed  themselves  apt  pupils 
of  their  carpetbag  masters  but  were  seldom  per- 
mitted to  appropriate  a  large  share  of  the  plunder. 
In  Florida  the  negro  members  of  the  Legislature, 
thinking  that  they  should  have  a  part  of  the  bribe 
and  loot  money  which  their  carpetbag  masters  were 
said  to  be  receiving,  went  so  far  as  to  appoint  what 
was  known  as  a  "smelling  committee"  to  locate 
the  good  things  and  secure  a  share. 

From  1868  to  1870  the  legisl'itiires  of  seven  States 
were  overwhelmingly  radical  and  in  several  the 
radical  majority  held  control  for  four,  six,  or  eight 
years.  Negroes  were  most  numerous  in  the  legis- 
latures of  Louisiana,  South  Carolina,  and  Missis- 
sippi, and  everywhere  the  votes  of  these  men 
were  for  sale.  In  Alabama  and  Louisiana  negro 
legislators  had  a  fixed  price  for  their  votes:  for 


yir 


CARPETBAG  AND  NBGBO  RULE  M7 
example,  six  hundred  dollars  would  buy  a  senator 
in  Louisiana.  In  South  Carolina,  negro  govern- 
ment appeared  at  its  worst.  A  vivid  description 
of  the  I^slature  of  this  State  in  which  the  negroes 
largely  outnumbered  the  whites  is  given  by  James 
S.  Pike,  a  Republican  journalist': 

In  the  place  of  this  old  aristocratic  society  stands  the 
rude  form  oi  the  most  ignorant  democracy  that  mankind 
ever  saw,  invested  with  the  functions  of  govotiment. 
It  is  the  dregs  of  the  population  habiliUted  in  the  robes 
of  their  intelligent  predecessors,  and  asserting  over  them 
the  rule  of  ignorance  and  corruption.  ...  It  is  bar- 
barism overwhelming  civilization  by  physical  force.  It 
is  the  slave  rioting  in  the  halls  of  his  master,  and  putting 
that  master  under  his  feet.  And,  though  it  is  done  with- 
out malice  and  without  vengeance,  it  is  nevertheless 
none  the  less  completely  and  absolutely  done.  .  .  . 
We  will  enter  the  House  of  RepresenUtives.  Here  sit 
one  hundred  and  twenty-four  members.  Of  these, 
twenty-three  are  white  men,  representing  the  remains  61 
the  old  civilization.  These  are  good-looking,  substan- 
tial citizens.  They  are  men  of  weight  and  standing  in 
the  communities  they  represent.  They  are  all  from  the 
hill  country.  The  frosts  of  sixty  and  seventy  winters 
whiten  the  heads  of  some  among  them.  There  they  sit, 
grim  and  silent.  They  feel  themselves  to  be  but  loose 
stones,  thrown  in  to  partially  obstruct  a  current  they 
are  powerless  to  resist.  .  .  . 
This  dense  negro  crowd  .  .    .  do  the  debating,  the 

« Pike.  The  ProHnte  State,  pp.  12  ff. 


;<■  ( 


r 


MS       THE  SBQUSL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

■quabbling,  the  Uwmaldiig.  and  crmte  all  the  dwnor 
and  disorder  of  the  body.  Theae  twenty-thtce  wUte 
men  are  but  the  obeervera.  the  enforced  auditon  trf  the 
dull  and  dumqr  imitation  of  a  deliberative  body,  wboee 
appearance  in  their  preient  capacity  ii  at  once  a  wiwder 
and  a  shame  to  modem  civilization.  .  .  .  The  Speaker  it 
bUck.  the  Clerk  is  black,  the  doorkeepers  are  black,  the 
little  pages  are  bUck,  the  chairman  of  the  Ways  and 
Means  is  black,  and  the  chaplain  is  coal  black.  At  some 
oS  the  desks  sit  colored  men  whose  types  it  would  be 
hard  to  find  outside  oS  Congo;  whose  costumes,  visages, 
attitudes,  and  expression,  only  befit  the  forecastle  of  a 
buccaneer.  It  must  be  remembered,  also,  that  these 
men,  with  not  more  than  a  half  dosen  exceptions,  have 
been  themselves  slaves,  and  that  their  ancestors  were 
slaves  for  generations.  .   .    . 

But  the  old  stagers  admit  that  the  colored  brethren 
have  a  wonderful  aptness  at  legislative  proceedings. 
They  are  "quick  as  lightning"  at  detecting  points  of 
order  and  they  certainly  make  incessant  and  extraordi- 
nary use  of  their  knowledge.  No  one  is  allowed  to  talk 
five  minutes  without  interruption,  and  one  interruption 
is  a  signal  for  another  and  another,  until  the  original 
speaker  is  smothered  under  an  avalanche  of  them.  Forty 
questions  of  privilege  will  be  raised  in  a  day.  At  times, 
nothing  goeh  on  but  alternating  questions  of  order  and  of 
privilege.  The  ineflBcient  colored  friend  who  sits  in  the 
Speaker's  chair  cannot  suppress  this  extraordinary  ele- 
ment of  the  debate.  Some  of  the  blackest  members 
exhibit  a  pertinacity  of  intrusion  in  raising  these  points 
of  order  and  que.stions  of  privilege  that  few  white  men 
can  equal.  Their  struggles  to  get  the  floor,  their  bel- 
lowings  and  physical  contortions,  baffle  description. 


^ 


CARPETBAG  AND  NEGRO  RULE   St9 

The  SpMker'a  bammei  plays  a  perpetual  Uttoo  to  no 
purpose.  The  Ulking  and  tbe  interruptions  from  all 
quarters  ro  on  with  tbe  utmost  license.  Everyone 
eflteems  himself  as  good  as  his  neighbor,  and  puts  in  his 
oar,  apparently  as  often  for  love  of  riot  and  confusion  as 
for  anything  else.  The  Speaker  orders  a  member 

whonn  he  has  dix?overed  to  be  particularly  unruly  to  take 
hit  feat.    The  member  obeys,  and  with  the  same  motion 
that  he  sits  down,  throws  his  feet  on  to  his  desk.  hidin« 
himself  from  tbe  Speaker  by  the  soles  of  his  boots.  . 
After  a  few  experiences  of  this  sort,  the  Speaker  threat- 
ens, in  a  laugh,  to  call  the  "gemman"  to  order.      This 
is  considered  a  capital  joke,  and  a  guffaw  follows.    The 
laugh  goes  round  and  then  the  peanuts  arc  cracked  and 
munched  faster  than  ever;  one  hand  beins  employed  in 
fortifying  the  iniier  man  with  this  iiutninent  of  uni- 
versal uae,  while  the  other  enforces  f  h*;  views  of  the  ora- 
tor.    This  laughing  propensity  of  the  sable  crowd  is  n 
great  cause  of  disorder.    They  laugh  us  hens  cackle   - 
one  begins  and  all  follow. 

But  underneath  all  this  shocking  buries,  ut  upon  !<>; 
islative  proceedings,  we  must  not  forget  'hat  then-  is 
something  very  real  to  this  uncouth  and  untutored  rauUi- 
tude.  It  is  not  all  sham,  nor  all  burlesque.  They  have  a 
genuine  interest  and  a  genuine  earnestness  in  the  business 
of  the  assembly  which  we  are  bound  to  recognize  and  re- 
spect. .  .  .  They  have  an  earnest  purpose,  bom  of  con- 
viction that  their  position  and  condition  are  not  fully  as- 
sured, which  lends  a  sort  of  dignity  to  their  proceedings. 
The  barbarous,  animated  jargon  in  which  they  so  often 
indulge  is  on  occasion  seen  to  be  so  transparently  sincere 
and  weighty  in  their  own  minds  that  sympathy  .sup- 
plants disgust.    The  whole  thing  is  a  wonderful  novelty 


» ,r:* 


«S0       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

to  them  as  well  as  to  observers.  Seven  years  ago  these 
men  were  raising  corn  and  cotton  under  the  whip  of  the 
overseer.  Today  they  are  raising  points  of  order  and 
questions  of  privilege.  They  find  they  can  raise  one  as 
well  as  the  other.  They  prefer  the  latter.  It  is  eaner 
and  better  paid.  Then,  it  is  the  evidence  of  an  accom- 
plished result.  It  means  escape  and  defense  from  old 
oppressors.  It  means  liberty.  It  means  the  destruc- 
tion of  prison-wails  only  too  real  to  them.  It  is  the  sun- 
shine of  their  lives.  It  is  their  day  of  jubilee.  It  is 
their  long-promised  vision  of  the  Lord  God  Almighty. 

The  congressional  delegations  were  as  radical  as 
tho  state  governments.  During  the  first  two  years 
there  were  no  Democratic  senators  from  the  recon- 
structed States  and  only  two  Democratic  represen- 
tatives, as  against  sixty-four  radical  senators  and 
representatives.  At  the  end  of  four  years  the  Dem- 
ocrats numbered  fifteen  against  seventy  radicals. 
A  negro  succeeded  Jefferson  Davis  in  the  Senate, 
and  in  all  the  race  sent  two  senators  and  thirteen 
representatives  to  Congress,  but  though  several 
were  of  high  character  and  fair  ability,  they  exer- 
cised practically  no  influence.  The  Southern  dele- 
gations had  no  part  in  shaping  policies  but  merely 
voted  as  they  were  told  by  the  radical  leaders. 


The  effect  of  dishonest  government  was  soon 
seen  in  extravagant  expenditures,  heavier  taxes, 


CARPETBAG  AND  NEGRO  RULE   281 

increase  of  the  bonded  debt,  and  depression  of 
property  values.  It  was  to  be  expected  that  after 
the  ruin  wrought  by  war  and  the  admission  of  the 
negro  to  civil  rights,  the  expenses  of  government 
would  be  greater.  But  only  lack  of  honesty  will 
account  for  the  extraordinary  expenses  of  the  re- 
construction governments.  In  Alabama  and  Flor- 
ida the  running  expenses  of  the  state  government 
increased  two  hundred  per  cent,  in  Louisiana  five 
hundred  per  cent,  and  in  Arkansas  fifteen  hun- 
dred per  cent  —  all  this  in  addition  to  bond  issues. 
In  South  Carolina  the  one  item  of  public  printing, 
which  from  1790  to  1868  cost  $609,000,  amounted 
in  the  years  1868-1876  to  $1,326,589. 

Corrupt  state  ofiScials  had  two  ways  of  getting 
money  —  by  taxation  and  by  the  sale  of  bonds. 
Taxes  were  everywhere  multiplied.  The  state  tax 
rate  in  Alabama  was  increased  four  hundred  per 
cent,  in  Louisiana  eight  hundred  per  cent,  and  in 
Mississippi,  which  could  issue  no  bonds,  fourteen 
hundred  per  cent.  City  and  county  taxes,  where 
carpetbaggers  were  in  control,  increased  in  the 
same  way.  Thousands  of  small  proprietors  could 
not  meet  their  taxes,  and  in  Mississippi  alone  the 
land  sold  for  unpaid  taxes  amounted  to  six  mil- 
lion acres,  an  area  as  large  as  Massachusetts  and 


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2SS        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

Rhode  Island  together.  Nordhoff '  speaks  of  seeing 
Louisiana  newspapers  of  which  three-fourths  were 
taken  up  by  notices  of  tax  sales.  In  protest  against 
extravagant  and  corrupt  expenditures,  taxpay- 
ers' conventions  were  held  in  every  State,  but 
without  effect. 

Even  the  increased  taxation,  however,  did  not 
produce  enough  to  support  the  new  governments, 
which  now  had  recourse  to  the  sale  of  state  and 
local  bonds.  In  this  way  Governor  Holden's  Ad- 
ministration managed  in  two  years  to  increase  the 
public  debt  of  North  CaroUna  from  $16,000,000  to 
$82,000,000.  The  state  debt  of  South  Carolina 
rose  from  $7,000,000  to  $29,000,000  in  1873.  In 
Alabama,  by  1874,  the  debt  had  mounted  from 
$7,000,000  to  $32,000,000.  The  public  debt  of 
Louisiana  rose  from  $14,000,000  in  1806  to  $48,- 
000,000  in  1871,  with  a  local  debt  of  $31,000,000. 
Cities,  towns,  and  counties  sold  bonds  by  the  bale. 
The  debt  of  New  Orleans  increased  twenty-five  fdd 
and  that  of  Vicksburg  a  thousandfold.  A  great 
deal  of  the  debt  was  the  result  of  fraudulent  issues 
of  bonds  or  overissues.  For  this  form  ai  fraud  the 
state  financial  agents  in  New  York  were  usually 

'  Charles  Nordhoff,  The  Cotton  States  in  the  Spring  and  Summer  0/ 
1876. 


\ 


CARPETBAG  AND  NEGRO  RULE  U8 
responsible.  Southern  bonds  sold  far  bdow  par, 
and  the  time  came  when  they  were  peddled  about 
at  ten  to  twenty-five  cents  on  the  dollar. 

Still  another  disastrous  result  followed  this  coi^ 
nipt  financiering.    In  Alabama  there  was  a  sixty- 
five  per  cent  decrease  in  property  values,  in  Florida 
forty-five  per  cent,  and  in  Louisiana  fifty  to  seventy- 
five  per  cent.    A  large  part  of  the  best  property  was 
mortgaged,  and  foreclosure  sales  were  frequent. 
Poorer  property  could  be  neither  mortgaged  nor 
sold.    There  was  an  exodus  of  whites  from  the 
worst  governed  districts  in  the  West  and  the  North. 
Many  towns,  among  them  Mobile  and  Memphis, 
surrendered  their  charters  and  were  ruled  directly 
by  the  governor;  and  there  were  numerous  "stran- 
gulated" counties  which  on  account  of  debt  had 
lost  self-government  and  were  ruled  by  appomtees 
of  the  governor. 

A  part  of  the  money  raised  by  taxes  and  by  bond 
sales  was  used  for  legitimate  expenses  and  the  rest 
went  to  pay  forged  warrants,  excess  warrants,  and 
swollen  mileage  accounts,  and  to  fill  the  pockets  of 
embezzlers  and  thieves  from  one  end  of  the  South 
to  the  other.  In  Arkansas,  for  example,  the  audi- 
tor's derk  hire,  which  was  $4000  in  1866,  cost 
twenty-three  times  as  much  in  1873.    In  Louisiana 


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StS4       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

and  South  Carolina  stealing  was  elevated  into  ao 
art  and  was  practiced  without  concealment.  In 
the  latter  State  the  worthless  Hell  Hole  Swamp  was 
bought  for  $S6,000  to  be  farmed  by  the  negroes 
but  was  charged  to  the  State  at  $120,000.  A  free 
restaurant  maintained  at  the  Capitol  for  the  legis- 
lators cost  $12A,000  for  one  session.  The  porter 
who  conducted  it  said  that  he  kept  it  open  sixteen 
to  twenty  hours  a  day  and  that  some  one  was  al- 
ways in  the  room  eating  and  drinking  or  smoking. 
When  a  member  left  he  would  fill  his  pockets  with 
cigars  or  with  bottles  of  drink.  Forty  different 
brands  of  beverages  were  paid  for  by  the  State  for 
the  private  use  of  members,  and  all  sorts  of  food, 
furniture,  and  clothing  were  sent  to  the  houses  of 
members  and  were  paid  for  by  the  State  as  "l^is- 
lative  suppUes. "  On  the  bills  appeared  such  items 
as  imported  mushrooms,  one  side  of  bacon,  one 
feather  bed,  bustles,  two  pairs  of  extra  long  stock- 
ings, one  pair  of  garters,  one  bottle  perfume,  twelve 
mont^ram  cut  glasses,  one  horse,  one  comb  and 
brush,  three  gallons  of  whisky,  one  pair  of  corsets. 
During  the  recess,  supplies  were  sent  out  to  the 
rural  homes  of  the  members. 

The  endorsement  of  railroad  securities  by  the 
State  also  furnished  a  source  of  easy  money  to 


CARPETBAG  AND  NEGRO  RULE   235 

the  dishonest  oflSdal  and  the  crooked  speculator. 
After  the  Civil  War,  in  respcmse  to  the  general  de- 
sire in  the  South  tor  better  railroad  facilities,  the 
"Johnson"  governments  began  to  underwrite  rail- 
road bonds.  When  the  carpetbag  and  negro  gov- 
ernments came  in,  thfe  policy  was  continued  but 
without  proper  safeguards.  Bonds  w»e  some- 
times endorsed  before  the  roads  were  constructed, 
and  even  excess  issues  were  authonaed.  Bcrnds 
were  endorsed  for  some  roads  of  whieh  not  a  rafle 
was  ever  built.  The  White  River  Valley  and 
Texas  Railroad  never  came  into  existence,  but  it 
obtained  a  grant  of  $175,000  frow  th*"  SUte  of 
Arkansas.  Speaker  Carter  of  the  Louisiaaa  Legis- 
lature received  a  financial  interest  in  ati  raflroad 
endorsement  bills  whicdi  he  steef«d  throvgh  the 
House.  N^ro  members  were  rignJaily  bribed  to 
vote  for  the  bond  steak.  A  witness  swore  that  in 
Louisiana  it  cost  him  $8§,000  to  get  a  railroad 
charter  passed,  but  that  the  Governor's  signature 
cost  more  than  the  consent  of  the  L^slature. 

When  the  roads  defaulted  on  the  payment  of 
interest,  as  most  of  them  did,  the  harden  fell  upcm 
the  State.  Not  all  of  the  blame  for  this  perverted 
legislation  should  be  placed  upon  the  corrupt 
legislators,  Irowever,  for  the  lai^ers  who  saw  the 


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989       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APFOBiATTOX 

bills  through  were  frequently  Southern  Democrats 
representing  supposedly  respectable  Northern  cap* 
italists.  The  railroads  as  well  as  the  taxpayers  suf- 
fered from  this  pernicious  lobbying,  for  the  com- 
panies were  loaded  with  debts  and  rarely  prof- 
ited by  the  loans.  Valuation  of  railroad  property 
rapidly  decreased.  The  roads  of  Alabama  which 
were  valued  in  1871  at  $26,000,000  had  decreased 
in  1875  to  $9,500,000. 

The  foundation  of  radical  power  in  the  South  lay 
in  the  alienation  of  the  races  which  had  been  ac- 
complished between  1865  and  1868.  To  maintain 
this  unhappy  distrust,  the  radical  leaders  found  an 
effective  means  in  then^px)  militia.  Under  the 
constitution  of  every  reconstructed  State  a  negro 
constabulary  was  possible,  but  only  in  South  Caro- 
lina, North  CaroUna,  Louisiana,  and  Mis-sissippi 
were  the  authorities  willing  to  risk  the  dangers  of 
arming  the  blacks.  No  governor  dared  permit  the 
Southern  whites  to  organize  as  militia.  In  South 
Carolina  the  carpetbag  governor,  Robert  K.  Scott, 
enrolled  ninety-six  thousand  negroes  as  members 
of  the  militia  and  organized  and  armed  twenty 
thousand  of  them.  The  few  white  companies  were 
ordered  to  disband.    In  Louisiana  the  governor 


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i 
I 


CARPETBAG  AND  NEGRO  RULE  SS7 
had  a  standing  anny  of  blacks  called  the  Metro- 
politan Guard.  In  several  SUtes  the  negro  militia 
was  used  as  a  constabulary  and  was  sent  to  any 
part  of  the  State  to  make  arrests. 

In  spite  of  this  provocation  there  were,  after  the 
riots  of  1866-67,  comparatively  few  race  con- 
flicts until  reconstruction  was  drawing  to  a  close. 
The  intervemng  period  was  filled  with  the  more 
peaceful  activities  of  the  Ku  Klux  Klan  and  the 
White  Camelia. '  But  as  the  whites  made  up  their 
mmds  to  get  rid  of  negro  rule,  the  clashes  came 
frequently  and  always  ended  in  the  death  of 
more  negroes  than  whites.'  They  would  prob- 
ably have  continued  with  serious  consequences  if 
the  whites  had  not  eventually  secured  control  of 
the  government. 

The  lax  election  laws,  framed  indeed  for  the 
benefit  of  the  party  in  power,  gave  the  radicals 
ample  opportunity  to  control  the  negro  vote.  The 
elections  were  frequently  corrupt,  though  not  a 
great  deal  of  money  was  spent  in  bribery.  It  was 
found  less  expensive  to  use  other  methods  of 
getting  out  the  vote.     The  negroes  were  generally 

'  See  pages  243-64. 

'  Among  the  bloodiest  conflicU  were  those  in  Louisiana  at  Colfax, 
Coushatt*.  and  New  Orleans  in  1878-74.  and  at  Vicksburg  and 
Clinton.  Mississippi,  in  1874-75. 


v''    , 


THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

made  to  undentand  that  the  Democrata  wanted  to 
put  them  back  into  slavery,  but  sometimes  the 
leaders  deemed  it  wiser  to  state  more  concretely 
that  "Jeff  Davis  had  come  to  Montgomery  and  is 
ready  to  organize  the  Confederacy  again"  if  the 
Democrats  should  win;  or  to  say  that  "if  Carter  is 
elected,  he  will  not  allow  your  wives  and  daughters 
to  wear  hoopskirts. "  In  Alabama  many  thousand 
pounds  of  bacon  and  hams  were  sent  in  to  be  dis- 
tributed among  "flood  sufferers"  in  a  region  which 
had  not  been  flooded  since  the  days  of  Noah.  The 
negroes  were  told  that  they  must  vote  right  and 
receive  enough  bacon  for  a  year,  or  "lose  their 
rights  "  if  they  voted  wrongly.  Ballot-box  stuffing 
developed  into  an  art,  and  each  negro  was  carefully 
inspected  to  see  that  he  had  the  right  kind  of  ticket 
before  he  was  marched  to  the  polls. 

The  inspection  and  counting  of  election  returns 
were  in  the  hands  of  the  county  and  state  boards, 
which  were  controlled  by  the  governor,  and  which 
had  authority  to  throw  out  or  count  in  any  number 
of  votes.  On  the  assumption  that  the  radicals 
were  entitled  to  all  negro  votes,  the  returning 
boards  followed  the  census  figures  for  the  black 
population  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  minimum 
radical  vote.    The  action  of  the  returning  boards 


CARPETBAG  AND  NEGRO  RULE       iS9 

was  specially  flagrant  in  Louisiana  and  Florida  and 
in  the  black  counties  of  South  Carolina. 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  very  best 
arrangements  had  been  made  at  Washington  and 
in  the  States  for  the  running  of  the  radical  ma- 
chine, everywhere  there  were  factional  fights  from 
the  beginning.  Usually  the  scalawags  declared 
hostilities  after  they  found  that  the  carpetbaggers 
had  control  of  the  negroes  and  tiie  inside  track  on 
the  way  to  the  best  state  and  federal  o£Bces.  Later, 
after  the  scalawags  had  for  the  most  part  left  the 
radicals,  there  were  contests  among  the  carpet- 
baggers themselves  for  the  control  of  the  negro  vote 
and  the  distribution  of  spoils.  The  defeated  fac- 
tion usually  joined  the  Democrats.  In  Arkansas 
a  split  started  in  1869  which  by  1872  resulted 
in  two  state  governments.  Alabama  in  1872  and 
Louisiana  in  1874-75  each  had  two  rival  govern- 
ments. This  factionalism  contributed  largely  to 
the  overthrow  of  the  radicals. 

The  radical  structure,  however,  was  still  power- 
fully supported  from  without.  Relations  between 
the  Federal  Government  and  the  state  govern- 
ments in  the  South  were  close,  and  the  policy  at 
Washington  was  frequently  determined  by  con- 
ditions in  the  South.    President  Grant,  though  at 


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MO        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APFOBIATTOX 
first  conaidente,  wm  uraally  contittently  ntdicfti 
in  his  Southern  policy.    This  attitude  is  difficult  to 
explain  except  by  saying  that  Grant  fell  under  the 
control  of  radical  advisers  after  his  break  with 
Johnsfm,  that  his  military  instincts  were  <^ended 
by  opposition  in  the  South  which  his  advisers  told 
him  was  rebellious,  and  that  he  was  impressed  by 
the  need  of  holding  the  Southern  radical  vote 
againinl  the  inroads  of  the  Democrats.   After  about 
1869  Grant  never  really  imderstood  the  condi- 
tions in  the  South.    He  was  content  to  control  by 
means  of  Federal  troops  and  thousands  of  deputy 
marshals.    For  this  policy  the  Ku  Klux  activities 
gave  sufficient  excuse  for  a  time,  and  the  contin- 
ued story  of  "rebel  outrages"  was  always  avail- 
able to  justify  a  call  for  soldiers  or  deputies.     The 
enforcement  legislation  gave  the  color  of  law  to 
any  interference  which  was  deemed  necessary. 

Federal  troops  served  other  ends  than  the  mere 
preservation  of  order  and  the  support  of  the  radical 
state  governments.  They  were  used  on  occasion 
to  decide  between  opposing  factions  and  to  oust 
conservatives  who  had  forced  their  way  into  office. 
The  army  officers  purged  the  Legislature  of  Geor- 
gia in  1870,  that  of  Alabama  in  1872,  and  that  of 
Louisiana  in  1875.    In  1875  the  city  government 


■M 


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CARPETBAG  AND  NEGRO  RULE      t4! 

of  Viduburg  and  the  itate  government  of  Louiii- 
an«  were  overturned  by  the  whites,  but  General 
Sheridan  at  once  intervened  to  put  back  the  ne- 
groei  and  carpetbaggers.  He  suggested  to  Frm- 
dent  Grant  that  the  conservatives  be  declared 
"banditti"  and  he  would  make  hunself  responsible 
for  the  rest.  As  soon  as  a  SUte  showed  signs  of 
going  over  to  the  Democrats  or  an  important  elec- 
tion was  lost  by  the  radicak.  one  House  or  the 
othCT  of  Congress  in  many  insUnces  sent  an  in- 
vestigation committee  to  ascerUin  the  reasons. 
The  Committees  on  the  Condition  of  the  South  or 
on  the  Late  Insurrectionary  States  were  nearly 
always  ready  with  reports  to  establish  the  necessity 
of  intervention. 

Besides  the  army  there  was  in  every  State  ^ 
powerful  group  of  Federal  officials  who  formed 
a  "ring"  for  the  direction  of  all  good  radicals. 
These  marshals,  deputies,  postmasters,  district 
attorneys,  and  customhouse  officials  were  in  cl<Me 
touch  with  Washington  and  frequently  dictated 
nominations  and  platforms.  At  New  Orleans  the 
officials  acted  as  a  committee  on  credentials  and 
held  all  the  state  conventions  under  their  control 
in  the  customhouse. 
Such  was  the  machinery  used  to  sustain  a  party 


16 


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(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


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APPLIED  IM/OE    Inc 

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Roch««ter,   N*w  York        14609       USA 

(716)  *82  -  0300  -  Phone 

(716)  288- 5989 -Fo« 


«42       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

which,  with  the  gradual  defection  of  the  whites, 
became  throughout  the  South  almost  uniformly 
black.  At  first  few  negroes  asked  for  offices,  but 
soon  the  carpetbaggers  found  it  necessary  to 
divide  with  the  rapidly  growing  number  of  negro 
politicians.  No  negro  was  elected  governor, 
though  several  reached  the  office  of  lieutenant 
governor,  secretary  of  state,  auditor,  superintend- 
ent of  education,  justice  of  the  state  supreme  court, 
and  fifteen  were  elected  to  Congress.'  It  would 
not  be  correct  to  say  that  the  negro  race  was  ma- 
licious or  on  evil  bent.  Unless  deliberately  stirred 
up  by  white  leaders,  few  n^roes  showed  signs  vf 
mean  spirit.  Few  even  made  exorbitant  demands. 
They  wanted  "something"  —  schools  and  freedom 
and  "something  else,"  they  knew  not  what.  De- 
prived of  the  leadership  of  the  best  whites,  they 
could  not  possibly  act  with  the  scalawags  —  their 
traditional  enemies.  Nothing  was  left  for  them 
but  to  follow  the  carpetbagger. 

'  Revels.  Lynch,  and  Bruce  represent  the  better  negro  officeholders: 
Pinchback,  Rainey,  and  Nash,  the  leas  respectable  ones;  and  below 
these  were  the  rascals  whose  ambition  was  to  equal  their  white 
preceptors  in  corruption. 


'^S? 


CHAPTER  XI 


THE  KU   KLUX  MOVEMENT 


The  Ku  Hux  movement,  which  took  the  lorm  of 
secret  revolutionary  societies,  grew  out  of  a  general 
conviction  among  the  whites  that  the  reconstruc- 
tion policies  were  impossible  and  not  to  be  endured. 
Somers,  an  English  traveler,  says  that  at  this  time 
"nearly  every  respectable  white  man  in  the  South- 
em  States  was  not  only  disfranchised  but  under 
fear  of  arrest  or  confiscation;  the  old  foundations 
of  authority  were  utterly  razed  before  any  new 
ones  had  yet  been  laid,  and  in  the  dark  and  be- 
nighted interval  the  remains  of  the  Confederate 
armies  —  swept  after  a  long  and  heroic  day  of  fair 
fight  from  the  field  —  flitted  before  the  eyes  of  the 
people  in  this  weird  and  midnight  shape  of  a  Ku 
Klux  Klan. "  Ryland  Randolph,  an  Alabama  edi- 
tor who  was  also  an  official  of  the  Klan,  stated  in 
his  paper  that  "the  origin  of  Ku  Klux  Klan  is  in 

the  galling  despotism  that  broods  like  a  night-mare 

as 


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I  d 


«44        THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

over  these  Southern  States  —  a  fungus  growth  of 
military  tyranny  superinduced  by  the  fostering  of 
Loyal  Leagues,  the  abrogation  of  our  civil  laws,  the 
habitual  violation  of  our  national  Constitution,  and 
a  persistent  prostitution  of  all  government,  all  re- 
sources and  all  powers,  to  d^prade  the  white  man 
by  the  establishment  of  negro  supremacy." 

The  secret  orders,  regardless  of  their  original 
purposes,  were  all  finally  to  be  found  opposing 
radical  reconstruction.  Everywhere  their  objects 
were  the  same:  to  recover  for  the  white  race 
their  former  control  of  society  and  government, 
and  to  destroy  the  baneful  influence  of  the  alien 
among  the  blacks.  The  people  of  the  South  were 
by  law  helpless  to  take  steps  towards  setting  up 
any  kind  of  government  in  a  land  infested  by  a 
vicious  element  —  Federal  and  Confederate  de- 
serters, bushwhackers,  outlaws  of  every  descrip- 
tion, and  n^roes,  some  of  whom  proved  ir  ^nt 
and  violent  in  their  newly  found  freedom.  No- 
where was  property  or  person  safe,  and  for  a  time 
many  feared  a  n^ro  insurrection.  General  Har- 
dee said  to  his  neighbors,  "I  advise  you  to  get 
ready  for  what  may  come.  We  are  standing  over 
a  sleeping  volcano." 

To  cope  with  this  situation  ante-belliun  pr^jols 


1* 


THE  KU  KLUX  MOVEMENT  245 

—  the  "patter-rollers"  as  the  negroes  called  them 

—  were  often  secretly  reorganized.    In  3ach  com- 
munity for  several  months  after  the  Civil  War,  and 
in  many  of  them  for  months  before  the  end  of 
the  war,  there  were  informal  vigilance  committees. 
Some  of  these  had  such  names  as  the  Biack  Cav- 
ahy  and  Men  of  Justice  in  Alabama,  the  Home 
Guards  in  many  other  placej,  while  the  anti-Con- 
federate societies  of  the  war,  the  Heroes  of  America, 
the  Red  Strings,  and  the  Peace  Societies,  trans- 
formed themselves  in  certain  localities  into  regula- 
tory bodies.     Later  these  secret  societies  numbered 
scores,   perhaps   hundreds,    varying   from   small 
bodies  of  local  police  to  great  federated  bodies 
which  covered  almost  the  entire  South  and  even 
had  membership  in  the  North  and  West.    Other 
important  organizations  were  the  Constitutional 
Union  Guards,  the  Pale  Faces,  the  White  Broth- 
erhood, the  Council  of  Safety,  the  '76  Associa- 
tion, the  Sons  of  '76,  the  Order  of  the  White  Rose, 
and  the  White  Boys.    As  the  fight  against  recon- 
struction became  bolder,  the  orders  threw  off  their 
disguises  and  appeared  openly  as  armed  whites 
fighting  for  the  control  of  society.     The  White 
League  of  Louisiana,  the  White  Line  of  Mississippi, 
the  White  Man's  party  of  Alabama,  and  the  Rifle 


n 

I  ! 


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1 


§46       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

Clubs  of  South  Carolina,  were  later  manifestations 
of  the  general  Ku  K)ux  movement. 

The  two  largest  secret  orders,  however,  were  the 
Ku  Klux  Klan,  from  which  the  movement  took  its 
name,  and  the  Knights  of  the  White  Camelia.  The 
Ku  Klux  Klan  originated  at  Pulaski,  Tennessee,  in 
the  autumn  of  1865,  as  a  local  organization  for 
social  purposes.  The  founders  were  young  Confed- 
eri  ^,  united  for  fun  and  mischief.  The  name  was 
an  accidental  corruption  of  the  Greek  word  Kuklos^ 
a  circle.  The  officers  adopted  queer  sounding  ti- 
tles and  strange  disguises.  Weird  night  riders  in 
ghostly  attire  thoroughly  frightened  the  supersti- 
tious uegroes,  who  were  told  that  the  spirits  of  dead 
Confederates  were  abroad.  This  terrorizing  of 
the  blacks  successfully  provided  the  amusement 
which  the  founders  desired  and  there  were  many 
applications  for  admission  to  the  society.  The 
Pulaski  Club,  or  Den,  was  in  the  habit  of  parading 
in  full  uniform  at  social  gatherings  of  the  whites 
at  night,  much  to  the  delight  of  the  small  boys 
and  girls.  Pulaski  was  near  the  Alabama  line, 
and  many  of  the  young  men  of  Alabama  who 
saw  these  parades  or  heard  of  them  organized 
similar  Dens  in  the  towns  of  Northern  Alabama. 
Nothing  but  horseplay,  however,  took  place  at  the 


THE  KU  KLIIX  MOVEMENT  «47 

meetings.  In  1867  and  1868  the  order  appeared 
in  parade  in  the  towns  of  the  adjoining  States  and, 
as  we  are  told,  "cut  up  curious  gyrations"  on  the 
public  squares. 

There  was  a  general  belief  outside  the  order  that 
there  was  a  purpose  behind  all  the  ceremonial  and 
frolic  of  the  Dens;  many  joined  the  order  convinced 
that  its  object  was  serious;  others  saw  the  possi- 
bilities of  using  it  as  a  means  of  terrorizing  the  ne- 
groes.  After  men  discovered  the  power  of  the  Klan 
over  the  negroes,  indeed,  they  were  generally  in- 
clined, owing  to  the  disordered  conditions  of  the 
time,  to  act  as  a  sort  of  police  patrol  and  to  hold  in 
check  the  thieving  negroes,  the  Union  League,  and 
the  "loyalists."    In  this  way,  from  being  merely 
a  number  of  social  clubs  the  Dens  swiftly  became 
bands  of  regulators,  taking  on  many  new  fantas- 
tic qualities  along  with  their  new  seriousness  of 
purpose.    Some  of  the  more  ardent  spirits  led  the 
Dens  far  in  the  direction  of  violence  and  outrage. 
Attempts  were  made  by  the  parent  Den  at  Pulaski 
to  regulate  the  conduct  of  the  others,  but,  owing  to 
the  loose  organization,  the  eflFort  met  with  little  suc- 
cess.   Some  of  the  Dens,  indeed,  lost  all  connection 
with  the  original  order. 
A  general  organization  of  these  societies  was 


J- 


7  f 


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P 


i 


.1? 


848       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

perfected  at  a  convention  held  in  Nashville  in  May, 
1867,  just  as  the  Ueconstruction  Acts  were  being  put 
into  operation.  A  constitution  called  the  Prewripi 
was  adopted  which  provided  for  a  national  organ- 
ization. The  former  slave  States,  except  Delaware, 
constituted  the  Empire,  which  was  ruled  by  the 
Grand  Wizard  (then  General  Forrest)  with  a  staff 
of  ten  Genii;  each  State  was  a  realm  under  a  Grand 
Dragon  and  eight  Hydras;  the  next  subdivision  was 
a  Dominion,  consisting  of  several  counties,  ruled 
by  a  Grand  Titan  and  six  Furies;  the  county  or 
Province  was  governed  by  a  Grand  Giant  and  four 
Goblins;  the  unit  was  the  Den  or  community  or- 
ganization, of  which  there  might  be  several  in  each 
county,  each  under  a  Grand  Cyclops  and  two  Night- 
hawks.  The  Genii,  Hydras,  Furies,  Goblins,  and 
Nighthawks  were  stafiF  officers.  The  private  mem- 
bers were  called  Ghouls.  The  order  had  no  name, 
and  at  first  was  designated  by  two  stars  (**), 
later  by  three  (***).  Sometimes  it  was  called  the 
Invisible  Empire  of  Ku  Klux  Klan. 

Any  white  man  over  eighteen  might  be  ad- 
mitted to  the  Den  after  nomination  by  a  member 
and  strict  investigation  by  a  committee.  The 
oath  demanded  obedience  and  secre  y.  The  Dens 
governed  themselves  by   the  ordinary  rules  of 


I! 


THE  KU  KLUX  MOVEMENT  249 

deliberative  bodies.  The  punishment  for  be*  -  val 
of  secrecy  was  "the  extreme  penalty  of  the  L^w." 
None  of  the  secrets  was  to  be  written,  and  there 
was  a  "Register"  of  alarming  adjectives,  such  as 
terrible,  horrible,  furious,  doleful,  bloody,  appalling, 
frightful,  gloomy,  which  was  used  as  a  cipher  code 
in  dating  the  odd  Ku  Klux  orders. 

The  general  objects  of  the  order  were  thus  set 
forth  in  the  revised  Prescript:  first,  to  protect  the 
weak,  the  innocent,  and  the  defenseless  from  the  in- 
dignities, wrongs,  and  outrages  of  the  lawless,  the 
violent,  and  the  brutal;  to  relieve  the  injured  and 
oppressed;  to  succor  the  suffering  and  unfortunate, 
and  especially  the  widows  and  orphans  of  Confed- 
erate soldiers;  second,  to  protect  and  defend  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  all  laws 
passed  in  conformity  thereto,  and  to  protect  the 
States  and  people  thereof  from  all  invasion  from 
any  source  whatever;  third,  to  aid  and  assist  in  the 
execution  of  all  "constitutional"  laws,  and  to  pro- 
tect the  people  from  unlawful  arrest,  and  from  trial 
excep*  '     -'  -ir  peers  according  to  the  laws  of  the 
land      -         ;.e  tests  for  admission  gave  further  in- 
dicati  ■■■■        .e  objects  of  the  order.    No  Republi- 
can, no  Union  Leaguer,  and  no  member  of  the  G. 
A.  R.  might  become  a  member.     The  members 


p 

'\:i 


I 


830       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

were  pledged  to  oppoie  negro  equality  of  any  kind, 
to  favor  emancipation  of  the  Southern  whites  and 
the  restoration  of  their  rights,  and  to  maintain 
constitutional  govemnent  and  equitable  laws. 

Prominent  men  testified  that  the  order  became 
popular  because  the  whites  felt  that  they  were  pi  "- 
secuted  and  that  there  was  no  legal  protection,  no 
respectable  government.  General  (later  Senator; 
Pettus  said  that  through  all  the  workings  of  the 
Federal  Government  ran  the  principle  that  "we 
are  an  inferior,  degraded  people  and  not  fit  to  be 
trusted."  General  Clanton  of  Alabama  further 
explained  that  "there  is  not  a  respectable  white 
woman  in  the  Negro  Belt  of  Alabama  who  will 
trust  herself  outside  of  htr  house  without  some 
protector.  ...  So  far  as  our  State  Govern- 
ment is  concerned,  we  are  in  the  hand.s  of  camp- 
followers,  horse-holders,  cooks,  bottle-washers,  and 
thieves.  .  .  .  We  have  passed  out  from  the  hands 
of  the  brave  soldiers  who  overcame  us,  and  are 
turned  over  to  the  tender  mercies  of  squaws  for 
torture.  ...  I  see  negro  police  —  great  black 
fellows  —  leading  white  girls  around  the  streets  of 
Montgomery,  and  locking  them  up  in  jails." 

The  Klan  ^rst  came  into  general  prominence  in 
1868  with  the  -eport  of  the  Federal  commanders  in 


THE  KU  KLUX  MOVEMENT  961 

the  South  concerning  its  activities.  Soon  after  that 
date  the  order  spread  through  the  white  counties 
of  the  South,  in  many  places  absorbing  the  White 
Brotherhood,  the  Pale  Faces,  and  some  other  local 
organizations  which  had  been  formed  in  the  upper 
r:  ^  of  the  Black  Belt.  But  it  was  not  alone  in 
the  field.  The  order  known  as  the  Knights  of  the 
White  Camelia,  founded  in  1  oirsiana  in  1867  and 
formally  organized  in  1868,  spread  rapidly  over  the 
lower  South  until  it  reached  the  territory  occupied 
by  the  Ku  Klux  Klan.  It  was  mainly  a  Black  Belt 
order,  and  on  the  whole  had  a  more  substantial 
and  more  conservative  membership  than  the  other 
large  secret  bodies.  Like  the  Ku  Klux  Klan,  it 
also  absorbed  several  minor  local  societies. 

The  White  Camelia  had  a  national  organization 
with  headquarters  in  New  Orleans.  Its  business 
was  conducted  by  a  Supreme  Council  of  the  United 
States,  with  Grand,  Central,  and  Subordinate 
Councils  for  each  State,  county,  and  community. 
All  communication  within  the  orde-  took  place  by 
passwords  and  cipher;  the  organization  and  the 
officers  were  similar  to  those  of  the  Ku  Klux  Klan; 
and  all  officers  were  gnated  by  initials.  An  ex- 
member  states  that  auring  the  three  years  of  its 
existence  here  [Perry  County,  Alabama]  I  believe 


I.  V 


V 


il 


I 


i! 


ui 


h 


tM       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APFOBIATTOX 

its  organisation  and  discipline  were  as  perfect 
as  human  ingenuity  could  have  made  it."  The 
fundamental  object  of  the  White  Camelia  was  the 
"  maintenance  of  the  supremacy  of  the  white  race,  '* 
and  to  this  end  the  members  were  constrained  "to 
observe  a  marked  distinction  between  the  races" 
and  to  restrain  the  "African  race  to  that  condition 
of  social  and  political  inferiority  for  which  God 
has  destined  it."  The  members  were  pledged  to 
vote  only  for  whites,  to  oppose  negro  equality 
in  all  things,  but  to  respect  the  legitimate  rights 
of  negroes. 

The  smaller  orders  were  .imilar  in  purpose  and 
organization  to  the  Ku  Klux  Klan  and  the  White 
Camelia.  Most  of  them  joined  or  were  aflSliated 
with  the  large  societies.  Probably  a  majority  of 
the  men  of  the  South  were  associated  at  some  time 
during  this  period  with  these  revolutionary  bodies. 
As  a  rule  the  politicians,  though  approving,  held 
aloof.  Public  opinion  generally  supported  the 
movement  so  long  as  the  radicals  made  serious  at- 
tempts to  carry  out  che  reconstruction  policies. 

The  task  before  the  secret  orders  was  to  regu- 
late the  conduct  of  the  blacks  and  their  leaders  in 
order  that  honor,  life,  and  property  might  be  secure. 
They  planned  to  accomplish  this  aim  by  playing 


!." 


I    r 


THE  KU  KLUX  MOVEMENT  f38 

upon  the  fean,  supentitioni,  and  cowardice  oi'  the 
black  race  —  in  a  word,  by  creating  a  white  terror 
to  counteract  the  black  one.  To  this  end  they 
made  use  of  strange  disguises,  mysterious  and  fear- 
ful conversation,  midnight  rides  and  driP>,  and 
silent  parades.  As  long  as  secrecy  and  mystery 
were  to  be  effective  in  dealing  with  the  negroes, 
costume  was  an  imporlant  matter.  These  dis- 
guises varied  with  the  locality  and  often  wita  the 
individual.  High  cardboard  hats,  covered  with 
white  cloth  often  decorated  with  stars  or  pictures 
of  animals,  white  masks  with  holes  cut  for  eyes, 
nose  and  mouth  bound  with  red  braid  to  give  a 
horrible  appearance,  and  fr'.viently  a  long  tongue 
of  red  flannel  so  fixed  that  it  could  be  moved  with 
the  wearer's  tongue,  and  a  long  white  robe  —  these 
made  up  a  costume  which  served  at  the  same  time 
as  a  disguise  and  as  a  means  of  impressing  the 
impressionable  negro.  Horses  were  covered  with 
sheets  or  white  cloth  held  on  by  the  saddle  and  by 
belts,  and  sometimes  the  am'mals  were  even  painted. 
Skulls  of  sheep  and  cattie,  and  even  of  human 
being?  were  often  carried  on  the  saddlebows  to 
add  another  element  of  terror.  A  framework  VtS 
sometimes  made  to  fit  the  shoulden  of  a  Ghcji 
which  caused  him  to  appear  twelve  feet  high.    A 


f' 
( 


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I: 


I 


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ill 


ii 


«54        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

skeleton  wooden  hand  at  the  end  of  a  stick  served 
to  greet  terrified  negroes  at  midnight.  For  safety 
every  man  carried  a  small  whistle  and  a  brace 
of  pistols. 

The  trembling  negro  who  ran  into  a  gathering 
of  the  Ku  Klux  on  his  return  from  a  Loyal  League 
meeting  was  informed  that  the  white-robed  figures 
he  saw  were  the  spirits  of  the  Confederate  dead 
killed  at  Chickamauga  or  Shiloh,  now  unable  to 
rest  in  their  graves  because  of  the  conduct  of  the 
negroes.  He  was  told  in  a  sepulchral  voice  of  the 
necessity  for  his  remaining  more  at  home  and 
taking  a  less  active  part  in  predatory  excursions 
abroad.  In  the  middle  of  the  night  a  sleeping 
negro  might  wake  to  find  his  house  surrounded 
by  a  ghostly  company,  or  to  see  several  terrifying 
figures  standing  by  his  bedside.  They  were,  they 
said,  the  ghosts  of  men  whom  he  had  formerly 
known.  They  had  scratched  through  from  Hell  to 
warn  the  negroes  of  the  consequences  of  their  mis- 
conduct. Hell  was  a  dry  and  thirsty  land;  and 
they  asked  him  for  wate..  Bucket  after  bucket  of 
water  disappeared  into  a  sack  of  leather,  rawhide, 
or  rubber,  concealed  within  the  flowing  robe.  The 
story  is  told  of  one  of  these  night  travelers  who 
called  at  the  cabin  of  a  radical  negro  in  Attakapas 


V 


St 


THE  KU  KLUX  MOVEMENT  »55 

County,  Louisiana.  After  drinking  three  buckets  of 
water  to  the  great  astonishment  of  the  darky,  the 
traveler  thanked  him  and  told  him  that  he  had 
traveled  nearly  a  thousand  miles  within  twenty- 
four  hours,  and  that  that  was  the  best  water  he 
had  tasted  since  he  was  killed  at  the  battle  of  Shi- 
loh.    The  negro  dropped  the  bucket,  overturned 
chairs  and  table  in  making  his  escape  through  the 
window,  and  was  never  again  seen  or  heard  of  by 
residents  of  that  community.    Another  incident  is 
told  of  a  parade  in  Pulaski,  Tennessee:   "While 
the  procession  was  passing  a  comer  on  which  a 
negro  man  was  standing,  a  tall  horseman  in  hideous 
garb  turned  aside  from  the  line,  dismounted  and 
stretched  out  his  bridle  rein  toward  the  negro,  as  if 
he  desired  him  to  hold  his  horse.    Not  daring  to 
refuse,  the  frightened  African  extended  his  hand  to 
grasp  the  rein.    As  he  did  so,  the  Ku  Klux  took  his 
own  head  from  his  shoulders  and  offered  to  place 
thai  also  in  the  outstretched  hand.     The  negro 
stood  not  upon  the  order  of  his  going,  but  departed 
with  a  yell  of  terror.    To  this  day  he  will  tell  you: 
'He  done  it,  suah,  boss.    I  seed  him  do  it.' " 

It  was  seldom  necessary  at  this  early  stage  to  use 
violence,  for  the  black  population  was  in  an  ecstasy 
of  fear.    A  silent  host  of  white-sheeted  horsemen 


ll 


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I 


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ill 
Hi; 


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we       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

parading  the  country  roads  at  night  was  sufBcient 
to  reduce  the  blacks  in  good  behavior  for  weeks  or 
months.  One  silent  Ghoul  posted  near  a  meeting 
place  of  the  League  would  be  the  cause  of  the  im- 
mediate dissolution  of  that  club.  Cow  bones  in 
a  sack  were  rattled  within  earshot  of  the  terrified 
negroes.  A  horrible  being,  fifteen  feet  tall,  walk- 
ing through  the  night  toward  a  place  of  congrega- 
tion, was  very  likely  to  find  that  every  one  had 
vacated  the  place  before  he  arrived.  A  few  figures 
wrapped  in  sheets  and  sitting  on  tombstones  in  a 
graveyard  near  which  n^^roes  were  accustomed  to 
pass  would  serve  to  keep  the  immediate  community 
quiet  for  weeks  and  give  the  locality  a  reputation 
for  "hants"  which  lasted  long. 

To  prevent  detection  on  parade,  members  of  the 
Klan  often  stayed  out  of  the  parade  in  their  own 
town  and  were  to  be  seen  freely  and  conspicuously 
mingling  with  the  spectators.  A  man  who  believed 
that  he  knew  every  horse  in  the  vicinity  and  was 
sure  that  he  would  be  able  to  identify  the  riders  by 
their  horses  was  greatly  surprised  upon  lifting  the 
disguise  of  the  horse  nearest  him  to  find  the  anima! 
upon  which  he  himself  had  ridden  into  town  a  short 
while  before.  The  parades  were  always  silent  and 
so  arranged  as  to  give  the  impression  of  very  large 


THE  KU  KLUX  MOVEMENT  257 

numbers.  In  the  r^^ar  drills  which  were  held  in 
town  and  country  the  men  showed  that  they  had 
not  forgotten  their  training  in  the  Confederate 
army.  There  were  no  commands  save  in  a  very 
low  tone  or  in  a  mysterious  language,  and  usually 
only  signs  or  whistle  signals  were  used. 

Such  pacific  methods  were  successful  to  a  con- 
siderable degree  until  the  carpetbaggers  and  scala- 
wags were  placed  in  office  under  the  Reconstruction 
Acts.  Then  more  violent  methods  were  necessary. 
The  Klans  patrolled  disturbed  communities,  vis- 
ited, warned,  and  frightened  obnoxious  individuals, 
whipped  some,  and  even  hanged  others.  Until  for- 
bidden by  law  or  military  order,  the  newspapers 
were  accustomed  to  print  the  mysterious  proclama- 
tions of  the  Ku  Klux.  The  following,  which  was 
circulated  in  Montgomery,  Alabama,  in  April, 
1868,  is  a  typical  specimen: 

Jv.  J^.  iv. 
Clan  of  Vega. 
hdqr'b  k.  k.  k.  hospitallers. 
Vega  Clan,  New  Moon, 
3rd  Month,  Anno  K.  K.  K.  1. 

Oedeb  No.  K.  K. 

Clansmen  —  Meet  at  the  Trysting  Spot  when  Orion 
Kisses  the  Zenith.  The  doom  of  treason  is  Death. 
Die*  IrcB.    The  wolf  is  on  his  walk  —  the  serpent  coils 

17 


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k 

^    11^. 

'4  41 

968       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

to  strike.  Action!  Action!  !  Action! ! !  b>  mid- 
night  and  the  Tomb;  by  Sword  and  Torch  and  the  Sa- 
cred Oath  at  Forrester's  Altar,  I  bid  you  come!  The 
clansmen  of  Glen  Iran  and  Alpine  will  greet  you  at  the 
new-made  grave. 
Remember  the  Idea  of  April 

By  command  of  the  Grand  D.  I.  H. 

Cheg.  V. 

The  work  of  the  secret  orders  was  successful.  As 
bodies  of  vigilantes,  the  Hans  and  the  Councils 
regulated  the  conduct  of  bad  negroes,  punished 
criminals  who  were  not  punished  by  the  State, 
looked  after  the  activities  and  teachings  of  North- 
em  preachers  and  teachers,  dispersed  hostile  gather- 
ings of  negroes,  and  ran  out  of  the  community  the 
worst  of  the  reconstructionist  officials.  They  kept 
the  negroes  quiet  and  freed  them  to  some  extent 
from  the  influence  of  evil  leaders.  The  burning 
of  houses,  gins,  mills,  and  stores  ceased;  property 
became  more  secure;  people  slept  safely  at  night; 
women  and  children  walked  abroad  in  security;  the 
incendiary  agents  who  had  worked  among  the 
negroes  left  the  country;  agitators,  political,  educa- 
tional, and  religious,  became  more  moderate;  "bad 
niggers"  ceased  to  be  bad;  labor  became  less  dis- 
organized; the  carpetbaggers  and  scalawags  ceased 
to  batten  on  the  Southern  communities.    It  was 


THE  KU  KLUX  MOVEMENT  269 

not  so  much  a  revolution  as  the  defeat  of  a  revo- 
lution. Society  was  replaced  in  the  old  historic 
grooves  from  which  war  and  reconstruction  had 
jarred  it. 

Successful  as  was  the  Ku  Klux  movement  in 
these  respects,  it  had  at  the  same  time  many  harm- 
ful results.     Too  often  local  orders  fell  under  the 
control  of  reckless  or  lawless  men  and  the  Klan  was 
then  used  as  a  cloak  to  cover  violence  and  thievery; 
family  and  personal  feuds  were  carried  into  the 
orders  and  fought  out;  and  anti-negro  feeling  in 
many  places  found  expression  in  activities  designed 
to  drive  the  blacks  from  the  country.    It  was  easy 
for  any  outlaw  to  hide  himself  behind  the  protec- 
tion of  a  secret  order.    So  numerous  did  these  men 
become  that  after  1868  there  was  a  general  exodus 
of  the  leading  reputable  members,  and  in  1869  the 
formal  disbanding  of  the  Klan  was  proclaimed  by 
General  Forrest,  the  Grand  Wizard.    The  White 
Camelia  and  other  orders  also  gradually  went  out 
of  existence.    Numerous  attempts  were  made  to 
suppress  the  secret  movement  by  the  military  com- 
manders, the  state  governments,  and  finally  by 
Congress,  but  none  of  these  was  entirely  successful, 
for  in  each  community  the  secret  opposition  lasted 
as  long  as  it  was  needed. 


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«60       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APFOBfATTOX 

The  political  effects  of  the  orders,  however,  sur- 
vived their  organized  existence.  Some  of  the 
Southern  States  began  to  go  Democratic  in  spite  of 
the  Reconstruction  Acts  and  the  Amendments,  and 
there  was  little  doubt  that  the  Ku  Klux  movement 
had  aided  in  this  change.  In  order  to  preserve  the 
achievements  of  radical  reconstruction  Congress 
passed,  in  1870  and  1871,  the  enforcement  acts 
which  had  been  under  debate  for  nearly  two  years. 
The  first  act  (May  81,  1879)  was  designed  to  pro- 
tect the  negro's  right  to  vote  and  was  directed  at 
individuals  as  well  as  against  States.  Section  six, 
indeed,  was  aimed  specifically  at  the  Ku  Klux  Klan. 
This  act  was  a  long  step  in  the  direction  of  giving 
the  Federal  Government  control  over  state  elec- 
tions. But  as  North  Carolina  went  wholly  and 
Alabama  partially  Democratic  in  1870,  a  Supple- 
mentary Act  (February  28, 1871)  went  further  and 
placed  the  elections  for  members  of  Congress  com- 
pletely under  Federal  control,  and  also  authorized 
the  use  of  thousands  of  deputy  marshals  at  elec- 
tions. As  the  campaign  of  1872  drew  near.  Grant 
and  his  advisers  became  solicitous  to  hold  all  the 
Southern  States  which  had  not  been  regained  by 
the  Democrats.  Accordingly,  on  March  23, 1871, 
the  Presideint  sent  a  message  to  Congress  declaring 


:i 


•  » 


THE  KU  KLUX  MOVEMENT  881 

that  in  some  of  the  States  the  laws  could  not  be 
enforced  and  asked  for  remedial  legislation.  Con- 
gress responded  with  an  act  (April  20, 1871),  com- 
monly called  the  "Ku  Klux  Act,"  which  gave  the 
President  despotic  military  power  to  uphold  the 
remammg  negro  governments  and  authorized  him 
to  declare  a  state  of  war  when  he  considered  it 
necessary.  Of  this  power  Grant  made  use  in  only 
one  instance.  In  October,  1871,  he  declared  nine 
counties  of  South  Carolina  in  rebellion  and  put 
taem  under  martial  law. 

During  the  ten  years  following  1870,  several 
thousand  arrests  were  made  under  the  enforce- 
ment acts  and  about  1250  convictions  were  secured, 
principally  in  Mississippi,  North  Carolina,  South 
Carolina,  and  Tennessee.  Most  of  these  viola- 
tions of  election  law.s,  however,  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  Ku  Klux  movement,  for  by  1870  the  better 
class  of  members  had  withdrawn  from  the  secret 
orders.  But  though  the  enforcement  acts  checked 
these  irregularities  to  a  considerable  extent,  they 
nevertheless  failed  to  hold  the  South  for  the  radi- 
cals and  essential  parts  of  them  were  declared 
unconstitutional  a  few  years  later. 

In  order  to  justify  the  passage  of  the  enforce- 
ment acts  and  to  obtain  campaign  material  for  use 


,  1 


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k 


208       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

in  1878,  Congreu  appointed  a  committee,  organ> 
iced  on  the  very  day  when  the  Ku  Klux  Act  was 
approved,  to  investigate  conditions  in  the  Southern 
States.  From  June  to  August,  1871,  the  commit- 
tee took  testimony  in  Washington,  and  in  the  fall 
subcommittees  visited  several  Southern  States. 
Tennessee,  Virginia,  Arkansas,  Louisiana,  and 
Texas  were,  however,  omitted  from  the  investiga- 
tion. Notwithstanding  the  partisan  purpose  and 
methods  of  the  investigation,  the  report  of  the 
committee  and  the  accompanying  testimony  con- 
stituted a  Democratic  rather  than  a  Republican 
document.  It  is  a  veritable  mine  of  information 
about  the  South  between  1865  and  1871.  The 
Democratic  minority  members  made  skillful  use 
of  their  opportunity  to  expose  conditions  in  the 
South.  They  were  less  concerned  to  meet  the 
charges  made  against  the  Ku  Klux  Klan  than  to 
show  why  such  movements  came  about.  The 
Republicans,  concerned  mainly  about  material  for 
the  presidential  campaign,  neglected  the  broader 
phases  of  the  situation. 

Opposition  to  the  eflPects  of  reconstruction  did 
not  come  to  an  end  with  the  dissolution  of  the  more 
famous  orders.  On  the  contrary,  it  now  became 
public  and  open  and  resulted  in  the  organization. 


Jv 


w 


THE  KU  KLUX  MOVEMENT  «6S 

after  1878,  of  the  White  League,  the  Mississippi  Shot 
Gun  Plan,  the  White  Man's  Party  in  Alabama,  and 
the  Rifle  Clubs  in  South  Carolina.  The  later  move- 
ments were  distinctly  but  cautiously  anti-negro. 
There  was  most  irritation  in  the  white  counties 
where  there  were  large  numbers  of  negroes.  Ne- 
gro schools  and  churches  were  burned  because  they 
served  as  meeting  places  for  negro  political  organiz- 
ations. The  color  line  b^an  to  be  more  and  more 
sharply  drawn.  Social  and  business  ostracism  con- 
tinued to  be  employed  against  white  radicals,  while 
the  n^roes  were  discharged  from  employment  or 
were  driven  from  their  rented  farms. 

The  Ku  Mux  movement,  it  is  to  be  noted  in  re- 
trospect, origmated  as  an  effort  to  restore  order  in 
the  war-stricken  Southern  States.  The  secrecy  of 
its  methods  appealed  to  the  imagination  and  caused 
its  rapid  expansion,  and  this  secrecy  was  inevitable 
because  opposition  to  reconstruction  was  not  law- 
ful. As  the  reconstruction  policies  were  put  in- 
to operation,  the  movement  became  political  and 
used  violence  when  appeals  to  superstitious  fears 
ceased  to  be  effective.  The  Ku  Klux  Klan  cen- 
tered, directed,  and  crystallized  public  opmion, 
and  united  the  whites  upon  a  platform  of  white 


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tM       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

•upremacy.  The  Southern  politicians  stood  aloof 
from  the  movement  but  accepted  the  results  of  its 
woric.  It  frightened  the  negroes  and  bad  whitesinto 
better  conduct,  and  it  encouraged  the  conservatives 
and  aided  them  to  regain  control  of  society,  for  with- 
out the  operations  of  the  Klan  the  black  districts 
would  never  have  come  again  under  white  control. 
Towards  the  end,  however,  its  methods  frequently 
became  unnecessarily  violent  and  did  great  harm  to 
Southern  society.  The  Ku  Klux  system  of  regukt- 
ing  society  is  as  old  as  history;  it  had  often  beeii 
used  before;  it  may  even  be  used  again.  When  a 
people  find  themselves  persecuted  by  aliens  under 
legal  forms,  they  will  invent  some  means  outside 
the  law  for  protecting  themselves;  and  such  experi- 
ences will  inevitably  result  in  a  weakening  of  respect 
for  law  and  in  a  return  to  more  primitive  methods 
of  justice. 


is 


CHAPTER  XII 

THB  CHANGING  SOUTH 

"The  bottom  rail  u  on  top"  was  a  phrase  which 
had  flashed  throughout  the  late  Confederate  SUtes. 
It  had  been  coined  by  the  negroes  in  1867  to  express 
their  view  of  the  situation,  but  its  aptness  had  been 
recognized  by  all.  After  ten  years  of  social  and  eco- 
nomic revolution,  however,  it  was  not  so  clear  that 
the  phrase  o(  1867  correctly  described  the  new  situ- 
ation. "The  whife  man  made  free"  would  have 
been  a  more  accurate  epitome,  for  the  white  man 
had  been  able,  in  spite  of  his  temporary  disabilities, 
to  compete  with  the  negro  in  all  industries. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  negro  districts 
were  least  exposed  to  the  destruction  of  war.  The 
well-managed  plantation,  lying  near  the  highways 
of  commerce,  with  its  division  of  labor,  nearly  or 
quite  self-sufficing,  was  the  bulwark  of  the  Con- 
federacy. When  the  fighting  ended,  an  industrial 
revolution  jegan  in  these  untouched  parts  of  the 

86A 


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tM       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APFOHATTOX 

BI«ck  Belt.  The  problem  of  free  negro  labor  now 
appeared.  During  the  year  1865  no  general  pUn 
for  a  labor  system  was  formulated  except  by  the 
Freedmen's  Bureau.  That,  however,  was  not  a 
success.  There  were  all  sorts  of  makeshifts,  such  as 
cash  wages,  deferred  wages,  cottperation,  even  shar- 
mg  of  expense  and  product,  and  contracts,  either 
oral  or  written. 

The  employers  showed  a  disposition  to  treat  the 
negro  family  as  a  unit  in  making  contracts  for  U- 
Dor,  wages,  food,  clothes,  and  care.'  In  general 
these  early  arrangements  were  made  to  transform 
slavery  with  its  mutual  duties  and  obligations  into 
a  free  labor  sy.<«tem  with  wages  and  "privileges." 
The  "  privileges  "  of  slavery  could  not  be  destroyed ; 
in  fact,  they  have  never  yet  been  destroyed  in  ni:- 
merous  places.  Curious  demands  were  made  by  the 
negroes:  here,  farm  bells  must  not  ring;  there,  over- 
seers or  managers  must  be  done  away  with;  in 
some  places  plantation  courts  were  to  settle  mat- 
ters of  work,  rent,  and  conduct;  elsewhere,  agree- 
ments were  made  that  on  Saturday  the  laborer 

'  J.  D.  B.  De  Bow,  the  economist,  teitified  before  the  Joint  Com- 
mittee on  Reconitniction  that,  if  the  negro  would  work,  free  labor 
would  be  better  for  the  planters  than  slave  labor.  He  called  atten- 
tion to  the  fact,  however,  that  negro  women  showed  a  derire  to  avoid 
fidd  labor,  and  there  is  also  evidence  to  show  that  they  objected  to 
domestic  service  and  other  menial  work. 


1^ 


'I 


Tktg  CHANGING  JOUTH  t07 

ihould  be  permitted  to  go  to  town  and.  perhapt, 
ride  a  mule  or  Lorw.  In  South  Carolina  the  Sea 
Island  negroea  demauded  that  in  laying  out  work 
the  old  "tadcs"  or  "■tinta"  of  .lavery  days  be 
retained  as  the  standard.  The  farming  districts 
at  the  edge  of  the  Black  Belt,  where  the  races  were 
about  equal  in  numbers,  already  had  a  kind  of 
"•hare  system. "  and  in  these  sections  the  economic 
chaos  after  the  war  was  not  so  complete.  The 
former  owners  worked  in  the  field  with  their  ex- 
sUves  and  thus  provided  steady  employment  for 
many.  Farms  were  rented  for  a  fixed  sum  of 
money,  or  for  a  part  of  the  crop,  or  on  "shares." 

The  white  districts,  which  had  previously  fought 
a  losmg  competition  with  the  efficiently  managed 
and  inexpensive  sUve  labor  of  the  Black  Belt,  were 
affected  most  disastrously  by  war  and  its  after- 
math. They  were  distant  from  transportation 
lines  and  markets;  they  employed  poor  farming 
methods;  they  had  no  fertilizers;  they  raised  no 
staple  crops  on  their  infertile  land;  and  in  addi- 
tic  they  now  had  to  face  the  destitution  that 
follows  fighting.  Yet  these  regions  had  formerly 
been  ahnost  self-supporting,  although  the  farms 
were  small  and  no  elaborate  labor  system  had 
been  developed. 


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t«8       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

In  the  planting  districts  where  the  owner  was 
land-poor  he  made  an  attempt  to  bring  in  Northern 
capital  and  Northern  or  foreign  labor.  In  the  belief 
that  the  negroes  would  work  better  for  a  Northern 
man,  every  planter  who  could  do  so  secured  a 
Northern  partner  or  manager,  frequently  a  soldier. 
Nevertheless  these  imported  managers  nearly  al- 
ways failed  because  they  did  not  understand  cot- 
ton, rice,  or  sugar  planting,  and  because  they  were 
either  too  severe  or  too  easy  upon  the  blacks. 

No  Northern  labor  was  to  be  had,  and  the  South 
could  not  retain  even  all  its  own  native  whites. 
Union  soldiers  and  others  seeking  to  better  their 
prospects  moved  west  and  northwest  to  fill  the 
newly  opened  lands,  while  the  Confederates,  kept 
out  of  the  homestead  region  by  the  test  oath, 
swarmed  into  Texas,  which  owned  its  own  public 
lands,  or  went  North  to  other  occupations.  Nor 
could  the  desperate  planters  hire  foreign  immi- 
grants. Several  States,  among  them  South  Caro- 
lina, Alabama,  and  Louisiana,  advertised  for  la- 
borers and  established  labor  bureaus,  but  without 
avail.  The  negro  politicians  in  1867  declared  them- 
selves opposed  to  all  movements  to  foster  immi- 
gration. So  in  the  Black  Belt  the  negro  had,  for 
forty  years,  a  monopoly  of  farm  labor. 


I! 


THE  CHANGING  SOUTH 

The  share  system  of  tenantry,  with  its  attendant 
evils  of  credit  and  crop  lien,  was  soon  established 
in  the  Southern  States,  mainly  in  the  Black  Belt, 
but  to  some  extent  also  in  the  white  districts.  The 
landlord  furnished  land,  house,  fuel,  water,  and  all 
or  a  part  of  the  seed,  fertilizer,  farm  implements, 
and  farm  animals.  In  return  he  received  a  " half," 
or  a  "third  and  fourth,"  his  share  depending  upon 
how  much  he  had  furnished.  The  best  class  of 
tenants  would  rent  for  cash  or  a  fixed  rental,  the 
poorest  laborers  would  work  for  wages  only. 

The  "privileges"  brought  over  from  slavery, 
which  were  included  in  the  share  renting,  aston- 
ished outside  observers.     To  the  laborer  was  usu- 
ally given  a  house,  a  water  supply,  wood  for  fuel, 
pasture  for  pigs  or  cows,  a  "patch"  for  vegetables 
and  fruit,  and  the  right  to  hunt  and  fish.     These 
were  all  that  some  needed  in  order  to  Uve.  Somers, 
the  English  traveler  already  quoted,  pronounced 
this  generous  custom  "outrageously  absurd,"  for 
the  negroes  had  so  many  privileges  that  they  re- 
fused to  make  use  of  their  opportunities.     "The 
soul  is  often  crushed  out  of  labor  by  penury  and 
oppression,"  he  said,  "but  here  a  soul  cannot  be- 
gin to  be  infused  into  it  through  the  sheer  excess  of 
privfiege  and  license  with  which  it  is  surrounded." 


>i\ 


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270       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

The  credit  system  which  was  developed  beside 
the  share  system  made  a  bad  condition  worse.  On 
the  1st  of  January  a  planter  could  mortgage  his 
future  crop  to  a  merchant  or  landlord  in  exchange 
for  subsistence  until  the  harvest.  Since,  as  a  rule, 
neither  tenant  nor  landlord  had  any  surplus  funds, 
the  latter  would  be  supplied  by  the  banker  or 
banker  merchant,  who  would  then  dictate  the 
crops  to  be  planted  and  the  time  of  sale.  As  a  re- 
sult of  these  conditions,  the  planter  or  farmer  was 
held  to  staple  crops,  high  prices  for  necessities, 
high  interest  rate,  and  frequently  unfair  bookkeep- 
ing. The  system  was  excellent  for  a  thrifty,  in- 
dustrious, and  int(  Iligent  man,  for  it  enabled  him  to 
get  a  start.  It  worked  to  the  advantage  of  a  bank- 
rupt landlord,  who  could  in  this  way  get  banking 
facilities.  But  it  had  a  mischievous  e£Fect  upon 
the  average  tenant,  who  had  too  small  a  share  of 
the  crop  to  feel  a  strong  sense  of  responsibility 
as  well  as  too  many  "privileges"  and  too  little 
supervision  to  make  him  anxious  to  produce  the 
best  resul'  . 

The  negroes  entered  into  their  freedom  with 
several  advantages:  they  were  trained  to  labor; 
they  were  occupying  the  most  fertile  soil  and  could 
purchase  land  at  low  prices;  the  tenant  system  was 


n 


THE  CHANGING  SOUTH  271 

most  liberal;  cotton,  sugar,  and  rice  were  bringing 
high  prices;  and  access  to  markets  was  easy.    In 
the  white  districts  land  was  cheap,  and  prices  of 
commodities  were  high,  but  otherwise  the  ne- 
i,roes  seemed  to  have  the  better  position.    Yet  as 
early  as  1870,  keen  observers  called  attention  to  the 
fact  that  the  hill  and  mountain  whiter  ^ere  thriv- 
ing as  compared  with  then-  former  condition,  and 
that  the  negroes  were  no  longer  their  serious  com- 
petitors.   In  the  white  districts  better  methods 
were  coming  into  use,  labor  was  steady,  fertilizers 
were  used,  and  conditions  of  transportation  were 
improving.    The  whites  were  also  encroaching  on 
the  Black  Belt;  they  were  opening  new  lands  in  the 
Southwest;  and  withm  the  border  of  the  Black 
Belt  they  were  bringing  negro  labor  under  some 
control.    In  the  South  Carolina  rice  lands,  crowds 
of  Irish  were  imported  to  do  the  ditching  which 
the  negroes  refused  to  do  and  were  carried  back 
North  when  the  job  was  finished. »  President  Thach 

«The  Census  of  1880  gave  proof  of  the  superiority  of  the  whites  in  cot- 
ton production.  For  purposes  of  comparison  the  cotton  area  may  be 
divided  into  three  regions:  first,  the  Black  Belt,  in  which  the  farmers 
were  black,  the  soil  fertUe,  the  plantations  large,  the  credit  evil  at  iU 
worst,  and  the  yield  of  cotton  per  acre  the  least;  second,  the  white  dis- 
tricts, where  the  soil  was  the  poorest,  the  farms  small,  the  workers 
nearly  aU  white,  and  the  yield  per  acre  better  than  on  the  fertile  Black 
Belt  lands;  third,  the  regions  in  which  the  races  were  nearly  equal  in 


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1«        THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

of  the  Alabama  Agricultural  College  has  thus  de- 
scribed the  situation: 

By  the  use  of  commercial  fertilizers,  vast  regions  once 
considered  barren  have  been  brought  into  profitable  cul- 
tivation, and  really  afford  a  more  reliable  and  constant 
crop  than  the  rich  alluvial  lands  of  the  old  slave  planta- 
tions. In  nearly  every  agricultural  county  in  the  South 
there  is  to  be  observed,  on  the  one  hand,  this  section  of 
fertile  soils,  once  the  heart  of  the  old  civilization,  now 
abandoned  by  the  whites,  held  in  tenantry  by  a  dense 
negro  population,  full  of  dilapidation  and  ruin;  while  on 
the  other  hand,  there  is  the  region  of  light,  thin  soils,  oc- 
cupied by  the  small  white  freeholder,  filled  with  schools, 
churches,  and  good  roads,  and  all  the  elements  of  a 
happy,  enlightened  country  life. 

All  the  systems  devised  for  handling  Qfgro  labor 
proved  to  be  only  partially  successful.  The  la- 
borer was  migratory,  wanted  easy  work,  with  one 
or  two  holidays  a  week,  and  the  privilege  of  attend- 
ing political  meetings,  camp  meetings,  and  cir- 
cuses. A  thrift*'  »eg^o  could  not  make  headway 
because  his  '  .,ows  stole  from  him  or  his  less  ener- 
getic relations  and  friends  visited  him  and  ate  up 

numbers  or  where  the  whites  were  in  a  slight  majority,  with  soil  of 
medium  fertility,  good  methods  of  agriculture,  and,  owing  to  better 
controlled  labor,  the  'jest  yield.  In  other  words,  negroes,  fertile  soil, 
and  poor  crops  went  together;  and  on  the  other  hand  the  wL'tes  got 
better  crops  on  less  fertile  soil.  The  Black  Belt  has  never  again 
reached  the  level  of  production  it  had  in  1860.  But  the  white  district 
kept  improving  slowly. 


la- 


THE  CHANGING  SOUTH  878 

his  substance.  One  Alabama  planter  declared  that 
he  could  not  raise  a  turkey,  a  chicken,  a  hog,  or  a 
cow;  and  another  asserted  that  "a  hog  has  no  more 
chance  to  live  among  these  thieving  negro  farmers 
than  a  June  bug  in  a  gang  of  puddle  ducks."  Lands 
were  mortgaged  to  the  supply  houses  in  the  towns, 
the  whites  gradually  deserted  the  country,  and 
many  rice  and  cotton  fields  grew  up  in  weeds. 
Crop  stealing  at  night  became  a  business  which 
no  legislation  could  ever  completely  stop. 

A  traveler  has  left  the  following  description  of 
"a  model  negro  farm"  in  1874.  The  farmer  pur- 
chased an  old  mule  on  credit  and  rented  land  on 
shares  or  for  so  many  bales  of  cotton:  any  old  tools 
were  used;  corn,  bacon,  and  other  supplies  were 
bought  on  credit,  and  a  crop  lien  was  given;  a 
month  later,  corn  and  cotton  were  planted  on  soil 
that  was  not  well  broken  up;  the  negro  "  would  not 
pay  for  no  guano  "  to  put  on  other  people's  land ;  by 
turns  the  farmer  planted  and  fished,  plowed  and 
hunted,  hoed  and  frolicked,  or  went  to  "meeting." 
At  the  end  of  the  year  he  sold  his  cotton,  paid  part 
of  his  rent  and  some  of  his  debt,  returned  the  mule 
to  its  owner,  and  sang: 

Nigger  work  hard  all  de  year, 
White  man  tote  de  money. 


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t74       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

The  great  landholdings  did  not  break  up  into 
small  farms  as  was  predicted,  though  sales  were 
frequent  and  in  1865  enormous  amounts  of  land 
were  put  on  the  market.  After  1867,  additional 
millions  of  acres  were  offered  at  small  prices,  and 
tax  and  mortgage  sales  were  numerous.  Ihe  re- 
sult of  these  operations,  however,  was  a  change  of 
landlords  rather  than  a  breaking  up  of  large  plan- 
tations. New  men,  negroes,  merchants,  and  Jews 
became  landowners.  The  number  of  small  farms 
naturally  increased  but  so  in  some  instances  did  the 
land  concentrated  into  large  holdings. 

It  was  inevitable  that  conditions  of  negro  life 
she  dd  undergo  a  revolutionary  change  during  the 
reconstruction.  The  serious  matter  of  looking  out 
for  himself  and  his  family  and  of  making  a  living 
dampened  the  negro's  cheerful  spirits.  Released 
from  the  discipline  of  slavery  and  often  misdirected 
by  the  worst  of  teachers,  the  negro  race  naturally 
ran  into  excesses  of  petty  criminality.  Even  under 
the  reconstruction  governments  the  proportion  of 
negro  to  white  criminals  was  about  ten  to  one. 
Theft  was  frequent;  arson  was  the  accepted  means 
of  revenge  on  white  people;  and  murder  became 
common  in  the  brawls  of  the  city  negro  quarters. 
The  laxness  of  the  marriage  relation  worked  special 


THE  CHANGING  SOUTH  «75 

hardship  on  the  women  and  children  in  so  many 
cases  deserted  by  the  head  of  the  family. 

Out  of  the  social  anarchy  of  reconstruction  the 
negroes  emerged  with  numerous  organizations  of 
their  own  which  may  have  been  imitations  of  the 
Union  League,  the  Lincoln  Brotherhood,  and  the 
various  church  organizations.   These  societies  were 
composed  entirely  of  blacks  and  have  continued 
with  prolific  reproduction  to  the  present  day. 
They  were  characterized  by  high  names,  gorgeous 
regalia,  and  frequent  parades.     "The  Brothers 
and  Sisters  of  Pleasure  and  Prosperity"  and  the 
"United  Order  of  African  Ladies  and  Gentlemen" 
played  a  large,  and  on  the  whole  useful,  part  in  ne- 
gro social  life,  teaching  lessons  of  thrift,  insurance, 
co5peration,  and  mutual  aid. 

The  reconstructionists  were  not  able  in  1867-68 
to  carry  through  Congress  any  provision  for  the 
social  equality  of  the  races,  but  in  the  reconstructed 
States  the  equal  rights  issue  was  alive  throughout 
the  period.  Legislation  giving  to  the  negro  equal 
rights  in  hotels,  places  of  amusements,  and  com- 
mon carriers,  was  first  enacted  in  Louisiana  and 
South  Carolina.  Frequently  the  carpetbaggers 
brought  up  the  issue  in  order  to  rid  the  radical 
ranks  of  the  scala..^gs  who  were  opposed  to  equal 


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876       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

rights.  In  Florida,  for  example,  the  carpetbag- 
gers framed  a  comprehensive  Equal  Rirfhts  Law, 
passed  it,  and  presented  it  to  Governor  Heed,  who 
was  known  to  be  opposed  to  such  lefiiblation.  He 
vetoed  the  measure  and  thus  lost  the  n^ro  sup- 
port. Intermarriage  with  whites  was  made  ler 
in  Louisiana  and  South  Carolina  and  by  court  ut 
cision  was  permitted  in  Alabama  and  Mississippi, 
but  the  Georgia  Supreme  Coiu*t  held  it  to  be  illegal. 
Mixed  marriages  were  few,  but  these  were  made 
occasions  of  exultation  over  the  whites  and  of 
consequent  ill  feeling. 

Charles  Sumner  was  a  persistent  agitator  for 
equal  rights.  In  1871  he  declared  in  a  letter  to 
a  South  Carolina  negro  convention  that  the  race 
must  insist  not  only  upon  equality  in  hotels  and  on 
public  carriers  but  also  in  the  schools.  "It  is  not 
enough,"  he  said,  "to  provide  separate  accommo- 
dations for  colored  citizens  even  if  in  all  respects 
as  good  as  those  of  other  persons.  .  .  .  The  dis- 
crimination is  an  insult  and  a  hindrance,  and  a 
bar,  which  not  only  destroys  comfort  and  prevents 
equality,  but  weakens  all  other  rights.  The  right 
to  vote  will  have  new  security  when  your  equal 
right  in  public  conveyances,  hotels,  and  common 
schools,  is  at  last  established;  but  here  you  must 


uc 


THE  CHANGING  SOUTH  877 

insist  for  yourselves  by  speech,  petition,  and  by 
vote."  The  Southern  whites  began  to  develop  the 
"Jim  Crow  '*  theory  of  "  separate  but  equal "  accom- 
modations. Senator  Hill  of  Georgia,  for  example, 
thought  that  hotels  might  have  separate  divisions 
'or  the  two  races,  and  he  cited  the  division  in  the 
churches  as  proof  that  the  negro  wanted  separation. 

About  1874  it  was  plain  that  the  last  radical 
Congress  was  nearly  ready  to  enact  social  equality 
legislation.  This  fact  turned  many  of  the  South- 
ern Unionist  class  back  to  the  Democratic  party, 
there  to  remain  for  a  long  time.  In  1875,  as  a  f  rt 
of  memorial  to  Sumner,  Congress  passed  the  Civil 
Rights  Act,  which  gave  to  negroes  equal  rights  in 
hotels,  places  of  amusement,  on  public  carriers,  and 
on  juries.  Some  Democratic  leaders  were  willing 
to  see  such  legislation  enacted,  because  in  the  first 
place,  it  would  have  little  effect  except  in  the  Bor- 
der and  Northern  States,  where  it  would  turn  thou- 
sands into  the  Democratic  fold,  and  in  the  second 
place,  because  they  were  sure  that  in  time  the 
Supreme  Court  would  declare  the  law  unconstitu- 
tional.   And  so  it  happened. 

In  regions  where  the  more  unprincipled  radical 
leaders  were  in  control,  the  whites  lived  at  times  in 
fear  of  negro  uprisings.    The  negroes  were  armed 


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178       THE  <«EQU£L  OP  AFFOIIATTOX 

and  insolent,  and  the  whites  were  few  and  widely 
scattered.  Here  and  there  outbreaks  occurred  and 
individual  whites  and  isolated  families  suffered, 
but  as  a  rule  all  such  movements  were  crushed  with 
much  heavier  loss  to  the  negroes  than  to  the  better 
organised  whites.  Nevertheless  everlasting  appre- 
hension for  the  safety  of  women  and  children  kept 
the  white  men  nervous.  General  Gamett  Andrews 
remarked  about  the  situation  in  Mississippi: 

I  have  never  suffered  such  an  amount  of  anguish  and 
alarm  in  all  my  life.  I  have  served  through  the  whole 
war  as  a  soldier  in  the  army  of  Northern  ^.^irginia,  and 
saw  all  of  it;  but  I  never  did  experience  ...  the  fear 
and  alarm  and  sense  of  danger  which  I  felt  that  time. 
And  this  was  the  universal  feeling  among  the  population, 
among  the  white  people.  I  think  that  both  sides  were 
alarmed  and  felt  uneasy.  It  showed  itself  upon  the 
countenance  of  the  people;  it  made  many  of  them  sick. 
Men  looked  haggard  and  pale,  after  undergoing  this 
sort  of  thing  for  six  weeks  or  a  month,  and  I  have  felt 
when  I  laid  [sic]  down  that  neither  myself,  nor  my  wife 
and  children  were  in  safety.  I  expected,  and  honestly 
anticipated,  and  thought  it  highly  probable,  that  I 
might  be  assassinated  and  my  house  set  on  fire  at 
any  time. 

By  the  fires  of  reconstruction  the  whites  were 
fused  into  a  more  homogeneous  society,  social  as 
well  as  political.     The  former  slaveholding  class 


I- 


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THE  CHANGING  SOUTH  in 

continued  to  be  more  considerate  of  the  negro  than 
were  the  poor  whites;  but,  as  misrule  went  on,  ail 
classes  tended  to  unite  against  the  negro  in  politics. 
They  were  tired  of  reconstruction,  new  amend- 
ments, force  bills,  Federal  troops— tired  of  being 
ruled  as  conquered  provinces  by  thp  incompetent 
and  the  dishonest.    Every  measure  aimed  at  the 
South  seemed  to  them  to  mean  that  they  were    ^n- 
sidered  incorrigible  and  unworthy  of  trust,  and  that 
they  were  being  made  to  suffer  for  the  deeds  of  ir- 
responsible whites.    And,  to  make  matters  worse, 
strong  opposition  to  proscriptive  measures  was 
called  fresh  rebellion.     "When  the  Jacobins  say 
and  do  low  and  bitter  things,  their  charge  of  want 
of  loyalty  in  the  South  because  our  people  grumble 
back  a  little  seems  to  me  as  unreasonable  as  the 
complaint  of  the  little  boy :    '  Mamma,  make  Bob 
'have  hisself .    He  makes  mouths  at  me  every  time 
I  hit  him  with  my  stick.* "  • 

Probably  this  burden  Tell  heavier  on  the  young 
men,  who  had  life  before  them  and  who  were 
growing  up  with  diminished  opportunities.  Sidney 
Lanier,  then  an  Alabama  school-teacher,  wrote  to 
Bayard  Taylor :    "Perhaps  you  know  that  with  us 

•  Usually  ascribed  to  General  D.  H.  Hill  of  North  Carolina,  and 
quoted  in  The  Land  We  Love,  vol.  i,  p.  146. 


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iM       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

of  the  young  generation  in  th^  South,  lince  the  war, 
pretty  much  the  whde  of  life  has  been  merely  not 
dying."  Nefc  and  alien  rule  was  a  constant  in- 
sult to  th'  elligence  of  the  country.  The  tax- 
payers Wv/e  nonparticipants  in  the  affairs  of  gov- 
ernment. Some  people  withdrew  entirely  from  pub- 
lic life,  went  to  their  farms  or  plantations,  kept 
awf./  from  towns  and  from  speechmaking,  wait- 
ing for  the  end  to  come.  There  were  some  who  re- 
fused for  several  years  to  read  the  newspapers,  so 
unpleasant  was  the  news.  The  good  feeling  pro- 
duced by  the  magnanimity  of  Grant  at  Appomat- 
tox was  destroyed  by  the  severity  of  his  Southern 
policy  when  he  became  President.  There  was  no 
gratitude  for  any  so-called  leniency  of  the  North, 
no  repentance  for  the  war,  no  desire  for  humilia- 
tion, for  sackcloth  and  ashes,  and  no  confession  of 
wrong.  The  insistence  of  the  radicals  upon  ob- 
taining a  confession  of  depravity  only  made  things 
much  worse.  Scarcely  a  measure  of  Congress  dur- 
ing reconstruction  was  designed  or  received  In  a 
conciliatory  spirit. 

The  new  generation  of  whites  was  poor,  bitter 
because  of  persecution,  ill  educated,  overworked, 
without  a  bright  future,  and  shadowed  by  the  race 
problem.    Though  their  new  political  leaders  were 


m 


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■>■     •  ! 
I 


THE  CHANGING  SOUTH 
shrewd,  narrow,  coniervaiiv^,  honett,  and  pani- 
monious,  the  constant  fightbg  of  fire  with  fire 
scorched  all.    In  the  bitter  discipline  of  reconstruc- 
tion, the  pleasantest  side  of  Southern  life  came  to 
an  end.    During  the  war  and  the  '.onsequent  re- 
construction there  was  a  marked  change  in  South- 
em  temperament  toward  the  severe.    Hospitality 
declined;  the  olu  Southern  life  had  never  been 
on  a  business  basis,  but  the  new  Southern  life  now 
adjusted  itself  to  a  stricter  economy;  the  old  in- 
dividuality was  partially  lost;  but  class  distinc- 
tions were  less  obvious  in  a  more  homogeneous 
society.    The  material  evils  of  reconstruction  may 
be  only  temporary;  state  debU  may  be  paid  and 
wasted  resources   renewed;   but  the  moral  and 
intellectual  results  of  the  revolution  will  be  the 
more  permanent. 


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! 


CHAPTER  Xra 

RESTORATION   OF  HOME   RULE 

The  radical  program  of  reconstruction  ended 
after  ten  years  in  failure  rather  because  of  a  change 
in  public  opinion  in  the  North  than  because  of  the 
resistance  of  the  Southern  whites.  The  North  of 
1877,  indeed,  was  not  the  North  of  1867.  A  more 
tolerant  attitude  toward  the  South  developed  as 
the  North  passed  through  its  own  period  of  mis- 
government  when  all  the  large  cities  were  subject  to 
"ring  rule"  and  corruption,  as  in  New  York  under 
"Boss"  Tweed  and  in  the  District  of  Columbia  un- 
der "Boss"  Shepherd.  The  Federal  civil  service 
was  discredited  by  the  scandals  connected  with  the 
Sanborn  contracts,  the  Whisky  Ring,  and  the  Star 
Routes,  while  some  leaders  in  Congress  were  under 
a  cloud  from  the  "Salary  Grab"  and  Credit 
Mobilier  disclosures. ' 


'  Ser  The  Bom  and  the  Machine,  by  Samuel  P.  Orth  (in  The  Chroni- 
det  of  Ameriea). 

88S 


RESTORATION  OF  HOME  RULE        288 

The  marvelous  material  development  of  the 
North  and  West  also  drew  attention  away  from 
sectional  controversies.  Settlers  poured  into  the 
plains  beyond  the  Mississippi  and  the  valleys  of 
the  Far  West;  new  industries  sprang  up;  unsus- 
pected mineral  wealth  was  discovered;  railroads 
were  built.  Not  only  broker;,;  Imt  tqixpaying  vot- 
ers took  an  interest  in  tj  le  financial  r<:  j^djustments 
of  the  time.  Many  thousand  peopl*  followed  the 
discussions  over  the  funding  and  reiunding  of  the 
national  debt,  the  retirement  of  the  greenbacks, 
and  the  proposed  lowering  of  tariflF  duties.  Yet 
the  Black  Friday  episode  of  1869,  when  Jay  Gould 
and  James  Fisk  cornered  the  visible  supply  of  gold, 
and  the  panic  of  1873  were  indications  of  unsound 
financial  conditions. 

These  new  developments  and  the  new  domestic 
problems  which  they  involved  all  tended  to  divert 
public  thought  from  the  old  political  issues  arising 
out  of  the  war.  Foreign  relations,  too,  began  to 
take  on  a  new  interest.  The  Alabama  claims  con- 
troversy with  England  continued  to  hold  the  pub- 
lic attention  until  finally  settled  by  the  Geneva  Ar- 
bitration in  1872.  President  Grant,  as  much  of  an 
expansionist  as  Seward,  for  two  years  (1869-71) 
tried  to  secure  Santo  Domingo  or  a  part  of  it  for  an 


I 

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S84        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

American  naval  base  in  the  West  Indies.  But  the 
United  States  had  race  problems  enough  already 
and  the  Senate,  led  by  Sumner,  refused  to  sanction 
the  acquisition.  Relations  with  Spain  were  fre- 
quently strained  on  account  of  American  filibuster- 
ing expeditions  to  aid  Cuban  insurgents.  Spain 
repeatedly  charged  the  United  States  with  laxness 
toward  such  violations  of  international  law;  and 
President  Grant,  seeing  no  other  way  out,  recom- 
mended in  1869  and  again  in  1870  that  the  Cuban 
insurgents  be  recognized  as  belligerents,  but  still 
the  Senate  held  back.  The  climax  came  in  1873, 
when  the  Spanish  authorities  in  Cuba  captured  on 
the  high  seas  the  Virginius'  with  a  filibustering  ex- 
pedition on  board  and  executed  fifty-three  of  the 
crew  and  passengers,  among  them  eight  Americans. 
For  a  time  war  seemed  imminent,  but  Spain  acted 
quickly  and  effected  a  peaceable  settlement. 

It  became  evident  soon  after  1867  that  the  issues 
involved  in  reconstruction  were  not  in  themselves 
sufficient  to  hold  the  North  solidly  Republican. 
Toward  negro  suffrage,  for  example.  Northern  pub- 
lic opinion  was  on  the  whole  unfriendly.  In  1867 
the  negro  was  permitted  to  vote  only  in  New  York 

« See  The  Path  of  Empire,  by  Carl  Riusdl  Fish  (b  The  Chronicle*  0/ 
America),  p.  119. 


RESTORATION  OF  HOME  RULE  285 
and  in  New  England,  except  in  Connecticut.  Be- 
fore 1869  negro  suffrage  was  rejected  in  Connecti- 
cut, Wisconsin.  Kansas,  Ohio,  Maryland,  Missouri, 
Michigan,  and  Minnesota.  The  Republicans  in 
their  national  platform  of  1868  went  only  so  far  as 
to  say  that,  while  negro  suflFrage  was  to  be  forced 
upon  the  South,  it  must  remain  a  local  question  in 
the  North.  The  Border  States  rapidly  lined  up 
with  the  white  South  on  matters  of  race,  church, 
and  politics. 

It  was  not  until  1874,  however,  that  the  changing 
opinion  was  made  generally  eflPective  in  the  elec- 
tions. The  skillfully  managed  radical  organization 
held  large  majorities  in  every  Congress  from  the 
Thirty-ninth  to  the  Forty-third,  and  the  electoral 
votes  in  1868  and  1872  seemed  to  show  that 
the  conservation  opposition  was  insignificant.  But 
these  figures  do  not  tell  the  whole  story.  Even  in 
1864,  when  Lincoln  won  by  nearly  half  a  million, 
the  popular  vote  was  a"  eighteen  to  twenty-two, 
and  four  years  later  .   the  most  popular  man 

in  the  United  States,  _  a  majority  of  only  three 
hundred  thousand  over  Seymour,  and  this  majority 
and  more  jame  from  the  new  negro  voters.  Four 
years  later  with  about  a  million  negro  voters  avail- 
able and  an  opposition  not  pleased  with  its  own 


?; 


;: 


J 


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M 


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V 


286       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

candidate,  Grant's  majority  reached  only  sev'.n 
hundred  thousand.  At  no  one  time  in  elections 
did  the  North  pronounce  itself  in  favor  of  all 
the  reconstruction  policies.  The  break,  signs  of 
which  were  visible  as  early  as  1869,  came  in  1874 
when  the  Republicans  lost  control  of  the  House 
of  Representatives. 

Strength  was  given  tc  the  opposition  because  of 
the  dissatisfaction  with  President  Grant,  who  knew 
little  about  politics  and  politicians.  He  felt  that 
his  Cabinet  should  be  made  up  of  personal  friends, 
not  of  strong  advisers,  and  that  the  military  ideal 
of  administration  was  the  proper  one.  He  was 
faithful  but  undiscriminating  in  his  friendships 
and  frequently  chose  as  his  associates  men  of  vuigar 
tastes  and  low  motives;  and  he  showed  a  naive  lo^^e 
of  money  and  an  undisguised  admiration  for  rich 
men  such  as  Gould  and  Fisk.  His  appointees  were 
often  incompetent  friends  or  relatives,  and  his  cyn- 
ical attitude  toward  civil  service  reform  lost  him 
th.  -^jpport  of  influential  men.  When  forced  by 
party  exigencies  to  select  first-class  men  for  his 
Cabinet,  he  still  preferred  to  go  for  advice  to  prac- 
tical politicians.  On  the  Southern  question  he 
easily  fell  under  control  of  the  radicals,  who  in  or- 
der to  retain  their  influence  had  only  to  convince 


hi 


RESTORATION  OP  HOME  RULE       887 

his  militaxy  mind  that  the  South  was  again  in  re- 
bellion, and  who  found  it  easy  to  distract  public 
opinion  from  political  corruption  by  "waving  the 
bloody  shirt. "  Dissatisfaction  with  his  Adminis- 
tration, it  is  true,  was  confined  to  the  intellectuals, 
the  reformers,  and  the  Democrats,  but  they  were 
strong  enough  to  defeat  him  for  a  second  term  if 
they  could  only  be  organized. 

The  Liberal  Republican  movement  began  in  the 
West  about  1869  with  demands  for  amnesty  and 
for  reform,  particularly  in  the  civil  service,  and  it 
soon  spread  rapidly  over  the  North.  When  it  be- 
came certain  that  the  "machine"  would  renomi- 
nate Grant,  the  liberal  movement  became  an  anti- 
Grant  party.  The  "New  Departure"  Democrats 
gave  comfort  and  prospect  of  aid  to  the  Liberal  Re- 
publicans by  declaring  for  a  constructive,  forward- 
looking  policy  in  place  of  reactionary  opposition. 
The  Liberal  chiefs  were  led  to  believe  that  the  new 
Democratic  leaders  would  accept  their  platform 
and  candidates  in  order  to  defeat  Grant.  The 
principal  candidates  for  the  Liberal  Republican 
nomination  were  Charles  Francis  Adams,  Lyman 
Trumbull,  Gratz  Brown,  David  Davis,  and  Horace 
Greeley.  Adams  was  the  strongest  candidate  but 
was  jockeyed  out  of  place  and  the  nomination  was 


n 


iM 


JM 


f? 


V 


I*' 


S88       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

given  to  Horace  Greeley,  able  enough  as  editor  of 
the  New  York  Tribune  but  impossible  as  a  candi- 
date for  the  presidency.  The  Democratic  party 
accepted  him  as  their  candidate  also,  although  he 
had  been  a  lifelong  opponent  of  Democratic  prin- 
ciples and  policies.  But  disgusted  Liberals  either 
returned  to  the  Republican  ranks  or  stayed  away 
from  the  polls,  and  many  Democrats  did  likewise. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  reflection  of  Grant 
was  a  foregone  conclusion.  There  was  certainly  a 
potential  majority  against  Grant,  but  the  opposi- 
tion had  failed  to  organize,  while  the  Republican 
machine  was  in  good  working  order,  the  negroes 
were  voting,  and  the  Enforcement  Acts  proved  a 
great  aid  to  the  Republicans  in  the  Southern  States. 
One  good  result  of  the  growing  liberal  sentiment 
was  the  passage  of  an  Amnesty  Act  by  Congress  on 
May  22, 1872.  By  statute  and  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  Congress  had  refused  to  recognize  the 
complete  validity  of  President  Johnson's  pardons 
and  amnesty  proclamations,  and  all  Confederate 
leaders  who  wished  to  regain  political  rights  had 
therefore  to  appeal  to  Congress.  During  the  Forty- 
first  Congress  (1869-71)  more  than  three  thou- 
sand Southerners  were  amnestied  in  order  that 
they  might  hold  office.    These,  however,  were 


ti 


RESTORATION  OF  HOME  RULE        280 

for  the  most  part  scalawags;  the  most  respectable 
whites  would  not  seek  an  amnesty  which  they  could 
secure  only  by  self-stultification. '  It  was  the  pres- 
sure of  public  opinion  against  white  disfranchise- 
ment and  the  necessity  for  meeting  the  Liberal 
Republican  arguments  which  caused  the  passage 
of  the  Act  of  1872.  By  this  act  about  150,000 
whites  were  reCnfranchised,  leaving  out  only  about 
five  hundred  of  the  motl  prominent  of  the  old  re- 
gime, most  of  whom  were  never  restored  to  citi- 
zenship. Both  Robert  E.  Lee  and  JeflFerson  Davis 
died  disfranchised. 

How  the  Southern  whites  escaped  from  negro 
domination  has  often  been  told  and  may  here  be 
sketched  only  in  outline.    The  first  States  regained 

'  The  machinery  of  government  and  politics  was  all  in  radical  hands 
—  the  carpetbaggers  and  scalawags,  who  were  numerous  enough  to 
fill  practically  all  the  oflSces.  These  men  were  often  able  leaders  and 
skillful  managers,  and  they  did  not  intend  to  surrender  control;  and 
the  black  race  was  obedient  and  furnished  the  votes.  In  1868,  with 
Virginia,  Mississippi,  Georgia,  and  Texas  unrepresented,  tha  first  radi- 
cal contingent  in  Congress  from  the  South  numbered  4«,  of  whom  10 
out  of  18  senators  and  86  out  of  3S  lepresenUtives  were  carpetbag- 
gers. There  were  two  lone  conservative  Congressmen.  A  few  months 
later,  in  1869,  there  were  64  radical  representatives  from  the  South,  «0 
senators  and  44  members  of  the  House  of  RepresenUtives.  In  1877 
this  number  had  dwindled  to  two  senators  and  four  representatives. 
The  difference  between  these  figures  measures  in  some  degree  the 
extent  of  the  undoing  of  reconstruction  within  the  period  of  Grant's 
Administration. 

19 


1 

ii' 
'p 


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I 


S90       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

from  radicalism  were  those  in  which  the  negro  popu- 
lation was  small  and  the  black  vote  large  enough 
to  irritate  but  not  to  dominate.  Although  North- 
em  sentiment,  excited  by  the  stories  of  "Southern 
outrage, "  was  then  unfavorable,  the  conservatives 
of  the  South,  by  organizing  a  "whit«  man's  party" 
and  by  the  use  of  Ku  Klux  methods,  made  a  fight 
for  social  safety  which  they  won  nearly  everywhere, 
and,  in  addition,  they  gained  political  control  of 
several  States  —  Tennessee  in  1869,  Virginia  in 
1869-1870,  and  North  Carolina  and  Georgia  in 

1870.  They  almost  won  Louisiana  in  1868  and 
Alabama  in  1870,  but  the  alarmed  radicals  came 
to  the  rescue  of  the  situation  with  the  Fifteenth 
Amendment  and  the  Enforcement  Laws  of  1870- 

1871.  With  more  troops  and  a  larger  number  of 
deputy  marshals  it  seemed  that  the  radicals  might 
securely  hold  the  remaining  States.  Arrests  of  con- 
servatives were  numerous,  plundering  was  at  its 
height,  the  Federal  Government  was  interested  and 
was  friendly  to  the  new  Southern  rulers,  and  the 
carpetbaggers  and  scalawags  feasted,  troubled  only 
by  the  disposition  of  their  negro  supporters  to  de- 
mand a  share  of  the  spoils.  Although  the  whites 
made  little  gain  from  1870  to  1874,  the  States 
already  rescued  became  more  firmly  conservative; 


RESTORATION  OP  HOME  RULE        291 

white  counties  here  and  there  in  the  black  States 
voted  out  the  radicals;  a  few  more  representatives 
of  the  whites  got  into  Congress;  and  the  Border 
States  ranged  themselves  more  solidly  with  the 
conservatives. 

3ut  while  the  Southern  whites  were  becoming 
desperate  under  oppression,  public  opinion  in  the 
North  was  at  last  beginning  to  aflFect  politics.  The 
elections  of  1874  resulted  in  a  Democratic  landslide 
of  which  the  Administratio:  was  obliged  to  take 
notice.  Grant  now  grew  m<  .0  responsive  to  criti- 
cism. In  1875  he  replied  to  a  request  for  troops 
to  hold  down  Mississippi:  "The  whole  public  are 
tired  out  v'  -  *hese  annual  autumnal  outbreaks  in 
the  South  anu  the  great  majority  are  ready  now  to 
condemn  any  interference  on  the  part  of  the  Gov- 
ernment." As  soon  as  conditions  in  the  South 
were  better  understood  in  the  North,  ready  sym- 
pathy and  political  aid  were  offered  by  many  who 
had  hitherto  acted  with  the  radicals.  The  Ku 
KIux  report  as  well  as  the  newspaper  writings  and 
the  books  of  J.  S.  Pike  and  Charles  NordhoflF,  both 
former  opponents  of  slavery,  opened  the  eyes  of 
many  to  the  evil  results  of  negro  suffrage.  Some  who 
had  been  considered  friends  of  th**  negro,  now  be- 
lieving that  he  had  proven  to  be  a  political  failure. 


J' 


i 


/.■ 


! 


i  i ! 


9M       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

coldly  abandoned  him  and  turned  Jidr  altruistic 
interests  to  other  objects  more  likely  to  succeed. 
Many  real  friends  of  the  negto  were  alarmed  at  the 
evils  of  the  reconstruction  and  were  anxious  to  see 
the  corrupt  political  leaders  deprived  of  further  in- 
fluence over  the  race.  To  others  the  constantly 
recurring  Southern  problem  was  growing  stale  and 
they  desired  to  hear  less  of  it.  Within  the  Repub- 
lican  party  in  each  Southern  State  there  were  seri- 
ous divisions  over  the  spoib.  First  it  was  carpet- 
bagger and  n^fro  against  the  scalawag;  later,  when 
the  black  leaders  insisted  that  those  who  furnished 
the  votes  must  have  the  larger  share  of  the  re- 
wards, the  fight  became  triangular.  As  a  result, 
by  1874  the  Republican  party  in  the  South  was 
spUt  into  factions  and  was  deserted  by  a  large 
proportion  of  its  white  membership. 

The  ovj^ervative  whites,  fiercely  resentful  after 
their  experiences  under  the  enforcement  laws  aod 
hopeful  of  Northern  sympathy,  now  planned  a  su- 
preme effort  to  regain  their  former  power.  Race 
lines  were  more  strictly  drawn;  ostracism  of  all  that 
was  radical  became  the  rule;  the  Republican  party 
in  the  South,  it  was  apparent,  was  doomed  to 
be  only  a  negro  party  weighed  down  by  the  scan- 
dal of  bad  government;  the  state  treasuries  were 


m 


\ 


RESTORATION  OF  HO^TE  RULE       MS 

bankrupt,  and  there  was  little  further  opportunity 
for  plunder.  These  considerations  had  mr  h  to  do 
with  the  return  of  scalawags  to  the  "white  man's 
party"  and  the  retirement  of  carpetbaggers  from 
Southern  politics.  There  was  no  longer  anything 
in  it,  they  said;  let  the  negro  have  it! 

It  was  under  these  conditions  that  the  "white 
man's  party"  carried  the  elections  in  Alabama, 
Arkansas,  and  Texas  in  1874,  and  Mississippi  in 
1875.  Asserting  that  it  was  a  contest  between  civ- 
ilization and  barbarism,  and  that  the  whites  under 
the  radical  regime  had  no  opportunity  to  carry  an 
election  legally,  the  conservatives  openly  made  use 
of  every  method  of  influencing  the  result  that  could 
possibly  come  within  the  radical  law  and  they  even 
employed  many  effective  methods  that  lay  outside 
the  law.  Negroes  were  threatened  with  discharge 
from  employment  and  whites  with  tar  and  feathers 
if  they  voted  the  radical  ticket;  there  were  night- 
riding  parties,  armed  and  drilled  "white  leagues," 
and  mysterious  firing  of  guns  and  cannon  at  night; 
much  plain  talk  assailed  the  ears  of  the  radical 
leaders;  and  several  bloody  outbreaks  occurred, 
principally  in  Louisiana  and  Mississippi.  Lou- 
isiana had  been  carried  by  the  Democrats  in  the 
fall  of  1872,  but  the  radical  returning  board  had 


I    i 


r 


,1 


' 


tM       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

revened  the  election.  In  1874  the  whites  rote  in 
rebellion  and  turned  out  Kellc^,  the  usurping 
Governor,  but  President  Grant  intervened  to  re- 
store him  to  oflSce.  The  "  Mississippi "  or  "  shot-gun 
plan"'  was  very  generally  employed,  except  where 
the  contest  was  likely  to  go  in  favor  of  the  whites 
without  the  use  of  undue  pressure.  The  white 
leaders  exercised  a  moderating  influence,  but  the 
average  white  man  had  determined  to  do  away 
with  negro  government  even  though  the  alterna- 
tive might  be  a  return  of  military  rule.  Congress 
investigated  the  elections  in  each  State  which  over- 
threw the  reconstructionists,  but  nothing  came  of 
the  inquiry  and  the  population  rapidly  settled  down 
into  good  order.  After  1875  only  three  States 
were  left  under  radical  government  —  Louisiana 
and  Florida,  where  the  returning  boards  could 
throw  out  any  Democratic  majority,  and  South 
Carolina,  where  the  negroes  greatly  outnumbered 
the  whites. 

Reconstruction  could  hardly  be  a  genuine  issue 
in  the  presidential  campaign  of  1876,  because  all  ex- 
cept these  three  reconstructed  States  had  escaped 
from  radical  control,  and  there  was  no  hope  and 

>  See  The  New  South,  by  Holland  Thompwo  (io  The  Chronicle*  of 
America). 


RESTORATION  OF  HOME  RULE       99^ 

little  real  deiire  o'  regaining  them.  It  was  even 
expected  that  in  thb  year  the  radicals  would  lose 
Louisiana  and  Florida  to  the  "  white  man's  party. " 
The  leaders  of  the  best  element  of  the  Republicans, 
both  North  and  South,  looked  upon  the  reccnstruc- 
tion  as  one  of  the  prime  causes  of  the  moral  break- 
down of  their  party;  they  wanted  no  more  of  the 
Southern  issue  but  planned  a  forward-looking, 
constructive  reform. 

To  some  of  the  Republican  leaders,  however, 
among  whom  w<u  James  G.  Blaine,  it  was  clear 
that  the  Republican  party,  with  its  unsavory 
record  under  Grant's  Adminis^  ation,  could  hardly 
go  before  the  people  with  a  reform  program. 
The  only  possible  thing  to  do  was  to  revive  some 
Civil  War  issue  —  "wave  the  bloody  shirt"  and 
fan  the  smoldering  embers  of  sectional  feeling. 
Blaine  met  with  complete  success  in  raising  the  de- 
sired issue.  In  January,  1876,  when  an  amnesty 
measure  was  brought  before  the  House,  he  moved 
that  Jefferson  Davis  be  excepted  on  the  ground 
that  he  was  responsible  for  the  mistreatment  of 
Union  prisoners  during  the  war.  Southern  hot- 
bloods  replied,  and  Blaine  skillfully  led  them  on  un- 
til they  had  foolishly  furnished  him  with  ample 
material  for  campaign  purposes.    The  feeling  thus 


H 


THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

aroused  was  so  strong  that  it  even  galvanized  into 
seeming  life  the  dying  interest  in  the  wrongs  of  the 
negro.  The  rallying  cry  "  Vote  as  you  shot ! "  gave 
the  Republicans  something  to  fight  for;  the  party 
referred  to  its  war  record,  claimed  credit  for  pre- 
serving the  Union,  emancipating  the  negro,  and 
reconstructing  the  South,  and  demanded  that  the 
country  be  not  "surrendered  to  rebel  rule. " 

Hayes  and  Tilden,  the  rival  candidates  for  the 
presidency,  were  both  men  of  high  character  and 
of  moderate  views.  Their  nominations  had  been 
forced  by  the  better  element  of  each  party.  Hayes, 
the  Republican  candidate,  had  been  a  good  soldier, 
was  moderate  in  his  views  on  Southern  questions, 
and  had  a  clean  political  reputation.  Tilden,  his 
opponent,  had  a  good  record  as  a  party  man  and 
as  a  reformer,  and  his  party  needed  only  to  attack 
the  past  record  of  the  Republicans.  The  principal 
Democratic  weakness  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  party 
drew  so  much  of  its  strength  from  the  white  South 
and  was  therefore  subjected  to  criticism  on  Civil 
War  issues. 

The  campaign  was  hotly  contested  and  was  con- 
ducted on  a  low  plane.  Even  Hayes  soon  saw  that 
the  "bloody  shirt"  issue  was  the  main  vote  winner. 
The  whites  of  the  three  "unredeemed"  Southern 


m 


RESTORATION  OF  HOME  RULE  207 
States  nerved  themselves  for  the  final  struggle.  In 
South  Carolina  and  in  some  parishes  of  Louisiana 
there  was  a  considerable  amount  of  violence,  in 
which  the  whites  had  the  advantage,  and  much 
fraud,  which  the  Republicans,  who  controlled  the 
election  machinery,  turned  to  best  account.  It 
has  been  said  that  out  of  the  confusion  which  the 
Republicans  created  they  won  the  presidency. 

The  first  election  returns  jemed  to  give  Tilden 
the  victory  with  184  undisputed  electoral  votes  and 
popular  majorities  of  ninety  and  over  six  thousand 
respectively  in  Florida  and  Louisiana;  only  185 
votes  were  needed  for  a  choice.  Hayes  had  166 
votes,  not  counting  Oregon,  in  which  one  vote  was 
in  dispute,  and  South  Carolina,  which  for  a  time 
was  claimed  by  both  parties.  Had  Louisiana  and 
Florida  been  Northern  States,  there  would  have 
been  no  controversy,  but  the  Republican  general 
headquarters  knew  that  the  Democratic  majorities 
in  these  States  had  to  go  through  Republican  re- 
turning boards,  which  had  never  yet  failed  to  throw 
them  out. 

The  interest  of  the  nation  now  centered  around 
the  action  of  the  two  returning  boards.  At  the 
suggestion  of  President  Grant,  prominent  Repub- 
licans went  South  to  witness  the  count.     Later 


■  i 


M 


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H^B^MliiMi^^ 


Mm 


) 


w^ 


296       THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

promineiit  Democrats  went  alao.  These  "visit- 
ing statesmen"  were  to  support  the  frail  returning 
boards  in  their  duty.  It  was  generally  undoiatood 
that  these  boards,  certainly  the  one  in  Louisiana, 
were  for  sale,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  the 
Democrats  inquired  the  price.  But  they  were 
afraid  to  bid  on  such  uncertain  quantities  as  Gov- 
ernor Wells  and  T.  C.  Anderson  of  Louisiana,  both 
notorious  spoilsmen.  The  members  of  the  boards 
in  both  States  soon  showed  the  stiffening  effect  of 
the  moral  support  of  the  Federal  Administration 
and  of  the  "visiting  statesmen."  Reassured  as 
to  their  political  future,  they  proceeded  to  do 
their  duty:  in  Florida  they  threw  out  votes  un- 
til the  ninety  majority  for  Tilden  was  changed  to 
925  for  Hayes,  and  in  Louisiana,  by  throwi^^  out 
about  fifteen  thousand  carefully  selected  Y  =  H, 
they  changed  Tilden's  lowest  majority  of  sb  ii  u- 
sand  to  a  Hayes  majority  of  nearly  four  thou.  A. 
Naturally  the  Democrats  sent  in  contesting  returns, 
but  the  presidency  was  really  won  when  the  Re- 
publicans secured  in  Louisiana  and  Florida  returns 
which  were  regular  in  form.  But  hoping  to  force 
Congress  to  go  behind  the  returns,  the  Democrats 
carried  up  contests  also  from  Oregon  and  South 
Carolina,  whose  votes  properly  belonged  to  Hayes. 


y 


RESTORATION  OF  HOME  RULE        299 

The  final  contest  came  in  Congress  over  the 
counting  of  the  electoral  votes.  The  Constitution 
provides  that  "the  President  of  the  Senate  shall, 
in  the  presence  of  the  Senate  and  the  House  of 
Representatives,  open  all  the  Certificates,  and  the 
Votes  shall  then  be  counted. "  But  there  was  no 
agreement  as  to  where  authority  lay  for  deciding 
disputed  votes.  Never  before  had  the  presidency 
turned  on  a  disputed  count.  Prom  1864  to  1874 
the  "twenty-second  joint  rule"  had  been  in  force 
under  which  either  House  might  reject  a  certificate. 
The  votes  of  Georgia  in  1868  and  of  Louisiana  in 
1872  had  thus  been  thrown  out.  But  the  rule  had 
not  been  readopted  by  the  present  Congress,  and 
the  Republicans  very  naturally  would  not  listen  to 
a  proposal  to  readopt  it  now. 

With  the  country  apparently  on  the  verge  of 
civil  war.  Congress  finally  created  by  law  an  Elec> 
toral  Commission  to  which  were  to  be  referred  all 
disputes  about  the  counting  of  votes  and  the  deci- 
sion of  which  was  to  be  final  unless  both  Houses 
concurred  in  rejecting  it.  The  act  provided  that 
the  commission  should  consist  of  five  senators,  five 
representatives,  four  designated  associate  justices 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  a  fifth  associate  justice 
to  be  chosen  by  these  four.    While  nothing  was 


i    i 


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1 

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MHM 


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i 


800       THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

said  in  the  act  about  the  political  affiliations  of  the 
members  of  the  commission,  every  one  understood 
that  the  House  would  select  three  Democrats  and 
two  Republicans,  and  that  the  Senate  would  name 
two  Democrats  and  three  Republicans.  It  was 
also  well  known  that  of  the  four  justices  designated 
two  were  Republicans  and  two  Democrats,  and  it 
was  tacitly  agreed  that  the  fifth  would  be  Justice 
David  Davis,  an  "independent. "  But  at  the  last 
moment  Davis  was  elected  Senator  by  the  Illinois 
legislature  and  declined  to  serve  on  the  G>mmis- 
sion.  Justice  Bradley,  a  Republican,  was  then 
named  as  the  fifth  justice,  and  in  this  way  the  Re- 
publicans obtained  a  majority  on  the  Commission. 

The  Democrats  deserve  the  credit  for  the  Elec- 
toral Commission.  The  Republicans  did  not  favor 
it,  even  after  they  were  sure  of  a  party  majority  on 
it.  They  were  conscious  that  they  had  a  weak  case, 
and  they  were  afraid  to  trust  it  to  judges  of  the 
Supreme  Court.  Their  fears  were  groundless,  how- 
ever, since  all  important  questions  were  decided 
by  an  8  to  7  vote,  Bradley  voting  with  his  fellow 
Republicans.  Every  contested  vote  was  given  to 
Hayes,  and  w'.th  185  electoral  votes  he  was  declared 
elected  on  March  2,  1877. 

Ten  years  before,  Senator  Morton  of  Indiana  had 


ii  i 


RESTORATION  OF  HOME  RULE        SOI 

said:  "I  would  have  been  in  favor  of  having  the 
colored  people  of  the  South  wait  a  few  years  until 
they  were  prepared  for  the  su£Prage,  until  they 
were  to  some  extent  educated,  but  the  necessi- 
ties of  the  times  forbade  that;  the  conditions  of 
things  required  that  they  should  be  brought  to 
the  polls  at  once. "  Now  the  condition  of  things 
required  that  some  arrangement  be  made  with  the 
Southern  whites  which  would  involve  a  complete 
reversal  of  the  situation  of  1867.  In  order  to  se- 
cure the  unopposed  succession  of  Hayes,  to  defeat 
filibustering  which  might  endanger  the  decision 
of  the  Electoral  Commission,  politicians  who  could 
speak  with  authority  for  Hayes  assured  influential 
Southern  politicians,  who  wanted  no  more  civil 
war  but  who  did  want  home  rule,  that  an  arrange- 
ment might  be  made  which  would  be  satisfactory 
to  both  sides. 

So  the  contest  was  ended.  Hayes  was  to  be  Pres- 
ident; the  South,  with  the  negro,  was  to  be  left  to 
the  whites;  there  would  be  no  further  military  aid 
to  carpetbag  governments.  In  so  far  as  the  South 
was  concerned,  it  was  a  fortunate  settlement  — 
^,  indeed,  than  if  Tilden  had  been  inducted 
mto  office.  The  remnants  of  the  reconstruction 
policy  were  surrendered  by  a  Republican  Prendent, 


13 


80S        THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX 

the  troops  were  soon  withdrawn,  and  the  three 
radical  States  fell  at  once  under  the  control  of  the 
whites.  Hayes  could  not  see  in  his  election  any  en- 
couragement to  adopt  a  vigorous  radical  position, 
and  Congress  was  deadlocked  on  party  issues  for 
fifteen  years.  As  a  result  the  radical  Republicans 
had  to  develop  other  interests,  and  the  North  grad- 
ually accepted  the  Southern  situation. 


Although  the  radical  policy  of  reconstruction 
came  to  an  end  in  1877,  some  of  its  results  were 
more  lasting.  The  Southern  States  were  burdened 
heavily  with  debt,  much  of  which  had  been  fraudu- 
'-^ntly  incurred.  There  now  followed  a  period  of 
adjustment,  of  refunding,  scaling,  and  repudiation, 
which  not  only  injured  the  credit  of  the  States  but 
left  them  with  enormous  debts.  The  Democratic 
party  under  the  leadership  of  former  Confederates 
began  its  r^me  of  strict  economy,  race  fairness, 
and  inelastic  Jeffersonianism.  There  was  a  po- 
litical rest  which  almost  amoimted  to  stagnation 
and  which  the  leaders  were  unwilling  to  disturb  by 
progressive  measures  lest  a  developing  democracy 
make  trouble  with  the  settlement  of  1877. 

The  undoing  of  reconstruction  was  not  entirely 
completed  with  the  understanding  of  1877.    There 


RESTORATION  OF  HOME  RULE       SOS 

remained  a  large  but  somewhat  shattered  Repub- 
lican party  in  the  South,  with  control  over  county 
and  local  government  in  many  negro  districts. 
Little  by  little  the  Democrats  rooted  out  these  last 
vestiges  of  negro  control,  using  all  the  old  radical 
methods  and  some  improvements,'  such  as  tissue 
ballots,  the  shuffling  of  ballot  boxes,  bribery,  force, 
and  redistricting,  while  some  regions  were  placed 
entirely  under  executive  control  and  were  ruled  by 
appointed  commissions.  With  the  good  govern- 
ment which  followed  these  changes  a  deadlocked 
Congress  showed  no  great  desire  to  interfere.  The 
Supreme  Court  came  to  the  aid  of  the  Democrats 
with  decisions  in  1875, 1882,  and  1883  which  drew 
the  teeth  from  the  Enforcement  Laws,  and  Congress 
in  1894  repealed  what  was  left  of  these  regulations. 
Under  such  discouraging  conditions  the  voting 
strength  of  the  Republicans  rapidly  melted  away. 
The  party  organization  existed  for  the  Federal 
offices  only  and  was  interested  in  keeping  down  the 
number  of  those  who  desired  to  be  rewarded.  As 
a  consequence,  the  leaders  could  work  in  harmony 
with  those  Democratic  chiefs  who  were  content  with 
a  "  solid  South  "  and  local  home  rule.     The  negroes 

» Sec  The  New  South,  by  Holland  Thompson  (in  Tht,  Chronicles  of 
America). 


km 


u 


804        THE  SEQUEL  OP  APPOMATTOX 

of  the  Black  Belt,  with  leM  enthusiaam  and  hope, 
but  with  quite  the  same  docility  as  in  1868,  began 
to  vote  as  the  Democratic  leaders  directed.  This 
practice  brought  up  in  another  form  the  question 
of  "negro  government"  and  resulted  in  a  demand 
from  the  people  of  the  white  counties  that  the 
n^ro  be  put  entirely  out  of  politics.  The  answer 
came  between  1890  to  1002  in  the  form  of  new 
and  complicated  election  laws  or  new  constitutions 
which  in  various  ways  shut  out  the  negro  from  the 
polls  and  left  the  government  to  the  whites.  Three 
times  have  the  Black  Belt  regions  dominated  the 
Southern  States:  under  slavery,  when  the  master 
class  controlled;  under  reconstruction,  when  the 
leaders  of  the  negroes  had  their  own  way;  and 
after  reconstruction  uiitil  negro  disfranchisement, 
when  the  Democratic  dictators  of  the  negro  vote 
ruled  fairly  but  not  always  acceptably  to  the 
white  counties  which  are  now  the  source  of  their 
political  power. 


Ml 


Ih 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

Tm  best  general  accounts  of  the  reconstruction  period 
are  found  in  James  Ford  Rhodes's  History  of  the  United 
States  from  the  Compromise  nf  1860  to  the  Restoration  of 
Eome  Rvie  at  the  South  in  1877,  volumes  v,  vi,  vn  (1006) ; 
m  William  A.  Dunning's  Reeonstruetion,  PoUtiad  and 
Eeonomict  1866-1877,  in  the  American  Nation  Series, 
volume  xxn  (1007) ;  and  in  Peter  Joseph  Hamilton's  The 
Reeonstruetion  Period  (1005),  which  is  volume  xvi  of  The 
History  of  North  America,  edited  by  F.  N.  Thorpe.  The 
work  of  Rhodes  is  spacious  and  fair-minded  but  there  are 
serious  gaps  in  his  narrative;  Dunning's  briefer  account 
covers  the  entire  field  with  masterly  handling;  Hamil- 
ton's history  throws  new  light  on  all  subjects  and  is 
particularly  useful  for  an  understanding  of  the  Southern 
point  of  view.  A  valuable  discussion  of  constitutional 
problems  is  contained  in  William  A.  Dunning's  Essay 
on  the  Civil  War  and  Reconstnution  and  Related  Topics 
(1004);  and  a  criticism  of  the  reconstruction  policies 
from  the  point  of  view  of  political  science  and  constitu- 
tional law  is  to  be  found  in  J.  W.  Burgess's  Reconstruc- 
tion and  the  Constitution,  1866-1876  (1002).  E.  B.  An- 
drews's The  United  States  in  our  own  Time  (1003)  gives 
a  popular  treatment  of  the  later  period.  A  collection 
of  brief  monographs  entitled  Why  the  Solid  South?  by 
Hilary  A.  Herbert  and  others  (1800)  was  written  as  a 

30  SOS 


MMlAiMl 


iteHii 


^'^  1 


IM  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

campaign  document  to  offset  the  drive  made  by  the 
Republicans  in  1888  for  new  enforcement  lawi. 

There  are  many  scholarly  monographs  on  reconstruc- 
tion in  the  several  States.  The  best  of  these  are :  J.  W. 
Gamer's  Reconitruetion  in  Mutisaippi  (1001),  W.  L. 
Fleming's  Civil  War  ami  RscotutrueHon  in  Alabama 
(1005).  J.  G.  deR.  Hamilton's  JUeonttnution  in  North 
Carolina  (1014).  W.  W.  Davis's  The  CivU  War  and  Rs- 
eonitnuiion  in  Florida  (lOlS),  J.  S.  Reynolds's  Reeon- 
ttrvetion  in  Sotiih  Carolina,  186&-1877  (1005);  C.  W. 
Ramsdell's  Reeonttruetion  in  'I'exaa  (1010).  and  C.  M. 
Thompson's  Reeonttruetion  in  Chorgia  (1015/. 

Books  of  interest  on  special  phases  of  reconstruction 
are  not  numerous,  but  among  those  deserving  mention 
are  Paul  S.  Pierce's  The  Fretdmen'a  Bureau  (1004).  D. 
M.  DeWitt's  The  Impeachment  and  Trial  of  Andrew 
Johnaon  (lOOS).  and  Paul  L.  Haworth's  The  Hayea-Til- 
den  Disputed  Presidential  Election  of  1876  (1006),  each 
oi  which  is  a  thorough  study  of  its  field.  J.  C.  Lester 
and  D.  L.  Wilson's  Ku  Klux  Klan  (1005)  and  M.  L. 
Avary's  Dixie  After  the  War  (1006)  contribute  much  to  a 
fair  understanding  of  the  feeling  of  the  whites  after  the 
Civil  War;  and  Gideon  Welles,  Diary,  S  vols.  (1011).  is  a 
mine  of  information  from  a  conservative  cabinet  officer's 
point  of  view. 

For  the  politician's  point  of  view  one  may  go  to  James 
G.  Blaine's  Ttoenty  Years  of  Congress,  2  vols.  (^  4, 
1886)  and  Samuel  S.  Cox's  Three  Decades  of  F  r  I 
Legislation  (1885).  Good  biographies  are  Jac  -j  A. 
Woodbum's  The  Life  of  Thaddeus  Stevens  (lOlS),  Moor- 
field  Storey's  Charles  Sumner  (1900).  C.  F.  Adams's 
Charles  Francis  Adams  (1900).  Less  satisfactory  be- 
cause more  partisan  is  Edward  Stanwood's  James 


II 


l\ 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 


907 


OUhspU  Bknne  (190d).  There  are  no  adequate  biog- 
n^hies  of  the  Democratic  and  Southern  leaden. 

The  oflBcial  documeLts  are  found  conveniently  ar- 
ranged in  William  McDonald's  Seleet  StaiuUa,  1861- 
1898  (IMS),  and  alao  with  other  matenal  in  Walter  L. 
Fleming's  Documentary  HUtory  of  Reconttrvetion,  2  vols. 
(1906, 1007).  The  general  reader  is  usually  repelled  by 
the  collections  known  as  Public  DocumerUt.  The  valu- 
able Ku  Klux  Triala  (1872)  is,  however,  separately 
printed  and  to  be  found  in  most  good  libraries.  By  a 
judicious  use  of  the  indispensable  Tablet  and  Index 
to  Public  Documenta  one  can  find  much  vividly  inter- 
esting material  in  connection  with  contested  election 
cases  and  reports  of  congressional  investigations  into 
conditions  in  the  South. 


I 


'AW 

w 

INDEX 


AbolitionUta.  Titm  on  racon- 
■Uuction.  W-tl 

AdftDu,  C.  P.,  cMdidatt  for 
prciidmtwl  aomiiMtioii,  t87 

Ad90rtuir,  Botton.  Sidney  Ao- 
drtwt  u  florvMpoodent  for, 
M 

Adttrtmr  of  Montgomery,  and 
•ducttion.  tlf 

Agricohure  in  th«  South,  M7-«8. 
t71.  I7S-74 

AlabMna,  oormption.  10-11 ;  pov- 
erty, 14;  PtoteetMit  Epiaeopel 
cburchet  doted.  IS;  labor.  47, 
110,  t68;  ncfro  kgialntion.  97; 
courta.  111;  and  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  I8f ;  negro  voten, 
Ul,  Mt;  oonititutfonal  con- 
vention, 158;eonatitution.  143- 
1A4,  lU;  abetention  policy, 
155. 150, 15S.  MS;  readmitted, 
157. 170;  Union  League  in.  189; 
negro  churchei,  SOO;  Khooli, 
215;  iUiterate  magirtrates.  M5; 
negro  legislaton.  fM;  taxes. 
tSl;  public  debt.  8S8;  de- 
creaw  in  property  valuea,  S83; 
value  of  railroacu.  SSO;  negro 
voting.  9SS;  two  govemmenta 
in.  SSO;  kgielatttre.  MO;  vigi- 
lance committee.  S45;  Kn  Klux 
b.  840;  partially  Democratic 
in  1870,  960;  permit!  mixed 
marriages,  870;  and  radicalism. 
890;  election  (1874).  893 

Alabama  daiaa,  tSS 

Alabama,  University  of.  S.  810. 
816 


Alexandria  (Va.).  Virginia  Gov- 
ernment transferred  to,  05. 
74 

Alvord.  J.  W..  quoted.  811 

Amendments,  »et  Constitution 

Ames,  General  Adelbert.  <wm- 
mands  military  district.  141 
(note) 

Amnesty.  Jtdmson's  procIam»- 
tion,  9.  75;  use  of  pardoning 
power,  87;  Art  of  1878.  888- 
889;  measure  (1870).  805 

Anderson.  T.  C„  «f  Louisiana, 
808 

Andrew,  J.  A.,  Governor  of 
MassachoMtts,  reconstruction 
policy,  81-88.  08 

Andrews,  General  Garnett.  oa 
fear  of  nepoes.  878 

Andrews.  Sidnev.  correspondent 
for  Boet6n  Adtertutr,  88 

Appomattox,  Grant  at.  880 

Arkansas,  808;  recognises  "Un- 
ion" State  government.  18; 
Lincoln's  reconstruction  plan 
adopted  (1808),  05;  Johnson 
recogniies  government.  74; 
negro  labor.  99;  representatives 
refused  admission  to  Congress. 
119;  abstention  policy  in  re- 
gard to  constitution,  155, 150 
170;  schools,  815;  scalawags  in, 
888;  corruption.  833;  railroad 
grant.  835;  split  in  state  gov- 
ernment, 830;  election  (1874), 
893 

Armstrong's  Hampton  Institute. 
tee  Hampton  Institute 


309 


il 


SIO 


INDEX 


I* 


Army,  officers  suist  civil  author- 
ities in  South,  75-70;  utilises 
negro  labor,  99-100;  military 
rule  in  South,  ISA,  140  et  $eq.; 
we  al*o  Occupation,  Army  of 

Ashley,  J.  M.,  of  Ohio,  160 

Atlanta  (Ga.),  post-war  condi- 
tion, 0 

Attakapas  Parish  (La.).  Ku  Klux 
incident,  254-55 

Banks,  General  Nathaniel,  and 
captured  slaves,  99 

Baptist  Church.  198.  202 

Beauregard,  General  P.  G.  T..  on 
negro  suffrage,  147-48 

Bingham,  J.  A.,  and  impeach- 
ment of  Johnson,  166 

Black,  Jeremiah,  and  impeach- 
ment of  Johnson,  166 

"Black  Belt,"  post-war  condi- 
tion, 40-41;  industrial  revolu- 
tion in,  265-67;  and  whites. 
271;  cotton  production,  271- 
272  (note);  domination  of 
South  by,  S04;  tee  alto  South 

Black  Cavalry,  245 

BUck  Friday  episode,  283 

"Bhtck  Laws,^'  89-90.  93-98, 
115-16,  127,  141;  lee  aUo 
Negroes,  legislation 

Blaine,  J.  G.,  quoted.  125;  and 
Republican  party,  295 

Bhur.  F.  P.,  o(  Missouri,  Demo- 
cratic nomination  (1868),  168- 
169 

"  Bloody  shirt "  issue  in  campaign 
of  1876,  295-96 

Border  States,  reconstruction  in, 
85-86;  see  aUo  South 

Botts,  J.  M.,  of  Virginia.  107 

Boutwell,  G.  S.,  radical  leader, 
122,  125;  and  tenure  of  office 
act,  134;  and  impeachment  of 
Johnson,  166 

Boynton,  General  H.  V.  N.,  on 
Southern  need  of  supplies,  5-6 

Bradley,  Justice  J.  P.,  on  elec- 
toral commission,  300 


"Brothers  and  Sisters  of  Pleas- 
ure and  Prosperity, "  275 

Brown,  J.  E.,  Governor  of  Geor- 
gia, and  negro  education,  212 

Brown,  Grats,  candidate  for 
presidential  nomination,  287 

Brownlow,  W.  G.,  Governor  of 
Tennessee,  224 

Bruce,  B.  K..  negro  senator,  242 
(note) 

Buchanan,  General  R.  C,  com- 
mands military  district  in 
South,  141  (note) 

Bullock  County  (Ala.),  Union 
League  in,  192 

Butler,  General  B.  F.,  and  negro 
labor,  99;  radical,  125;  and 
impeachment  of  Johnson,  160, 
166 

Campbell,  Judge,  Lincoln  gives 
reconstruction  terms  to,  VI 

Canby,  General,  commands  mili- 
tary department  in  South,  140- 
141  (note),  163 

Cardoso,  school  official  in  Mis- 
sissippi, 216 

Carpetbaggers,  appointed  to  Fed- 
eral offices,  80;  in  radical  Re- 
publican party,  149;  in  con- 
ventions. 153;  and  Union 
League,  193;  and  reli^on.  205; 
rule  in  South,  9,91  et  $eq. ;  use  of 
term.  222;  and  equal  rights 
issue,  275-76;  government  in 
hands  of,  289  (note);  against 
scalawags,  892 

Carter,  Speaker  of  Louisiana 
Legislature,  and  railroad  bills, 
235 

Catholic  Church,  23.  198 

Chamberlain,  D.  H.,  Governor  of 
South  Carolina,  825 

Charleston  (S.  C),  post-war 
condition,  5 

Chase,  S.  P.,  counsels  against 
seizure  of  cotton,  9;  and  negro 
suffrage,  28,  50,  132;  oppmed 
to  military  reconstruction,  159; 


INDEX 


Sll 


Chaw    •CanHnutd 
advJMs  Johnxm  againat  lus- 
pending   Stanton.    163;   and 
impeafmment     of     Johnaon, 
166-67 

Civil  BighU  Act.  84.  1S7.  141, 
«77 

Clanton.  General  J.  H..  of  Ala- 
bama, on  poaition  of  white*. 
250 

Oayton,  Judge,  of  Alabama.opin- 
ion  of  FreMmen'i  Bureau.  90 

Cktyton.  Mra..  Black  and  Wh^ 
under  the  Old  Rtoime,  quoted, 
S8-S9 

Cleveland,  foldien'  and  aailors' 
convention  at.  ISO;  Union 
League  formed  (1862),  176- 
177 

Clinton  (Mias.).  race  conflict  in. 
237  (note) 

Cloud,  achool  official  in  Ala- 
bama, 216 

Cdfaz.  Schuyler,  candidate  for 
Vice  President  (1868).  168 

Colfax  (La.),  race  conflict  u,  287 
(note) 

Columbia  (S.  C).  post-war  con- 
dition. 5 

Congreaa.  impatient  of  executive 
precedence.  65-66,  119-20; 
and  Southern  representatives, 
80,  86, 110-20, 128;  refuses  to 
recognise  reconstructed  oov- 
emments.  81 ;  Joint  Committee 
on  Reconstruction.  %t,  84. 121, 
125-26,  127.  129-30,  131,  198. 
266  (note) ;  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, 82,  85,  130;  tee  also 
Constitution;  radical  recon- 
struction plans,  83-84;  ludi- 
calism.  83-84.  118  ei  eeq.,  285; 
CivO  Riflhts  Act,  84,  137. 141. 
277;  and  Johnson,  126  et  eeq.; 
assumes  control  of  reconstruc- 
tion, 129.  142-43;  Tenure  of 
Office  Act.  134;  Army  Appro- 
priation Act.  134;  reconstruc- 
tion acU,  134-37,  158-60;  su- 


preme control.  140;  and  Su- 
preme Court.  158-60;  im- 
peachment of  President,  160 
et  leg.;  and  Grant.  171;  negro 
members,  230. 242;  Committee 
on  the  Condition  of  the  South, 
241;  Committee  on  the  Late 
Insurrectionary  States.  241; 
enforcement  bcts,  260.  261-62. 
290, 892, 808; "  Ku  Klux  Bill,  " 
261, 862;  committee  to  investi- 

§ate  conditions  in  Southern 
Utes,  262;  Amnesty  Act 
(1872),  288-89;  dedine  of  radi- 
calism. 288  (note),  890;  inves- 
tigates election,  294;  anmesty 
measure  (1876),  295;  Electoral 
Conunission,  299-300;  dead- 
locked by  party  issues.  302 

Connecticut  and  negro  suffrage. 
285 

Constitution.  Johnaon  and,  72. 
162;  Thirteenth  Amendment. 
79;  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
82,  84,  85,  130,  131-33,  135- 
136,  137,  156,  178;  Fifteenth 
Amendment,  169-70, 171, 178, 
882.290 

Constitutional  conventions  in 
South.  158  et  eeq. 

Constitutional  Union  Guards. 
245 

Conway,  stImjoI  official  in  Louisi- 
ana. j216 

Copperheads.  176 

Cotton,  tax  on,  8;  seised.  9-11; 
destruction  of.  11;  production 
(1880).  271-72  (note) 

Council  of  Safety.  245 

Coushatta  (La.),  race  conflict  in. 
237  (note) 

Cowan,  administration  Repub- 
lican. 122 

Credit  Mobilier,  282 

Crittenden-Johnson  resolutions, 
55,69 

Cuba.  United  States  and.  284 

Cumberland  Presbyterian 
Church.  204 


ii 


Sli 


INDEX 


miiifi  f*.  at 

Curry,  J.  L.  M.,  and  negro  educa- 
tion. SIS.  S14-15 

Curtie,  B.  Rtoouniel  »t  impeeeh- 
ment,  IM 

Davii,  David,  candidate  for 
preiidential  nomination,  t87; 
and  Electoral  CommiMion,  800 

Davia,  Jeffenon.  pray«  in 
Church  for.  S3;  aiMoeeded  by 
negro  in  Senate,  S80;  diifran- 
chiaed.  S89;  and  amnesty,  S95 

Davii,  Nichokf,  duuracteriset 
Lakin.S05-06 

De  Bow,  J.  D.  B..  on  negro  la- 
bor, see  (note) 

Democratic  party,  and  Critten- 
den-Johnaon  rnoluUoni,  56, 
e9;  at  end  of  war,  70;  Doudas 
Democrats,  70,  87;  ttad  Jonn- 
•on,  70,  88,  188;  "Democratic 
and  Conservative"  party,  150; 
platform  (ISeS),  109;  Union 
League  and.  188,  100-01;  in 
Consress  from  South,  SSO; 
Southern  Unionists  turn  to, 
S77;  and  Civil  RighU  Act,  S77; 
"New  Departure,"  Democrats, 
S87;  supports  Greeley,  S88; 
and  election  of  1876,  S97-98; 
and  Electoral  Commission, 
SOO;  during  period  of  adjust- 
ment, SOS,  SOS 

Dennison,  William,  resigns  from 
Cabinet,  131 

District  of  Columbia,  negro  suf- 
frage in.  134;  corruption,  S82 

Dixon,  James,  admmistration 
Republican,  ISS 

Dixon,  W.  H..  S9 

Doolittle,  administration  Repub- 
lican. ISS 

Douglass,  Frederick,  quoted. 
37-38 

Eaton,  John,  chaplain  in  Grant's 

army,  99 
Eaton.  Colonel  John,  106 


Education,    negro,    46;    Freed- 

men's  Bureau  and,  111-lS;  b 

South.  S08-SO 
Elections  under  carpetbag  rule, 

S37-S0 
Electoral  Commission,  S90-S00 
Emancipation  Prodamation,  36, 

176 
Enforcement  acts,  S60-61,  SSO, 

SOS,  303 
Episcopal  Church.  198,  S04 
Evarts,  W.  M.,  counsel  at  im- 

peadmient.  166 
Ewing,      Thomas,      nominated 

Semtary  of  War,  164 

Feasenden,  General.  Ftcedmen's 
Bureau  oflSdal.  106 

Fessenden.  W.  P..  moderate  Re- 
publican. ISS;  and  negro  suf- 
frage, 18S 

Finance,  post-war  condition  in 
South,  S.  5;  war  taxes.  8;  li- 
cense taxes.  76;  repudiation  of 
Confederate  war  debt.  77, 130; 
under  military  governors,  145- 
146;  effect  of  bad  government 
in  South,  S30-36;  credit  sys- 
tem, S70;  readjustments,  S83; 
panic  of  187S,  S8S 

Fish,  C.  R.,  The  Path  of  Empire. 
cited,  S84  (note) 

Fislc,  General,  critidsm  of  Ken- 
tucky Legislature,  113 

Fisk,  James,  S83,  S86 

Florida,  negro  colony  in.  36;  ne- 
gro legiuation,  96;  and  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  ISS;  ne- 
gro voters.  151;  schools,  S15; 
recitation  in  negro  school,  S18- 
S19;  and  reconstruction  ({ov- 
ernment.  SSI ;  corruption, 
SS6;  taxes.  SSI;  decrease  in 

Sroper^  values,    SS3;  Equal 
lights  Law.  S76;  and  radicals, 
S04,  S95;  election  of  1876.  S97, 
SOS 
Forrest.  General.  Grand  Wizard 
of  Ku  Klux,  S48,  S59 


INDEX 


SIS 


n«edmen,  tee  N«groei 

Fkvedmea'i  Aid  Societies.  177. 
807.  SIS 

BVeedmen'i  Bureau,  88,  81,  8S. 
8«,  80,  90.  U6,  Ifll,  187;  con- 
fiacable  property  turned  over 
to.  11;  official  deicribet  con- 
ditioni  in  South.  18-14;  aa  re- 
lief agency,  IS;  in  Kentucky. 
M;  aa  publicity  agent.  S8;  and 
contract  labor,  46;  on  relation! 
between  races.  48;  agiUtors 
from,  fiS;  extension.  74.  84. 
128, 129;  and  negroes.  80. 14i, 
149,  175;  views  of  North  cai^ 
ried  out  in.  89;  influence  on 
legiahttion  and  oovemment. 
94, 97, 148;  officials  of.  97, 98- 
99:  character  of,  98;  esUb- 
lished  (1885).  102-03;  func- 
tions. 10S-O4.  107-00;  ob- 
jections to,  104-05,  112-18; 
organisation.  105-07;  courts. 
110-11.  llS-14;  educational 
work.  111-18;  political  pos- 
sibilities. 115;  results.  116-17; 
and  radicals.  181.  156;  Union 
League  and.  177.  188.  194 
(note),  195;  negro  education 
218 

FVeedmen's  Bureau  Act,  128. 1 29, 
187 

PVeedmen'g  Inquiry  Conunission 
101 

"Freedmen's  Readers."  218 

Frterant,  J.  C.  and  the  radicals. 
119 

Fulloton.  General,  and  Freed- 
men's Bureau.  106.  113;  on 
treatment  of  negroes.  112-13 

Garfield.  J.  A..  132 

Garland,  ex  parte.  159 

Geneva  Arbitration  (1872),  283 

Georgetown  (D.  C).  vote  on 
negro  suffrage  in.  184 

Georgia,  poverty  in,  14;  govern- 
ment relief,  15;  negro  colony 
in,  86;  courts.  111,  113;  mili- 


tary government.  143.  144; 
suit  against  Stanton.  159; 
military  rule  resumed.  170; 
reoonstruction  in,  171-72, 821 ; 
legislature,  172,  240;  repre- 
senUtives  in  Congress,  172, 
289  (note);  n«gro  voters.  822; 
Godkin  diaracterises  officials 
of.  226;  holds  mixed  marriages 
illegal.  276;  conservatives  gain 
control  in.  290;  election  (1868), 
299 

Gillem,  General,  commands  mili- 
Ur^  department.  141  (note) 

Godkui.E.L.,  quoted,  180  (note); 
on  Georgia  politicians,  226 

Gordon.  J.  B..  and  negro  educa- 
tion. 212 

Gould.  Jay.  283.  286 

Grant,  U.  S..  186,  224,  280.  297; 
urges  use  of  white  troofis  b 
South,  21;  orders  arrest  of 
paroled  Confederates.  22;  re- 
port on  South,  88, 89;  protests 
arrest  of  Southern  military 
leaders.  74;  and  captured 
ahives,  99;  and  Freedmen's 
Bureau,  106;  Army  Appro- 
priation Act,  134;  radiaUum, 
141  (note),  889-40;  Congress 
given  full  powers  to,  148;  tem- 
porarily Secretary  of  War,  163 ; 
and  Stanton,  163,  165;  nom- 
inated by  National  Union 
party,  168;  elected  President. 
169;  reconstruction,  171;  and 
enforcement  acts,  860-61; 
expansionist,  283-84;  vote  for, 
285-86;  appointees,  286;  re- 
election. 288;  refuses  to  inter- 
fere in  Mississippi.  291;  re- 
stores Kellogg  to  office,  294 

Greeley.  Horace,  candidate  for 
Presidenw.  287-88 

Greene.  S.  S..  quoted.  208 

Groesbeck,  W.  S..  counsel  at 
unpeachment,  166 

Guthrie,  .Tames,  Democratic 
leader,  122 


814 


INDEX 


Halin,  Michael.  Goranor  of 
Lodakaa.  Liooob'a  letter 
tOk  88-<l7 

HttU  Columbia  ning  at  Union 
Lewue  initiation,  188 

Halleck.  General  H.  W..  orders 
in  Ttigud  to  marriMe,  SO 

Hampton,  General  Wade,  174, 
176,  kttur  to  Jdinaon,  81; 
and  negro  niffrage,  81;  and 
Vntdmen'a  Bureau,  107 

Hiimpton  Institute,  ttO;  teadi- 
er'aremark  on  negro  education, 
211-18 

Hancock,  General  W.  S.,  com- 
manda  military  department, 
141  (note).  168 

Hardee,  General  W.  J.,  quoted, 
244 

Harlan,  Jamea,  resigns  from 
Cabinet.  181 

Harria,  I.  G.,  on  Johnson,  78 

Hayea^  R.  B.,  candidate  for  prea- 
idem^.  806,  807,  808;  elected, 
300,  801:  and  radicaliam,  808 

UeU  Hole  Swamp,  834 

Hendricka,  T.  A.,  Democratic 
leader,  188 

Htrald,  New  York,  Knox  as 
correraondent  of,  88;  on 
radical  reconatruction,  148 

Heroea  of  America.  179. 848 

Hill.  B.  H..  of  Georgia,  and  "Jim 
Crow"  theory,  877 

Hill,  General  D.  H.,  of  North 
Candina.  879  (note) 

Hill,  Thomaa,  President  of  Har- 
vard. 800 

Holden,  W.  W.,  provisional  gov- 
erns of  Nwtli  Carolina,  7ft, 
77, 884, 888:  and  Union  League. 
18«,  189 

Home  Guards,  845 

Howard,  General  O.  O.,  head  of 
Ftreedmen'a  Bureau,  105 

Humphr^a,  B.  G.,  Governor  of 
Miaaiaaippi.  opinion  of  Freed- 
men'a  Bureau,  90;  advocatea 
civil  equality,  01 


Immigration  to  South,  negioea 

agunst.868 
Impeachment  of  President,  160 

ttuq. 
Irish,  South   Carolina  imports, 

871 

Jadcson  (Miss.),  post-war  con- 
dition, 5 

Jews  in  South,  88,  874 

Jillaon,  acbool  official  in  South 
Carolina,  216 

"Jim  Crow,"  car,  05;  theory  of 
"separate  but  equal"  rights, 
877 

John  Brown'*  Bodjf  sung  in 
Union  League  initiatbn.  184 

Johnson.  Andrew,  amnes^  proc- 
lamation. 9,  75;  policies  op- 
posed by  Andiews.  88;  and 
negro  aimrase.  50.  78;  recon- 
atruction policy.  57-58.  73  et 
Mq.,  88;  military  ^vemor  of 
Tennessee.  05;  nonunation,  70; 
personal  characteriatics,  71-78, 
78;  adopta  Lincoln'a  policy,  73, 
88;  and  Congreaa.  80  et  aeq., 
118.  119.  180-81,  126  et  uq.. 
888;  use  of  pardoning  power, 
87;  speechmaking  tour  to  the 
West.  181;  impeachment,  158 
et  »eq.\  and  Stanton,  163-65 

Johnson,  Reverdy,  122 

Kansas  and  negro  suffrage,  156, 
285 

Kelley,  "Pig  Iron,"  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, 150 

Kellogg,  W.  P.,  Governor  of 
Louisiana.  224-25, 204 

Kentucky,  Confederates  in,  25- 
26;  and  abolition  of  slavray, 
36;  exception  in  reconstruction 
problem,  86 

Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle,  176 

Knights  of  the  White  Camelia, 
287,  246,  251-52,  250 

Knox,  T.  W..  correspondent  for 
NewYork£reraU,28 


INDEX 


815 


Ku  Khu  Kkn.  191,  «S7.  t4S  ei 
Mq.,  290;  development.  49, 
S4S-46;  and  Freedmen's  Bu- 
reau, 107;  and  Union  League, 
194  (note) ;  activities,  207, 219, 
240,  2A2  et  aeq.,  26S-64;  organ- 
iiation,  246-49;  objecU,  249- 
250, 2A2, 2eS;  report  of  Federal 
commanders,  250-51;  political 
effects,  260-61;  "Ku  KIux 
Act,"  261,  262;  and  negro 
miffrage,  201 

Labor,  free  negro.  45-47,  266-67, 
272-73;  Freedmen's  Bureau, 
46,  109-10,  266;  testimon^r  of 
Joint  Committee  concerning, 
82;  importation  of  labor,  268 

Laldn,  Hev.  A.  S.,  agent  of 
Northern  Methodist  Church 
in  Alabama,  205-06.  207-08 

Land,  price  i^ter  Civil  War,  4; 
fertiluers  for,  271,  272 

Lanier,  Sidney,  letter  to  Taylor, 
quoted,  279-80 

Latham,  Henry,  29 

Lee,  General  R.  E.,  president  of 
Washington  College,  17-18; 
and  his  uniform.  20;  letter  to 
Letcher,  31,  32;  kneels  beside 
negro  in  church,  44;  witness 
before  Joint  Committee,  125; 
and  military  reconstruction, 
147;  disfranchised,  289 

Lwslation,  Negro,  see  "Black 
Laws'* 

Leslie,  South  Carolina  carpet- 
bagger. 225 

Letcher.  John,  Governor  of  Vir- 
ginia, Lee  writes  to.  31, 32 

Lewis,  D.  P.,  of  Alabama,  and 
Union  League,  189 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  and  negro 
suffrage,  50, 66-67;  reconstruc- 
tion policy,  55-57,  58,  62;  and 
Wade-Davis  Bill,  56,  66,  120; 
last  speech  quoted,  56-57;  re- 
construction plan  put  to  trial, 
6S-68;   Proclamation  of  De- 


cember,  1863,   64,  119;   and 
Congress,  65-60.  67-68;  nom- 
inated   by     National    Union 
part^     (1864),     70;     Moond 
Cabmet,  70;   and  radicalism, 
119;  vote  for  (1864),  285 
Lincoln  Brotherhood,  275 
Lindsay,    R.    B.,   Governor  of 
Alabama,  on   Northern  mis- 
sionaries, 205 
Lonjptreet,  General  James,  147 
Louuiana,  recogniises  "Union" 
state  government,  18;  White- 
law  B^id  in,  28;  Lincoln's  re- 
construction    plan     adoptted 
(1862),  65;  Johnson  recognizes 
government  of,  74;  treatment 
of  negroes  by  army  in,  99; 
I      Freedmen's  Bureau  courts  in, 
'       113;    representatives    refused 
I      admission  to  Congress,  119- 
120;  military  government  in, 
!       144;  negro  voters,   151,   152, 
222,  239;  equal  rights  legiala- 
!       tion,  154,  275,  276;  schools, 
i      215,  217;  carpetbag  rule,  221; 
I       conservatives,  228;  corruption, 

225,  233-34,  235;  legiskture. 

226,  227,  240;  taxes,  231 ;  pub- 
lic debt,  232;  decrease  in  prop- 

'       erty  values,  233;   negro  miJi- 
I      tia,  236-87;  two  governments 
in,    230;    government    over- 
turned, 24(M1;  omitted  from 
I      Federal    investigation,    262; 
!      labor,  268;  and  radicalism,  290, 
I       294,    295;   elections,    293-94, 
!       297,  298,  299 
;  Louisiana  State  Seminary,  3 
!  Louisiana  State  University,  217 
I  Louisville  and  Nashville  Rail- 
'       road,  7 

I  Loyal  League,  «<«  Union  League 
I  Lynch,  negro  officeholder,  242 
I       (note) 

I   McCardle,  ex  parte,  159-60 

I   McCuUoch,  Hugh,  Secretary  of 

I      Treasury,  and  seizure  of  cotton 


8ie 


INDEX 


McCuUodi— ConlmiMl 
in  South,  9-10;  and  Johnaon, 
74.168 

McDowdl,  G«iwnl  Irvin.  com- 
mandi  military  diitrict,  141 
(note) 

McPhenon,  Edward,  clerk  of  the 
Houae,  ISl 

Marvin,  William,  Governor  of 
Florida,  on  status  of  negroes. 
91,M.9S 

Maryland,  disfranchisement  in, 
fUHM;  state  emancipation  in, 
86;  and  negro  suffrage,  285 

Meade^  General  G.  G.,  com- 
mands military  district,  140- 
141  (note) 

Memminger,  C.  G.,  Govemw  of 
South  Carolina,  on  status  of 
freedmen,  90-91,  9t-9S 

Memphis  (Tenn.),  18ft:  race 
riots  in,  siS,  181,  175;  conven- 
tion of  Confederate  sddiers 
and  sailors  at,  ISO;  surrenders 
charter,  288 

Men  of  Justice,  i45 

Methodist  Church,  198, 199-201, 
202,203-04,206 

Metropolitan  Guwd,  2S7 

Michigan  rejects  negro  suffrage, 
156,285 

Milligan,  ex  parts,  159 

Minnesota  rejects  negro  suffrage, 
156,285 

Mississippi,  poverty  in,  14;  re- 
jects Thirteenth  Amendment, 
79;  negro  legislation  in,  94, 
95-96;  treatment  of  negroes  b^ 
army  in,  99;  courts.  111;  mili- 
tary government,  148,  144, 
157;  negro  voters,  151.  222; 
constitution,  158-54,  155; 
suit  against  President.  159; 
reconstruction  fails  in,  170; 
and  radicalism,  171;  schools, 
215,  217,  218;  conservatives, 
828;  negroes  in  legislature,  226; 
taxes,  281;  negro  militia,  286; 
and   enforcement  acta,  261; 


ponita  mised  marriafes,  276; 
unrepresented  m  Coniress, 
289  (note);  Grant  and  b- 
terference  in.  291;  elections 
(1875),  298 

Mississqq)!  River,  negro  colonies 
alon|^S7 

Mississippi  Shot  Gun  Ran,  208. 
294 

Mississippi,  University  of,  216 

Missouri,  and  Confederates,  26; 
state  emancipation  in,  86;  re- 
jects negro  suffrage,  285 

Mobile  (Ala.),  post-war  condi- 
tion, 5;  surrenders  chuter,  2^ 

Montgome^  (Ala.),  separate 
organisation  ot  Baptist  Church 
m,  208;  negro  education,  212; 
Ku  Kliu  prodamation,  257-58 

Montgomery  Conference  on  Race 
Problems  (1900),  Proeeedingi 
quoted,  214-15 

Moore,  Governor,  and  negro 
education,  212 

Morgan,  E.  D.,  Senator,  and 
Freedmen's  Bureau  Act,  129 

Morton,  O.  P.,  of  Indiana,  125; 
on  negro  suffrage,  800-01 

Moses.  F.  J.,  Jr.,  Governor  of 
South  Carolina.  224 

Moses.  Judge,  in  South  Carolina. 
225 

Nash,  negro  officeholder.  242 
(note) 

NaUon,  New  York,  180  (note); 
editorial  on  post-war  church 
situation  <^uoted,  201  (note); 
on  corruption  of  government, 
226 

National  Teachers  Association 
meeting  (1865),  208 

National  Union  party,  Rmubli- 
can  party  becomes,  70;  Whigs 
and  Dou^as  Democrats  join, 
70-71;  convention  at  nila- 
delphia.  180;  nominates  Grant. 
168 

Negro  Affairs,  Dq>artment  of,  177 


INDEX 


S17 


Ncpoes,  M  loldien  in  South,  91- 
M;  proUema  of  raooutruc- 
tion.  Si  et  teq.;  healUi  condi- 
tioni  unong,  41-4S;  morala 
and  mannen,  4t-4S;  poverty, 
44-44:  education.  44-4A.  209, 
211-90:  relationa  with  whitea, 
47-48,  977-78:  lawleaaneaa, 
48-49:  auffrage.  40-59,  A8.  06- 
67, 78. 84, 85, 134, 169, 984-85, 
300-01,  304;  lincoln  urgea 
deportation  of  freedmen,  66: 
legialation  concerning,  77-78, 
80-90, 93-98, 115-16, 197, 141; 
atatua  at  doae  of  war,  89  et 
M?. :  Freedmen'a  Bureau  Buper- 
viaes,  109;  Union  League  and. 
181  et  »eq.;  religion,  901-06; 
rule  in  South,  991  et  $eq.\  in 
Congreu,  930,  949;  and  sUte 
offioea,  949:  and  Ku  ifluz, 
958;  anti-negro  movementa, 
963;  labor,  966,  979;  "privi- 
leges," 969;  advantages,  970- 
971 ;  aa  farmers,  971-74 ;  change 
in  condition  diving  reconstruc- 
tion, 974-75;  mixed  marriages, 
976 

Nelson,  coimael  at  impeachment, 
166 

New  England,  and  negro  suffrage 
156,  985;  Ftaedmen's  Aid  So- 
ciety, 909 

New  Orleans,  negro  soldiers  in, 
91-99;  riots  in,  83,  131,  175. 
937  (note);  Northern  teachers 
in.  910;  public  debt,  939;  Fed- 
eral officials  at,  941 

New  York,  charity  for  relief  of 
South,  14;  and  negro  suffrage, 
156,984 

New  York  City.  Union  League 
organised.  177;  headquartera 
for  Union  League,  181;  cor- 
ruption in,  989 

Nordhoff,  Charles,  991;  The  Cot- 
ton Statet  in  tke  Spring  and 
Summer  of  1876,  cited,  939 
(note) 


N  /Tfolk,  "oontnbaad"  eaap,  86 
North,  free  negroes  of,  85-86; 

Clantera  from,  49;  capital  and 
kbor  from,  908;  raange  in 
attitude  toward  South,  989; 
politics,  991 

North  Carolina,  negro  colonies 
in,  36,  99;  Johnson  proclaims 
restoration  of,  75;  committee 
on  lawa  for  freedmen.  91.  99; 
courts.  Ill;  negro  voters,  159; 
Union  League,  185.  186.  194; 
carpetbag  rule,  991;  public 
debt.  939;  negro  militia.  936; 
Democratic  in  1870,  960;  and 
enforcement  acts,  961;  con- 
servatives gain  control  of,  980 

North  Carolina,  University  of,910 

Occupation,  Army  of,  18-99,  81; 

«M  afao  Army 
Ohio  rejects  negro  suffrage,  156, 

985 
Ord,  General  E.  O.  C,  commands 

military  division,  140  (note) 
Or^on,  election  of  1876, 997, 998 
Orr,  J.  L.,  and  negro  education, 

919 
Orth,  S.  P.,  The  Bote  and  the 

Maekine,  dted,  989  (note) 

Pale  Faces,  945,  951 

Patton,  R.  M.,  Governor  of  Ala- 
bama, 174,  175;  and  negro 
suffrage,  51,  78;  and  contract 
labor,  110;  and  negro  educa- 
tion. 919 

Peabody  Board,  917-18 

"Peace  Societies,"  149,  179,  945 

Perry,  B.  F.,  Governor  of  South 
Carolina,  and  negro  suffrage, 
78-79 

Pettua,  General,  <}uoted,  950 

Phelps,  J.  S.,  inihtary  governor 
of  Arkansas,  65 

Philadelphia,  convention  of  N^ 
tional  Union  party  at,  ISO; 
Union  League  organized 
(1863),  177 


• 
818 


INDEX 


Wmpa,  W«mM1.  Icbmaa  aad. 
Its 

Pikfl^  J.  8.,  t01;  aoooiiBt  of  con- 
dhknu  in  Sooth  Cwdiiut.  1»- 
17:  Tk$  Pmtntt  StaU,  quoted. 

tt7-ao 

PindibMk.  P.  B.  S.,  negro  offioe- 
hdder.  Mt  (note) 

FHtibivi^,  eoloiera'  and  Miilon' 
convention  at.  190 

Politio.  theoretinl  buia  of.  A4- 
Ui  tee  alto  names  of  partia 

Pi^te^  General  John,  oommanda 
military  district,  140-41  (note) 

Poverty,  of  South  after  Civil 
War,  1^14;  among  negroes,  44 

PMbyterian  Chaidi,18e-M,  C04 

Preteript,  constitution  of  Ku 
Kluz  Klan,  M8,  «40 

Professions  in  South  after  Civil 
War,  16 

Propaganda,  campaign  of  mis- 
representation against  South, 
8S-8S;  by  Union Xeague.  177- 
178;  tee  tdto  Publicity 

Publicity,  newq>aper  correspond- 
ents in  South.  87-49 

Pulaski  (Tenn.).  Ku  Klux  Klan 
orif^ates  at,  246;  Ku  Klux 
incident,  956 

Quakers,  opinion  as  to  secession, 
1»8 

Radicalism,  118  et  iq.;  decline 
of,S8(MM 

Bailroads,  post-war  condition  in 
South,  fr-7;  dishonest  specu- 
lation, SS4-S6 

Bainey,  negro  oflSceholder,  MS 
(note) 

Randolph,  Ryland,  editor  of 
Tutealooia  Independent  Moni- 
tor, 146,  24S-44 

Raymond,  administration  Re- 
publican, 182 

Reconstruction,  problems  in 
South,  1  et  teg.,  86;  negro  as 
central  figure,  S4  et  teg. ;  execu- 


tive plans  for,  Siettea.;  CrH- 
teadeoJohnson  reBohiaoM,a5; 
Democratic  party  on.  90;  Jobt 
Committee  on,  8t,  84.  Ill, 
18»HM.  1«7,  18»-8Q.  181,  108, 
866  (note);  congressional  pol- 
icy of.  184-88;  politkal  issue, 
160,  804-06;  results  of  radical 
policy,  808-04;  bibliogruhy, 
805-07 

Bed  String  Band.  170.  846 

Reed.  Governor  of  Florida,  876 

Refugees^  14.  108 

Refugees.  Fiieedmen  and  Aban- 
doned Lands.  Bureau  of.  108; 
tte  alto  Freedmen's  Bureau 

ReM,  Whitdaw,  relates  inckknt 
of  Confteierate  uniforms,  80- 
81;  as  newspaper  correspond- 
ent,  88;  interview  with 
Hampton,  61-68 

Relief  agoicies,  after  Civil  War, 
14-16;  Freedmen's  Bureau, 
16,  107-00;  Government,  16 

Religbn,  separation  at  Northern 
and  Southern  churches,  83; 
among  negroes,  49-44;  in 
South,  196-808;  military  cen- 
sorship in  diurdi  matters,  197; 
tee  alto  names  of  den(Nnina- 
tions^ 

R^MiUkan  party,  and  recon- 
struction, 63,  896;  during 
Civil  War,  60-70;  secures  ne- 
gro vote,  116;  majority  in  Con- 
gress, 188;  in  South,  148-49. 
161. 898;  platform  (1868).  169; 
and  the  North,  884;  negro 
suffrage,  884-86;  loses  control 
in  House,  886;  Liberal  Repub- 
lican movement,  887;  issues 
(1876),  896-96:  and  Electoral 
Commission,  300;  dedine  of 
strength,  808 

Revels,  negro  officeholder,  848 
(note) 

Rhodes,  J.  F.,  on  con^resoonal 
policy  of  reconstruction,  118- 
119 


INDEX 


81» 


lUehmoDd  (Vs.)«  pott-irar  oon- 
ditk».  «:  Hdlwk'i  order  b 
regard  to  nuurUge.  tO;  inei- 
dent  of  Lee  and  a  negro  in 
church,  4S-44;  Lincoln  and 
Confederate  Government  in. 
«7 

Rifle  Club*  of  South  Carolina. 
M6-46.MS 

Boada  in  Tennesiee  after  Civil 
War.  4 

Saifold,  M.  J.,  on  negro  suffrage, 
M 

"8aiaiyGnb."«M 

Santo  Domingo,  Grant  aeelu  an- 
nexation of.  883-84 

Savannah  (Ga.).  inddent  relat- 
ing to  Confederate  uniforms. 
tO-81 

Scalawags,  in  constitutional  con- 
ventions, US;  desert  radicals, 
IM;  disabilities  removed,  171; 
and  the  churches,  205;  use  of 
term,  8M 

Schofleld.  General  J.  M.,  106; 
commands  military  district, 
140  (note):  Secretxy  of  War, 
187 

Schudcers,  J.  W.,  quoted,  166 

Sdiurs,  Carl,  on  army  of  occupa- 
tion, 19;  report  on  conditions 
in  SouUi.  88.  89,  SO;  on  negro 
labor,  45-46 

Scott,  R.  K..  Governor  of  South 
Carolina,  8S6 

Sea  Islands,  negron  sent  to,  36, 
108.114 

Seward.  W.  H.,  and  Jackson.  74; 

espansionist,  883 
Seymour,  Hwatio,  of  New  York, 

168. 169 
Sharkey,   W.   L.,   Governor  of 

Mississippi,  78 
Shepherd,  A.  R..  882 
Shepley,  General  G.  F.,  military 

govonor  of  Louisiana,  S5 
Sheridan,  General  P.  U.,  com- 
mands military  district,  140- 


141  (Boto):  JohiwaB  nmovea, 
168;  ^'banditti"  report.  841 

Sherman.  General  W.  T.,  88,  86; 
Sea  Island  order,  108,  114 

Shot  Gun  Plan,  ««•  Mississippi 
Shot  Gun  Plan 

SicUes,  General  D.E..  commands 
military  district.  140-41  (note); 
removed  by  Johnson,  169 

Slavery,  Abolition  of,  Lincoln 
and,  58,  66;  Johnson  and,  58, 
76;  Sumner  and.  59;  ue  alio 
Emancipation  I^odamation 

Smith.  Gcrrit,  view  of  recon- 
struction. 00-61 

Smith,  W.  H.,  Governor  of  Ala- 
bama. 807, 884:  quoted.  84 

Somers,  Robert,  English  writer 
on  the  South,  4,  88-89,  41-48, 

flAQ 

Sons  of  '76.  845 

South,  post-war  condition,  8  el 
leq. ;  exploitation  by  Northern- 
ers, 26-87;  relation  between 
races,  47-48;  Presidents'  work 
of  reconstruction,  54  et  teq. 
He  aUo  Reconstruction;  con 
ference  ot  governors  df,  85 
military  rule  in,  140  et  eeq.; 
churches.     196-806;    schocris, 
808-80;  carpetbag  and  negro 
rule.  881  e(  teq. ;  social  condi- 
tions. 865  et  «ef . 
South  Carolina,  Pike's  account  of 
post-war  condition,  16-17;  ne- 
groes on  Sea  Islands  of,  36; 
negro  legislation,  94,  95,  96. 
875,  276;  negro  voters,  151. 
158,  222;  race  lines  abolished. 
154;  schools,  215-16.  217;  car- 
petbag rule.  221,225;  conserva- 
tives. 223;  judidaiy.  225;  ne- 
groes in  legislature  «rf.  226, 227 ; 
taxes,  231;  public  debt,  232; 
corruption,  234;  negro  militia, 
236;  elections,  289,  297.  298; 
put  under  martial  law,  261; 
labor.  267.  268;  Irish  in.  271; 
and  radicalism,  294 


ii 


■i 


8» 


INDEX 


Smrtk  CmoHm,  Uahwiily  of. 
•1*>17 

SoukhirHt.  SotttlMra  wIiHm  opm 
kaikiii.t71 

Spain.  rdatioM  with  United 
8tetai.n4 

Speed.  Junes,  leeigni  ffom 
Cikbinet.181 

Spenoar,  Gcnenl.  188 

Stenbery.  Kcnry,  AttanMi]r>Gen- 
enl.  opiniiHi  on  reeonstniction 
laws,  i4f ;  omuud  nt  impeach- 
ment,  188 

Stenton.  E.M.,  Secreterjr  of  War, 
87;  draws  up  army  act  184; 
radical,  IM:  Johnwo  and,  188- 
188;  MiH  broogiit  afainet,  by 
Georgia,  109 

SterRoutee,888 

Aor  SvangM  Bamur,  Tlu,  Mine 
at  Union  League  initiation, 
188 

Staami,  M.  L.,  Governor  of 
Florida.  M4 

Steedman,  General  J.  B.,  108, 
118 

Ste  :  qu,  A.  H.,  witness  before 
j^iut  Committee,  185-86 

Stmhenson,  N.  W.,  Tkt  Day  o/ 
tkt  Conftimey,  dted.  149 
(note);  Abnhtmi  Lincoln  and 
Ike  Unkm,  cited,  176  (note) 

Stevens,  Thaddeus,  reconstruc- 
tion polinr,  59-00,  118,  188- 
183;  and  Johnson.  71, 181, 188, 
180,  161,  168,  166;  radical 
leader.  188. 187. 188, 173;  and 
negro  suffrage.  188;  on  MiU- 
ta^  Reoonstniction  Bill.  185, 
188-S9:  and  Akbama.  156 

Stockton.  Senator  from  New 
Jersey,  unseated,  189 

Stonemao,  General  Geor^  com- 
mands military  district.  140 
(note) 

Suffrage,  Negro,  see  Negroes 

Sumner,  Cnarles,  reoonstruc- 
Uon  policy,  58-59,  60,  119; 
radicsl  leader,   188.    18S-84. 


187.  188,  178:  Johnson  and 
I88i  188;  and  nam  sufliFnas, 
188;  and  equal  rights,  878-rr; 
■ad  ei^antion.  884 

Supreme  Court.  Congrtas  and. 
T5»-80;  and  CivU  ffighto  Act, 
877;  and  Enforcement  Law% 
808 

SwayML  General  Wagsr.  head  of 
l^eedmen's  Bureau  in  Ala- 
bama. 97.  106:  on  contract 
labor,  110;  and  courts.  111; 
and  Unioa  Leama.  188,  198- 
198;  on  negro  education,  818 

"Swinging  Around  the  Cirde." 
Johnson's  tour  of  the  West.  181 

TarbaU.  General  John,  before 
Joint  Committee  on  Beooo- 
struction.  80 

Tasation.  »m  Finance 

Turlor,  B«yaid.  Lanier  writes  to, 

Tsylor,  General  Bidiard,  88 
Tennesseeb  recognises  "Union" 
flovemment,  18;  impoees  fines 
for  wearing  Coofeoerate  uni- 
form. 80;  Confederates  in. 
85-86;  Stete  emancipation  m. 
88;  attitude  toward  negroes  in, 
48;  Linoofai's  reconstruction 
plan  adopted  (1868).  65; 
Johnson  recognises  govem- 
nwnt  of.  74;  reouostruction  in. 
85;  negro  labor,  9«;  readmitted 
to  Congress,  189,  ISS;  and 
Fourteenth  Amendment.  ISS; 
negro  voters.  888;  and  enforce- 
ment acts.  861;  omitted  from 
investigation.  868;  conserva- 
tives gain  control  of.  890 
Tennessee  Valley  after  Civil  War, 

Tenure  of  office  act,  1S4 

Texas,  158,  157,  808;  dehiy  in 
electing  olBcisJs,  79;  military 
government  in.  14S,  144;  con- 
stitution, 153. 155;  reconstruc- 
tion fails  in,  170;  radicals  in. 


INDEX 


171{  CoafaiknilH  go  to,  fM; 
uwwpwMiitwl  in  Coocrwt, 
188  (DOto):  dwtiou  (1874), 
888 

Tha^  prMidnit  of  /ikbuM 
AgrieuHunl  College,  '<71-7t 

I'hoiMU.  Gtaaral  G.  H..  on 
MBtinMnt  of  TeniMHee,  84-U 

ThonuM,  Loranso,  u  uting 
Secretory  ol  War,   104 

Tkompeoo.  Holbiid.  Tk»  iV«w 
Soulk,  citod.  tlB  (note),  894 
(note),  808  (note) 

nehwior,  Rev.  I.  T..  808-08 

Tllden,  S.  J^  onndidbte  for  preii- 
dsncy,  888.  898.  901 

Tillaon.  General,  quoted.  Hi 

TourfM,  A.  W.,  chief  of  Union 
League  in  North  Carolina, 
ISO 

l^ade  rettrictiona  in  South.  7-18 

Treawiry  Departoient.  frauda  in 
ariling  conAacable  property 
in  South,  8-18;  auperviae 
negro  colonies,  37;  employer 
of  negro  labor,  100 

TrUmnt,  Chicago,  Sidney  An- 
drewi  correepondent  for.  88 

Tnbun$,  New  York.  Horace 
Greeley  as  editor  of.  888 

Trowbridge,  J.  T..  on  frauds  in 
South,  11-18;  on  sentiment  of 
East  Tennessee  toward  rebeb. 
85;  correspondent  in  South. 
88;  on  rektion  of  races.  48 

Thiman,  B.  C.  on  society  in 
South.  87;  report  on  conditions 
in  South,  88.  89-30;  on  negro 
labor.  46;  on  relation  of  races, 
48 

Trumbull,  Lyman,  moderate  Re- 
publican. 188;  candidate  for 
presidential  nomination.  887 

Tutealoota  IndepeniUnt  Motaim 
suppressed.  IM 

Tuscumbia  (Ala.).  Female  Acad- 
emy burned  in.  185-80 

Tweed.  W.  M>.  888 


Uniforms,  wearing  of  Confeder- 
ate, forbidden,  80 

Union  League  of  America,  174 
H  Nv..  875;  Fteodmen's  Bu- 
raau  sd,  115;  negroes  in.  115. 
149;  and  radicals.  158;  and 
Ku  iQia  lOan.  847.  856 

Union  party,  m*  National  Union 


"(Jdtel 


Jnited  Order  of  African  Ladiea 
andGentlaaen."875 
United  Stotas  Sanitary   Com- 
mission, 178 

Vieksburg  (Bliss.),  public  debt. 
888;  raca  conffiets.  837  (note); 
govamnwnt  ovwtumed.  840- 
841 

Vir^nia,  158.  157.  868;  recog- 
nises "Union"  State  govern- 
ment. 18;  army  in,  64;  Lin- 
coln's reconstruction  plan 
adopted  (1863).  65;  Uncoln 
and.  67.  180;  Johnson  recog- 
nises government  of.  74:  es- 
caped slaves  declared  oontra> 
bsM.  98;  military  government 
in,  143. 144;  coosUtution.  154- 
155,  171;  reconrtruction  fails 
in,  170;  schools,  810;  carpet- 
bag rule.  881;  scalawags  in, 
888;  unrepresented  in  Congress 
880  (note);  conservatives  fsin 
control  of.  890 

Virginia  Military  Institute,  3 

Vvtiniut  dispute,  884 

Wade,  B.  F.,  of  Ohio.  67. 189;  and 
Johnson.  73;  radical  leader.  188, 
185;  and  negro  suffrage.  138; 
and  the  presidency.  101, 167 

Wade-Davis  Bill.  56,  65-66,  180 

Wages,  Freedmen's  Bureau  fixes. 
109 

War  Department,  takes  over 
railways.  6-7;  Bureau  of  Refu- 
gees, Freedmen  and  Aban- 
doned Lands,  108;  «««  alio 
Freedmen's  Bureau 


INDEX 


LoukiuM.  IM-M 
WwiMr,   Ckwml.    Mid    Uak» 

Lmcm^IM 
WadaiMKM.    hMukinvtOT    of 

Jhmmm'*  Buwu.  IM*.  vote 

on  Mgro  MiffnM,  184 
WMbiaitoB  and  Lm  UniTmitjr, 

17 
WMkioitoa  CoUh^  latar  WmIi- 

inftoo   umI   Lw  Uaiwiity, 

17 
WatUfMM.  U.  M..  18 
Waylud.  Flru»eit.  Ptaddrat  of 

BrowB  Univanttjr.  iOMW 
Webb.  GcMiml  A.  S.,  oomBuuida 

military  dirtrict.  140  (noU) 
Wdttd,  Gcnenl  Godfrey.  Lin- 

eolB«iid,07 
Wdka,   Gideon,  and   Johnnn. 

74 
Wdb.  Governor  of  Loddnna. 

t08 
Wert,  devdopment  of.  108.  ttS 
Wcet  Vir^nia.  Confederataa  in. 


■88;  Btoto  anaadpatioa  In. 
wlaiilldml,  81,  M 

130, 


8ft-88: 
88: 
Whk  party,  70^  71.  87. 148. 

Wbipper.  Judge  In  8ooth  Caro- 

iiaa,tS4 
Whidcy  Riat,  88t 
Whit^y%  848 
WhHa  BroAwkood.  848.  881 
Whit*  CamaHa.  m$  KidgbU  of 

tba  Whits  CaaMlia 
Wbita  Lmmpw.  818. 848. 888 
Wbita  Una  of  MiMiidppi.  84A 
White  Maa'e  party  of  Alafaaaia. 

White  River  VaDey  aad  Taiai 
Railroad  obtain*  mat,  888 

Whit«  Roes.  Order  oTthe.  848 

Wibaar.  K^  R.  H..  aad  pray- 
ers for  Davfa,  89 

Wilson,  Henry,  on  reeonstnic- 
tion.  184-88;  tours  the  South. 
150 

Wieoonain  and  negro  iuflrage. 


i ! 


'  1 


